

An aerial photograph of Gaza, showing a dense urban area with a mix of green and brownish-yellow tones. A large, solid blue triangular shape is overlaid on the top-left corner of the image. The text 'Plan for Postwar Gaza' is centered in the lower half of the image in a bold, white, sans-serif font.

Plan for Postwar Gaza

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Cover image of Gaza taken from the space shuttle, NASA/JPL, January 22, 1997. Source:
<https://photojournal.jpl.nasa.gov/catalog/PIA00547>

Plan for Postwar Gaza

Executive Summary

Hamas's terrorist attack on October 7 killed more than 1,200 Israelis and has led to Israel's determination to end Hamas's control of Gaza. History shows that what comes after any war ends is vitally important to secure a chance for a lasting, prosperous peace. To ensure an attack like October 7 cannot happen again, Israel should work with the United States and, eventually, other regional and non-regional states to implement a plan for postwar Gaza that calls for:

- a Multi-National Authority;
- overseen by an International Contact Group;
- and to include an international Policing Force;
- to temporarily administer Gaza, establish security, remove Hamas's control of civil governance, start Gaza's physical and social reconstruction, and provide for a better life for the people of Gaza to live in security, opportunity, and dignity, alongside the State of Israel;
- culminating in a transition to local Palestinian governance and security responsibility once conditions are met.

Strategic objectives. Any plan for postwar Gaza should: (1) prevent future Hamas- and Gaza-based attacks by conventional, terrorist, or asymmetric means; (2) end the cycle of wars between Israelis and Gazans and institute a program of de-radicalization; (3) end Hamas's role in Gaza's governance and deter Iranian-backed threats originating in Gaza; (4) gain international support for a post-Hamas security and political architecture in Gaza; (5) provide for a better life for the people of Gaza and the Israeli people who are their neighbors; and (6) create the conditions for a positive socioeconomic and political reality in Gaza.

This plan is not intended to settle the ultimate political outcome for Gaza, nor any of the larger issues concerning Israel and the Palestinians. Rather, it responds to the urgent and immediate need to secure and stabilize Gaza, including in the parts of Gaza that will soon be out of Hamas's control. Waiting until larger political issues are settled risks anarchy that could lead to Hamas's return to power in Gaza and to more suffering for Gaza's people.

Israel does not want to be drawn into a long-term occupation of Gaza, nor does any other country. Even so, the IDF will need to retain the ability to carry out security operations to deal with Hamas remnants.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is not ready to administer Gaza, nor does it have the requisite capacity to do so. The PA could not now address Israel's legitimate security requirements in Gaza. Nor does it enjoy the necessary credibility with the Gazan people. There will be a role for consultations over payments to non-Hamas people and programs in Gaza, which should continue. But asking the PA to take on Gaza now would jeopardize the PA's ability, and

credibility, to do what it can to keep the West Bank secure. Revitalizing and reforming the PA is an important task that is outside the scope of this plan.

Approval from Israel and the United States. This plan overcomes the present strategic impasse between Israel and the United States. Israel's position is that the current Palestinian Authority should not be given responsibility for postwar Gaza. The United States' position is that the Palestinian Authority should be given control of postwar Gaza. This impasse threatens the long-term interest of all concerned—Israel, the Palestinian people, the United States, and the region. **The plan has been shared with designated Israeli agencies and in the authors' view is fully in compliance with Israel's essential requirements.** It needs the United States to express support for taking the lead to set up a Multi-National Authority (MNA) to administer Gaza, overseen by an International Contact Group (ICG). This needs to be done urgently in order for the MNA to be operational when the IDF is ready to transfer formal responsibility for administering and policing Gaza, while the IDF retains the authority to carry out security operations against Hamas and other terrorist remnants. Only the United States has the capacity and resources, civilian and military, to start this up fast enough and to get other key countries to participate—and, other than Israel, only the United States has the political will to assure that Israel's security stays as one of the paramount objectives in postwar Gaza. The United States is now, as President Biden said on October 20, "[the indispensable nation.](#)"

Establishing an International Contact Group and a Multi-National Authority. The United States, working closely with Israel and Egypt, should establish a Multi-National Authority (MNA) to administer Gaza, which would report to an International Contact Group (ICG). These two entities would be created by an international charter drafted by the United States in consultation with Israel and Egypt and other key governments to give the MNA international legitimacy. ICG members should include, in addition to Israel and Egypt, the G-7, and some of the G-20 (e.g., Australia, South Korea and Saudi Arabia, and inviting the United Arab Emirates to join). The charter will include a consultation mechanism with the PA.

The legal authority for the MNA. Authority for assuming governance could be based on several legal alternatives (but the first two are likely to be problematic): (i) the PA ceding temporary responsibility; (ii) a well-drafted UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII that gives a one-time-only authorization, not a renewable mandate nor any UN role; (iii) Israel taking responsibility for Gaza as an Occupying Power under international law and then transferring its authority to the MNA pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding; or (iv) another mechanism that can meet the vital urgency requirement.

Setting up the MNA. The plan lays out the road map for setting up the MNA, led by a High Representative who would not be an American but would have the trust of the United States and Israel and the respect of Palestinians, the Middle East, Europe, and others. The United States would contribute key personnel and resources to the MNA and deploy teams to Israel and Egypt to get the MNA started quickly. A core team of 50-100 needs to be built in the first month before the MNA takes on operational responsibilities. The MNA would be funded by ICG governments on a pay-to-play principle, with the ability to receive funds from other governments. Initially, the MNA would have offices in Israel and Egypt, adding offices in

Gaza when conditions allow. The MNA will need its own teams for finance, security, transportation, ministry liaisons, opinion polling, and public affairs. Israel will provide key early logistical support.

The Policing Force. The United States would organize a multinational Policing Force, similar to what was set up for Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the counter-ISIS coalition. As described in more detail in section [III B 4](#), the United States would contribute a small number of military personnel for command, logistics, intelligence, staff, and back-office functions, with other countries' forces carrying out "presence patrols" until a post-Hamas civil police and gendarmerie can be vetted and trained to take on policing responsibilities. Only if the United States commits personnel will other countries contribute personnel.

Key mission priorities. The MNA has a number of vital "day one" priorities: negotiating an end to hostilities, probably locally rather than all at once; preventing strategic looting; restoring sewer, water, electricity/fuel, and trash removal; restoring Gaza's medical capabilities; coordinating with Israel and Egypt on the return of other services; mobilizing and coordinating activities of international, governmental, and non-governmental agencies and organizations; vetting (with Israeli and U.S. participation) and rebuilding a post-Hamas Gazan police force and gendarmerie; and restarting the Gazan economy while ending Hamas's culture of economic corruption and repression.

Other priorities are equally important to **begin work on immediately even though they will take months or years to fully achieve their goals:** begin the task of physical and social reconstruction to remove Hamas's pervasive radicalizing influence over Gazan society in which all social and economic development was made secondary to Hamas's radical goal of Israel's destruction. The MNA will also need to develop a capacity to listen to and talk with Gaza's residents; set up a de-radicalization/demobilization/re-integration (DDR) program (see [Annex I](#)); re-start Gaza's schools in late 2024 without Hamas's influence; establish effective border security between Gaza and Israel and Gaza and Egypt; address housing needs; begin to reform Gaza's judicial system; survey damaged buildings and assess reconstruction priorities; and set up local councils to rebuild post-Hamas representative governance and support reconstruction from the bottom up.

The de-radicalization program must proceed hand in hand with reconstruction and the establishment of public order, and will need to account for changes to the educational system, Gaza-based media, ending the role of religious and civic organizations in radicalizing people to violence, and ending or modifying the distinctions between the eight historical refugee camps and other parts of Gaza.

Transition. Eventually, when conditions permit, both the PF and the MNA would transition responsibilities to local Palestinian entities once they are able to provide for governance, security, and law enforcement and not leave a security vacuum that terrorists or criminals could exploit. The MNA, after ending its governance roles and authority, would drastically reduce its personnel and become a coordinator for international stabilization, reconstruction, training, and technical assistance programs.

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תקציר מנהלים

במתקפת הטרור ב-7 אוקטובר נהרגו למעלה מ-1200 ישראלים, ומכאן נחישותה של ישראל לשים קץ לשלטון חמא"ס ברצועת עזה. ההיסטוריה מלמדת שהמהלכים שלאחר סיום המלחמה חיוניים כדי להבטיח מציאות בת-קיימא של שלום ושל סיכוי לצמיחה. כדי לוודא שמתקפה כמו זו של 7 אוקטובר לא תוכל להתרחש עוד, על ישראל לפעול יחד עם ארצות הברית - ובמעלה הדרך, עם שותפות נוספות מן האזור ומחוצה לו – כדי ליישם תוכנית לעזה שלאחר המלחמה, הקוראת:

- לכינון רשות רב-לאומית (Multi-National Authority);
- תחת פיקוחה והנחייתה של קבוצת קשר רב-לאומית - International Contact Group, ICG – במתכונת שיושמה במקומות נוספים;
- כולל כוח שיטור רב-לאומי;
- שייעודה יהיה לנהל את רצועת עזה, לקיים את הביטחון, לשים קץ לשליטת חמא"ס במנגנונים האזרחיים, להתניע מהלך רחב של דה-רדיקליזציה, לנהל במקביל את מהלכי השיקום הפיזיים והחברתיים, ולהציע לתושבי עזה חיים טובים יותר - בהיבטי ביטחונם, כלכלתם וכבודם – לצידה של מדינת ישראל;
- תוך הנחת יסודות למעבר בבוא העת לשלטון עצמי ונטילת אחריות ביטחונית כאשר התנאים יאפשרו זאת.

יעדים אסטרטגיים: כל תוכנית באשר לעתידה של רצועת עזה חייבת:

1. למנוע כל מתקפה של חמא"ס או אחרים משטח עזה, בין אם במאפיינים צבאיים, בפעולות טרור, או באמצעים א-סימטריים אחרים;
2. לשים קץ לסבבי הלחימה בין ישראל לבין העזתים, ולכונן מציאות חדשה למול מורשת השנאה של חמא"ס;
3. לשים קץ לתפקיד חמא"ס בשלטון בעזה ולהרתיע כל איום הנתמך על ידי איראן משטח הרצועה;
4. להשיג תמיכה רב-לאומית לקיומה של מערכת ביטחונית ומדינית שלאחר תבוסת חמא"ס בעזה;

5. להבטיח חיים טובים יותר הן לתושבי עזה והן לשכניהם הישראלים;
6. ליצור את התנאים למציאות חברתית, כלכלית ופוליטית חיובית בעזה.

מטרת התוכנית איננה ליישב את שאלת הסדר הקבע המדיני עבור עזה, או את השאלות הרחבות יותר הנוגעות ליחסי ישראל עם הפלסטינים. היא מכוונת לענות לצורך הדוחק והמידי להשיב את הביטחון והיציבות לעזה, צעד צעד, החל באזורים שייצאו בקרוב מידי שליטת חמא"ס. המתנה עד לפתרון הסוגיות היסודיות יותר כרוכה בסכנה מוחשית של מצב כאוטי, שעלול להוביל להשבת שלטון חמא"ס בעזה וסבל רב עוד יותר עבור האוכלוסייה.

ישראל איננה מעוניינת להיקלע לשליטה ארוכת טווח ברצועת עזה, ואין גם מדינות אחרות המעוניינות בכך. עם זאת, חיוני שתישמר לצה"ל היכולת להוציא לפועל מבצעים ביטחוניים לטיפול ביכולות שירות של חמא"ס וגורמי טרור נוספים.

הרשות הפלסטינית אינה ערוכה, בנסיבות הקיימות, לנהל את עזה, וחסרות לה היכולות הנדרשות לשם כך. היא אינה מסוגלת כיום לענות לדרישות הביטחון הלגיטימיות של ישראל ברצועה. נוסף לכך, היא אינה זוכה לאמון מצד תושבי עזה. יהיה אמנם מקום להידברות והתייעצות עם הרש"פ, בייחוד באשר להסדרת התשלומים שהיא מעבירה לגורמים לא-חמא"סיים ולפרויקטים בעזה, שיצטרכו להימשך. אך לדרוש מן הרש"פ לקבל עליה כעת את נטל השליטה בעזה פירושו לסכן את יכולותיה, המעורערות ממילא, ואת אמינותה גם בכל הנוגע לשימור המצב הביטחוני באיו"ש. "שיקום" (revitalizing)

וכינון רפורמה ברש"פ הם יעדים חשובים אך חורגים מתחומיה של תוכנית זו.

הסכמת ישראל וארה"ב: בכל הקשור ב-"יום שאחרי" בעזה, התוכנית המוצעת מגשרת על פני פער העמדות שהתגלע בין ישראל לארה"ב בשאלת תפקיד הרש"פ בעזה – פער המאיים לשתק את המהלכים המיידיים הנדרשים, ומסב נזק לאינטרסים של כל הנוגעים בדבר – ישראל, האוכלוסייה הפלסטינית, ארה"ב, ומדינות האיזור. התוכנית הוצגה לפרטיה לגורמי המערכת הרלבנטיים בישראל ולהבנתם של אנשי הצוות היא עולה בקנה אחד באופן מלא עם דרישות היסוד הישראליות. כעת נדרשת הבעת נכונות מצד ארה"ב להביע תמיכה בנטילת ההובלה של המהלכים לכינון הרשות הרב-לאומית

(MNA) לניהול רצועת עזה, תחת הנחייתה של קבוצת הקשר (ICG). מהלכים אלה צריכים להיות מיידיים, על מנת להיות מוכנים ליישום כאשר צה"ל יהיה ערוך – מודולרית – להעביר סמכויות שלטוניות לידי ה-MNA, בעודו שומר בידו, מתוקף פרוטוקול מוסדר עם ה-ICG, את הסמכות לפעול ביטחונית כנגד שרידי חמא"ס ושאר ארגוני הטרור. בפועל, רק לארה"ב יש את היכולת והמשאבים, האזרחיים והביטחוניים, להניע את המהלכים במהירות הנדרשת ולגייס מדינות נוספות ליטול בהם חלק. מעבר לכך, רק לארה"ב, חוץ מאשר לישראל עצמה, יש מחויבות מדינית לוודא שביטחון ישראל ימשיך להיות אחד היעדים העליונים במציאות שלאחר המלחמה בעזה. ארצות הברית היא איפוא כעת, כפי שאמר הנשיא ביידן (20 אוקטובר), "האומה ההכרחית", The indispensable nation.

כינון קבוצת הקשר והרשות הרב-לאומית: על ארה"ב, בשיתוף פעולה הדוק עם ישראל ומצרים, לפעול להקמת רשות רב-לאומית (המונח במסמך הוא "רשות בינלאומית", Multi-National Authority, אך לא במובן של גוף השואב סמכותו מן האו"ם) לשליטה בעזה, שתהיה כפופה לסמכות של קבוצת קשר רב-לאומית – International Contact Group (ICG). שתי מסגרות אלה יוגדרו על ידי מסמך בינלאומי (Charter) שינוסח על ידי ארה"ב בהתייעצות עם ישראל ומצרים, ועם מדינות מפתח נוספות, על מנת להקנות לגיטימציה לפעילותן. חברות קבוצת הקשר יכולות לכלול, לצד ישראל ומצרים, גם את מדינות ה-G-7, כמו גם חלק ממדינות ה-G-20 (לדוגמא, אוסטרליה ודרום קוריאה) ולהזמין את ערב הסעודית ואיחוד האמירויות ליטול חלק. המסמך המכונן יכול גם מנגנון להתייעצות עם הרש"פ.

מקור הסמכות המשפטית של הרשות הרב-לאומית: הסמכות ליטול תפקידי שלטון יכולה להתבסס על פי דין, לחליפין, על כמה אפשרויות (אלא ששתי הראשונות בעייתיות ביותר) (I) הסכמה של הרש"פ להעביר סמכויות לעת עתה; (II) החלטה מנוסחת בקפידה של מועצת הביטחון על פי פרק 7 שתעניק סמכות חד פעמית וללא הגדרת זמן (בניגוד למנדט מתחדש נוסח אוניפי"ל), וללא תפקיד ישיר לאו"ם; (III) מסירת האחריות על ידי ישראל כמעצמה הכובשת בפועל על פי הדין הבינלאומי, המוסרת את סמכותה

ל-MNA בכפוף למזכר הבנה (MoU); (IV) כל מנגנון אחר שיענה לצורך המייד במהלכים לשעת חירום.

כינון הרשות הרב-לאומית: התוכנית משרטטת מפת דרכים לכינון ה-MNA, שבראשה יעמוד "נציג בכיר" (High Representative) – שלא יהיה אמריקני אך ייחנה מאמון של ישראל וארה"ב ומיחס של כבוד מצד הפלסטינים, מדינות האזור הרלבנטיות, אירופה ואחרים. ארה"ב תתרום אנשי סגל בעמדות מפתח ומשאבים ראשוניים ותשגר צוותי הקמה לישראל ולמצרים כדי לאפשר כינון מהיר של ה-MNA. צוות ליבה של 50-100 אנשי מקצוע צריך להיבנות כבר בחודש הראשון שלפני נטילת האחריות האופרטיבית (המודולרית) על ידי ה-MNA. המימון ל-MNA יבוא ממדינות קבוצת הקשר הרב-לאומית על בסיס העקרון של "תשלום תמורת השתתפות" – pay to play – לצד נכונות לקבל תרומות ממדינות נוספות. בשלבים הראשוניים, יהיו לרשות משרדים בישראל ובמצרים, ובהמשך יעברו לעזה כשהתנאים יאפשרו זאת. יהיו ל-MNA צוותים לניהול פיננסי, לביטחון, לתעבורה, לקשרים עם ממשלות, לסקרי דעת קהל וליחסי ציבור. ישראל תעניק תמיכה לוגיסטית לפעילותם.

כוח השיטור: ארצות הברית תיזום את הקמתו של כוח שיטור רב-לאומי בדומה לאלו שפעלו בבוסניה, בקוסובו, בעיראק, באפגניסטאן, ובמסגרת הקואליציה למלחמה בדאע"ש. כמפורט בסעיף 4 b III להלן, ארה"ב תתרום מספר מצומצם של אנשי סגל למשימות פיקוד, לוגיסטיקה, מודיעין, מטה וגיבוי מנהלתי, בעוד שאת משימות הפטרול להפגנת נוכחות יבצעו גורמי שיטור ממדינות אחרות – עד שיבשילו התנאים לכך שמטרה וז'נדרמריה מקומיים, שעברו מיון קפדני ואישור, יוכשרו ליטול לידיהם סמכויות ביטחון. רק אם ארה"ב תתרום אנשי סגל למשימה זו, יעשו כך גם מדינות נוספות.

סדר העדיפויות במשימות המפתח: לרשות הרב-לאומית יהיו כמה **משימות חיוניות שיגדרו בעדיפות מן היום הראשון והלאה:** הסדרת הסיום של מעשי האיבה, ככל הנראה באופן מקומי ולא בכל הרצועה בעת ובעונה אחת; מניעת ביזה ברמה האסטרטגית והשבת הסדר הציבורי; שיקום תשתיות מים, ביוב, חשמל ודלק, ופינוי אשפה; השבת מערכות הבריאות ברצועת עזה לתפקוד מלא; תיאום עם ישראל ומצרים

באשר להשבת שירותים נוספים לתפקוד; גיוס ותיאום של פעילות גורמים וסוכנויות בינלאומיים, ממשלתיים ו-NGOs בסיוע לאוכלוסייה; מיון ואישור (בסיוע ישראל ומצרים) של כוח אדם ותחילת הקמתם של כוחות משטרה וז'נדרמריה בעידן שלאחר חמא"ס; והתנעה מחדש של כלכלת רצועת עזה לאחר שיוסר ממנה הנטל של תרבות השחיתות והדיכוי של חמא"ס.

עדיפויות נוספות ומרכזיות יבואו לידי ביטוי מיד לאחר שה-MNA תחל לפעול (מודולרית) בשטח רצועת עזה – גם אם ברור שמימושן ישתרע בפועל על פני חודשים ושנים: תחילת הטיפול במשימה של שיקום פיזי וחברתי; בניית יכולת להאזין ולקיים שיח עם תושבי הרצועה בכללותם; כמוסבר להלן ובנספח, ניהול מהלך נרחב של דה-רדיקליזציה; יצירת התנאים לפתיחה מחדש של בתי הספר בסתיו 2024, לאחר שהשפעת חמא"ס על תכני ההוראה תוסר; כינון הסדרי ביטחון הולמים בגבול ובמעברים בין עזה לבין ישראל ומצרים; מתן מענה לצרכי שיכון; סקר של הרס מבנים והערכה של סדרי העדיפויות לבניה מחדש; ראשיתה של רפורמה במערכת המשפט בעזה; וכינון מועצות מקומיות כדי לאפשר משילות על בסיס ייצוג, לאחר הכרעת חמא"ס, ולתמוך במהלכי השיקום ברמת השטח (from the bottom up).

דה-רדיקליזציה: ה-MNA תפעיל תוכנית לשינוי תודעתי מקיף, שמעבר לעזיבת השורות של ארגוני הטרור, פירוק נשקם, ואינטגרציה מחדש בסדר החברתי (deradicalization, disarmament, re-integration – DDR) לגבי מי שיתאימו לכך. מדובר בתפיסה שיושמה גם בזירות אחרות: אך בנסיבות הייחודיות בעזה, מהלך השינוי יצטרך לכלול גם שינויים עמוקים בתכנית הלימודים ומערכת החינוך; באמצעי התקשורת המקומיים; בפעילותן של מסגרות דתיות ואזרחיות המסיתות להקצנה ולאלימות, כמו גם בביטול הפערים (במסגרת מהלכי השיקום) בין עזתים "מקוריים" ליושבי שמונת מחנות הפליטים, פערים שנועדו להנציח נרטיב של שיבה ונקם.

העברת סמכויות: בבוא היום, וכאשר התנאים יאפשרו זאת, הן כוח הביטחון והן הרשות הרב-לאומית יעבירו (במדורג) את סמכויותיהם למסגרות פלסטיניות מקומיות, משעה שאלו יוכיחו יכולת ליצור משילות ולקיים ביטחון ואכיפת חוק, ולא להותיר חלל ריק שגורמי טרור או פשיעה יוכלו לנצל. ה-MNA, משעה שתסיים את תפקידיה וסמכותה

השלטוניים, תצמצם באורח דרסטי את היקף נוכחותה ואת כוח האדם שלה ותהפוך (כבמקומות אחרים) לגורם מתאם של התוכניות הבינלאומיות לייצוב, שיקום, הכשרה וסיוע טכני לתושבי רצועת עזה.

משתתפי הצוות, על פי סדר האלף-בית:

השגריר ג'ים ג'פרי (ארה"ב)

לט. גנרל קית' דייטון (ארה"ב)

מר תומאס וורוויק (ארה"ב)

אל"מ (בדימוס) ערן לרמן (ישראל)

מר רוברט סילברמן (ארה"ב)

Strategic Objectives

Any plan for postwar Gaza should achieve the following objectives:

1. To prevent future Hamas and Gaza-based attacks by conventional, terrorist, or asymmetric means against Israel and other countries.

Hamas's terrorist attack on October 7 was both a terrorist attack and a large-scale military operation, and included elements of hybrid warfare such as disinformation. Attackers included non-Hamas elements: other terrorist groups and criminal elements from within Gaza, both of which have thrived under Hamas's rule. It was directed at Israeli Jews, civilians as well as soldiers, but also targeted non-Israelis and even Muslim Israelis. To establish a lasting peace—for the benefit of both Israelis and Palestinians—Israel and the International Community need to work together to ensure neither Israel nor other countries are attacked by Hamas or by any terror group operating out of Gaza.

2. To end the cycle of wars between Israelis and Gazans.

Israel fought several rounds with Hamas and other terrorists based in Gaza after the disengagement from Gaza in 2005 and the end of the Israeli presence, military or civilian, in the Gaza Strip. After limited confrontations in 2006 and 2007 came extensive warfare in 2008-2009 (Hamas attacks that led Israel to launch Operation Cast Lead), 2012 (Hamas attacks that led Israel to launch Operation Pillar of Defense), 2014 (Operation Protective Edge), short rounds in 2018 and 2019, and major action again in Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021. Hamas sat out two rounds with Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 2022 and 2023, apparently to mask its preparations for October 7. This list is partial and excludes smaller clashes and terrorist attacks. A postwar plan should work to end once and for all this increasingly destructive cycle of wars.

3. To end Hamas's rule of Gaza and deter Iranian-backed threats from Gaza against Israel and other countries.

The Government of Israel has repeatedly announced and reaffirmed that its objective—alongside the release of hostages—is ending Hamas's rule in Gaza. Given the Islamic Republic of Iran's stated aim to destroy the State of Israel and its extensive support for Hamas (as well as Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an Iranian proxy) through funding, training of terrorists and other operatives, and providing armaments and key military components, it is important to sever the connection between Iran and those in Gaza who would carry out attacks against Israel or elsewhere.

4. To gain international support for a post-Hamas security and political architecture in Gaza.

Gaza will need a post-Hamas security architecture that provides security for Israelis—specifically those who wish to return to the devastated region next to the border—while also providing civilian police protection to the people of Gaza from crime and

intimidation by criminal elements. Israel alone will not be able to do this. Israel will not agree to the Palestinian Authority taking on security responsibility, and in any event the PA does not have the present capacity to do so—particularly if Hamas reasserts itself and ousts the PA as Hamas did in 2007. The support of the International Coalition will be needed to give the people of Gaza the opportunity to live their lives without Hamas’s rule and for Israelis to be rid of the constant threat of another war. A post-Hamas political architecture is also essential to allow the people of Gaza to govern local affairs without the influence of Hamas or other terrorist groups intent on attacking Israel, other Palestinians, or anyone else.

5. To provide for a better life for the people of Gaza, living in security, opportunity, and dignity, alongside the State of Israel.

Any plan for postwar Gaza must give the people of Gaza the opportunity for a better life than they had under Hamas, bearing in mind the growing deprivation that has befallen them since the Hamas coup of 2007—and recognizing that this goal would be impossible to achieve without acceptance of the reality of life alongside the State of Israel and starting with de-radicalization in Gaza. A similar formulation was incorporated in the Tokyo Principles presented during the G-7 summit by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on November 8, 2023 (see [Annex IV.F](#)).

6. To create the conditions for a positive socioeconomic and political reality in Gaza to sustain the above objectives.

Hamas’s rule of Gaza since 2007 has failed by every measure, including moral, political, social, and economic. Since Hamas’s 2007 violent takeover, a steadily growing gap opened between the GDP per capita in Gaza vs. the West Bank. Trade dwindled to zero, and much of the funds that did flow into the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip was spent on armaments and on the tunnel system. Continued rule by Hamas will not reverse this decline. Given Israel’s determination to remove the threat of Hamas and ensure Hamas will no longer attack Israel from Gaza, the present circumstances are an opportunity to turn these trends around so that the people of Gaza can build a better future to live in peace, prosperity, dignity, and mutual security alongside the State of Israel.

Assumptions (expectations of future events that would affect implementation)

“Assumptions” in this plan refer to policy choices that Israel, the United States, and other governments may decide to take. If those governments make different choices, this plan may not come into effect, or it may not succeed.

For example, this plan assumes that Israel does not want to be drawn into the long-term occupation of Gaza. If the Government of Israel were to decide it wanted to occupy Gaza for the next ten years, and to pay the accompanying cost in blood and treasure, and to accept the international political risks of a long-term occupation of Gaza, this plan would not be viable to guide an Israeli occupation.

This plan assumes the following:

1. **This plan is not intended to settle by itself the ultimate political outcome for Gaza,** nor does it address the larger issues concerning Israel and Palestine nor the many existing modalities (such as diplomatic efforts) related to the quest to resolve those larger issues. It does describe the foundation that needs to be laid for a political outcome, the specifics of which are yet to be determined, in ways that achieve the strategic objectives for Israelis, Gazans, other Palestinians, the United States, and the Middle East. However, the ultimate political outcome for Gaza and the West Bank is beyond the scope of this plan.
2. **This plan does not address the immediate humanitarian supply needs of the Gaza population,** other than to note Egypt's key role in continuing to facilitate that supply, which has a bearing on the plan's implementation. The world has sophisticated aid organizations like USAID capable of delivering humanitarian assistance to Gaza at scale. This plan does not need to duplicate the planning capacity of those organizations.
3. **Parts of Gaza will be secured before all fighting in Gaza ends.** Thus, postwar plans will need to be put into effect in some parts of Gaza even while other parts of Gaza are not yet secure. Ongoing major military operations are bound to create challenges to putting together an international coalition to support postwar stabilization efforts, as some governments will not want to be associated with ongoing fighting. There may be a period of months between the end of active military operations in northern Gaza and the cessation of hostilities in the Strip as a whole.
4. **Israel does not want to be drawn into a long-term occupation of Gaza,** as distinct from Israel retaining the capacity to take security measures inside Gaza when necessary. **Neither does the United States want to occupy Gaza.** As noted above, if either country preferred carrying out a long-term occupation of Gaza, parts of this plan would not be relevant or achievable.
5. **The political will exists in the region and among donor states (including the United States and Europe) to commit to a sustained transformation (beyond the timeframe of this postwar plan) of the way young people in Gaza are educated and civic life is organized.** While this might sound like a major new undertaking, in fact it is not. The United States has already been willing to sustain a commitment over many decades by its support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)—although questions exist as to the utility of UNRWA's efforts. A commitment to reform education, media, and civic life (including those religious and charitable institutions co-opted by Hamas) in Gaza will be needed to displace the mindset Hamas has instilled in the young people of Gaza since 2007 that considers attacks like October 7 to be legitimate. There should an end to the distinction in support for families who are Gazan by origin and those who came as refugees in 1948. Israel, the United States, and other countries will need to mutually reinforce each other's commitment to this undertaking for their own security as well as the long-term benefit of the people of Gaza. This is a decades-long commitment whose cost is minor compared to the cost of war, but this commitment will be vital to peace and security for both Israel and the Palestinians.

Constraints (facts that the plan must reflect, recognize, or incorporate)

“Constraints” in this plan are facts that the plan must reflect, recognize, or incorporate. Listing constraints up front help planners understand why certain choices must be made or avoided.

1. **There are multiple links among (i) humanitarian assistance, restoring Gaza’s economy, re-establishing basic services, and technical assistance to Gaza—whether provided by Israel, Egypt, or the rest of the international community—and (ii) the status of security in Gaza.** This makes an acceptable level of security in Gaza a top priority for all concerned. Providing assistance of any kind to Gaza both **requires** security and **advances** security. Civilian agencies that provide essential services cannot operate without security—most will withdraw their personnel if they come under fire. The absence of civilian security invites armed militias to take charge over an area. They usually seize whatever assistance is available so that they can control the distribution of that aid to a desperate population. This, in turn, cements popular support for the militias, and strengthens militias’ hands in obtaining weapons to carry out further acts of violence and intimidation against the people. Once militias become implanted in a region like Gaza, they become almost impossible to dislodge without the use of military force.
2. **Thus, an adequate level of security, and the meeting of agreed security benchmarks within any ceasefires established between parties, is essential for other governments to commit financial resources and personnel to advance reconstruction and development.** This linkage must be both clear and monitored. For this reason, armed peacekeepers with robust rules of engagement and the ability to provide a visible security presence will be essential to enforce whatever ceasefires are established in Gaza.
3. **Plans for the future must take into account the weakness of Palestinian Authority governance as a constraint on its ability to rule in Gaza and more generally.** Palestinian Authority (PA) officials have expressed their unwillingness to be seen coming back into Gaza on the backs of Israeli tanks. More importantly, the PA lacks the capacity to take over administration of Gaza—immediately after the end of active Israeli military operations, and for some time beyond that. The PA also lacks sufficient credibility with the people of both the West Bank and Gaza. In part, paradoxically, this is because of the PA’s cooperation with Israel on security issues. But it is also due to the inability of the PA to deliver essential services with public integrity, free of corruption.

[Israeli officials have been clear](#) about Israel’s unwillingness to transfer authority over Gaza to the PA even if it is reformed to address issues like corruption.

Making necessary reforms and improvements in the PA is important and worthwhile, but even the most minimal changes necessary will take months or years. The speed and pace of internal PA reforms depends on the willingness of the PA’s leadership, an unproven proposition. Moreover, Israel will insist upon other fundamental changes to the PA, such as ending payments to families of those involved in terrorist attacks against Israelis and

an end to policies and practices that have the effect of promoting perpetual hostility between Israelis and Palestinians, before Israel could consider turning over control of Gaza to a PA-led entity.

4. **Extremely high bar of “minimum security” for the people of Israel post-October 7.** The October 7 attack and the resulting displacement of Israelis living near Gaza (and in the north, under threat from Hizbullah) have created a sense of insecurity among Israelis that is without precedent in more than fifty-six years. As a result, the Israeli public is expecting that military operations in Gaza, and any postwar plans, will render Hamas incapable of inflicting a future attack on Israel of any magnitude. This will require stronger security measures than Israel has used heretofore in Gaza, including the ability to dismantle Hamas as a military organization and as a government, and prevent (not just deter) its resurgence in Gaza.
5. **Hamas’s cadres, terrorist cells, political leadership, and ideology are all quite resilient**, and any postwar plan must take this into account. Hamas can be expected to try to regain power in Gaza, perhaps after hiding underground (figuratively and perhaps literally) during an occupation. Hamas has suffered military defeats before, and may look to survive by relocating some of its more capable cadres to safe havens such as Iran or Lebanon. Hamas can also be counted on to attempt to disrupt any governance efforts by Israel or other countries. Hamas can be expected to try attacks like the August 2003 al-Qaeda in Iraq attack that killed Sérgio Vieira de Mello and forced a reduction of United Nations activities in Iraq, or the March 2004 al-Qaeda attack in Madrid that led to a political upheaval and thus to the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Forestalling efforts by Hamas remnants to disrupt security, and to coerce other governments to withdraw, must be a priority during the postwar, especially at the outset.
6. **Arab states could make important contributions but are conflicted** because of domestic politics, in some cases colored by acute dislike for Israel and sympathy towards Hamas—while at the same time their leaders are driven by their own security concerns (e.g., towards the Muslim Brotherhood), and by the role of Israel as a possible ally against Iran.

As a practical matter, Arab states could be sources of military, gendarmerie, or police units for postwar Gaza security, sources of funding for reconstruction and development projects, and sources of expert personnel. But their actual choices are likely to be constrained and slow to deploy.

Linguistically and culturally, on-the-ground assistance from Arab states offers many advantages over personnel from non-Arab countries. Even so, Gazans will have differences with other Arabs that will have to be taken into account in organizing any kind of postwar Gaza administrative or security organizations.

Some Arab governments will be reluctant to work directly with the Government of Israel, especially during active hostilities and in the immediate months thereafter. Some would be [willing to work with the United States under U.S. command](#). Others would be willing

to work only through a multinational coalition of states committed to building a better future for the people of Gaza.

7. **Competing priorities of the U.S. Government** must be taken into account. These include U.S. domestic politics, the desire to turn away from the Middle East to “pivot” to Great Power competition (China and Russia/Ukraine), a desire to avoid U.S. casualties, a desire to minimize civilian casualties among Gazans, limited capacity and resources for humanitarian assistance, concerns over possible escalation with Iran or Russia, and concerns over the stability of Arab partner governments.
8. **Frail understanding of “the logic of war” on the part of U.N. institutions, international NGO’s and other aid providers, the international media, and many nations not facing a military threat**, compounded by anti-Israeli sentiment on the part of international institutions involved in assistance to the Palestinians. This has led to some prominent voices misunderstanding what will be required to assure Israel’s security going forward. A number of international organizations are unlikely to be able to fulfill important missions that they could do elsewhere in the world because of these concerns.
9. **Gaza population’s longstanding dependence on massive international donations and on-the-ground assistance providers, exacerbated by post-conflict reconstruction needs.** International assistance accounts for a significant part of Gaza’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat’s September 11, 2023 report on “[Developments in the economy of the Occupied Palestinian Territory](#),” page 3, 58% of the people of Gaza needed humanitarian assistance in 2023. (The comparable number for the West Bank was about 25%.) International donors fund education and healthcare through UNRWA. Nations such as Qatar give assistance directly. Iran gives cash and weapons directly to Hamas.

Hamas’s governance of Gaza and the decision to launch the October 7 attack on Israel have cost the Gazan people dearly. Few Gazans will be able to find employment in Israel in the near term, which prior to October 7 represented a significant part of the Gazan economy. The basic payments system will be disrupted, perhaps for months. And Gaza will need to rebuild 50% or more of its housing stock. Reconstruction of infrastructure for a very basic economy will likely run into billions of dollars in the next few years.
10. **While this plan focuses on Gaza, developments in the West Bank affect Gaza and vice versa.** Gaza and the West Bank have organic links. Politics in Gaza and the West Bank have been intertwined since 1948. Familial ties and a shared history unite the West Bank and Gaza, and at times have divided them. News travels quickly between Gaza and the West Bank, including disinformation. Economically, the PA still pays salaries of tens of thousands of workers in Gaza, even though many take direction from Hamas, not the PA. All of these factors will need to be taken into account in postwar Gaza.
11. **Israeli military and security decisions at the operational stage will factor into a host of “day-after” decisions**, including decisions by the Gazan people, humanitarian and reconstruction decisions, and the readiness of international actors to cooperate with whoever is in charge in postwar Gaza. Whoever runs postwar Gaza will need to

coordinate closely with Israel on a range of security decisions. Israel will need to bear in mind that its military and security decisions will affect other governments' willingness to stay committed to helping to rebuild postwar Gaza.



Source: Gringer, retrieved 2023-10-19, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5670402>.

Part I – Israel’s role in postwar Gaza

This part will summarize the steps Israel will need to take in the initial transition from Gaza under Hamas rule to what will follow, with greater emphasis and detail on the near-term steps.

1. **Israel’s support for the United States’ leadership roles in setting up an International Contact Group (ICG) and Multi-National Authority (MNA) will be essential.**

Under the present circumstances, there are no better options that are workable than setting up an international authority to administer Gaza. Currently, Israel and the United States are at an impasse. The U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the Biden administration thus far reluctant to see any significant hands-on role in Gaza. The Biden administration has publicly stated its preference to turn Gaza back to a [“revitalized Palestinian authority.”](#) Israel, for security reasons, will not do so, but nor does Israel want to commit the tens of thousands of troops required to secure Gaza for a long-term military occupation. **Unless this impasse is ended, Hamas will re-emerge from the ashes to regain effective control over humanitarian aid, local security, and Gaza’s economy.** While this impasse is going on, Gazans increasingly expect Hamas’s return to power. March 2024 opinion polling of Gazans showed that a [majority \(59%\) believe that Hamas will rule Gaza](#) when the war ends—an increase of eight percentage points in Hamas’s favor than when Gazans were asked the same question in November 2023.

Israel will need to show support, at first privately, then publicly, for the United States setting up a Multi-National Authority to administer Gaza, overseen by an International Contact Group, when the IDF is ready to transfer that responsibility over at least part of Gaza. **Apart from Israel itself, only the United States has the political will to assure that Israel’s security stays as one of the paramount objectives in postwar Gaza.** Only the United States, moreover, has the civilian and military personnel and resources that will be required to jump-start any effort to secure Gaza and enable the conditions to prevent mass starvation and suffering among Gazan civilians. The United States is unique in having more experience in setting up civilian and military organizations to undertake this responsibility—and has learned lessons about what to do and what not to do. Experience in this area is hard-won, and the United States has it. As President Biden said on October 20, the United States is [“the indispensable nation”](#)—in this context as in others.

Just as neither Israel nor the United States want to be solely responsible for administering postwar Gaza, no other country has offered to take on this responsibility. Egypt and Jordan have said No, and no other Arab country has experience with its military working closely enough with Israel’s security services. It is hard to imagine any Arab government, even those who are deeply suspicious of the Muslim Brotherhood, willing to take Gaza over from the IDF and be directly responsible for security (including security for Israel) and to take responsibility for Gaza’s civilian administration. Those that would be willing

to participate at all will need some kind of multinational umbrella with non-Israeli leadership to do so.

Neither is an international organization like the United Nations (UN) or NATO suited to this role. UN peacekeeping in southern Lebanon has not been a success, and no civilian agencies of the UN secretariat or UN agencies are suited to take on the leadership of this situation. A further challenge is the veto power of Russia and China in the UN Security Council (UNSC), as both could try to impose unacceptable conditions on any UN mandate. Requiring annual renewals of mandates, a standard UN practice, would create a significant risk of organizational paralysis in Gaza.

As for NATO, while its member states possess highly capable military forces, and individual governments may make important contributions to security in Gaza, NATO’s political capacity is weak. Militarily, its top priority for the foreseeable future is the threat from Russia against Ukraine and other countries on NATO’s eastern flank, as well as the need to integrate Finland and Sweden as new members. In previous NATO deployments (Kosovo and the Iraq training mission), NATO countries so restricted NATO forces with “caveats” on what missions NATO forces were authorized to undertake that the forces were hamstrung in responding to real-world challenges, such as the 2004 riots in Kosovo. While NATO does not operate strictly on a requirement of consensus, Turkey’s membership in NATO, and its attitude toward Hamas since October 7, give Turkey the ability and the motivation to slow down NATO action. Politically, Gaza would always be a lesser organizational priority to NATO than the defense of Europe.

Having no one in charge of security or administration of Gaza is a theoretical option, but as a chaotic situation would almost certainly result in Hamas’s return to power and further terrorist attacks against Israel, this option should be summarily rejected.

This leaves setting up an international authority to administer Gaza and provide security as the best available option. It has costs and risks, as this paper will make clear. Prior to October 6, no government was budgeting for the cost of securing and administering a post-Hamas Gaza, and there were no staffing plans for setting up an organization to do this. Hamas’s October 7 attack and the Israeli campaign to remove Hamas from power in Gaza have created a new environment that would generate serious risks if security is not established, but also may provide opportunities for progress if a better, more secure and prosperous future can be achieved for the people of Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, the United States, and the Middle East. The best way to achieve those goals will be for Israel and the United States to adopt the position that the United States needs to set up a Multi-National Authority (MNA) to administer and secure Gaza until someone else has the capacity and the willingness to take on this responsibility.

Israel will need to accept some American conditions for the full support of the United States. The “[Tokyo Principles](#)” (see [Annex IV.F.](#)) represent the basis on which the United States has engaged the Government of Israel. This plan satisfies from the outset all the “Five No’s” and two of the “Three Must’s” of the Tokyo Principles. For the U.S. goals of including Palestinian-led governance and unifying Gaza with the West Bank, this plan would lay the groundwork for such a possibility but recognizes that

unifying the West Bank and Gaza under a single authority with the requisite capacity and popular support from Palestinians will require verifiable progress on the ground in a number of respects, not all of which are limited (as this plan is) to Gaza.

Time is of the utmost urgency. The fastest time required to set up any organization to administer part or all of postwar Gaza is measured in weeks. After the November 1995 Dayton accords, the United States and Europe stood up the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia four weeks later—and even that planning was actually started weeks before the Dayton conference. For Gaza, discussions about postwar security and civilian governance have already been underway in various capitals for some weeks. However, Israel and the United States will need to agree on a single plan for postwar Gaza, then begin to assemble the people and resources needed, including commitments from willing countries to provide personnel, resources, and especially the forces required for day-to-day policing. Israel will need to quickly move to assign people and resources to support this effort (see Part I, [section 4](#), page 22).

2. As parts of Gaza are firmly secured, Israel will hand off day-to-day security responsibilities to the policing forces of a Multi-National Authority.

It is apparent as of April 2024 that parts of Gaza will be relatively more secure even while fighting continues in other parts of Gaza. As the IDF clears parts of Gaza, it will want to redeploy its forces. Signs are already present that an extended power vacuum—even the lack of knowing who will administer Gaza in the coming weeks and months—will lead to looting, public safety issues, and impeded legitimacy for whatever follow-on entity is responsible for Gaza.

If the United States takes the lead in organizing and supporting a Multi-National Authority, and recruiting the policing forces for it, Israel should plan to hand off day-to-day security responsibilities to the MNA’s Policing Forces (PF) when enough forces are present to take on those responsibilities. These initial responsibilities would include basic security, facilitating the work of civilian aid agencies that are allowed into the secured areas, and observing the return of civilians when that is allowed. Depending on the forces deployed (such as whether they bring engineering units), they may be able to take on additional roles in helping clear areas for civilian returns.

Handing off policing responsibilities will require staff coordination between the IDF and the Policing Force. Coordination should begin as soon as the military units that will comprise the PF are identified—in other words, before they actually arrive in-theater.

Israel will also need to identify locations where the PF can initially deploy and a border crossing that the PF can use to move in and out of Gaza that does not allow civilian traffic. This will require access to one or more military airfields and to port facilities.

A significant amount of additional military planning will need to be done between Israel and the United States, and among Israel and the nations contributing to the PF. The United States has extensive experience staffing up the deployment of security and policing forces, and some NATO members like the United Kingdom have capacity as

well. For this reason, this plan does not need to go into additional details—these plans can be addressed between or among the militaries involved.

3. Israel will need retain its freedom of action to carry out security operations to ensure Hamas remnants do not pose a threat to Israelis, Palestinians, the Multi-National Authority, and others.

Initially, Hamas will very likely try to be a spoiler for anyone other than itself to administer postwar Gaza. The IDF’s military campaign in Gaza will not capture or kill every Hamas fighter, and it should be expected that some fighters, weapons caches, and underground facilities will remain in areas that the IDF considers secured. To prevent Hamas fighters from carrying out attacks on Israelis, other Palestinians, the MNA, aid workers, or others, Israel will need the ability to carry out security operations to neutralize those threats. This will involve the potential of lethal force.

Over time, Israeli security operations can be expected to change from predominantly military operations to more targeted special operations. Additionally, the MNA PF should achieve a level of capacity that it needs to rely less on the IDF, with Israel still providing intelligence, drone coverage, and other kinds of support. Within six to twelve months, a non-Hamas Gaza civilian police force and gendarmerie should be vetted, trained, and deployed, and able to take on basic policing operations in the way that the Palestinian Civil Police and Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) currently do in the West Bank.

4. Israel will participate as a member of the International Contact Group and provide significant resources to support the Multi-National Authority, particularly in the early stages: funding, logistics, basing and office space, and intelligence support, but relatively few personnel.

The MNA will formally report to an International Contact Group (ICG) of governments that support the MNA and provide personnel, funding, and diplomatic support. Similar contact groups have overseen the work of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and the Defeat-ISIS Coalition. The ICG is described in more detail in [Part III.A.](#), page 28.

Israel will need to help facilitate the startup of the MNA. The MNA will need temporary offices (close to Gaza plus in Jerusalem), office equipment (such as furniture and copiers), housing (plus food if the housing is on a military base), security (including secure vehicles, trucks to move cargo and equipment, drones for its own security, and personal protective equipment), transportation (ground vehicles, helicopter lift with crews, small aircraft with crews), diplomatic credentials, communications (cell phones and Internet service), and funding (for expenses on the local Israeli economy). In sum, Israel should assume that the first wave of MNA officials and personnel will show up with a suitcase of clothes and ready to work, and with security personnel bringing their service weapons, but with Israel providing everything else that the MNA officials will need to begin work immediately. This need will change over time as the MNA builds up its own administrative and logistical capacity.

At the outset, the MNA will also need Israel to facilitate setting up office space in Gaza. This will require Israel and the MNA jointly finding space suitable for temporary offices and housing, with controlled access, overhead security (from mortar and small rocket fire), and its own helipad (a runway would be ideal, but this would put the MNA’s offices away from where they should probably be located). Israel will need to help the MNA set up temporary buildings and housing (the U.S. military used contractors to set this up in Iraq and Afghanistan; it might be more efficient for those to be Israeli or Egyptian contractors).

The MNA will also hire Gazans to work in a number of roles—Israel should plan on vetting those Gazans. Initial numbers will be in the hundreds in the first two to three months, with potentially thousands of Gazans taking over functions previously carried out by Hamas, so Israeli security vetting of Gazans will need to be a priority if the MNA is to work.

Within six months, the MNA should transition to financial and administrative independence, using its own resources.

5. While most of the MNA’s activities will be in Gaza, the MNA will be based in part in Israel and will need to rely on at least one dedicated Israel-Gaza crossing point to get in and out of Gaza.

As noted above, the MNA will have a substantial presence in Gaza to be able to administer assistance and governmental functions that the MNA will undertake. The MNA will also need offices in Israel to liaise with the Government of Israel and other governments that will not maintain a separate presence in Gaza. (Initially, few will.) The MNA will need at least one dedicated Israel-Gaza crossing point that can be reserved for its use to get in and out of Gaza.

During the time of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and thereafter, the United States and Coalition personnel and contractors used a special border crossing between Kuwait and Iraq to provide for greater efficiency and security than using ordinary commercial crossing points.

Israel will eventually need to re-open at least one crossing point for civilian traffic between Gaza and Israel. Hamas will almost certainly seek to target that checkpoint for terrorist attack as a means of discouraging Gazans from using it.

6. **In return for ensuring Israel’s ability to inspect cargoes and people entering or leaving Gaza across the “Philadelphi” corridor, Israel will need to devote sufficient resources to the screening and inspection mission so that people and cargoes are expedited, not delayed.** (See Part III, [point 22](#), page 50, for more about this.)

Even while the MNA is administering Gaza, Israel will need the ability to inspect, from the Gazan side, cargo and people entering or leaving Gaza into Egypt. Israel will need to devote sufficient resources—people, data systems, communications systems, and scanning equipment—to ensure that screening and inspection can be expedited, not delayed. This is one of the greatest points of avoidable friction that Israel will continue to have with the Gazan populace and aid workers once Israel has turned policing responsibility over to the MNA’s Policing Force. Minimizing this friction will give Israel greater ability to sustain this inspection regime.



Source based on: Gringer, retrieved 2023-10-19, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=5670402>.

7. **At some future point, Israel will want to consider—as the Allies did after World War II for Germany and Japan—whether Israel’s national security interests justify contributing significant funding or investments for Gaza’s reconstruction and other activities.**

After the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, the Israeli public is not favorably disposed towards paying to rebuild Gaza. This view should not be expected to change while active hostilities are underway. While many Gazans found employment in Israel prior to October 7, there will also be a reluctance to employ Gazans in Israel in the future.

However, if post-Hamas governance begins to take root in Gaza, Israel should consider, as the Allies did after World War II for Germany and Japan, whether Israel’s national security interests justify funding or investments in Gaza’s reconstruction and other activities.

If Israel does so, Israel and the United States will need to keep in mind, as the Allies did after World War II, that economic reconstruction can help build the foundation for stability and, ultimately, a lasting peace. However, physical reconstruction by itself is not sufficient to ensure peace and security. Just as the Allies did for Germany and Japan, other measures in the realms of de-radicalization, education, and civil society will also be

necessary to ensure that both sides can advance from conflict management to conflict resolution.

Part II – The United States’ role

- 1. The United States will need to take the lead in establishing the three pillars for postwar Gaza security and stability. No government other than the United States can do this with the urgency required while meeting essential Israeli security requirements and priorities.**

As noted above, **apart from Israel itself, only the United States has the sustainable political will to assure that Israel’s security stays as one of the paramount objectives in postwar Gaza.** Only the United States, moreover, has the civilian and military personnel and resources that will be required to jump-start any effort to secure Gaza and enable the conditions to prevent mass starvation and suffering among Gazan civilians. The United States is unique in having more experience in setting up civilian and military organizations to undertake this responsibility—and has learned lessons about what to do and what not to do. Experience in this area is hard-won, and the United States has it. As President Biden said on October 20, the United States is “[the indispensable nation.](#)”

Once Israel and the United States have agreed that establishing an international authority to administer Gaza is the best available option, the United States will need to take the lead in establishing a Multi-National Authority (MNA) for Gaza (see [Part III](#) below). The United States is also the only nation that can recruit a credible, well-resourced policing force (PF) to take over day-to-day policing missions from the IDF.

To provide oversight and enhance the MNA’s legitimacy, the MNA should report formally to an International Contact Group (ICG) that only the United States can take the lead in establishing (see [Part III](#) below). Each member government should be prepared to make significant, enduring commitments to the effort. The ICG would initially be about twelve governments, including some from the G-7 (United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom), Israel, Egypt, and some from the G-20 (e.g., Australia and South Korea, and inviting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join). There should be no international organizations in the Contact Group, as their governance mechanisms could complicate decision-making within the ICG.

- 2. The United States will provide a number of vital enabling capabilities and “back office” military personnel, although there should be no large-scale U.S. ground troop presence in the MNA policing force.**

U.S. military forces should provide the MNA’s Policing Force with important enabling capabilities such as logistics, strategic airlift, intelligence, and staff functions. However, because of the depth of U.S. support for Israel’s military action against Hamas and the likely initial reaction of Gazans to the presence of any international force in Gaza, U.S. forces should not be involved in the day-to-day patrols on the streets of Gaza.

The United States has far more experience organizing the kind of military structure that will be required for Gaza, having done similar missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The United States also has greater depth by far in the number general officers and senior commissioned and noncommissioned officers who can serve in staff roles because of their experience in these missions—this will provide an important head start when troops of other countries arrive to join the PF. And because of the United States’ lead role in military manufacturing, and its experience with NATO and other military partnerships, much of the equipment used by the PF will either be American or from NATO countries, giving the United States a considerable advantage as the Policing Force’s organizer, especially over other countries like India that still use often-outdated Russian equipment.

This U.S. “back-office” approach will put a premium on **the need for urgent diplomacy to recruit other governments to commit forces to this policing mission.** Here, again, the United States has more and better experience in recruiting multinational forces than any other country, having done this before for Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Israel could not recruit other Arab states to participate, and Egypt will not take on this role. No other country besides the United States has comparable experience.

Speed in pulling together an international force is of the essence, and again only the United States has the ability to pull such a force together quickly enough. Even the United Nations, which recruits peacekeepers for dozens of missions around the world, would have institutional challenges in quickly recruiting a policing force for Gaza that would meet Israeli security requirements.

Finally, experience shows that other countries will be willing to contribute forces to the MNA’s Policing Force only if the United States contributes its own forces. Several Arab countries have [made a similar point](#) to the United States with respect to Gaza.

It is also in the United States’ interest to move Israeli forces out of the role of providing day-to-day policing in areas of Gaza that are stabilized. Hamas remnants—and even young Gazan men with no ties to Hamas—can be expected to seek out confrontations with IDF patrols that will make the objectives in the Tokyo Principles (see [Annex IV.F.](#)) harder to achieve. A Policing Force of international troops with United States back-office support has the best chance of stabilizing Gaza so that reconstruction—both physical and political—and de-radicalization efforts can begin.

3. The United States will need to play a central role in organizing the Multi-National Authority, jump-starting its creation, and providing key personnel, significant resources, and capabilities—but the head of the MNA should not be an American.

Only the United States has the experience needed to set up an international authority to administer Gaza, based on the U.S. experience, both good and otherwise, in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The United States has more civilian personnel with experience than any other country, has the legal authorities in place to bring on people with experience, and has the ability to organize an office and give it the resources needed to jump-start it.

An international authority will need people with relevant experience, but it will also need important back-office staff to do hiring, logistics, security, and contracting. The U.S. Government has more such people with experience than any other single government.

The United States also has the ability to send an advance team of personnel to Israel and to Egypt to help set up the MNA even before the MNA is formally chartered. These “jump teams” can work with Israel and Egypt to set up the infrastructure the MNA will need for its field offices, so that when MNA staff begin to arrive, they can start work immediately.

However, while the United States should insist on a number of leadership positions in the MNA, the head of the MNA should not be an American—but it should be someone who has the trust of the United States and Israel, and the respect of Palestinians and in the Arab world. The late Paddy Ashdown’s service in Bosnia is a comparable example: a former political party leader in the United Kingdom who was highly respected as the High Representative in 2002-2006.

4. The United States will need to set up an office within the Department of State to coordinate the ICG, much as the Defeat-ISIS Coalition used the Department of State as its secretariat.

The ICG will provide the diplomatic framework and oversight of the MNA, and the MNA’s legitimacy derives from the combination of governments that participate in it. Most governments (other than Israel and the United States) will interact with the ICG through their foreign ministries. For this reason, the United States should set up an office within the Department of State to coordinate the ICG, much as the Defeat-ISIS Coalition was coordinated by an office in the State Department.

The State Department will need to coordinate periodic meetings of the ICG. Defeat-ISIS Coalition meetings are organized twice-yearly. The ICG could meet at the ministerial or under secretary level, or alternate between the two.

Part III – The roles of the Multi-National Authority and the International Contact Group

Who administers Gaza, or the parts of Gaza no longer ruled by Hamas, is one of the greatest challenges to building a more secure postwar for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Middle East. If not Israel, if not the Palestinian Authority (PA), and if no other government is willing to take ownership of this mission, then the only other option besides anarchy would be an international authority roughly analogous to the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia or the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Both provide numerous lessons of what not to do, and some positive lessons that could be adapted to the unique challenges of post-Hamas Gaza. Given the difficulties in setting up an effective international authority for Gaza, it is easy to see why this becomes an example of the “best available option.” However, the odds for success can be improved considerably by urgent, detailed planning by both Israel and the United States. This plan provides a checklist of issues to consider.

The core assumption is that **Israel cannot set up an effective international authority on its own, so the United States will need to take the lead in organizing the Multi-National Authority (MNA)**, with Israel being the key stakeholder with approval rights over most, but not all, of the operational decisions required to set up the MNA. No other government or international organization has the necessary trust of Israel, nor the experience (good and bad) that the United States does. No one else has the resources and experience needed to start up the MNA quickly and with sufficient capacity to have the greatest chance for long-term success.

A second core assumption is that the MNA should be built with the expectation that more governments will join over time. Given the divisiveness of the war, some governments would be reluctant to join at the outset, but will realize as time goes on that they should join because have a national interest in a successful outcome, and have expertise and resources to contribute.

As noted in section 30 below, when conditions permit, the MNA would end its governance roles and authority, while continuing, at much-reduced staffing levels, to coordinate stabilization, reconstruction, training, and technical assistance.

A. The International Contact Group

Formal oversight of the MNA will come from an International Contact Group led by the United States with participation from key governments acceptable to Israel, primarily drawing on the G-7 (United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom), Israel, Egypt, and with important, responsible and prominent other countries who are prepared to make significant, enduring commitments to the effort (e.g., Australia, South Korea, and inviting Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). No international organizations would formally be members of the ICG, as their governance mechanisms could complicate decision-making within the ICG.

As the Defeat-ISIS Coalition and other international contact groups have operated in the past, the ICG for Gaza would not operate by consensus or by voting, but it provides a mechanism for hearing diverse opinions, collective decision-making where feasible, and obtaining buy-in from ICG member states. According to a [2021 study](#), “Since 1977, as many as 27 ICGs were formed to find common positions and coordinate international engagement in crises.”

To give greater legitimacy to the ICG and the Multi-National Authority, the ICG or the MNA should have a “founding document” or charter that establishes, in diplomatic terms, the objectives of the ICG and formally establishes the Multi-National Authority and authorizes it to undertake its responsibilities (see section 2 below). Some governments will want to see this in writing before agreeing to join the ICG. The Defeat-ISIS Coalition has had similar declarations of principles since it was established in 2014. However, drafting and agreeing on this charter must not hold up the urgent process of standing up the MNA. The sections of this plan can form the basis of a document describing what the MNA needs to be able to do. The language from the Dayton Agreement about the mission and authorities of the Office of the High Representative could also be used (see [Annex IV.A.](#)). Language from UNSCR 1031 (1995) is potentially relevant and useful for the charter (see [Annex IV.B.](#)). Excerpts of

language from post-October 7 official statements of some of the governments involved will also be useful in developing the charter (see [Annex IV.F.](#)).

The ICG will not be run through an existing international organization, but will be served by a secretariat provided by an office in the U.S. Department of State, as the Defeat-ISIS Coalition was.

The ICG will enable *ad hoc* consultation among governments as issues arise that need collective consultations (as opposed to decisions best made by the Multi-National Authority or the High Representative, see below).

The ICG will hold twice-yearly ministerial or under-secretary level meetings (more frequently at the outset) that will include separate discussion among a small group and a larger discussion to include supporting ministries from member governments. For example, ministries of defense involved in the Policing Force, ministries of finance involved in economic assistance, and ministries of interior that are involved in recruiting and training police forces, a gendarmerie, and border security should be represented in order to coordinate their respective activities with the MNA and with each other.

Intelligence coordination among ICG countries is also vital, but this should be handled through existing intelligence and security agencies, rather than through all ICG member states. As has been done in some previous crises, governments could establish dissemination caveats (“Releasable to Gaza ICG”) that allow sharing of suitably cleared information to all ICG member states, but not outside ICG members. Most intelligence coordination, however, would continue to occur in bilateral channels, as at present.

To facilitate information sharing on political issues and prompt decision-making, Contact Group members should also have responsible designated senior officials stationed full-time on the ground, likely based in the respective embassies of ICG countries in Jerusalem, Washington and Cairo.

B. Internal MNA Functions and Capabilities

1. The most important decision by far will be who will head the Multi-National Authority.

The right person (called here “**High Representative**”) must have a vision for Gaza’s future without Hamas, an understanding of Israel’s essential security requirements, knowledge of the region, the trust of the Israelis, the respect of Palestinians and Arab leaders, and a strong working relationship with the policing force commander. Ideally, the High Representative will be someone nearing retirement who is not looking to use this position as a platform for career advancement. The second most important personnel decision will be the MNA Policing Force senior military commander (see #4 below).

Previous experience (both good and bad) in Bosnia and Iraq demonstrates the paramount importance of having the right top official. It is essential for those selecting the High Representative to remember that the skill set and judgment required for this position are

different from what it takes to be a successful cabinet minister, diplomat, uniformed flag officer, or governor of a state or province. It is important to have someone with political skills who will not compromise decisions that should not be compromised.

The late Paddy Ashdown, the High Representative in Bosnia from 2002-2006, exemplifies the qualities needed to succeed. Ashdown had previously advocated for the use of military force against Serbia in the 1990s, proof that neutrality is not necessarily the most important requirement for success.

Ideally, the High Representative should not be American, in order to encourage non-American contributions to the MNA. The High Representative will also be highly visible to Gazans and the world. Given the United States' close ties with Israel, all other things being equal, a non-American will have more credibility with skeptical governments and the Gazan public than an American. Fluency in Arabic would be very valuable but is not essential.

There should be an understanding that the High Representative has a two-year term, renewable by the ICG. Frequent personnel changes, especially at the top, would be very disruptive of the MNA's mission. However, if the High Representative ever loses the confidence of both the United States and Israel, the High Representative should be replaced.

2. The legal authority for the MNA needs to be settled before the MNA goes into Gaza.

There are several possible bases for the MNA's legal authority. The funders of the MNA, which will include Israel and the United States at the outset, will need to decide which one to use before the MNA goes into Gaza.

One option would be for the United States to get the PA to agree in writing that the MNA should administer Gaza. The PA might prefer this to an Israeli occupation, but the PA could insist on conditions, like a specific endstate, that Israel will not accept. A second option is a workable UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII authority, analogous to UNSCR 1031's "authorizing" the independent NATO-commanded IFOR. This is discussed below in this section. The option that is most under Israel's and the United States' control is for Israel to take responsibility for Gaza as an Occupying Power that transfers its authority to the MNA pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding.

Hamas's attack on October 7, Israel's right to self-defense under UN Charter Article 51, and the subsequent Israeli occupation (based on military operations now underway) give Israel both rights and obligations under international law that will supersede the 2006 election that brought Hamas to power. Israel is under no obligation to return Hamas to power—far from it—but the post-MNA legal status of Gaza will need to be resolved through a mechanism to be determined in the future.

To insist that the ICG charter and the MNA's legal mandate would need to specify in advance Gaza's final status would be a mistake. If the MNA succeeds in its mission, the options for Gaza's final status will be broadened and improved. A Gaza without Hamas's influence will have a different relationship with Israel than a Gaza

where Hamas's return to power was a few months or years away. A Gaza free of Hamas's influence would not require Israel to take the same protective measures against the people of Gaza and Gazan territory that Israel would require if it cannot ensure that Hamas will never return to Gaza. A Gaza without Hamas's misrule would have considerably better economic and political prospects. Gaza's ability to attract foreign investment would also be improved, reducing the need for indefinite international assistance. However, success cannot be assured in advance. A decision today on Gaza's final status would look grim indeed. If the MNA is given a chance to succeed, the prospects for a better decision on Gaza's final status could be much improved.

The MNA's mandate, which should be embodied in a written document or agreement, needs to authorize administering and securing Gaza, ensuring that Gaza does not become the launchpad for terrorist or conventional attacks against Israel (this has both a security and a political/social component), starting Gaza's economic recovery, and preparing for eventual re-integration with the West Bank, if events go in that direction.

While a workable mandate from a Chapter VII United Nations Security Council resolution would be ideal, this is not likely given China's and Russia's veto powers. Even so, the United States should have a draft resolution ready, in case a window opens up. A resolution under the Security Council's Chapter VII authority can be binding under international law, whereas a Chapter VI resolution is not. Most previous resolutions relating to Israel and the Palestinians have been passed under Chapter VI authority precisely so that they are not binding. However, a well-crafted Chapter VII resolution would (1) override much of the confusing legal status of Gaza and (2) give the MNA the comprehensive authority it needs.

If someone on the Gazan side can be found who is willing to sign a surrender, that should be explored, but it, too, is not likely. Formal German and Japanese surrenders ended World War II and gave legitimacy to the postwar reconstructions that followed. Iraqi generals signed an agreement at Safwan, Iraq, on March 3, 1991, accepting the Coalition's terms for a cease-fire after the First Gulf War. It is unlikely that Hamas's military wing would formally surrender, but the possibility exists that someone from Hamas's civilian leadership or the Gazan civilian government might. The United States and Israel should have a draft agreement ready in case a window opens up.

3. The MNA will primarily be funded by donor governments of the ICG on a pay-to-play principle, with the ability to receive funds from other sources in an open, transparent way.

Funding to support the MNA will come principally from donor states, initially, the United States and Israel, expanding to include other members of the ICG: European, Middle Eastern, and Asia/Pacific governments. Some countries will be reluctant to join at the outset—the expectation is that as the MNA gets further from Israeli military operations, other countries may join the ICG and help fund the MNA. The MNA's charter should allow it to receive funding from non-ICG governments, international organizations, and private donors, but the MNA should have the discretion to refuse donations it does not want.

The MNA will also need the authority to seize and utilize the assets controlled by Hamas, whether in Gaza or anywhere else, for the benefit of the people of Gaza. The MNA will also need to work with other governments to “unfreeze” any Hamas frozen assets and have them transferred to the MNA to be used for the benefit of the people of Gaza. International law would require the MNA to compensate individual Gazans for any private property seized for the MNA’s use, and the MNA will need to establish a legal mechanism to settle claims for compensation.

The MNA will also need the authority to collect taxes and customs duties, but should do so in an open and transparent way, with established tariff rates, public accounts, and an audit mechanism. This will also help to give confidence to international donors. One recent [Israeli media report, citing Israeli analysts](#), said Hamas collected about US\$300 million in taxes from Gazans bringing cash back home to Gaza (in addition to taxes withheld by Israel and remitted to the PA). Hamas collected about US\$700 million at the Rafah border crossing—this should either stop or become legitimate customs duties. The MNA should negotiate an agreement with Israel so that when Gazans resume work in Israel, and employment taxes are withheld by Israel, they are remitted to the MNA. PA payments directly from Ramallah to Gazans should continue during a transitional period. The MNA will eventually need to negotiate with the PA in Ramallah whether such payments should continue to be paid directly, or whether the PA should transfer funds instead to the MNA for further direct payments.

4. A key part of the MNA will be armed international peacekeepers as a uniformed policing force (PF) who report through a senior military commander to the High Representative.

To maintain a basic level of civilian security in Gaza, the MNA will have armed international peacekeepers as a uniformed Policing Force (PF) under a senior military commander who reports to the High Representative.

The PF will start initially as a military force primarily carrying out ground “presence” patrols, using mainly wheeled but some tracked vehicles, supported by drones. The PF’s mission would transition after several months to a gendarmerie mission (which may involve replacing military units with quasi-military or uniformed civilian forces), with the **ultimate goal in approximately 6-12 months of handing over civilian policing to a local Gazan civilian police force and security force (gendarmerie) vetted by the MNA and Israel.**



U.K. Army Rifleman Joe Nalewabau talks to Iraqis during a presence patrol on December 19, 2008, in Basra province, Iraq. Source: UK Defense Visual Information Distribution Service.

No Israeli troops should be part of the armed peacekeeping force, nor should the PF operate as a U.N. peacekeeping operation or otherwise report to the UN Security Council. If a workable U.N. Security Council resolution could be obtained (see point 2 above), the

resolution could provide a general mandate to the PF analogous to UNSCR 1031's "authorizing" the independent NATO-commanded IFOR (see [Annex IV.B.](#), operative paragraphs 14-17).

Even though Israeli forces will not be a part of the PF, deconfliction with Israeli forces will be a key function for the PF and Israel. Experience from Afghanistan and Iraq shows the importance of deconfliction. If the MNA is negotiating with a local Gazan power broker to switch sides and support Gaza's reconstruction, a raid could destroy the opportunity for strategic progress. Equally, if the IDF learns that Hamas terrorists are using political negotiations as a cover for a terrorist attack, the MNA will have to take this into account in what it does.

U.S. troops will not patrol Gaza's streets, but the United States should contribute military forces to "back office" missions like logistics, airlift, intelligence, and staff positions, training (of other Policing Force personnel and any private security contractors the MNA hires), and advisers (special operations forces).

For the next several months, recruiting the Policing Force will need to be a high diplomatic and military priority for the United States and other contributing states, in order that Israeli troops can move out of any peacekeeping role as quickly as possible. The U.S. Departments of Defense and State have considerable experience in organizing such forces, having done it in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Experience shows that other governments will be unwilling to contribute to the PF if the United States does not contribute a meaningful number of uniformed personnel.

Selecting the right PF commander is vital to the success of the policing mission, second only to the High Representative. The right commander must have both military and diplomatic skills, an understanding of the strategic mission, the trust of the Israelis and the United States, the respect of the Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank, and the trust and respect of the other nations' armed forces in the PF. A successful PF commander should expect to stay with the job for its duration, until the PF hands over its authorities to whatever follows. This should not be thought of as a one-year rotation or a steppingstone to a four-star command.

The United States may want to select the PF's commander; there are both pros and cons for this. The United States has more commanders with relevant field experience in similar situations than any other military, and U.S. commanders have more peacetime training for this mission than most commanders from other countries' militaries. Additionally, the first members of the PF likely to deploy to Israel and Gaza will likely be from the United States, simply because the United States is able to mobilize personnel faster into theater.

However, the United States may not want an American flag officer as the public face of the PF, and may prefer this role goes to a non-American. If the commander is not an American, he should have extensive experience working with the U.S. military, because a number of the key supporting personnel in the PF will be American, and support from the U.S. military and the U.S. Congress will both be enhanced if a non-American PF commander has extensive experience working with the U.S. military.

History shows examples of disastrous commands of peacekeeping missions—Rwanda and Srebrenica being especially notorious. In both cases, there was a combination of a restrictive mandate and commanders who lost sight of the real reason they were there in the first place. For Gaza, the leadership challenges will come from the need to protect the local Gazan populace from predatory elements like criminal gangs, many of which are organized along familial lines—prior to October 7, these existed with Hamas’s knowledge and acquiescence. Hamas remnants will pose a security challenge for the PF and the IDF. Deconfliction between IDF or Shin Bet security operations and the PF will be very important. The PF’s commander will need to have experience dealing with a potential counterinsurgency and a civilian population that will initially be suspicious of the PF. Building trust with the non-Hamas elements of Gazan society will be as important for the PF Commander as for the High Representative.

5. The head of the MNA should not be an American—to encourage European and other contributions. But other key officials should be American or have the complete trust of the U.S. government. Maintaining U.S. support is essential to maintaining Israeli support, and both are vital to the success of postwar Gaza.

As noted above, the High Representative should not be an American, as this will help in encouraging European and other contributions. It will also help increase the international character of the MNA. However, the United States should lay claim to several key positions in order to ensure the MNA stays on course, has the right organizational culture, and maintains priorities that otherwise might drift, such as maintaining the importance of Israel’s security as a top priority. Some of these positions could go to non-U.S. officials in whom the United States has confidence. Key personnel should plan on signing on for at least two years, preferably more, to avoid the problem of one-year rotations that disrupted the work of U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- a. **The Principal Deputy High Representative.** When the High Representative is not available, the Principal Deputy will have the authority to make (or delay) decisions. The Principal Deputy will probably have greater contact with the MNA staff, and will help set a positive organizational culture for the MNA. There should probably be **two or three other Deputy High Representatives** not from the United States.
- b. **The Chief of Staff to the High Representative.** This will ensure two U.S. voices at the table of key internal meetings—an important social dynamic for small group decision-making—and ensure that even when one top American is absent, there will be at least one American present.
- c. **The official in charge of hiring staff.** This will ensure staff who are loyal to the vision and key mission priorities for the MNA (see below). This could be given to a trusted non-U.S. official.
- d. **The chief financial officer.** This official will have necessary control over budgets and financial accountability. Counting programs run by the MNA, this official will be overseeing billions of dollars of spending a year. **Public integrity will be essential**

- for the success of the MNA**, but the MNA is required by international law and good politics to consider itself as a fiduciary for the people of Gaza and Israel.
- e. **An inspector general will be essential from the start**, to give assurance to skeptical members of the U.S. Congress and other donor governments. The overall budget for the MNA, including programs and reconstruction projects, is likely to run into the billions of dollars a year. This could be given to a trusted non-U.S. official, although the United States has considerable experience through the offices of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR). **Both of these offices’ reports are essential reading for senior officials working for the MNA and have informed the drafting of this plan for postwar Gaza.** [Annex IV.E.](#) includes a summary of SIGAR’s excellent lessons-learned report from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan.
- 6. Ultimate staff size for the MNA will be determined by the exact mission, but a core team of 50-100 people needs to be built in the first month, before the MNA takes on operational responsibilities.**

The MNA’s personnel will include (i) international staff responsible for overseeing Gaza governance, paid for by contributing governments and, in some cases, out of the MNA’s own budget, (ii) the Policing Force, paid for by contributing governments, and (iii) locally hired professional and support staff, paid for by Israel for Israeli citizens, and otherwise out of the MNA’s own budget, which can include tax revenues.

The most urgent two priorities for the MNA staff will be (i) high-level policy work to set up the missions and governance mechanisms of the MNA, and (ii) the personnel, logistics, and finances needed to get the MNA deployed first into Israel, and thereafter quickly into Gaza as soon as security conditions permit. For these reasons, the MNA should start with a core team of 50-100 people in the first month after the decision is taken to set up the MNA, expecting to expand staff quickly into the hundreds. Initially, most international staff will come from the United States, Israel, and the countries that join the ICG. Governments will need to use current personnel or hire people on contract. Apart from those whose responsibilities are necessarily short-term, staff should expect to serve at least two years. Arrangements will need to be made through the government of Israel or U.S. government contractors for the quick procurement of office space, equipment (computers, cell and satellite phones, copiers, and the like), housing, and food.

The MNA will need quickly to establish a headquarters, obtain key logistical requirements (transportation, security, language capabilities), determine what field personnel it needs (more below), establish a budget, and obtain funds. Initial offices should be set up in Israel and in Egypt (both in Cairo and in the Sinai). Using personnel from the United States and other early supporters of setting up the ICG and MNA, “jump teams” should arrive in Israel and Egypt to begin opening up those offices, so that when the MNA’s personnel arrive, they will be able to begin work without delay. The jump teams will need support from the Israeli and Egyptian government on such issues as visas, permits, logistics, and other support.

The MNA's ultimate civilian staff size will be determined by the missions for which the MNA is responsible (see below), and by conditions on the ground. Conditions on the ground include the needs of the population in secured areas where fighting has ended, the number of government workers the MNA will oversee, and the extent of reconstruction programs funded by outside donors and by Gazans themselves. Before October 7, the total civilian government workforce in Gaza was approximately 70,000 to 80,000, which includes teachers, doctors, police, and other government workers, but not aid workers who were not on Gazan government payrolls. Many government workers were paid by the PA from Ramallah—it is in Gaza's, the MNA's, and Israel's interest that those payments to Gazan government workers and pensioners should continue. Other government workers were paid by Hamas, but many of those performed legitimate government functions while others did not. One recent report before October 7 by an [Israeli NGO critical of Israel's policy](#) towards Palestinians estimated that about 31% of Gazan employees worked for the government. If so, this is about the same as many Scandinavian countries, according to [OECD data](#); the OECD average is about 18%. In other words, the number of Gazan government employees is higher than the global norm, but this reflects both the Gazan reliance on international aid donations and high unemployment in the civilian economy. Government employment is likely to stay at the 70,000-80,000 level. This would suggest an international staff of about 1,000 civilians at full staffing by early in the third quarter of 2024.

The ultimate size of the Policing Force should be determined by military planners. The United States Department of Defense has the greatest experience in this area, and the ability to hire contractors to provide essential support services such as housing and meals for MNA personnel. The Government of Israel should also contribute expertise and resources to determine the optimal force structure.

7. The MNA will need a security office with protective teams able to protect MNA personnel when traveling, including into Gaza. The MNA cannot rely entirely on protective details supplied by Israel, the PA, or others.

Security for MNA personnel will be a top priority, given the likelihood that Hamas and other terrorist groups will try to disrupt the MNA's work in order to drive it out of Gaza and re-establish Hamas control. The MNA will be operating alongside ongoing Israeli and the MNA's own security operations aimed at rounding up Hamas networks that would otherwise form an insurgency.

The security "tail" for MNA personnel will be considerable, comparable to what the United States experienced in Baghdad at the height of the Sunni insurgency in 2004-2005. It was not until 2008-2010 that the United States installed adequate defensive measures at its Embassy in Baghdad. This level of security will need to be built in from the outset of the design of the MNA's headquarters and compound in Gaza, and in its staffing plan. Here, the United States and Israel have more experience than other governments in developing security arrangements and designing security systems to protect MNA personnel.

The MNA should have its own protective details in order to be able to move more efficiently around Gaza. The MNA needs to coordinate personnel movements within its own ranks, rather than coordinate movements with outside bodies like the IDF or the Gaza equivalent of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). There may be occasions when the MNA's security office will need to rely on outside assistance, but ordinary movements should be coordinated within the MNA.

Close intelligence cooperation between the MNA's security office and Israeli security services and other governments' security services will be essential to protect the MNA staff, especially when traveling off-compound.

The MNA's security office will need to build into its planning the importance of reducing the "friction" that its protective details will have with the people of Gaza. This was a major concern in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deaths of Iraqis at the hands of U.S. government security contractors, and even the day-to-day disruptions caused by routine security operations, took a heavy toll on the United States' ability to work with the Iraqi people during and after the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

8. Small teams of 5-10 people would be assigned initially as ministry liaison teams to Gazan ministries.

Government ministries in Gaza substantially mirror the PA ministries in the West Bank. According to [websites on PA](#) governance (which sometimes differ with each other), these include Finance, Justice, Health, Education, Higher Education and Scientific Research, Information (includes Telecommunications), Agriculture, Labor, Local Government, Waqf and Religious Affairs, Women's Affairs, Public Works, Housing, Prisoners' Affairs, Tourism and Antiquities, and Culture. Portfolios were often combined and reshuffled within the PA, but since 2017 Hamas ran most ministries that operated in Gaza.

Given the conditions on the ground in Gaza when the MNA is activated, the MNA will need to prioritize restoring functions in ministries based on urgency and what facilities are available when the shooting stops. Some ministries will need more international expertise than others to resume function, while others can be restarted with Gazan staff.

The initial organization of the MNA's staff should therefore include small teams of 5-10 people who will be assigned to make contact as quickly as possible with the key ministries to determine what is necessary to restart essential government operations. Additional staff to support key ministries can be added, if needed.

Several ministries will be of key importance for efforts to remove Hamas's radicalizing influence. These include Education, Higher Education, Information, Waqf and Religious Affairs, Finance, and Justice, but other ministries will also be important. De-radicalization is discussed below in point 17 and in [Annex I](#).

9. The MNA will require a motor pool and a small air wing of helicopters and 2-3 fixed-wing aircraft for moving people, equipment, and supplies.

The MNA will need to rely on making personnel movements by ground convoys of armored cars, trucks and armored vehicles. The MNA will also need its own, on-call helicopter and air cargo capability by C-130 or comparable aircraft. This will need to be based in Israel.

Helicopters are less risky for some kinds of movements than ground vehicles. Hamas will no doubt try to stage ambushes like the 1993 “Battle of Mogadishu” ground ambush described in the book and film “Black Hawk Down.”

The MNA will require a number of small drones for security purposes, both to monitor its own compounds and to protect movements of its personnel.

10. The MNA will need a strong, independent, well-resourced opinion polling capacity.

It is especially important for a political operation like the MNA to have unbiased opinion polling to understand what the people of Gaza are thinking. A robust, well-resourced polling capability will help offset an inherent problem in multi-national authorities—that they tend to listen to governments, international officials, returning exiles, and people who speak English well—and less so the people whose long-term interests they are supposed to be advancing. This is especially important in a territory where elections are not going to be possible for some years, and it is also especially so where security considerations may limit the ability of the MNA’s staff to travel around Gaza to engage with the public.


A number of qualified opinion polling firms have worked in Gaza and the West Bank before October 7. When the shooting stops, most should be able to resume their work.

The MNA should have a sufficient budget and its own in-house polling analytical expertise to understand the different biases of the firms. In Iraq, for example, the Coalition Provisional Authority had an excellent opinion polling contracting and analytical capability, and was able to determine that one of its two main polling contractors had a systematic bias in the city of Mosul, but nowhere else, because of how it did ethnic weighting of its raw results. CPA’s polling unit developed important insights that should have guided CPA’s actions—but, as with other CPA decisions, greater weight was given to views of the exiles on the Iraqi Governing Council and the United Nations on issues like the design of Iraq’s election system, the role of religion in society, the basis of support for the Sadrist movement, the lack of support for former exiles who were considered corrupt, and the priorities of what the Iraqi people wanted their government to do for them. In each of these decisions, opinion polling in 2003-2004 predicted Iraqi popular dissatisfaction that still holds Iraq back some twenty years later.

The following graphics from the recent Arab Barometer poll taken just before the October 7 attack show the complexity of Gazan opinion. This graphic that appeared in [Foreign Affairs](#) would seem to suggest that Fatah is more popular than Hamas, and the most popular party in Gaza:

HAMAS’S MODEST BASE OF SUPPORT

Which party, if any, do you feel closest to?




Source: Arab Barometer Wave VIII, Gaza (2023).


However, putting the same results on a spectrum shows that almost half of Gazans support parties that oppose Israel’s right to exist—a major danger that should inform the MNA’s choice of strategy for civic engagement.

What Party, if Any, Do You Feel Closest To?

Survey Taken September 28-October 6, 2023



An if an election for President of the Palestinian Authority had been held just before the October 7 attack, extremist candidates would have dominated the results:



This kind of analysis needs to inform the MNA’s strategies for approaching its mission.

Additionally, the MNA’s polling unit will need to work with its contractors on question design and survey methodology to ensure its results are as free of bias as possible. Previous polling in Gaza and the West Bank has sometimes been done on behalf of clients who had a bias towards a particular political outcome—often with regard to overstating or understating Hamas’s influence, or showing that Hamas’s influence over life in Gaza was benign or malign.

11. The MNA will also need a strong, well-resourced public affairs and public diplomacy capacity.

The MNA will need considerable focus on public affairs to inform Gazans in Arabic, Israelis in Hebrew, people in the West Bank, and international audiences in a variety of languages what it is doing and why. The MNA should prioritize engaging professional staff with expertise in these individual geographic and cultural markets that the MNA needs to reach.

The MNA will need an extensive social media capability. This is one area where the U.S. Government is very lacking—how to reach out to audiences that use Telegram or

Snapchat that are popular with Gazans but seldom used or understood by senior U.S. officials.

The MNA will presumably quickly disband or reform the Hamas ministry of information and communications, turning it into a purely regulatory body, much as the CPA did in Iraq in 2003. However, the CPA failed to invest in quality alternative media. Many of its initial efforts were too heavy-handed and lost credibility with the Iraqi public. Hamas will no doubt get support from Iran to develop content to discredit any alternative government in Gaza—the MNA and its supporters will need to develop specific plans for how to counter Iranian-funded influence and disinformation operations.

C. Key Mission Priorities

Sections 12-19 are “Day One” activities that the MNA needs to start working on even before it deploys into Gaza. They must be prioritized for action in the opening days and weeks that the MNA is responsible for Gaza’s civilian governance and as the MNA ramps up its Policing Force. Sections 20-28 are activities that should be started as soon as possible, even though their full effects may not become known for several months. Sections 29 and 30 refer to the wind-down of the MNA’s activities and the MNA’s transition to a more normal international assistance organization in support of whatever is decided about Gaza’s post-MNA future.

12. Negotiating a formal end to hostilities with Israel, when Hamas and related forces in an area have surrendered, been eliminated, or are driven away.

One of the MNA’s top initial priorities will be negotiating a formal end to hostilities with warring factions in Gaza. Arrangements for with former Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fighters to lay down their arms will be obvious top priorities. So too will be negotiations with the numerous powerful *hamayil* (حمائل, referring to extended family units larger than a “clan” but smaller than a “tribe”; singular is حمولة, *hamula*), some of which control key sectors of Gazan society. Some *hamayil* hold considerable power over smuggling at Rafah and elsewhere, and some control other activities that are important from a security perspective or important to ordinary Gazans. Many of these familial networks may become more powerful in the chaos as Hamas’s authority breaks down and before the MNA takes over.

When the MNA is in its early weeks of deployment, the IDF will have the lead in arranging for an end to hostilities, but as the MNA establishes its military Policing Force presence and its core civilian political office, the IDF may prefer to have the MNA take more of a lead in such arrangements because Gazans may more readily deal with the MNA rather than the IDF. Even when the MNA is fully operational, it will need to involve the IDF in negotiating these ceasefires.

These agreed procedures will need to have detailed security provisions for the deployment and employment of the international peacekeepers cited above, residual Israeli military operations, and disarmament of remaining armed elements.

It is doubtful there will be a Gaza-wide end of hostilities all at once, though plans should be made (and documents drawn up) for a formal Hamas or Gazan surrender or agreed-upon ceasefire in the unlikely case that occurs.

More likely, fighting will end on a local or regional basis within Gaza, arranged with local Gazan leaders (military, paramilitary, or civilian) willing to come forward. The MNA would work with the IDF to broker the terms for such arrangements. The MNA will become a point of contact between Israeli forces and groups of local Gazans seeking an end to fighting in specific neighborhoods. (Gazan doctors and hospital staff may form a nucleus around which other Gazans may unite—the MNA may find it benefits from doctors self-organizing like this.)

13. Preventing strategic looting.

A top priority for the MNA's Policing Force should be the prevention of large-scale strategic looting, foiling acts of retribution against civilians, and ensuring the protection of citizens and property from criminal gangs. Hamas made the calculated decision to use Gaza's civilian population as human shields. Residual elements associated with Hamas are likely to loot and vandalize so as to render Gaza ungovernable and discredit the MNA and Israel both.

Similar "strategic looting" occurred in Sarajevo in December 1995-January 1996, when Bosnian Serbs looted the plumbing from high-rise apartment buildings to prevent them from being used to relocate refugees, as intended by the Dayton Accords. Likewise, in Iraq in 2003, Baath Party operatives destroyed the civilian power grid in central Iraq to render Iraq ungovernable.

The IDF now, and the MNA eventually, should prioritize capturing and preserving Gaza government records to prevent them from being destroyed. Here, again, Hamas may try to destroy government records to render Gaza ungovernable. Original documents will be difficult to replace.

14. Priority should go to restoring "SWET"—sewer, water, electricity/fuel, and trash removal.

Much of Gaza's basic infrastructure of electricity, water, sewers, fuel, and trash removal—referred to in counterinsurgency manuals as "SWET"—was in a poor state before October 7, and has been severely damaged by the war. Restoring a basic level of functionality will need to be one of the MNA's top priorities.

In the initial months, the MNA should seek to get (and pay for) Gazan workers to help rebuild these essential systems in stabilized parts of Gaza. Restoration should rely as much as possible on Gazan and Palestinian personnel, but they may need immediate help from outside experts. This will require Gazans to work with Israelis to restore these services. Israel is both the closest geographically and has the ability to build or rebuild connections from Israel. International personnel will need to be brought to supplement Gazan, Palestinian, and Israeli experts to rebuild and re-start key SWET systems.

One challenge the MNA will face is the need to have sufficient resources—people and money—at the outset to staff the MNA on infrastructure restoration so that this technical but vital work does not consume the time of the High Representative and his or her top deputies. In Iraq in 2003, top officials at CPA in Baghdad and in U.S. government officials in Washington spent far too much time trying to arrange delivery of generators. Restoring infrastructure should not require high-level political decisions. It requires a sufficient number of engineers, technicians, equipment and vehicles, and money. Developing the resource requirements should therefore be one of the priorities for the MNA even before it deploys into Gaza.

Gaza had cell phone service prior to October 7, but was restricted to 2G bandwidth by Israel for security reasons. Many Gazans who lived near Israel or worked in Israel used Israeli SIM cards. Restoring cell phone service throughout Gaza is urgent in order to meet health and economic needs, but this will need to be restored in ways that reflect Israel's legitimate security needs, and the MNA's security needs, in this sensitive area.

15. Priority should also go to restoring Gaza's medical capabilities.

Another top MNA priority will be restoring Gaza's medical capabilities. Gaza had approximately 4,000 doctors and 32 hospitals before the war, according to 2019 PA data. Re-establishing medical care for Gaza's population will be essential both for humanitarian reasons and because this will build confidence in the ability of the MNA to meet Gaza's other essential needs. Rebuilding the basic housing stock, even with temporary housing, will be the top reconstruction priority, as is restoring SWET, but rebuilding hospitals and medical facilities or restoring them to working order is close behind.

The MNA should recruit Arab, European, and Asian governments, some of whom have already been involved, to airlift military field hospitals and medical personnel into stabilized areas of Gaza. The U.S. and European governments should make available medical facilities aboard naval vessels that can be stationed offshore Gaza. Israel and other governments should bring in basic and advanced diagnostic and treatment facilities. If any countries have sanctions against delivery of medical supplies to Gaza, they should lift those sanctions once Hamas is no longer the *de facto* government.

16. Coordinate with Israel and Egypt on return of other services, logistics, and entry/exit points to and from Gaza.

One of the MNA's top priorities will be working with both Israel and Egypt to restore at least limited return of the ability to move equipment, construction materials, and outside experts quickly into and out of Gaza. Prior to October 7, most of Gaza's trade was with Israel and Egypt. Restoring pre-existing services and other arrangements will often be the fastest way to resume essential services and civilian capabilities. Making this work will require the MNA to negotiate changes with Israel and Egypt that speed up these movements while maintaining security. A pre-October 7 "business as usual" at border crossings will not be sufficient to restore basic services fast enough.

At Rafah, the MNA may need to fund some immediate improvements on both the Gaza and the Egyptian sides of the Rafah border crossing in order to maintain necessary security while increasing capacity and throughput. (Some of this may be underway.) The MNA should set up offices in both Cairo and in the Sinai to coordinate its logistics and movements there, and to be able to meet with Gazans on their way in or out of Egypt.

Between Israel and Gaza, it will be extremely important to restore at least a few functioning border crossings for both security and economic reasons. For security reasons, the MNA will want a crossing reserved for its use. There will also need to be a civilian crossing for people and cargo moving into Gaza and, eventually, allowing Gazans to be screened so they can be permitted to cross into Israel—bearing in mind the extreme sensitivity of Israeli opinion on this matter given the lessons of abuse of such permits that led to October 7.

17. The MNA will mobilize and coordinate activities of international, governmental, and non-governmental agencies and organizations involved in providing humanitarian, stabilization, development, technical, reconstruction, de-radicalization, and other assistance to Gaza.

The MNA's authorities need to include the ability to mobilize and coordinate all aid and reconstruction activities in Gaza. This would include the work done by international, governmental, and non-governmental agencies and organizations. The MNA needs to be able to say "no" to assistance that would enable or promote the return of Hamas, Iranian influence, or other terrorist groups. The MNA will need sufficient personnel overseeing this that the MNA does not become a burden on restoring essential services. The goal of this coordination will be to ensure security and to provide as rapid a return as possible to normalcy for the Gazan people.

Centralized control is necessary both for security reasons (to prevent the inflow of weapons or war materiel) and to ensure the adherence to the cessation of violence or other security benchmarks (beyond humanitarian assistance, which should not be turned off). An important lesson from both Bosnia and Iraq is the need for a central authority to have the ability to turn off reconstruction in areas where local authorities are allowing terrorist groups to plot attacks or are otherwise blocking the implementation of necessary measures for long-term stabilization such as de-radicalization. Similarly, there needs to be a single central authority with the ability to restore reconstruction and other kinds of programs when the requirements are met. At the same time, local authorities need to be able to negotiate their compliance with a single, empowered High Representative, who must be able to deliver on his or her word when an agreement is reached.

The MNA's charter (discussed above) should make this a clear authority of the MNA and the High Representative. A well-drafted UN Security Council resolution under Chapter VII authority would strengthen the MNA's hand in this regard, but setting up the MNA and beginning its coordination role cannot be delayed if UN negotiations fail or take too long.

The reason for this requirement is that an expected point of friction between the MNA and some in Gaza will be the need for de-radicalization within post-Hamas Gazan society. This is one of the most important challenges, and requires careful, judicious action from the High Representative and the MNA. Prompt but not over-aggressive policy development is essential in this area—the excesses of the U.S. de-Baathification of Iraq in 2003, which was done without a thorough understanding of the consequences of the decision, or of alternatives that would have provided the same long-term benefits without fueling an insurgency, provide an example of how de-radicalization could easily go wrong. Any plan that tries to suggest that this will be simple in practice will almost certainly fail. **Much of the MNA’s work across multiple lines of effort (see points 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 27, and 28 and [Annex I](#)) will include persuading Gazans to appreciate that Hamas’s core strategic aim of eliminating the State of Israel is unachievable**, led the people of Gaza to ruin, and should be abandoned in favor of solutions that will lead to better outcomes than the last 75 years of Gaza’s history. This turnaround will not be achieved merely by a Multi-National Authority, Israelis, or anyone else ordering it to be so. It will take patience, time, and leadership—by both Gazans and outsiders—but history has enough successful examples to show it can be done. A core part of the MNA’s mission is to start Gazans down that road.

18. Vetting and rebuilding a Gazan police force and security force free of Hamas influence needs to be a top priority.

Civilian policing will allow the MNA’s Policing Force to take a step back from frequent patrols of Gaza intended to help prevent ordinary criminal activity. The pre-October 7 Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) in Gaza was effectively controlled by the [armed wing of Hamas](#). This will require the creation of a new PCP free of Hamas influence. This important effort will take a minimum of three to six months of vetting and training the first members of a new PCP for Gaza. The Palestinian Authority Security Force (PASF) is a gendarmerie force in the West Bank that could serve as a model for a comparable internationally vetted and trained paramilitary force in Gaza.

According to a [2017 academic report](#), a significant number of security personnel in Gaza are paid by the PA but “on a leave of absence,” i.e., not actively working, given Hamas’s control of Gaza since 2007:

Location	
West Bank, paid by PA	31,913
Gaza, paid by PA (on a “leave of absence”)	33,550
Gaza, paid by Hamas	<u>17,813</u>
Total in West Bank and Gaza, 2014	83,276

This report gives an estimate of 1:48 for the total number of Palestinian security personnel in 2014 to the total PA population, equivalent to 2,083 security personnel to every 100,000 people—more security personnel per capita than almost any other country has. However, this includes the pre-Hamas security personnel on a “leave of absence” in Gaza. The actual number of security personnel on paid leaves of absence in 2023 may be much less than 33,550. Including only those on active duty, the ratio of security personnel

to all Palestinians in 2014 was 1,244 per 100,000 people, still high by international standards. If this ratio were applied to Gaza's current 2.1 million people, this would project that the Gaza Civil Police and gendarmerie should total about 26,000.

A better estimate would be that Gaza will need about 10,000 officers in the civil police and 5,000 in a gendarmerie, or 15,000 total, equivalent to 714 security personnel for every 100,000 people—a ratio that is still relatively high but not excessively so. A percentage of those put on paid leaves of absence in 2007 could be re-vetted and perhaps called back to active service in the Civil Police, but there will clearly be the need to train thousands of police officers and gendarmerie in six months to a year to provide civilian security in Gaza.

The work to set up, and be able to train, a post-Hamas PCP and PASF in Gaza should begin immediately, even before agreement to set up the MNA. (Several interested governments, including the United States, [may already have begun](#) this work.)

The MNA will need to quickly pension off pro-Hamas elements of the current Gazan PCP. New hires for the post-Hamas PCP, and for any members of the PCP who want to continue in the PCP, will need to be vetted three times, though vetting must be done in parallel, not one at a time: (1) by the MNA, (2) by Israel, and (3) by the United States using its intelligence and counterterrorism databases. In addition, European governments may be able to run prospective PCP candidates through their holdings.

Both the United States and the European Union have considerable experience in training the Palestinian police and security forces (gendarmerie). The [Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority](#) (USSC) is based in Jerusalem and headed by a Lieutenant General. USSC is supported by more than the United States: contributing nations include Bulgaria, Canada, Italy, Greece, Poland, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. USSC's work should be expanded with additional resources and personnel to assist in vetting and training the post-Hamas PCP and a gendarmerie for Gaza. In parallel, [EUPOL COPPS](#) coordinates training for the European Union. Consideration should be given to expanding its work as well, to include retraining the post-Hamas Gaza PCP.

Additionally, the United States has experience in setting up vetted units of law enforcement in countries where public integrity and the reputation of most local police are in question. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Investigations unit and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration have set up vetted law enforcement units in Central America and elsewhere.

One of the MNA's top priorities should be to get access to Gazan police, criminal, and (if possible) intelligence records. Israel may already have access to some of these records. This will allow the MNA to determine, for example, who is truly a criminal (especially violent criminals) and which Gazans are legitimate victims of Hamas's brutality. Based on experience in Iraq, it is possible Hamas will empty out what is left of its own prisons in order to deliberately make it difficult for the MNA to restore order.

19. A well-staffed finance team with a broad range of economic expertise will be needed to restart the Gazan economy.

Detailed plans need to be developed urgently for the immediate, if limited, purpose of restarting Gaza’s shattered economy so that it can sustain its population over the next year and—this is also very urgent—to end Hamas’s culture of corruption and repression. The MNA should learn from CPA’s experience in Iraq that economists looking at an economic disaster (Iraq in 2003, Gaza in 2024) can propose overly ambitious economic reforms that fail to address the practical needs of day-to-day living—this needs to be a caution. To use a medical analogy, the MNA will start with a patient in intensive care. The goal over the next two years needs to be to excise Hamas’s corrupt influence and stabilize the patient. The medical goal of rehabilitation—putting Gaza on a path to where it will not need international assistance—can be helped by what the MNA can do, but it will take years until the Gazan economy can achieve the goal of catching up to the West Bank and realizing the potential of the Gazan people. The MNA and the ICG member states need to make it clear that it will take a lasting peace with Israel for Gaza’s economy to truly prosper—there is no other economic or political option.

For the next several months, humanitarian assistance organizations will need to carry out their emergency operations. Gazans will need food, medical care, and shelter, especially during next winter. Existing aid agencies have the capacity to develop plans and budgets for what this will require. The MNA’s role will be to facilitate this assistance but not to duplicate what the aid agencies are able to do better.

Economic overview. Since Hamas took power in 2007, its economic mismanagement, and the security measures necessitated by Gaza-based terrorism and conventional attacks against Israel, have caused Gaza’s economy to fall far behind the West Bank (see [chart](#) below). According to a September 11, 2023 report by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) secretariat, [Gaza’s Gross Domestic Product \(GDP\) in 2022](#) was US\$2.7 billion in 2015 dollars, equivalent to \$3.5 billion in current (2023) dollars. In constant dollars, Gaza’s GDP is 1.1% higher than it was in 2006, but because Gaza’s population has increased 61%, from 1,349,000 to 2,166,000, this resulted in a change in per-capita GDP of –27%. The unemployment rate in Gaza in 2022 was 45.3%, according




Figure 1. GDP Per Capita, 2005-2015 (in constant prices, 2004 base year)

Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics¹

to the [UNCTAD secretariat](#), with only 527,000 in the workforce. The war started by Hamas's October 7 attack has further devastated Gaza's economy for ordinary Gazans.

Prior to October 7, Gaza's economy ran on a cash basis, which reduced the impact of financial sanctions on Hamas, facilitated corruption, promoted radicalization, and limited more efficient economic activity in Gaza. Gazans working in Israel—a principal source of income for many Gazan families—had taxes withheld by their Israeli employer and remitted to the PA, but Hamas imposed an extra tax on cash that workers brought back to Gaza. One recent [Israeli media report](#), citing Israeli analysts, said Hamas collected approximately US\$300 million from taxes on Gazans, US\$700 million from smuggling through and under the Rafah crossing, \$500 million from “charities” abroad, and \$250 million from Iran. The last three sums paid for Hamas's military and its military infrastructure, including tunnels.

Steps the MNA will need to take: Gaining access to Hamas's funds will be important to help fund international stabilization and reconstruction efforts, and to promote de-radicalization efforts. However, wholesale seizures of noncombatants' currency is neither legal under international law nor wise as a matter of policy. The MNA will need teams of people, most of which will need to be seconded by governments like the United States, with help from Israel, who can be assigned to seize Hamas's assets (cash, bank accounts, and cryptocurrency) and determine which Hamas properties should be seized.

At the same time, the MNA, working with local Gazans, Egyptians, and Israelis, should identify Gazan businesses needed for ordinary life, especially food and essentials, and provide those businesses access to new sources of commercial finance to re-open quickly. The MNA will need to work with Israel and Egypt to help rebuild inventories of necessities. This will likely require purchasing supplies in Israel and Egypt, or elsewhere, for wholesale delivery into the parts of Gaza where the shooting has stopped. The MNA should also facilitate delivery of food and other essential supplies by responsible, vetted international NGO's. Increased commercial supplies, and delivery of supplies through humanitarian NGO's, should reduce the incidence of hunger and privation. The return of markets for staples can provide alternatives for most Gazans to meet their daily needs and provide jobs to engage Gazans constructively.

Mobile payments: One urgent step over the first two to three months should be to implement an alternative payments system, probably based on mobile phone technology. About 69% of Gazans have mobile phones, according to 2022 data. This will allow for more secure payments than just using cash, reduce the opportunity for corruption, avoid the need to move large quantities of currency, as well as allowing for more transparent and fair taxation. It will also make terrorist finance more difficult. The United States did not implement this system in Iraq in 2003—Iraq's communications technology infrastructure at the time did not allow it. The United States and other international donors urged Iraq to do this years later. There are number of commercial vendors worldwide that could help today to set up a mobile payments system in Gaza. An [Atlantic Council study](#) in February 2024 described such a payments system.

Banking, hawalahs, assets control, and cryptocurrency expertise: During the first six months, Gaza will need to restore basic commercial banking and to establish vetted hawalas (networks of small, money-changing businesses) that will operate legitimately, and not be used to fund terrorism. According to the [Wall Street Journal](#), starting in 2020, Iran used hawalas in Gaza to channel tens of millions of dollars in cryptocurrency to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The MNA will need to use banking and foreign assets control experts seconded from the United States and other countries, working with counterparts in Israel, to ensure that banks and hawalahs meet international standards.

During the first year, in order to reduce Hamas’s remaining influence, the MNA will need to implement reforms in civil service hiring, government contracting, business practices, and licensing. These reforms will need to be one of the MNA’s most important positive legacies. Detailed plans should take account of salaries and pensions in Gaza that the PA is currently funding from Ramallah. Where possible, experienced, non-political civil servants should be retained, applying the lessons learned from the ill-advised mass de-Baathification in Iraq. Reforms also need to take into account the *hamayil* family-based networks important in Gazan life that sometimes control which families get hired into which ministries. **These reforms will require more than economists alone to develop.** Reforms that fail to recognize the complexities of Gaza’s social networks are not likely to be sustainable, but some reforms will improve the lives of ordinary Gazans.

Gaza will have extensive reconstruction needs, with the immediate need of rebuilding the housing stock. By some estimates, 50% or more of Gaza’s housing stock may be uninhabitable by the end of the war. This will create both short-term emergency housing needs and require longer-term plans for Gazans and international donors to plan large-scale reconstruction projects. Based on experience in the Balkans, Iraq (e.g., [Basrah Children’s Hospital](#)), and elsewhere, the MNA will sometimes need to stand firm and urge donors to resist funding large-scale “prestige” projects at the expense of more practical, smaller-scale projects and creation of mortgage facilities. Gaza will need for access on the order of \$30-\$40 billion to rebuild its housing stock and small businesses. The MNA, working with the people of Gaza, will need to make every donor contribution count.

Sections 12-19 above are “Day One” priorities. Sections 20-28 refer to important priorities that will need to be undertaken immediately but whose effects will take time to succeed.

20. The MNA needs to develop the capacity and capability to listen to what Gaza’s residents want.

Ordinary Gazans must have a say in their future. The MNA, in addition to its technocratic efforts to restore basic services and remove Hamas’s radicalizing influences, will need a political section to listen to Gazans, engage with them, and advise the High Representative in making decisions with political implications. The MNA will face the temptation of previous international authorities to be “captured” by elites, returning exiles, and people who speak international languages like English or French (or Hebrew) well. The MNA will need this political section to engage with leaders of *hamayil*, religious leaders,

doctors and other professionals—but not only with elites. Many people will claim to, but do not, speak for the people of Gaza.

21. Even though schools will likely be closed until fall, prioritize a reset to Gaza’s schools.

Gazan schools are currently closed, and as a practical matter, many may not be able to open until the next academic year begins in late August or early September. The MNA will need to work towards re-opening schools, and will need to review the educational curriculum to end the amplification of hatred of Israel, especially in the schools that were run by Hamas.

Gaza had three different educational systems for primary and secondary education, plus a dozen colleges and universities. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Education, when [Gaza started its school year in August 2023](#), almost 30% of Gaza’s population attended primary or secondary school:

	Students	Teachers	Schools	Student:Teacher Ratio
State schools (Hamas)	305,000	12,000	448	25:1
UNRWA schools	300,000	9,300	228	32:1
Private schools	21,000	1,300	67	16:1

The MNA will need to make potentially controversial decisions on curriculum and other issues. It will need to have sufficient oversight capability to make sure that reforms are implemented in the classroom. There are many experts today in the Middle East and outside it who have constructive ideas for an educational curriculum that is true to Palestinian history and in the best interests of building towards lasting coexistence. However, in order to get textbooks or other materials printed, the MNA will need to engage with educational experts at the earliest opportunity.

The best Arab model for rebuilding Gazan educational materials to provide a modern curriculum is the educational system of the United Arab Emirates. Most Middle East [experts](#) believe that the UAE has done better than other countries in [purging](#) extremism, intolerance, and al-Islah (the UAE branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) from [Emirati schools](#). Educational curriculum encourages curiosity, dialogue, and promotes a tolerant Islam. Textbooks take a [largely realist view](#) of international relations.

22. Border security for Gaza that Israel can live with—not a siege—is vital.

Israel has a legitimate security interest in ensuring that neither Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iran, nor anyone else can smuggle in or out of Gaza the means of waging war or carrying out terrorist attacks. Both Israel and Egypt have a legitimate interest in ensuring that terrorists are not able to cross freely in or out of Gaza. To these ends, the MNA will need to work with Israel and Egypt to ensure border security, clearance of travelers and cargoes entering and leaving Gaza, and legitimate customs and health inspections.

However, unnecessary delays at border checkpoints are one of the major sources of “friction” felt by ordinary Gazans. If the MNA can improve this aspect of Gazans’ lives, it will gain political capital that will allow the MNA to take other necessary measures, including de-radicalization, some of which will be less popular with Gazans.

The MNA will therefore need to work with Israel and Egypt to be able to move legitimate trade and travel through crossing points securely and expeditiously. This will require having modern screening equipment and sufficient personnel to conduct inspections promptly and securely. This will require the MNA to be able to command, not merely request, prompt Israeli security clearance of imports and exports at all border crossings, including Rafah. Israel can address its legitimate security needs, but delaying customs clearance for goods or people cannot be used as a tactic. International assistance by border agencies through the MNA can help build the infrastructure and design the data systems that will allow Gaza’s border crossings to be both secure and efficient.

Comparable arrangements will be needed for seaborne access to Gaza. The MNA will need to work closely with Israeli maritime and security services and to establish inspection and clearance for vessels arriving at sea or that offload or take on cargo from Gaza. Humanitarian assistance that comes by sea must be inspected and travelers vetted as securely as if they had entered at a land crossing point. [Efforts in Cyprus](#) to allow Israeli inspections of shipments on Cyprus is an example of this approach. The MNA will need to work with international aid donors to take advantage of the U.S. floating pier now under construction, so that aid can be distributed fairly and reliably without diversion by Hamas remnants.

Gaza’s airport in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip has been closed since October 2000 during the Second Intifada. When security is sufficiently stable, perhaps late in the MNA’s first year, the MNA should consider starting the rebuilding of Gaza’s airport with modern security screening equipment and data systems, and with both Egyptian and Israeli security and customs personnel stationed at the airport in a preclearance role to securely vet travelers and cargo. Rebuilding of the airport would likely take at least two or three years, but starting construction would send an important symbolic message to Gaza’s people that with Hamas’s removal, Gaza’s isolation could come to an end. However, strong security and complete transparency with both Israel and Egypt should be built into airport’s security and screening systems. When the airport is eventually operational, Israel and Egypt, for legitimate security reasons, will both want to the ability to determine the origin/destination of flights in and out of Gaza. (Any civilian aircraft would have to overfly Israel and Egypt to land or takeoff from Gaza.)

23. Liaison with Israeli security services over Gazans detained by Israel; establishing an MNA de-radicalization/de-mobilization/re-integration program.

When the MNA assumes the administration of Gaza, Israel will have custody of individuals detained during the conflict or security operations afterwards. Whether the MNA takes over detention of captured or surrendered Hamas fighters will have to be worked out between Israel and the MNA. Until such time, Israel will retain custody of

those individuals. Israel and the MNA will also need to address how those responsible for the October 7 attacks will be held accountable.

In the meantime, the MNA should have the formal role of checking on detainees' status, to ensure that detainees' humanitarian needs are met, and that conditions for detention meet relevant international standards—particularly avoiding overcrowding. The MNA will also need to facilitate communications between detainees and their families in keeping with security requirements and international norms.

As described in [Annex I, section 9](#), the MNA should develop a de-radicalization/de-mobilization/re-integration program (DDR); this should not be an obligation of Israel, though Israel has a strong, legitimate interest that this program be successful. The MNA's DDR program will need to be extensive, potentially reaching more than ten thousand armed Hamas men. The MNA's DDR program should learn from the successful and unsuccessful experiences in DDR programs in other theaters of conflict. In many ways, though, the success of this DDR program will determine whether the strategic goals of building lasting peace and security for Israelis and Palestinians will be achieved.

24. Plan and oversee the design of housing for next winter to ensure basic humanitarian housing needs are met.

Humanitarian aid organizations will treat housing for Gaza's civilian population for the winter of 2024 as a priority, but those facilities and arrangements may be so temporary that they do not last through the summer of 2024 and the winter of 2025. The MNA will need a program office to oversee the reconstruction of basic housing for Gaza's population, coordinating international donations and helping to deconflict different housing reconstruction projects to avoid overlapping or exceeding the capacity of the SWET systems that will need to serve those rebuilt housing units.

25. Reform Gaza's judicial system, prioritizing removing Hamas influence from Gaza's courts starting with retiring Hamas-affiliated judges.

Gaza's judicial system is a mess, with some courts controlled by Hamas, others controlled by *hamayil* leaders, and some nominally part of the PA's judicial system. International law will allow the MNA to make some reforms, but a comprehensive overhaul, while long overdue, will extend beyond the MNA's expected governance timeframe. The MNA should focus on removing Hamas's influence both (i) over court personnel and (ii) by modifying laws that discriminate against women in violation of international norms.

Gaza's criminal courts will need the most urgent overhaul. Initially, most of those arrested by the IDF or the MNA PF will be placed in detention awaiting some kind of judicial proceeding. Setting up courts within the MNA to hear cases of those detained by the MNA PF needs to be a priority. The MNA will need to set up a process to review sentences handed down by Hamas's courts or security services to determine who deserves release as political prisoners.

The MNA should plan to reform civil courts to remove Hamas’s influence, but this will be a secondary priority to the overhaul of the criminal courts. The MNA will probably need to allow consent-based resolution of private disputes using *hamula*-based dispute resolution methods, recognizing the tension between this and the rights of women.

26. Survey damaged and functional buildings to assess reconstruction priorities.

The MNA will need to undertake a survey of damaged and functional buildings throughout Gaza and make an assessment of reconstruction priorities. Humanitarian aid groups have already begun some of the work required, but a combination of satellite imagery, aerial photography, and on-ground surveys will be needed. The MNA should work with local Gazans to understand whether new building codes are needed and how strictly existing building codes should be enforced.

At some point in 2024, the MNA will need to convene a donor’s conference to set out reconstruction priorities and to obtain pledges from donor governments. This will need to raise at least \$30-\$40 billion over several years. As noted in point 17 above, the MNA needs the authority to say No to donations that are inappropriate for Gaza, though the MNA would work first to try to reshape or re-characterize projects that did not make sense.

27. Setting up local councils to rebuild representative governance and support reconstruction from the bottom-up.

In 1995, the Palestinian Authority organized the Gaza Strip into five governorates and within them, 25 local administrative units ranging in size from cities to local councils, as described in more detail in [Annex III](#). The MNA should maintain this structure.

Initially, the MNA should work with local Gazans to identify people to appoint for interim, transitional terms to lead, first, the five governorates and then the 25 local administrative units. Their terms of office must be written delegations of authority from the MNA to avoid later negotiations on extensions. The terms of office must be published in the local media as being transitional in nature and leading to local and governorate council elections.

The appointed governors and their core staffs should have a key role in appointing the leaders of the 25 local administrative units under them.

The MNA High Representative must have dedicated governance and reconstructions staff for each of the five governorates of the Gaza Strip, plus a national staff to work with the Gaza-wide ministries and Gaza council.

Although **the MNA should have the authority to run elections**, no Gaza-wide elections should be held for at least a year, given the need to build new civil society institutions free of Hamas’s radicalizing influence. In the short term, these transitional governorate and local council officials should be set up to provide a formal means for Gazans to engage politically with the MNA and, perhaps, even the PA.

In appointing the governorate and local council officials and representatives to sit on the councils, the MNA should consult with local Gazans and Israeli authorities, including the IDF and the Israeli General Security Service (Shin Bet), which have primary responsibility in Israel for intelligence on Palestinian affairs.

For the MNA to make these transitional appointments requires a thorough understanding of Gaza and Palestinian society and politics at the Gaza-wide, governorate, and local levels. For instance, there are balances that will need to be maintained, depending on the composition of the governorate or locality, between those from post-1948 refugee backgrounds (who are the great majority in some parts of Gaza) and those whose families are from pre-1948 Gaza. There are balances between people with urban and Bedouin backgrounds to keep in mind in some localities, and tribal or familial ties that in some places bind members of a community. Even if Gazans want to avoid tribal identities as pre-modern, which is often the case, nevertheless keeping in mind the tribal composition in the locality in question will be important in the MNA's making transitional appointments to local government.

During this transitional period to elected local government, the MNA will fund the local councils.

The MNA will give governorate and local councils moderate-sized reconstruction budgets to spend on local projects agreed upon by the councils, both to meet local, urgent needs for which the MNA or Gazan ministries did not budget, and to enhance the councils' credibility so they can deliver tangible benefits to their constituents.

One lesson for the MNA is that building up representative government costs money, especially when Hamas remnants and its die-hard supporters may have access to clandestine sources of funding that could disrupt the alternative political process the MNA is seeking to develop.

28. Setting up and funding a Palestinian Gaza Government based on the local councils.

Parallel with the efforts to appoint and work with the five governorates, and their local administrative units, the MNA Gaza-wide team should engage the existing ministry officials, coordinating with the PA where possible, because the PA funds some Gaza government workers' salaries, and because the PA will have had direct contact with current or former Gaza government officials. Ministry officials with strong Hamas ties should be removed from office wherever feasible, as soon as the MNA identifies replacements.

Just as at the governorate and local levels, the Gaza ministry appointments will be interim, transitional—and confirmed in writing and published in the media.

The timing of elections for a Gaza parliament, which would form a new Gaza government and then appoint officials, should be left to the discretion of the High Representative in consultation with the appointed Gaza officials, the ICG, the PA, and Israel. Following Gaza-wide elections, appointments to senior ministry positions would be the job of an elected government of Gaza.

The MNA and ICG should resist pressures to determine in advance the date of new elections, noting that it should be based on progress on the ground in Gaza's physical and social reconstruction, including de-radicalization. The MNA's mission also may not be finished with the election of a new Gaza government and appointment of ministry officials; both the security and civilian side of the MNA may be needed by the new government for some time following elections.

Sections 29 and 30 address the security and political endstate conditions.

29. Eventually, the PF would withdraw from Gaza when conditions justify this.

The MNA's Policing Force should withdraw from Gaza when there is an alternative body able to provide for security and law enforcement functions and not leave a security vacuum that could be exploited by terrorists or criminals. This withdrawal should be conditions-based, not timeline-based.

The MNA should develop a more detailed exit strategy after six to twelve months, in consultation with Israel and the ICG. Any exit strategy developed before this would likely require assumptions that may not be met or may not be achievable.

The withdrawal agreement will need to be negotiated principally among the MNA, Israel, Egypt, and whatever political entity will represent the Gazan people. Other ICG member states, especially the states that contributed to the Policing Force, would also be interested parties in the negotiation of the agreement.

30. When conditions permit, the MNA would end its governance roles and authority, while continuing to coordinate stabilization, reconstruction, training, and technical assistance.

As the successor to Israel as the occupying power, the MNA would eventually end its governance roles and authority, transferring that to whatever is determined to be the successor power. This decision should be conditions-based, not timeline-based.

The MNA should develop a more detailed exit strategy after 6-12 months. Any exit strategy developed before this would likely require assumptions that may not be met or may not be achievable.

The exit strategy should be developed by the MNA in consultation with Israel, Egypt, the ICG, and whatever political entity will represent the Gazan people. Other ICG member states would also be interested parties in the negotiation of the agreement.

Part IV – Egypt's role

Egypt will play a number of vital roles in postwar Gaza, reflecting its regional importance and its interest in a secure region:

1. Egypt’s relationship with the MNA and the ICG.

Egypt’s support for the International Contact Group and Multi-National Authority will be important. First, Egypt will participate as a member of the International Contact Group. Second, Egypt will maintain close working relationships with the MNA and the High Representative. A number of Egyptian ministries will want to work closely with the offices of the MNA and Gazan ministries to implement security, assistance, and reconstruction programs.

Egypt should also support the MNA in setting up liaison offices in Cairo and in the Sinai, because of much of the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance will enter Gaza through Egypt. Egyptian ministries should be prepared to set up means to expedite transshipment of goods and the movement of officials and assistance workers in and out of Gaza.

2. Security cooperation between Egypt and the MNA.

Egypt has a strong interest in ensuring that no terrorists or terrorist groups enter Egypt or use Egyptian territory for transit or to carry out operations against Egyptian interests. Egypt will therefore want to provide intelligence support to the Multi-National Authority to enable it to carry out its security operations, and to receive intelligence support on any threats to Egyptian interests. Existing intelligence and security cooperation and consultations between Egypt and Israel would continue as at present.

3. The importance of the Rafah border crossing and the port of El-Arish.

For the foreseeable future, Egypt’s border crossing with Gaza at Rafah will likely be the main ground conduit for humanitarian supplies, reconstruction materials, and other imports. Increasing the capacity and security of the Rafah crossing is now an international imperative, for both security and humanitarian reasons, and Egypt has every reason to expect that other governments should assist Egypt so that Egypt does not bear the full cost of the necessary expansion. Expansion planning should begin even before the MNA is fully operational.

When the MNA becomes operational, Egypt will coordinate closely with both the MNA and Israel on inspection of goods and on the full range of activities needed to operate the Rafah crossing. The MNA will need to coordinate international assistance from the United States or other countries to improve facilities at Rafah to speed up the security processing and inspection of goods and people crossing in or out of Gaza. Israel will need to provide sufficient personnel and resources to assist Egypt and the MNA so that processing of goods and people proceeds both expeditiously and securely.

Egypt will want to work with the MNA and Israel to develop an integrated capability to exchange information on cargo and travelers transiting Rafah. Shippers and travelers should submit information to a common data portal in advance of arrival, which can be routed to all three entities (Egypt, the MNA/Gaza, and Israel) for security checks, analysis, and clearance. Every feasible effort should be made to reduce the burden on

border guards, inspectors, and customs officials while increasing the security and capacity of the Rafah crossing.

With international support, the northern Sinai should become the hub of support activities for the reconstruction of Gaza. El-Arish, as the only deepwater port in the northern Sinai (satellite image at right), is the most probable place for trans-shipment of cargo destined for Gaza, but it will almost certainly need upgrades to accommodate international assistance shipments. Integrated data collection and inspection for clearance of cargo could speed up processing at the Rafah crossing. Egypt has every reason to expect that other governments should assist Egypt so that Egypt does not bear the full cost of the necessary expansion of the port of El-Arish. The same expectation should apply to upgrades of the roads from the port of El-Arish to Rafah if expansion is necessary.



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Part V – The role of the Palestinian Authority

The PA should have a special consultative role to offer advice and assistance, and to be informed about, the work of the MNA in Gaza. That role should be outlined in a separate agreement negotiated between the PA and the MNA. During the MNA’s governance of Gaza, the PA would not be a member of the ICG, given the structural conflict of interests that would otherwise arise. One option to establish the MNA’s legitimacy would be if the PA asked the MNA to take responsibility for Gaza. However, this is likely to lead to the PA insisting on assurances about the political endstate for Gaza when Israel is not ready for those discussions.

During the initial phase of the MNA’s governance of Gaza, payment of salaries in Gaza should continue. Before October 7, [according to PA Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh](#), the PA had a role in helping to cover the cost of electricity and water in Gaza (using about one-third of the taxes collected by Israel). The PA provided teaching materials, paid the salaries of teachers in Hamas-run schools, and paid the salaries of doctors and some non-Hamas government workers. It also issued travel documents to Gazans. For the initial period, at least, payments to Gazans should continue, and the PA should continue to issue travel documents. Some PA-provided teaching materials would also continue to be provided, albeit after an MNA review. The PA will also work closely with the MNA and Israel on the funding necessary to restore electricity and water service to Gazans.

Efforts are now underway by the United States, the United Kingdom, and others to help reform the PA. The agreement between the PA and the MNA should be subject to review every six months, in case the agreement needs to be adjusted.

However, the success of PA reforms will likely remain undecided for some time. The PA will need to undertake its own internal reforms, increase its capacity to provide necessary services to Gaza, address its organizational and leadership challenges, and deal with its credibility problems. Bringing Hamas leaders or supporters into PA political structures raises questions whether or how those individuals will be required to give up forever, in a credible way, the idea of eliminating the State of Israel. The MNA will need to keep its focus on Gaza from the outset.

Part VI – Roles of others

1. The United Nations

The United Nations Security Council would, ideally, adopt a Chapter VII resolution to confirm a set of workable arrangements for the Multi-National Authority, as it did for Bosnia in UNSCR 1031 (1995) (see [Annex IV.B.](#)). However, this may not be achievable if one of the permanent members threatens to veto a workable resolution or wants to impose unworkable conditions. Lack of a workable UN Security Council resolution must not be a showstopper for setting up the MNA.

Other parts of the United Nations will have a very limited role in postwar Gaza. UNRWA, for example, will need to be replaced by different arrangements to deliver the health and educational services UNRWA now provides to Gazans. The MNA will need to review other UN programs for Gaza to ensure they do not preserve or strengthen Hamas or other terrorist groups.

2. The European Union and European governments

The European Union (EU) and European governments—including significant non-EU countries like the United Kingdom, Norway, and Switzerland—should be offered prominent public roles in the MNA and its component services. This will encourage Europeans to resource the effort and may encourage Palestinian cooperation. The EU may want to join the ICG as a member (this would be an allowed exception to the general rule against multinational organizations as ICG members), and may be willing to contribute financially or providing assistance through EU institutions.

Whether European governments choose to support the MNA’s work through bilateral or multilateral arrangements is largely a decision for the governments involved.

Existing European support for training police (through EUPOL COPPS) and the local security services (through individual countries) are examples of models that could usefully be applied for assistance to help the MNA rebuild the Gazan police.

3. Middle Eastern governments.

Arab Middle Eastern governments should be invited to join in the work of the MNA, and several may be prominent members of the ICG. Arab governments may be an important source of funding for the MNA’s humanitarian, reconstruction, and other activities that

benefit the Gazan people, and may contribute expertise to the MNA. However, non-Arab governments must bear in mind that Arab governments have their own internal and external political considerations, constraints, and differences that must be considered.

Iran is certain to be a spoiler, and its probable actions and capabilities need to be factored into the MNA's planning.

4. Russia.

Although Russia enjoys better relations with Israel than Russia has with many other states, Russia's relations with Hamas, Iran, and Syria, and its extreme animus against the United States, make it far more likely than not that Russia will be a spoiler to the MNA and the ICG.

During the formation of the MNA and the ICG, Israel should, with full transparency with the United States, approach Russia to see if Russia's present leadership is prepared to support Israel's objectives with respect to Gaza, and to support the work of the MNA and the ICG. Once Russia gives its response, or fails to respond, Israel and the United States will need to consult and agree on next steps.

For planning purposes, this plan assumes Russia's response will not be positive enough to include Russia in the ICG and the MNA.

Russia's veto power in the UN Security Council makes it difficult to rely on adoption or renewals of Security Council mandates. Similarly, Russian officials in key roles in the United Nations make relying on the UN Secretariat problematic.

5. China.

China will try to use postwar Gaza to advance its own interests in any engagement involving Israel or the United States in connection with the ICG and the MNA. As with Russia: Israel and the United States would need to agree on any substantive engagement with China beyond current levels of purely diplomatic discourse.

Given the United States' concerns about China, this plan will assume China will not be interested in facilitating the work of the ICG or the MNA except at a political or security price that neither the United States nor Israel would want to pay. China might expect to demand control over how its money is spent, a certain number of senior positions in the MNA, or the ability to use Chinese technology that would raise strong security concerns for the United States and other countries.

As with Russia, China's veto power in the UN Security Council makes it difficult for the MNA, the United States, and Israel to rely on adoption or renewals of Security Council mandates. The importance of the MNA's work should not be subject to Chinese linkage with other issues, e.g., Taiwan or the South China Sea. Similarly, Chinese officials in key roles in the United Nations make relying on the UN Secretariat problematic.

Part VII – The people of Gaza

While this is Part VII of this plan, the people of Gaza are at the center of what needs to be done to build a Gaza that is prosperous and at peace, with security, opportunity, and dignity, alongside the State of Israel.

It would be presumptuous for this report to tell the people of Gaza, emerging from a war started by Hamas’s leaders, what to think after the war is over.

However, other countries have gone through military defeats and emerged as prosperous, democratic, and at peace with their neighbors. Other countries have successfully taken the road that Gazans need to decide, for themselves, whether they will take. A positive vision for Gaza and a Palestinian entity in the future will greatly assist in building support for the transition.

Gazans will obviously play vital roles in rebuilding Gaza after the war, and in building Gaza’s future. Many of these roles are explained in Part III. For example:

1. Key professionals (medical professionals, first responders, SWET administrators, bakers, shopkeepers who stock essential items) need to help rapidly re-establish their operations in these key sectors.
2. Gazans will participate in establishing local councils with the support of the MNA, as described in Part III, section [27](#).
3. Building on the local councils, Gazans will also participate in establishing a Palestinian Gaza Local Government, as described in Part III, section [28](#).
4. Under supervision of the MNA and its Policing Force, the Gazan Local Government will assume responsibility for local security forces.
5. Gazans will eventually assume all governance roles from the MNA, which would continue after transfer as an international coordinator of humanitarian, stabilization, reconstruction, and technical assistance.

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Annex I: De-Radicalization, De-Mobilization, and Re-Integration in Gaza

Strategic Objective: To establish a lasting peace for the benefit of both Israelis and Palestinians, any successful postwar plan for Gaza must include de-radicalization, de-mobilization, and re-integration (DDR) of Hamas and other terrorist groups to end the cycle of violence, prevent future attacks by Hamas or Gaza-based terrorists against Israel and other countries, provide for a better life for the people of Gaza and the Israeli people who are their neighbors, and create the conditions for a positive socioeconomic and political reality in Gaza.

*Israeli expert thinking on de-radicalization has focused on specific sectors or issues—education, media, religious and civic institutions, and the continued discrimination by aid agencies between those whose families came to Gaza as refugees starting in 1948 compared to those whose families previously lived in Gaza. **These four lines of effort are all important**, and are covered in sections [4](#), [5](#), [6](#), and [7](#) of this Annex. However, other lines of effort are also important, as this Annex describes.*

While programs to achieve de-radicalization are woven throughout the fabric of this Plan for Postwar Gaza, this Annex draws those together to show how these programs and the Multi-National Authority work together to achieve this result. Treating de-radicalization as incidental to the physical reconstruction of Gaza, or entrusting it to governments or entities that would not give it priority, risks having Gaza fall back into the hands of Hamas or a similar terrorist group that could bring suffering to both Israelis and Gazans, as Hamas has done repeatedly. This is why a Multi-National Authority is the best means to achieve a lasting peace.

Historical context

History shows success in de-radicalization is possible, with lessons both on what to do and what not to do—and history shows that some of those lessons have been misapplied. Since World War II, Germany and Japan have become democratic and prosperous, but the fraught history in Germany of [Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung](#) (coming to terms with the past) shows that de-radicalization was initially unpopular but ultimately embraced in ways that have proven deep and long-lasting. Japan repudiated militarism and embraced the U.S.-assisted constitution that disavows the use of military force, but failed to adequately address systematic sexual assaults against its Asian neighbors. The Balkans since Dayton have undergone a transformation that is far from perfect but the Balkans have not been at war for more than twenty years. Iraq is a partial success—no longer the threat to international security it was under Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party but still facing internal and external social and political challenges that were the result of a de-radicalization effort that rejected more sensible advice, followed false narratives, and made [mistakes](#) that were known at the time to be wrong but were implemented anyway by outsiders who failed to understand Iraqi society.

History shows that fast, cheap, and easy de-radicalization does not work—but lasting, positive change has happened and, with resources and time, can happen in Gaza.

Germany was occupied for four years, Japan for seven. Proper consideration of the reasons for de-radicalization’s successes and failures, and of Gazan society, will be essential.

Linkage is the key: Linkage of all the elements of a DDR program is absolutely essential—governance, funding, programmatic offices, the external environment, education, media, the role of religious and social institutions, equal treatment of all Gazans, truth-telling to the Palestinian people, and demobilization of Hamas fighters all must work together. DDR will not work if it is an “add-on” program or the responsibility of a single program office, nor if it is thought of as a purely military or a purely “social” program. Some United Nations DDR programs have fallen short, for example, because they depended on voluntary cooperation from warring parties that reluctantly agreed to end their fighting, but where the UN DDR program lacked the means to compel compliance in the face of obstruction or backsliding. Separate, uncoordinated programs under the control of different governments is often a recipe for failure, leading to programs that, intentionally or not, undercut rather than reinforce each other.

As the [Plan for Postwar Gaza](#) notes ([Constraints](#), point 1, page 15), there are multiple links among (i) humanitarian assistance, restoring Gaza’s economy, re-establishing basic services, and technical assistance to Gaza and (ii) the status of security in Gaza. De-radicalization both *requires* security and *advances* security. Civilian agencies involved in these efforts cannot operate without security—most will withdraw their personnel if they come under fire. The absence of civilian security invites armed militias to take charge over an area, undermining de-radicalization. Militias usually seize whatever assistance is available so that they can control the distribution of that aid to a desperate population. This, in turn, cements popular support for the militias, and strengthens their hand in obtaining weapons to carry out further acts of violence and intimidation against the people. For this reason, armed peacekeepers with robust rules of engagement and the ability to provide a visible security presence will be essential. **De-radicalization likewise cannot occur without security.** That security should not come from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), and it will take six to nine months before re-vetted (to remove Hamas influences), retrained local Gazan civil police will be ready to help with this task—and even then, they must report to an authority—not today’s Palestinian Authority (PA)—that is both willing and resourced to oversee de-radicalization and other DDR efforts.

Why a Multi-National Authority (MNA) is the best way to achieve de-radicalization:

The [Plan for Postwar Gaza](#) calls for the MNA to have [governing authority](#) in Gaza, backed up and overseen by an [International Contact Group](#) (ICG) whose internationally approved charter gives it international legitimacy. As happened with the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, a UN Security Council resolution comparable to [UNSCR 1031](#) (1995) would give the MNA and the ICG additional legitimacy but is not essential. Israeli-led de-radicalization efforts would not have the necessary legitimacy or credibility. Arab governments alone in charge of Gaza would likely give more weight to physical reconstruction than the equally necessary need for social reconstruction, which includes de-radicalization. Even though many Arab governments regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a security threat at home, the domestic politics of those Arab governments would favor the

easier task of pouring concrete to the harder task of de-radicalization. The [Plan for Postwar Gaza](#) also includes a policing force ([point 4, page 32](#)) able to address basic security for Gazan society, while Israel continues to carry out security operations against Hamas remnants that are also a threat to the de-radicalization of Gaza.

Core de-radicalization lines of effort

Success in possible, even in Gaza: There is evidence to support the conclusion that even after Hamas started the war on October 7, de-radicalization efforts will find some support among a significant number of Gazans. [Opinion polling](#) during the November-December pause in fighting said that Hamas’s support in Gaza for continuing to govern Gaza was under 40%. However, a greater number of Gazans, more than 50%, believe that Hamas will stay in power in Gaza after the war. More significantly, even after seventeen years of Hamas rule, only [56% of Gazans](#) believed that armed struggle was the best means to achieve Palestinian goals, with [43% favoring nonviolence or negotiations](#). **Subsequent polling in March 2024 in Gaza has shown even stronger support for nonviolence or negotiations: [50% of Gazans now support nonviolence or negotiations, compared to only 39% who support armed struggle](#).** As (now-deceased) Hamas deputy chief Saleh al-Arouri told the [Times of London](#) in 2007, “Our job is to keep the Palestinians radicalized. Most of them would settle in a moment for peace, some deal that will let them get on with their lives. We need to keep them angry.”

While it is commonly understood that education, media, and religious and civic institutions play vital roles in de-radicalization, an effective plan for de-radicalizing Gaza needs to rest on additional lines of effort. This Annex provides details on the most important lines of effort.

1. Governance: the role of the Multi-National Authority in hiring, selecting, recognizing, and advancing.

Whoever is in charge of governance of Gaza will make tens or hundreds of thousands of decisions over the next several years to hire, select, recognize, and advance individuals. A distinction will need to be drawn between future decisions and what to do about current officials tied to Hamas.

Looking forward: One of the most important factors determining Gaza’s future is whether government positions or other preferments go to those who support violent attacks on Israel or those who do not. De-radicalization efforts should inform every discretionary act of governing:

- Hiring decisions for local government positions ([see Plan for Postwar Gaza, points 14, 15, 18, 25, and 27, starting on page 42](#)).
- Who is selected to serve on local councils ([see Plan for Postwar Gaza, points 27 and 28, starting on page 53](#)).
- Who is selected for government contracts ([see Plan for Postwar Gaza, point 19, particularly pages 48-49](#)).

- Who is recognized for accomplishments such as reconstruction milestones ([Plan for Postwar Gaza, point 27, page 54](#)).
- Who is selected for scholarships and awards.

Hamas used all of these levers, and far more oppressive measures, to reward its adherents when it was in power.

Building civil society: While hiring is the most obvious influence the MNA will have on de-radicalization, other methods to shape post-Hamas Gaza civil society are also important. The MNA will have convening power to bring Gazans together, and can use this to draw out under-represented voices who were largely silenced during Hamas’s rule. The MNA will be controlling invitations to public events such as ribbon-cuttings for major reconstruction projects ([Plan for Postwar Gaza, point 27, page 54](#)). The MNA will also have “seed money” it can use to fund civil society projects.

Lustration—removal of key officials tied to Hamas: A number of key officials who are closely tied to Hamas or who exert power over other Gazans will need to be removed from their positions and either retired (pensioned off) or found other work where their views on the use of violence against Israel will not be a security danger. Key areas for prioritization:

- Judges and court officials ([see Plan for Postwar Gaza, point 25, page 52](#)).
- Prison officials and guards in Hamas-run detention sites.
- Finance officials (see [section 2](#) below and [Plan for Postwar Gaza point 19, particularly pages 48-49](#)).
- Education officials (see [section 4](#) below and [Plan for Postwar Gaza point 21, page 50](#)).
- Occupants of luxury villas used by Hamas officials. These carry symbolic importance as signs of power.
- Personal bodyguards for Hamas officials.

The U.S. experience with “de-Baathification” in Iraq shows that removing too many officials can have strongly negative, irreversible consequences. The U.S. decision to fire all Baath Party members down to the fourth level (*firqa*) was done at the suggestion of a [small group of Iraqi](#) exiles who wanted to remove their future political opponents. Those same exiles then ran a process of granting waivers to Iraqis who paid bribes or swore political allegiance to certain parties or officeholders. (This illustrates the vital need for integrity among those entrusted with de-radicalization decisions.) Most dangerously, though, this decision, coupled with the decision to disband the Iraqi army without providing alternative employment, helped drive tens of thousands of Sunni Iraqis into the hands of the violent [insurgency](#) led by former officials of the Saddam Hussein regime. This, in turn, led to repressive measures by Iraq’s Shia majority, including reaching out to Iran for support, which in turn led many Iraqi Sunnis to support the so-called Islamic State in 2014.

Similarly, the U.S. experience in Iraq shows the importance of not cutting off dismissed officials from pensions or other forms of economic survival. This was known to be wrong at the time but was done anyway by U.S. officials who did not understand Iraq. Dismissing tens of thousands of former government and military officials ensured they would go to work for an insurgency. It took several months for the United States to reverse this decision. By the

time pensions were restored for many, the insurgency had grown and the damage could not be undone.

Experience from Germany, Japan, and Iraq shows the importance of having general rules for which officials should be removed, but some flexibility to allow exceptions. Some number of Hamas sympathizers will be willing to renounce their support for Hamas. Done in the right way, some number of exceptions can pull larger numbers of others away from Hamas's extremist ideology.

Reliance on cooperation from security services: One of the MNA's greatest challenges in determining who should be given positions of trust and authority, or who should be removed, is the need for credible, reliable information. The MNA will need to develop liaison relationships with security services, including Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the United States, and European and Middle Eastern governments.

Need sufficient resources at MNA and contributing governments: The MNA will need sufficient personnel and resources assigned to screening and vetting Gazans for offices and honors, and to determine which officials need to be removed. Much of this work can be done by the security services of MNA contributing states, but sufficient personnel at MNA will need to pull the information together so that appropriate officials at MNA and in contributing governments can make the necessary decisions. Insufficient people and resources for screening and vetting risks undermining the entire de-radicalization effort.

Humanitarian assistance: In accordance with international humanitarian law, humanitarian assistance should not be conditioned on political views. However, a Multi-National Authority will be in a better position than the Palestinian Authority or a group of Arab governments to detect and prevent diversion of humanitarian assistance to Hamas remnants.

2. Control over the money

The second-most important lever for de-radicalization is control over the money. Hamas relied on extensive control of money and finance to build up its underground infrastructure, weapons factories, and fighters. As noted in the [Plan for Postwar Gaza, point 19, pages 47-49](#), Hamas controlled smuggling (worth US\$700 million a year), taxed the Gazan people (US\$300 million a year), provided luxuries to the Hamas leadership that were denied to most Gazans, and allowed the political leadership to live in comfort in Qatar and elsewhere. It obtained hundreds of millions of dollars a year from Iran, Qatar, and private sources through "charities." Most of all, though, it used its control over money and finance to stay in power. **De-radicalization will not succeed unless Hamas loses control over Gaza's money.**

This is another reason why a Multi-National Authority is necessary to ensure de-radicalization succeeds. A PA-led effort, or one led by an Arab government, will not give sufficient priority to the dismantlement of Hamas's control over money and finance in Gaza. Many Arab governments, even though committed to the defeat of al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State, continue to have challenges limiting funding going to terrorist or extremist causes.

Control over the money will be particularly important when billions of dollars begin to flow into Gaza for reconstruction. If even a small percentage were siphoned off to Hamas-affiliated companies, this could fuel an insurgency that will threaten Israel and other countries in only a few years. Control over financial flows is another reason why an MNA, able to draw on advanced U.S. and Western auditing and financial tracking systems, is better able to oversee Gaza's de-radicalization.

The MNA will need to establish control over Gaza's cash-based economy, ensuring that commercial finance is available to re-stock store shelves while keeping as much of that credit away from Hamas and those who would fund Hamas's activities. Hawalahs and other money-changing businesses will need to be vetted and monitored. The MNA should also look into setting up a [mobile payments system](#) to allow tracking of payments and make it harder for Hamas or other terrorist groups to divert money.

As noted in [Plan for Postwar Gaza point 19, page 49](#), during the first year, to reduce Hamas's remaining influence over Gaza's economy, the MNA will need to implement reforms in government contracting, business practices, and licensing. It is hard to imagine these reforms happening spontaneously, or under PA auspices given the PA's track record in the West Bank. Without overall leadership and coordination from the Multi-National Authority, this important work is not likely to be done right.

Sufficient resources at MNA and from contributing governments is important: The MNA will need sufficient people and resources to monitor financial flows, process transactions, and audit major vendors and contractors.

3. Cutting off external support for radicalization.

Another vital element of de-radicalization is cutting off Gaza from external support for radicalization: money, training, recruiting, propaganda, and even, to the extent possible, outside encouragement for resistance. The presence of powerful outside voices from Iran and elsewhere, backed (as they are) by the resources of nation-states, have provided Hamas and similar groups with material and rhetorical support that contributed directly to October 7 and could try to disrupt any efforts to de-radicalize postwar Gaza. Additionally, "charities" raise money for Hamas in Arab and Western countries, often using the guise of humanitarian aid organizations.

To the maximum extent possible, de-radicalization efforts by the MNA and ICG member governments should aim to cut off this outside support for radicalization.

Control over money coming into Gaza from outside sources is considerably easier under a Multi-National Authority than under any other postwar arrangement, because as noted in the previous section of this plan, the MNA will have the ability to use governing authority to regulate financial transactions, close banks or *hawalas* that fund terrorism or radicalization. The MNA will also be able to call on support from ICG member governments to support its efforts to limit funds going to Hamas remnants or extremist groups and their supporters.

Control over travel of operatives in or out of Gaza seeking terrorist training would best be accomplished by control over Gaza's borders ([Plan for Postwar Gaza, points 22 and 16, pages 50-51 and 43-44](#)), particularly the Philadelphi corridor ([Plan for Postwar Gaza, page 24](#)). Because the MNA would control governance of Gaza, the MNA will have greater knowledge of who are legitimate travelers and which travelers pose a security concern.

Rhetorical support will be impossible to stop but the MNA and ICG can reduce its effect. In today's Internet and satellite age, it will be impossible to completely control governments like Iran or terrorist groups like Hizbullah seeking to stir up terrorist attacks or trouble in postwar Gaza. However, because the MNA would have both *de facto* and *de jure* control over Gaza's communications infrastructure, the MNA can restrict some of the Iranian or other propaganda that tries to enter Gaza's information environment. The MNA and ICG member governments will need to develop counter-programming capabilities to counter Iranian and other propaganda. The ICG will also provide a forum for governments to "encourage" each other to limit or clamp down on rhetoric that seeks to undermine de-radicalization efforts.

4. Educational reform.

Reform of the educational system in Gaza is essential for long-term, lasting de-radicalization. Hamas has controlled much of Gaza's educational system for sixteen years.

As noted in [Plan for Postwar Gaza point 21, page 50](#), the Multi-National Authority will need to review the educational curriculum to end the amplification of hatred of Israel, especially in the 60% of Gaza's schools that were run by Hamas. The MNA will need to make potentially controversial decisions on curriculum and other issues. It will need to have sufficient oversight capability to make sure that reforms are implemented in the classroom. There are many experts today in the Middle East and outside it who have constructive ideas for an educational curriculum that is true to Palestinian history and in the best interests of building towards lasting coexistence. However, in order to get textbooks and other materials printed, the MNA will need to engage with educational experts at the earliest opportunity.

The best Arab model for rebuilding Gazan educational materials to provide a modern curriculum is the educational system of the United Arab Emirates. Most Middle East [experts](#) believe that the UAE has done better than other countries in [purging](#) extremism, intolerance, and al-Islah (the UAE branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) from [Emirati schools](#). Educational curriculum encourages curiosity, dialogue, and promotes a tolerant Islam. Textbooks take a [largely realist view](#) of international relations.

However, the scale of the problem of educating children in Gaza is significant. The number of children in UAE primary and secondary schools was about [1 million](#) in 2021, not much larger than the number of school-age children in Gaza alone, 626,000 in 2023 ([Plan for Postwar Gaza point 21, page 50](#)). Planning should begin as soon as possible with the UAE to print and introduce updated curriculum and supporting materials.

5. Media.

As part of de-radicalization, Hamas and its supporters should be banned from owning media outlets, including television channels, newspapers, and social media platforms. After October 7, Gazans should expect monitoring of Internet and phone communications. The MNA will have governance authority over Gaza, and thus the legal ability to limit individuals' access to the Internet, as well as lawful intercept authority.

The MNA should contract with qualified non-profit organizations to monitor open-source media of all kinds.

Because the MNA would have governance authority over Gaza, it has the capability to enforce regulations on media. It would also have the authority to take actions to disrupt criminal plots, or to refer terrorist threats to appropriate security or policing forces for action.

As noted in the previous section, preventing the penetration of external media is impossible in the Internet and satellite era, but the MNA should have resources to counter external radicalization efforts.

6. Mosques and social institutions.

In Gaza, as in most of the Arab world, mosques are supported by the governing authorities. So are many other social institutions. The Multi-National Authority will need to take over these responsibilities during its administration of Gaza. This will give the MNA the responsibility to ensure that mosques and social institutions do not become advocates of violence or centers of planning for attacks. This will require walking a fine line, but with guidelines that will be radically different from Hamas-sponsored sermons prior to October 7. Israel is not positioned to credibly take on this responsibility. Because the MNA will have participation from moderate Arab states, officials seconded from those countries should play a leading role in rebuilding religious institutions in Gaza, with transparency for all members of the International Contact Group, including Israel, in how those institutions are being run.

Similarly, the MNA will need to oversee Islamic charities operating in Gaza to ensure that funds are not diverted for rebuilding Hamas or other terrorist or extremist groups. Financial transparency (see sections 2 and 3 above) will be essential to rebuilding credible charitable groups and allowing both donors and ICG members to understand where funds are coming from and where they are going. These de-radicalization reforms will not be possible without control over governance institutions relating to money, finance, and trade, which the MNA will have.

7. Treating all Gazans equally.

The present practice of some aid and assistance agencies is to treat Gazans from families that arrived after 1948 differently from those whose families lived in Gaza for generations.

The MNA should make no distinction in the quality and availability of housing, medical services, education, or any other services between the families who are Gazan by origin and

those who came as refugees in 1948. Programs should be designed to serve all Gazans equally, without regard to lineage or pre-1948 residence. The MNA’s authority over assistance and reconstruction programs ([Plan for Postwar Gaza, point 17, page 44](#)) will allow it to enforce equal treatment for all Gazans.

8. Telling the Palestinian people the hard truths.

When the shooting stops, Palestinian society will need to face some hard truths. If Hamas had not attacked Israel, more than 30,000 Gazans would still be alive and Gaza’s infrastructure would be intact. Seventy-five years of “resistance” has failed to deliver security, opportunity, and dignity for the people of Gaza. Some of this truth-telling will happen spontaneously—and this needs to be encouraged by the Multi-National Authority. The MNA will also have the ability through its interactions with Gazan political, social, and religious elites and the public to encourage leaders to come forward to speak these truths.

This approach was followed in all successful societal transformations that involved de-radicalization, including postwar Germany and Japan, as well as the Balkans and Iraq. Leaders emerged from the destruction of war to advocate for different approaches, and with encouragement from outside, those leaders gained legitimacy, began the transformation of their societies, and eventually took up positions of authority.

- *How political parties are funded is another area of vital importance to de-radicalization, but this requires a separate plan.* There are extensive lessons to be learned from the Gaza elections process in 2006 and experiences of the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. **There should be no popular-vote elections in Gaza** for several years at least, until de-radicalization reforms have progressed sufficiently, but the process of establishing local councils provides for representation and support for reconstruction, [Plan for Postwar Gaza, points 27-28, pages 53-55](#).

Israeli leaders will not be in a position to speak credibly to the people of Gaza about the hard truths that Gazans will need to hear. Neither will pro-Israel U.S. political figures. Because the work of the MNA will help rebuild Gaza, some MNA leaders may be in a position to deliver tough messages—privately at first, then over time more publicly.

Experts in the region are familiar with many of the issues that will need to be raised so that forward-looking Palestinian leaders can come forward with workable solutions:

- **“Resistance”** through violence against Israel and Israelis has not brought security and dignity to the Palestinians in seventy-five years. There is no prospect that it ever will.
- **Right of Return:** A Palestinian state would probably exist today, and the current war avoided, if Palestinian leaders had found a way in negotiations in the year 2000 to reconcile aspirations about the right of return to the realities of land ownership in Israel.
- **Aspirations for justice and dignity** are strong among Palestinians—but the same can be said about Israelis, after the security issue is addressed.

- **Equal treatment for all Gazans**, ending the disparity of treatment between those families who arrived as refugees in 1948 and those whose families lived in Gaza before then.
- **The limits of international support:** If Hamas was counting on Hezbollah to launch a full-scale war against Israel, or on Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea to have a decisive effect on governments, both efforts look like strategic blunders. Israeli unity against Hamas after the October 7 attack has likewise shown that the Hamas stratagem of relying on civilian deaths to force Israel to leave Hamas in power also looks like a historic misjudgment. On the other hand, humanitarian assistance has attracted broad international support. Eventual civilian reconstruction will attract broad support from Arab governments, provided they can be assured that what gets rebuilt will not be destroyed in another war in a few years' time.
- **What model do Gazans aspire to?** In 2004, a year after the overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, credible Arab opinion polls of Iraqis revealed that, when asked what country should be a model for Iraq going forward, the most frequent choice was neither Iran, the United States, Western Europe, nor Saudi Arabia, it was "Iraq needs no model"—a sign of strong, latent nationalism around a sense of Iraqi identity (which subsequent sectarian governments failed to deliver). But the second choice by far was the United Arab Emirates. Drill-down polling explained why the UAE was the model many Iraqis chose: the Iraqi people (1) wanted to be rich, and they saw average Emiratis as rich; (2) they wanted the government to provide essential services; and (3) they wanted the government to leave them alone. Palestinians need to work through similar choices in an environment in which advocates of extremism or an unpopular, corrupt *status quo* do not shut out everyone else. A Multi-National Authority can provide the civic space for such a public dialogue to begin. Once dialogue begins in Gaza, it may spread to the West Bank.

9. Demobilization and Re-integration of Hamas fighters.

A final, essential element of de-radicalization is the demobilization and, where feasible, re-integration of Hamas fighters through a comprehensive DDR program ([Plan for Postwar Gaza, point 23, pages 51-52](#)). **For the short and medium term, however, continued detention of Hamas terrorists and fighters is essential.** Even after the MNA is established and operational, Hamas is likely to try to carry out terrorist attacks to test the will of the MNA and see if contributing countries will withdraw. When this fails and Hamas's leadership either surrenders or organized resistance collapses, Israel and the MNA will need to implement a plan to demobilize Hamas fighters and, where feasible, to re-integrate many of them into Gazan society. How this demobilization will be done is complex, and so plans should be developed and agreed to by the relevant parties at the earliest opportunity.

It will be up to Israel in the first instance to decide how to handle those detained during its period of military operations. But based on the U.S. and Iraqi experience during the insurgency in Iraq (2003-2010), the MNA will need to plan and budget for a detention and judicial processing system within Gaza focused on preventing a Hamas-inspired insurgency from succeeding. The MNA will need to avoid letting dangerous individuals remain at large while not unnecessarily alienating the civilian population. Facilities to house detainees while

deciding who can safely be released, and who needs to be held in custody, is going to be an early priority. Adequate resources and personnel for this mission will be a priority for the MNA and the PF. The United States and Iraq built several “[Rule of Law Complexes](#)” in Iraq to co-locate detainees, their guards, and the judges assigned to review cases. The MNA may need something similar in Gaza.

For those detained by the MNA, the MNA will need:

- the ability to determine who poses a high threat or has information of value;
- the ability to conduct initial interviews with individuals deemed valuable and to develop tactical intelligence;
- access to a mechanism for bringing individuals prosecutable under criminal law to the attention of judicial authorities;
- the ability to legally transfer individuals remanded into custody by judicial authorities to a civilian prison;
- a mechanism to prevent those posing a high threat but not prosecutable under criminal law from re-engaging in violence;
- continued access to individuals who continue to provide useful information;
- a release mechanism for individuals who have been interviewed and deemed not prosecutable, and who do not pose a high threat; and
- the legal authority and practical capability to do all of the above in a manner consistent with the rule-of-law.

It should be expected that Israel will determine that those responsible for the terrorist attack on October 7 would face some kind of tribunal.

Not all Hamas fighters and supporters can be de-radicalized. One unknown at present is how many Hamas fighters and supporters can be de-radicalized. Experience in other conflicts, from intensive U.S. work with detainees at Guantanamo Bay, and from the experience of other countries like Saudi Arabia has shown that while many terrorists and fighters are utterly committed to their cause, a not-insignificant percentage (1) can be persuaded to abandon terrorism in order to rebuild their lives, (2) will abandon terrorism if they become convinced that their terrorist groups are a lost cause, and (3) will abandon terrorism if they conclude that terrorist leaders are exploiting them for corrupt ends. All these factors exist in Gaza.

Demobilization and re-integration in Gaza will be a greater challenge than was faced in postwar Germany or Japan. In Germany, surrendered armies were willing, often eager, to return to civilian life, though there was also a [small number](#) of hard-core Nazis who carried out low-level attacks against the occupying troops. In Japan, Western concepts of “surrender” were outside of Japanese military tradition, but most former Japanese soldiers quickly began rebuilding civilian lives. A survey taken in November-December 1945 said 70% of Japanese expressed “[satisfaction](#)” with the occupation.

The **United Nations** has considerable experience [setting up DDR programs](#), most frequently in Africa, but their track record is underwhelming. These programs have most often been put in place after the warring factions have exhausted themselves and reached a political

accommodation. Standing armies of young men then pose a threat to whatever government has emerged. UN DDR programs work best when soldiering is no longer a well-paid, sought-after “profession” and the new government wants former soldiers to find gainful civilian employment rather than have them go back to fighting under a new warlord. The UN approach is also uniquely dependent on the [consent of all warring factions](#), making the UN’s approach not suitable for Gaza.

In recent years, several Arab countries have had reasonably successful efforts to de-radicalize terrorists. [Saudi Arabia’s program](#), set up under the leadership of former Minister of Interior Mohammed bin Nayef, was particularly attuned to the norms of Saudi society, which may limit its direct applicability to Hamas and Gaza, even if elements of the Saudi program could be useful. Most terrorists with Saudi citizenship, who were typically young men, were sentenced criminally, giving the state the ability to order their lives, but then most terrorists were put through a well-funded rehabilitation program that squarely addressed religious re-education from the Saudi perspective. The patriarch of the family or some other respected male figure was put in charge of making sure the young man did not revert to terrorism or even associate with terrorists. A frequently cited aspect of the program (at least by some observers) was that the family would often try to find these young men wives and encourage them to start families and think of how they would work to support their families.

Jordan, likewise, has had some success with its rehabilitation program. Israel has extensive knowledge of Jordan’s program and its strengths and weaknesses. Saudi experts in de-radicalization considered Jordan’s program moderately successful—not surprisingly, the Saudis think their program was better—but those Saudi experts also believe that Jordan’s social controls and internal security measures are an essential part of the success that Jordan’s program has had. Jordan’s program could not be imported into Gaza without the comprehensive control of governing institutions and an effective internal security program.

Negative examples also exist. The **United States** had some spectacular failures in Iraq, with harsh treatment of Sunni detainees at Abu Ghuraib prison in 2004 undermining much of whatever goodwill had been built up among Iraqis after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Overcrowding at the [Camp Bucca prison](#) in southern Iraq helped not only recruit new terrorists but made them [more dangerous](#)—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, later the first head of ISIS, recruited many fighters from those detained at Camp Bucca. Detention sites in northeastern Syria continue to hold many former ISIS fighters, with the Al-Hol refugee camp of women and children still allowing the [indoctrination of young men](#) to fight on ISIS’s behalf if released.


U.S. efforts to re-integrate al-Qaeda detainees from **Guantanamo Bay** have had better success, in part because arrangements were made with receiving countries for individualized measures to ensure former detainees did not return to terrorism. Considerable resources went into the negotiations of individual return agreements, and the United States often provided resources or incentives to ensure that those arrangements remained in place and effective.

Several lessons learned from other experiences should inform the DDR program for Hamas fighters:

- Avoid overcrowding in detention. Monitoring of the prison population for radicalization becomes exponentially more difficult when detention facilities are overcrowded.
- Match release plans to de-radicalization efforts outside of detention. In particular, do not release detainees into a still-radicalized civilian setting.
- Monitored contacts with families can help in the de-radicalization process.

Israel will have accumulated a considerable amount of data and experience on the ideological commitment of captured or surrendered Hamas fighters. This data should inform the development of a program for de-radicalization and demobilization of individual Hamas fighters. It will need to be fully resourced by the Multi-National Authority and contributing ICG members. Any program for the demobilization and re-integration of former Hamas fighters should be done jointly and in consultation with Israel.

Annex II: Timeline



Annex III: Local Governance Structures in Gaza

The current governance structures in the Gaza Strip, like those in the West Bank, were created by the Palestinian Authority in 1995 pursuant to the powers delegated to it in the Oslo Agreement of September 1993.

The Gaza Strip is divided into five governorates from north to south: North Gaza, Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. Each governorate should have a director and a local council.

The five governorates contain a total of 25 local government administrative units (بلديات) in the Gaza Strip, each with local councils. These 25 are divided into four categories depending on size of the population, according to the latest population survey of Gaza (2017):

- 10 cities, each of over 10,000 persons. The four largest each has over 100,000: Gaza City (590,500); Khan Yunis (205,100); Jabaliya (172,7000); Rafah (171,900).
- 6 towns of over 8,000 persons
- 4 villages of between 4 to 8,000 persons
- 5 local councils of between 1 to 4,000 persons.

Annex IV: Reference Documents

A. Annex 10 from the Dayton Accords (1995)

Source: <https://www.ohr.int/dayton-peace-agreement/annex-10/>

Annex 10 Agreement on Civilian Implementation

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska (the “Parties”) have agreed as follows:

Article I: High Representative

The Parties agree that the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement will entail a wide range of activities including continuation of the humanitarian aid effort for as long as necessary; rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of free and fair elections according to the timetable in Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. A considerable number of international organizations and agencies will be called upon to assist.

In view of the complexities facing them, the Parties request the designation of a High Representative, to be appointed consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to facilitate the Parties’ own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out, as entrusted by a U.N. Security Council resolution, the tasks set out below.

Article II: Mandate and Methods of Coordination and Liaison

The High Representative shall:

Monitor the implementation of the peace settlement;

Maintain close contact with the Parties to promote their full compliance with all civilian aspects of the peace settlement and a high level of cooperation between them and the organizations and agencies participating in those aspects.

Coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. The High Representative shall respect their autonomy within their spheres of operation while as necessary giving general guidance to them about the impact of their activities on the implementation of the peace settlement. The civilian organizations and agencies are requested to assist the High Representative in the execution of his or her

responsibilities by providing all information relevant to their operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation.

Participate in meetings of donor organizations, particularly on issues of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Report periodically on progress in implementation of the peace agreement concerning the tasks set forth in this Agreement to the United Nations, European Union, United States, Russian Federation, and other interested governments, parties, and organizations.

Provide guidance to, and receive reports from, the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force established in Annex 11 to the General Framework Agreement.

In pursuit of his or her mandate, the High Representative shall convene and chair a commission (the "Joint Civilian Commission") in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will comprise senior political representatives of the Parties, the IFOR Commander or his representative, and representatives of those civilian organizations and agencies the High Representative deems necessary.

The High Representative shall, as necessary, establish subordinate Joint Civilian Commissions at local levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A Joint Consultative Committee will meet from time to time or as agreed between the High Representative and the IFOR Commander.

The High Representative or his designated representative shall remain in close contact with the IFOR Commander or his designated representatives and establish appropriate liaison arrangements with the IFOR Commander to facilitate the discharge of their respective responsibilities.

The High Representative shall exchange information and maintain liaison on a regular basis with IFOR, as agreed with the IFOR Commander, and through the commissions described in this Article.

The High Representative shall attend or be represented at meetings of the Joint Military Commission and offer advice particularly on matters of a political-military nature. Representatives of the High Representative will also attend subordinate commissions of the Joint Military Commission as set out in Article VIII(8) of Annex 1A to the General Framework Agreement.

The High Representative may also establish other civilian commissions within or outside Bosnia and Herzegovina to facilitate the execution of his or her mandate.

The High Representative shall have no authority over the IFOR and shall not in any way interfere in the conduct of military operations or the IFOR chain of command.

Article III: Staffing

The High Representative shall appoint staff, as he or she deems necessary, to provide assistance in carrying out the tasks herein.

The Parties shall facilitate the operations of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by the provision of appropriate assistance as requested with regard to transportation, subsistence, accommodations, communications, and other facilities at rates equivalent to those provided for the IFOR under applicable agreements.

The High Representative shall enjoy, under the laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina, such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of his or her functions, including the capacity to contract and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property.

Privileges and immunities shall be accorded as follows:

The Parties shall accord the office of the High Representative and its premises, archives, and other property the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by a diplomatic mission and its premises, archives, and other property under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Parties shall accord the High Representative and professional members of his or her staff and their families the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by diplomatic agents and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The Parties shall accord other members of the High Representative staff and their families the same privileges and immunities as are enjoyed by members of the administrative and technical staff and their families under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Article IV: Cooperation

The Parties shall fully cooperate with the High Representative and his or her staff, as well as with the international organizations and agencies as provided for in Article IX of the General Framework Agreement.

Article V: Final Authority to Interpret

The High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.

Article VI: Entry into Force

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.
For the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the Republic of Croatia
For the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
For the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the Republika Srpska

B. Excerpt from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031 (1995) implementing the Dayton Accords

Source: [United Nations Security Council Resolution 1031](#):

...

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

I

1. Welcomes and supports the Peace Agreement and calls upon the parties to fulfil in good faith the commitments entered into in that Agreement;
2. Expresses its intention to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement under review;
3. Welcomes the progress made towards mutual recognition among the successor States to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized borders;
4. Reaffirms its resolutions concerning compliance with international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, reaffirms also that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and its organs in accordance with the provisions of resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and the Statute of the International Tribunal, and shall comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 of the Statute, and calls upon them to allow the establishment of offices of the Tribunal;
5. Recognizes that the parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in implementation of the peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and that the parties have in particular authorized the multinational force referred to in paragraph 14 below to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;
6. Welcomes the agreement by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to adopt and put in place a programme of elections for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the request of the parties to Annex 3 of the Peace Agreement;
7. Welcomes also the parties' commitment, as specified in the Peace Agreement, to securing to all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, stresses that compliance with this commitment is of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, and welcomes the invitation by the parties to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the OSCE, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or organizations to monitor closely the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

8. Welcomes further the parties' commitment to the right of all refugees and displaced persons freely to return to their homes of origin in safety, notes the leading humanitarian role which has been given by the Peace Agreement to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in coordination with other agencies involved and under the authority of the Secretary-General, in assisting with the repatriation and relief of refugees and displaced persons, and stresses the importance of repatriation being phased, gradual and orderly;
9. Emphasizes the importance of the creation of conditions conducive to the reconstruction and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina and encourages Member States to provide assistance for the programme of reconstruction in that country;
10. Underlines the relationship, as described in the conclusions of the London Conference, between the fulfilment by the parties of their commitments in the Peace Agreement and the readiness of the international community to commit financial resources for reconstruction and development;
11. Welcomes the agreement of the parties to Annex 1-B of the Peace Agreement that establishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to creating a stable peace in the region, emphasizes the importance of all Member States supporting their efforts to this end, and supports the OSCE's commitment to assist the parties with the negotiation and implementation of such measures;

II

12. Welcomes the willingness of the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to assist the parties to the Peace Agreement by deploying a multinational implementation force;
13. Notes the invitation of the parties to the international community to send to the region for a period of approximately one year a multinational implementation force to assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;
14. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement;
15. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall be held equally responsible for compliance with that Annex, and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by IFOR as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that Annex and the protection of IFOR, and takes note that the parties have consented to IFOR's taking such measures;

16. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, in accordance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the rules and procedures, to be established by the Commander of IFOR, governing command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all civilian and military air traffic;
17. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of IFOR, either in defence of IFOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognizes the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of attack;
18. Demands that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of IFOR and other international personnel;
19. Decides that, with effect from the day on which the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR has taken place, the authority to take certain measures conferred upon States by resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993, 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993 and 958 (1994) of 19 November 1994 shall be terminated, and that the provisions of resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and subsequent resolutions regarding safe areas shall also be terminated from the same date;
20. Requests the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with the IFOR Commander to ensure the effective management of the airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the responsibilities conferred on IFOR by Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement with regard to the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;
21. Decides, with a view to terminating the authorization granted in paragraphs 14 to 17 above one year after the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR, to review by that date and to take a decision whether that authorization should continue, based upon the recommendations from the States participating in IFOR and from the High Representative through the Secretary-General;
22. Decides also that the embargo imposed by resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 shall not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, or of international police forces;
23. Invites all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support and facilities, including transit facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above;
24. Welcomes the conclusion of the agreements concerning the status of forces as referred to in Appendix B to Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, and demands that the parties comply fully with those agreements;
25. Requests the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to report to the Council, through the

appropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals, the first such report be made not later than 10 days following the adoption of this resolution;

26. Endorses the establishment of a High Representative, following the request of the parties, who, in accordance with Annex 10 on the civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement, will monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to, and coordinate the activities of, the civilian organizations and agencies involved, and agrees the designation of Mr. Carl Bildt as High Representative;

27. Confirms that the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of Annex 10 on the civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement;

28. Decides that all States concerned, and in particular those where the High Representative establishes offices, shall ensure that the High Representative enjoys such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of his functions, including the capacity to contract and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property;

29. Notes that close cooperation between IFOR, the High Representative and the agencies will be vital to ensure successful implementation;

30. Affirms the need for the implementation of the Peace Agreement in its entirety and, in this context, stresses the importance it attaches to the urgent implementation of Annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, decides to act expeditiously on the report of the Secretary-General recommending the establishment of a United Nations Civilian Police Force with the tasks set out in that Annex, together with a civilian office with the responsibilities described in the report of the Secretary-General, and further decides that in the interim civilian police, demining, civil affairs and other personnel that might be required to carry out the tasks described in that report shall continue in theatre, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 33 and 34 below;

31. Stresses the need for early action in Sarajevo to create confidence between the communities and to this end requests the Secretary-General to ensure the early redeployment of elements of United Nations civilian police from the Republic of Croatia to Sarajevo;

32. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council reports from the High Representative, in accordance with Annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and the conclusions of the London Conference, on the implementation of the Peace Agreement;

III

33. Decides that the mandate of UNPROFOR shall terminate on the date on which the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR has taken place;

34. Approves the arrangements set out in the report of the Secretary-General on the withdrawal of UNPROFOR and headquarters elements from the United Nations Peace Force

(UNPF), including the arrangements for the command and control of UNPROFOR following the transfer of authority from it to IFOR;

35. Expresses its warmest appreciation to all UNPROFOR personnel, who have served the cause of peace in the former Yugoslavia, and pays tribute to those who have given their lives and those who have suffered serious injuries in that service;

36. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to use all necessary means to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR;

37. Calls upon the parties to ensure the safety and security of UNPROFOR and confirms that UNPROFOR will continue to enjoy all existing privileges and immunities, including during the period of withdrawal;

38. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council when the withdrawal of UNPROFOR is complete;

IV

39. Recognizes the unique, extraordinary and complex character of the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, requiring an exceptional response;

40. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

C. The Oslo Accords I (1993) and II (1995) Excerpts

Source for Oslo I (1993):

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IL%20PS_930913_DeclarationPrinciplesInterimSelf-Government%28Oslo%20Accords%29.pdf

Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).

Article II FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.
2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.
2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people's representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest.
4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.
2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII INTERIM AGREEMENT

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.
3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.
4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, that will specify their powers and responsibilities.
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX
LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X
JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.

Article XI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programmes identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII
LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII
REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.
2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.
3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV
RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by

negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.
3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMMES

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programmes and other programmes, including special programmes for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.
2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September 1993.

For the Government of Israel:

(Signed) Shimon PERES

The United States of America

(Signed) Warren CHRISTOPHER

For the PLO:

Witnessed By:

(Signed) Mahmud ABBAS

The Russian Federation

(Signed) Andrei V. KOZYREV

ANNEX I
Protocol on the Mode and Conditions of Elections

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:
 - (a) The system of elections;
 - (b) The mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition;

(c) Rules and regulations regarding election campaigns, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and television station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4 June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process owing to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

(a) Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives;

(b) Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations and other mutually agreed matters;

(c) Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers;

(d) A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon;

(e) Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes;

(f) An economic development and stabilization programme including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims;

(g) Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

(a) Gaza - Egypt;

(b) Jericho - Jordan.

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III
Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programmes

[Omitted]

ANNEX IV
Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation concerning Regional Development Programmes

[Omitted]

Agreed Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS
Article IV

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI (2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism and any other authorities agreed upon.
2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.
3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII (2)

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII (5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

ANNEX II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September 1993.

[Signatures]

Source for Oslo II (1995):

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IL%20PS_950928_InterimAgreementWestBankGazaStrip%28OsloII%29.pdf

[Title page and Preamble omitted]

CHAPTER 1 - THE COUNCIL**ARTICLE I****Transfer of Authority**

1. Israel shall transfer powers and responsibilities as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council in accordance with this Agreement. Israel shall continue to exercise powers and responsibilities not so transferred.
2. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council shall be exercised by the Palestinian Authority established in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which shall also have all the rights, liabilities and obligations to be assumed by the Council in this regard. Accordingly, the term "Council" throughout this Agreement shall, pending the inauguration of the Council, be construed as meaning the Palestinian Authority.
3. The transfer of powers and responsibilities to the police force established by the Palestinian Council in accordance with Article XIV below (hereinafter "the Palestinian Police") shall be accomplished in a phased manner, as detailed in this Agreement and in the Protocol concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements attached as Annex I to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex I").
4. As regards the transfer and assumption of authority in civil spheres, powers and responsibilities shall be transferred and assumed as set out in the Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs attached as Annex III to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex III").
5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of the military government shall not prevent it from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
6. A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter "the CAC"), Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees, one for the Gaza Strip and the other for the West Bank, and District Civil Liaison Offices in the West Bank shall be established in order to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Council and Israel, as detailed in Annex III.
7. The offices of the Council, and the offices of its Ra'ees and its Executive Authority and other committees, shall be located in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

ARTICLE II**Elections**

1. In order that the Palestinian people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council in accordance with the provisions set out in the Protocol concerning Elections attached as Annex II to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex II").
2. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights' of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and will provide a democratic basis for the establishment of Palestinian institutions.

3. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there may participate in the election process in accordance with the provisions contained in this Article and in Article VI of Annex II (Election Arrangements concerning Jerusalem).
4. The elections shall be called by the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority immediately following the signing of this Agreement to take place at the earliest practicable date following the redeployment of Israeli forces in accordance with Annex I, and consistent with the requirements of the election timetable as provided in Annex I I the Election Law and the Election Regulations, as defined in Article I of Annex TJ.

ARTICLE III

Structure of the Palestinian Council

1. The Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which will be elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the transitional period agreed in Article I of the DOP.
2. The Council shall possess both legislative power and executive power, in accordance with Articles VII and DC of the DOP. The Council shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it under this Agreement. The exercise of legislative powers shall be in accordance with Article XVUI of this Agreement (Legislative Powers of the Council).
3. The Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the Election Law and Regulations, which shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
4. The Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall be elected for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994.
5. Immediately upon its inauguration, the Council will elect from among its members a Speaker. The Speaker will preside over the meetings of the Council, administer the Council and its committees, decide on the agenda of each meeting, and lay before the Council proposals for voting and declare their results.
6. The jurisdiction of the Council shall be as determined in Article XVTI of this Agreement (Jurisdiction).
7. The organization, structure and functioning of the Council shall be in accordance with this Agreement and the Basic Law for the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, which Law shall be adopted by the Council. The Basic Law and any regulations made under it shall not be contrary to the provisions of this Agreement.
8. The Council shall be responsible under its executive powers for the offices, services and departments transferred to it and may establish, within its jurisdiction, ministries and subordinate bodies, as necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities.
9. The Speaker will present for- the Council's approval proposed internal procedures that will regulate, among other things, the decision-making processes of the Council.

ARTICLE IV
Size of the Council

The Palestinian Council shall be composed of 32 representatives and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority, who will be directly and simultaneously elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

ARTICLE V
The Executive Authority of the Council

1. The Council will have a committee that will exercise the executive authority of the Council, formed in accordance with paragraph 4 below (hereinafter "the Executive Authority").
2. The Executive Authority shall be bestowed with the executive authority of the Council and will exercise it on behalf of the Council. It shall determine its own internal procedures and decision making processes.
3. The Council will publish the names of the members of the Executive Authority immediately upon their initial appointment and subsequent to any changes.
4. a. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall be an *ex officio* member of the Executive Authority.
 - b. All of the other members of the Executive Authority, except as provided in subparagraph c. below, shall be members of the Council, chosen and proposed to the Council by the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority and approved by the Council.
 - c. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks. Such appointed members may not vote in meetings of the Council.
 - d. Non-elected members of the Executive Authority must have a valid address in an area under the jurisdiction of the Council.

ARTICLE VI
Other Committees of the Council

1. The Council may form small committees to simplify the proceedings "of the Council and to assist in controlling the activity of its Executive Authority.
2. Each committee shall establish its own decision-making processes within the general framework of the organization and structure of the Council.

ARTICLE VII
Open Government

1. All meetings of the Council and of its committees, other than the Executive Authority, shall be open to the public, except upon a resolution of the Council or the relevant committee on the grounds of security, or commercial or personal confidentiality.

2. Participation in the deliberations of the Council, its committees and the Executive Authority shall be limited to their respective members only. Experts may be invited to such meetings to address specific issues on an ad hoc basis.

ARTICLE VIII

Judicial Review

Any person or organization affected by any act or decision of the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council or of any member of the Executive Authority, who believes that such act or decision exceeds the authority of the Ra'ees or of such member, or is otherwise incorrect in law or procedure, may apply to the relevant Palestinian Court of Justice for a review of such activity or decision.

ARTICLE IX

Powers and Responsibilities of the Council

1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council will, within its jurisdiction, have legislative powers as set out in Article XVIII of this Agreement, as well as executive powers.
2. The executive power of the Palestinian Council shall extend to all matters within its jurisdiction under this Agreement or any future agreement that may be reached between the two Parties during the interim period. It shall include the power to formulate and conduct Palestinian policies and to supervise their implementation, to issue any rule or regulation under powers given in approved legislation and administrative decisions necessary for the realization of Palestinian self-government, the power to employ staff, sue and be sued and conclude contracts, and the power to keep and administer registers and records of the population, and issue certificates, licenses and documents.
3. The Palestinian Council's executive decisions and acts shall be consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
4. The Palestinian Council may adopt all necessary measures in order to enforce the law and any of its decisions, and bring proceedings before the Palestinian courts and tribunals.
5. a. In accordance with the DOP, the Council will not have powers and responsibilities in the sphere of foreign relations, which sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment of or admission of diplomatic and consular staff, and the exercise of diplomatic functions.
 - b. Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the PLO may conduct negotiations and sign agreements with states or international organizations for the benefit of the Council in the following cases only:
 - (1) economic agreements, as specifically provided in Annex V of this Agreement;
 - (2) agreements with donor countries for the purpose of implementing arrangements for the provision of assistance to the Council;
 - (3) agreements for the purpose of implementing the regional development plans detailed in Annex IV of the DOP or in agreements entered into in the framework of the multilateral negotiations; and
 - (4) cultural, scientific and educational agreements.

- c. Dealings between the Council and representatives of foreign states and international organizations, as well as the establishment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of representative offices other than those described in subparagraph 5.a above, for the purpose of implementing the agreements referred to in subparagraph 5.b above, shall not be considered foreign relations.
6. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the Council shall, within its jurisdiction, have an independent judicial system composed of independent Palestinian courts and tribunals.

CHAPTER 2- REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

ARTICLE X

Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces

1. The first phase of the Israeli military forces redeployment will cover populated areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, villages, refugee camps and hamlets - as set out in Annex I, and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e., 22 days before the day of the elections.
2. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian Police, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council as detailed in Articles XI (Land) and XIII (Security), below and in Annex I.
3. The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security for Palestinians in a phased manner in accordance with Article XIII (Security) below and Annex I.
4. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for external security, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israeli military forces" includes Israel Police and other Israeli security forces.

ARTICLE XI

Land

1. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
2. The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, as specified below:
 - a. Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and Al Waqf land, will come under the jurisdiction of the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
 - b. All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and B, set out in Annex III will be transferred to and assumed by the Council during the first phase of redeployment.

- c. In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory, as set out in Annex III.
 - d. The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.
 - e. During the further redeployment phases to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, powers and responsibilities relating to territory will be transferred gradually to Palestinian jurisdiction that will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
 - f. The specified military locations referred to in Article X, paragraph 2 above will be determined in the further redeployment phases, within the specified time-frame ending not later than 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, and will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
3. For the purpose of this Agreement and until the completion of the first phase of the further redeployments:
- a. "Area A" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in brown on attached map No. 1;
 - b. "Area B" means the populated areas delineated by a red line and shaded in yellow on attached map No. 1, and the built-up area of the hamlets listed in Appendix 6 to Annex I; and
 - c. "Area C" means areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE XII

Arrangements for Security and Public Order

1. In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council shall establish a strong police force as set out in Article XIV below. Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.
2. Agreed security arrangements and coordination mechanisms are specified in Annex I.
3. A Joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for Mutual Security Purposes (hereinafter "the JSC"), as well as Joint Regional Security Committees (hereinafter "RSCs") and Joint District Coordination Offices (hereinafter "DCOs"), are hereby established as provided for in Annex I.
4. The security arrangements provided for in this Agreement and in Annex I may be reviewed at the request of either Party and may be amended by mutual agreement of the Parties. Specific review arrangements are included in Annex I.
5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "the Settlements" means, in the West Bank - the settlements in Area C; and in the Gaza Strip - the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, as shown on attached map No. 2.

ARTICLE XIII
Security

1. The Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in each district, as set out in Appendix 1 to Annex I, assume the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area A in that district.

2. a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.

b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and requirements in the following manner:

(1) The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages, and other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex I and as delineated on map No. 3. The West Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if required.

(2) The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in which only Palestinians are involved.

(3) The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police stations and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b(i) above.

(4) While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination and confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.

(5) The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the relevant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate communication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned operation, including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for returning to the police station or post.

The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, following a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, in normal or routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.

(6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security activities on the main roads as set out in Annex 1.

(7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names- of the policemen, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to each police station and post in Area B.

(8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases; each to

take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.

(9) The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of the completion of the first phase of redeployment.

ARTICLE XIV **The Palestinian Police**

1. The Council shall establish a strong police force. The duties, functions, structure, deployment and composition of the Palestinian Police, together with provisions regarding its equipment and operation, as well as rules of conduct, are set out in Annex I.
2. The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement.
3. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
4. Except for the arms, ammunition and equipment of the Palestinian Police described in Annex I, and those of the Israeli military forces, no organization, group or individual in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shall manufacture, sell, acquire, possess, import or otherwise introduce into the West Bank or the Gaza Strip any firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosives, gunpowder or any related equipment, unless otherwise provided for in Annex I.

ARTICLE XV **Prevention of Hostile Acts**

1. Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other's authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders.
2. Specific provisions for the implementation of this Article are set out in Annex I.

ARTICLE XVI **Confidence Building Measures**

With a view to fostering a positive and supportive public atmosphere to accompany the implementation of this Agreement, to establish a solid basis of mutual trust and good faith, and in order to facilitate the anticipated cooperation and new relations between the two peoples, both Parties agree to carry out confidence building measures as detailed herewith:

1. Israel will release or turn over to the Palestinian side, Palestinian detainees and prisoners, residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage of release of these prisoners and detainees will take place on the signing of this Agreement and the second stage will take place prior to the date of the elections. There will be a third stage of release of detainees and prisoners. Detainees and prisoners will be released from among categories detailed in Annex VII (Release of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees). Those released will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

2. Palestinians who have maintained contact with the Israeli authorities will not be subjected to acts of harassment, violence, retribution or prosecution. Appropriate ongoing measures will be taken, in coordination with Israel, in order to ensure their protection.
3. Palestinians from abroad whose entry into the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is approved pursuant to this Agreement, and to whom the provisions of this Article are applicable, will not be prosecuted for offenses committed prior to September

CHAPTER 3 - LEGAL AFFAIRS
ARTICLE XVII
Jurisdiction

1. In accordance with the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory as a single territorial unit, except for:
 - a. issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis; and
13, 1993.
 - b. powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.
2. Accordingly, the authority of the Council encompasses all matters that fall within its territorial, functional and personal jurisdiction, as follows:
 - a. The territorial jurisdiction of the Council shall encompass Gaza Strip territory, except for the Settlements and the Military Installation Area shown on map No. 2, and West Bank territory, except for Area C which, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of the Council. At this time, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.
Territorial jurisdiction includes land, subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
 - b. The functional jurisdiction of the Council extends to all powers and responsibilities transferred to the Council, as specified in this Agreement or in any future agreements that may be reached between the Parties during the interim period.
 - c. The territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except for Israelis, unless otherwise provided in this Agreement.
 - d. Notwithstanding subparagraph a. above, the Council shall have functional jurisdiction in Area C, as detailed in Article IV of Annex III.
3. The Council has, within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in this Agreement.
4. a. Israel, through its military government, has the authority over areas that are not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council and Israelis.
 - b. To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.

5. The exercise of authority with regard to the electromagnetic sphere and air space shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
6. Without derogating from the provisions of this Article, legal arrangements detailed in the Protocol Concerning Legal Matters attached as Annex IV to this Agreement (hereinafter "Annex IV") shall be observed. Israel and the Council j may negotiate further legal arrangements.
7. Israel and the Council shall cooperate on matters of legal assistance in criminal and civil matters through a legal committee (hereinafter "the Legal Committee"), hereby established.
8. The Council's jurisdiction will extend gradually to cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for the issues to be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, through a series of redeployments of the Israeli military forces. The first phase of the redeployment of Israeli military forces will cover populated areas in the West Bank - cities, towns, refugee camps and hamlets, as set out in Annex I - and will be completed prior to the eve of the Palestinian elections, i.e. 22 days before the day of the elections. Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence immediately upon the inauguration of the Council and will be effected in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, to be concluded no later than eighteen months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.

ARTICLE XVIII

Legislative Powers of the Council

1. For the purposes of this Article, legislation shall mean any primary and secondary legislation, including basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.
2. The Council has the power, within its jurisdiction as defined in Article XVII of this Agreement, to adopt legislation.
3. While the primary legislative power shall lie in the hands of the Council as a whole, the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall have the following legislative powers:
 - a. the power to initiate legislation or to present proposed legislation to the Council;
 - b. the power to promulgate legislation adopted by the Council; and
 - c. the power to issue secondary legislation, including regulations, relating to any matters specified and within the scope laid down in any primary legislation adopted by the Council.
4. a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council or which is otherwise inconsistent with the provisions of the DOP, this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void *ab initio*.
 - b. The Ra'ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this paragraph.
5. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee.
6. Without derogating from the provisions of paragraph 4 above, the Israeli side of the Legal Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israel considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply, in order to discuss issues arising from such legislation. The Legal Committee will consider the legislation referred to it at the earliest opportunity.

ARTICLE XIX
Human Rights and the Rule of Law

Israel and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law.

ARTICLE XX
Rights, Liabilities and Obligations

1. a. The transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its civil administration to the Council, as detailed in Annex III, includes all related rights, liabilities and obligations arising with regard to acts or omissions which occurred prior to such transfer, Israel will cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions and the Council will bear all financial responsibility for these and for its own functioning.
 - b. Any financial claim made in this regard against Israel will be referred to the Council.
 - c. Israel shall provide the Council with the information it has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel in this regard.
 - d. Where legal proceedings are brought in respect of such a claim, Israel will notify the Council and enable it to participate in defending the claim and raise any arguments on its behalf.
 - e. In the event that an award is made against Israel by any court or tribunal in respect of such a claim, the Council shall immediately reimburse Israel the full amount of the award.
 - f. Without prejudice to the above, where a court or tribunal hearing such a claim finds that liability rests solely with an employee or agent who acted beyond the scope of the powers assigned to him or her, unlawfully or with willful malfeasance, the Council shall not bear financial responsibility.
2. a. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1.d through 1.f above, each side may take the necessary measures, including promulgation of legislation, in order to ensure that such claims by Palestinians, including pending claims in which the hearing of evidence has not yet begun, are brought only before Palestinian courts or tribunals in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and are not brought before or heard by Israeli courts or tribunals.
 - b. Where a new claim has been brought before a Palestinian court or tribunal subsequent to the dismissal of the claim pursuant to subparagraph a. above, the Council shall defend it and, in accordance with subparagraph 1.a above, in the event that an award is made for the plaintiff, shall pay the amount of the award.
 - c. The Legal Committee shall agree on arrangements for the transfer of all materials and information needed to enable the Palestinian courts or tribunals to hear such claims as referred to in subparagraph b. above, and, when necessary, for the provision of legal assistance by Israel to the Council in defending such claims.
3. The transfer of authority in itself shall not affect rights, liabilities and obligations of any person or legal entity, in existence at the date of signing of this Agreement.
4. The Council, upon its inauguration, will assume all the rights, liabilities and obligations of the Palestinian Authority.

5. For the purpose of this Agreement, "Israelis" also includes Israeli statutory agencies and corporations registered in Israel.

ARTICLE XXI
Settlement of Differences and Disputes

Any difference relating to the application of this Agreement shall be referred to the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism established under this Agreement. The provisions of Article XV of the DOP shall apply to any such difference which is not settled through the appropriate coordination and cooperation mechanism, namely: /

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Agreement or any related agreements pertaining to the interim period shall be settled through the Liaison Committee.
2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be settled by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between the Parties.
3. The Parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both Parties, the Parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

CHAPTER 4 . COOPERATION
ARTICLE XXII
Relations between Israel and the Council

1. Israel and the Council shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and shall accordingly abstain from incitement, including hostile propaganda, against each other and, without derogating from the principle of freedom of expression, shall take legal measures to prevent such incitement by any organizations, groups or individuals within their jurisdiction.
2. Israel and the Council will ensure that their respective educational systems contribute to the peace between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples and to peace in the entire region, and will refrain from the introduction of any motifs that could adversely affect the process of reconciliation.
3. Without derogating from the other provisions of this Agreement, Israel and the Council shall cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property, including offenses related to vehicles.

ARTICLE XXIII
Cooperation with Regard to Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities

In order to ensure a smooth, peaceful and orderly transfer of powers and responsibilities, the two sides will cooperate with regard to the transfer of security powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex I, and the transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of Annex III.

ARTICLE XXIV
Economic Relations

The economic relations between the two sides are set out in the Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29, 1994, and the Appendices thereto, and the Supplement to the Protocol on Economic Relations, all attached as Annex V, and will be governed by the relevant provisions of this Agreement and its Annexes.

ARTICLE XXV
Cooperation Programs

1. The Parties agree to establish a mechanism to develop programs of cooperation between them. Details of such cooperation are set out in Annex VI.
2. A Standing Cooperation Committee to deal with issues arising in the context of this cooperation is hereby established as provided for in Annex VI.

ARTICLE XXVI
The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee

1. The Liaison Committee established pursuant to Article X of the DOP shall ensure the smooth implementation of this Agreement. It shall deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest and disputes.
2. The Liaison Committee shall be composed of an equal number of members from each Party. It may add other technicians and experts as necessary.
3. The Liaison Committee shall adopt its rules of procedures, including the frequency and place or places of its meetings.
4. The Liaison Committee shall reach its decisions by agreement.
5. The Liaison Committee shall establish a subcommittee that will monitor and steer the implementation of this Agreement (hereinafter "the Monitoring and Steering Committee"). It will function as follows:
 - a. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will, on an ongoing basis, monitor the implementation of this Agreement, with a view to enhancing the cooperation and fostering the peaceful relations between the two sides.
 - b. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will steer the activities of the various joint committees established in this Agreement (the JSC, the CAC, the Legal Committee, the Joint Economic Committee and the Standing Cooperation Committee) concerning the ongoing implementation of the Agreement, and will report to the Liaison Committee.
 - c. The Monitoring and Steering Committee will be composed of the heads of the various committees mentioned above.
 - d. The two heads of the Monitoring and Steering Committee will establish its rules of procedures, including the frequency and places of its meetings.

ARTICLE XXVII
Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt

1. Pursuant to Article XII of the DOP, the two Parties have invited the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. As part of these arrangements a Continuing Committee has been constituted and has commenced its deliberations.
2. The Continuing Committee shall decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder.
3. The Continuing Committee shall also deal with other matters of common concern.

ARTICLE XXVIII
Missing Persons

1. Israel and the Council shall cooperate by providing each other with all necessary assistance in the conduct of searches for missing persons and bodies of persons which have not been recovered, as well as by providing information about missing persons.
2. The PLO undertakes to cooperate with Israel and to assist it in its efforts to locate and to return to Israel Israeli soldiers who are missing in action and the bodies of soldiers which have not been recovered.

CHAPTER 5 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XXIX
Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Arrangements for safe passage of persons and transportation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are set out in Annex I.

ARTICLE XXX
Passages

Arrangements for coordination between Israel and the Council regarding passage to and from Egypt and Jordan, as well as any other agreed international crossings, are set out in Annex I.

ARTICLE XXXI
Final Clauses

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signing.
2. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement, except for Article XX (Confidence-Building Measures), the Preparatory Transfer Agreement and the Further Transfer Protocol will be superseded by this Agreement.
3. The Council, upon its inauguration, shall replace the Palestinian Authority and shall assume all the undertakings and obligations of the Palestinian Authority under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer Agreement, and the Further Transfer Protocol.

4. The two sides shall pass all necessary legislation to implement this Agreement.
5. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.
6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DOP. Neither Party shall be deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.
7. Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.
8. The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.
9. The PLO undertakes that, within two months of the date of the inauguration of the Council, the Palestinian National Council will convene and formally approve the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant, as undertaken in the letters signed by the Chairman of the PLO and addressed to the Prime Minister of Israel, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994.
10. Pursuant to Annex I, Article IX of this Agreement, Israel confirms that the permanent checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the Jericho Area (except those related to the access road leading from Mousa Alami to the Allenby Bridge) will be removed upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.
11. Prisoners who, pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, were turned over to the Palestinian Authority on the condition that they remain in the Jericho Area for the remainder of their sentence, will be free to return to their homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip upon the completion of the first phase of redeployment.
12. As regards relations between Israel and the PLO, and without derogating from the commitments contained in the letters signed by and exchanged between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO, dated September 9, 1993 and May 4, 1994, the two sides will apply between them the provisions contained in Article XXII, paragraph 1, with the necessary changes.
13. a. The Preamble to this Agreement, and all Annexes, Appendices and maps attached hereto, shall constitute an integral part hereof.
 - b. The Parties agree that the maps attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement as:
 - a. map No. 1 (The Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 2 (in this Agreement "map No. 2");
 - b. map No. 4 (Deployment of Palestinian Police in the Gaza Strip), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 5 (in this Agreement "map No. 5"); and
 - c. map No. 6 (Maritime Activity Zones), an exact copy of which is attached to this Agreement as map No. 8 (in this Agreement "map No. 8");are an integral part hereof and will remain in effect for the duration of this Agreement.
14. While the Jiftlik area will come under the functional and personal jurisdiction of the Council in the first phase of redeployment, the area's transfer to the territorial jurisdiction of the Council will be considered by the Israeli side in the first phase of the further redeployment phases.

Plan for Postwar Gaza

Annex IV: Reference Documents
C. Oslo Accords I (1993) and II (1995)

Done at Washington DC, this 28th day of September, 1995.


[Signatures]

D. Coalition Provisional Authority Organizational Chart (2003)

Source: L.E. Halchin, “The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities,” Congressional Research Service, June 6, 2005
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA458968.pdf#page=34> (the report notes this chart is partial and omits a number of offices)

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Figure 1. Coalition Provisional Authority



E. “What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction” (Summary) (2021)

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

Source: <https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/what-we-need-to-learn/index.html>

Lesson 1: Strategy

The U.S. government continuously struggled to develop and implement a coherent strategy for what it hoped to achieve.

Key sentence: “For the U.S. government to successfully rebuild a country, especially one still experiencing violent conflict, civilian agencies will need the necessary resources and flexibility to lead in practice, not just on paper.”

Lesson 2: Timelines

The U.S. government consistently underestimated the amount of time required to rebuild Afghanistan, and created unrealistic timelines and expectations that prioritized spending quickly. These choices increased corruption and reduced the effectiveness of programs.

Key paragraph: “The U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan could be described as 20 one-year reconstruction efforts, rather than one 20-year effort. U.S. officials often underestimated the time and resources needed to rebuild Afghanistan, leading to short-term solutions like the surge of troops, money, and resources from 2009–2011. U.S. officials also prioritized their own political preferences for what they wanted reconstruction to look like, rather than what they could realistically achieve, given the constraints and conditions on the ground. Early in the war, U.S. officials denied the mission resources necessary to have an impact, and implicit deadlines made the task even harder. As security deteriorated and demands on donors increased, so did pressure to demonstrate progress. U.S. officials created explicit timelines in the mistaken belief that a decision in Washington could transform the calculus of complex Afghan institutions, powerbrokers, and communities contested by the Taliban.”

Lesson 3: Sustainability

Many of the institutions and infrastructure projects the United States built were not sustainable.

Key paragraph: “Over time, U.S. policies emphasized that all U.S. reconstruction projects must be sustainable, but Afghans often lacked the capacity to take responsibility for projects. In response, the U.S. government tried to help Afghan institutions build their capacity, but those institutions often could

not keep up with U.S. demands for fast progress. Moreover, pervasive corruption put U.S. funds sent through the Afghan government at risk of waste, fraud, and abuse. These dynamics motivated U.S. officials to provide most assistance outside Afghan government channels. While expedient, the approach meant that Afghan officials were not getting experience in managing and sustaining U.S. reconstruction projects over the long term. As a result, even when programs were able to achieve short-term success, they often could not last because the Afghans who would eventually take responsibility for them were poorly equipped, trained, or motivated to do so.”

Lesson 4: Personnel

Counterproductive civilian and military personnel policies and practices thwarted the effort.

Key paragraph: “The U.S. government’s inability to get the right people into the right jobs at the right times was one of the most significant failures of the mission. It is also one of the hardest to repair. U.S. personnel in Afghanistan were often unqualified and poorly trained, and those who were qualified were difficult to retain. DOD police advisors watched American TV shows to learn about policing, civil affairs teams were mass-produced via PowerPoint presentations, and every agency experienced annual lobotomies as staff constantly rotated out, leaving successors to start from scratch and make similar mistakes all over again. These dynamics had direct effects on the quality of reconstruction. There were often not enough staff to oversee the spending, and certainly not enough who were qualified to do so. This was particularly true for civilian agencies, such as State or the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which should have been leading the effort but were unable to meaningfully perform that role.”

Lesson 5: Insecurity

Persistent insecurity severely undermined reconstruction efforts.

Key sentences: “The absence of violence was a critical precondition for everything U.S. officials tried to do in Afghanistan—yet the U.S. effort to rebuild the country took place while it was being torn apart. For example, helping Afghans develop a credible electoral process became ever more difficult as insecurity across the country steadily worsened—intimidating voters, preventing voter registration, and closing polling stations on election day.”

Lesson 6: Context

The U.S. government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly.

Key paragraph: “Effectively rebuilding Afghanistan required a detailed understanding of the country’s social, economic, and political dynamics. However, U.S. officials were consistently operating in the dark, often because of the difficulty of collecting the necessary information. The U.S. government also clumsily forced Western technocratic models onto Afghan economic institutions; trained security forces in advanced weapon systems they could not understand, much less maintain; imposed formal rule of law on a country that addressed 80 to 90 percent of its disputes through informal means; and often struggled to understand or mitigate the cultural and social barriers to supporting women and girls. Without this background knowledge, U.S. officials often empowered powerbrokers who preyed on the population or diverted U.S. assistance away from its intended recipients to enrich and empower themselves and their allies. Lack of knowledge at the local level meant projects intended to mitigate conflict often exacerbated it, and even inadvertently funded insurgents.”

Lesson 7: Monitoring and Evaluation

U.S. government agencies rarely conducted sufficient monitoring and evaluation to understand the impact of their efforts.

Key sentences: “The absence of periodic reality checks created the risk of doing the wrong thing perfectly: A project that completed required tasks would be considered “successful,” whether or not it had achieved or contributed to broader, more important goals. ... The U.S. government’s M&E efforts in Afghanistan have been underemphasized and understaffed because the overall campaign focused on doing as much as possible as quickly as possible, rather than ensuring programs were designed well to begin with and could adapt as needed. As a result, the U.S. government missed many opportunities to identify critical flaws in its interventions or to act on those that were identified.”

F. Tokyo Principles for Postwar Gaza (2023)
Secretary Antony Blinken, November 8, 2023

Source: <https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-at-a-press-availability-41/>

Five No's:

1. No forcible displacement of Palestinians from Gaza – not now, not after the war.
2. No use of Gaza as a platform for terrorism or other violent attacks.
3. No reoccupation of Gaza after the conflict ends.
4. No attempt to blockade or besiege Gaza.
5. No reduction in the territory of Gaza.

Three Must's:

1. Must include the Palestinian people's voices and aspirations at the center of post-crisis governance in Gaza.
2. Must include Palestinian-led governance and Gaza unified with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority.
3. Must include a sustained mechanism for reconstruction in Gaza, and a pathway to Israelis and Palestinians living side by side in states of their own, with equal measures of security, freedom, opportunity, and dignity.