



NORTH KOREA INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTATION PROJECT

DOCUMENT READER

New Evidence on the Korean War

Edited by James Person

June 2010

NKIDP



NEW EVIDENCE ON THE KOREAN WAR

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Prepared for the conference:

**New Documents and New Histories: Twenty-First
Century Perspectives on the Korean War**

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and

**The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars'
North Korea International Documentation Project**

Dear Participant

The North Korea International Documentation Project (NKIDP) is pleased to present you with this “document reader,” which is intended to facilitate and enrich the discussion at the June 16-17 conference “New Documents and New Histories: Twenty-First Century Perspectives on the Korean War,” held at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri. The volume consists of select Russian and Polish archival documents that we hope will provide context for discussion on the Korean War as we mark the 60th anniversary of the conflict.

The collection, compiled by NKIDP is by no means comprehensive, however, in selecting the materials, the editors sought to include some of the most important materials available and made a substantial effort to mine relevant official archives. The document reader is organized chronologically, starting with March 1949 and ending in April 1954.

In compiling these documents, the editors received much appreciated cooperation and assistance from scholars from several countries, reflecting the multinational scope of this project. NKIDP is particularly grateful to Jakub Poprocki for contributing documentation from the Polish Foreign Ministry Archives and Dongkil Kim for contributing new Russian documents. The document reader would not have been ready for distribution had it not been for the diligence of NKIDP interns Kathleen Harrington, Lauren Sungeun Bae, Scott LaFoy, and Will Treece. For his sage advice, the editors would also like to thank Jongdae Shin. The editors are especially grateful to the Korea Foundation, whose support made the translation of many of the documents contained in this reader possible. Last but not least, the editors would like to thank the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, President and Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and Dr. Michael Van Dusen, Deputy Director, for providing Center resources for additional document translations.

NKIDP is part of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy Program, directed by Christian F. Ostermann. The Project was launched in 2006 in cooperation with the University of North Korean Studies (Seoul).

James F. Person
Coordinator, NKIDP

Christian F. Ostermann
Director, History and Public Policy Program

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DOCUMENT NO. 1

[Source: Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (AP RF), Fond (F.) 3, Opis (Op.) 65, Delo (D.) 775, pp. 74-76. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Excerpt from the minutes of a VKP(b) CC Politburo meeting and the approved draft of a Soviet-Korean protocol on the temporary retention of Soviet naval subunits in the port of Seishin [Cheongjin].

18 March 1949

[...]

14. Korea.

Approve:

1. The Soviet-Korean protocol about temporarily leaving Soviet naval subunits in the port of Seishin (Attachment N° 1).

2. An agreement between the Main Directorate of the USSR Civil Air Fleet and the Ministry of Communications of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about the establishment of regular air service between the cities of Voroshilov and Pyongyang (Attachment N° 2).

3. An agreement between the government of the USSR and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about the construction of a rail line from the Kraskino Station of the Primorsky Railroad to the Honio Station of the North Korean Railroad (Attachment N° 3).

4. A USSR Council of Ministers decree on the renewal of and a partial change to the agreement on the establishment of the Soviet-Korean Mortsans merchant shipping companies and the VNO petroleum refining company (Attachment N° 4).

5. An agreement between the governments of the USSR and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea about the conditions of an apprenticeship in technical industrial work for Korean specialists in the USSR (Attachment N° 5).

6. A note about establishing a Soviet trade mission in Korea (Attachment N° 6).

CC Secretary

PROTOCOL

Article 1

The government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to grant the request of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and, in view of the presence of American troops in South Korea, to temporarily leave subunits of its navy in the port of Seishin; the government of the USSR assumes all the expenses associated with the maintenance of these naval subunits.

Article 2

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea commits itself to put at the disposition of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the port equipment and facilities necessary to meet the requirements for basing these naval subunits at the port of Seishin.

Article 3

The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agrees to exempt from customs inspection, customs fees, and customs duties freight being sent from the USSR for maintenance of the naval subunits at the port of Seishin and also the cargo being sent from the USSR which belongs to these subunits.

Soviet citizens serving the naval subunits will cross the Korean border while traveling from the USSR to Korea and from Korea to the USSR on documents issued by the appropriate Soviet organizations in a manner approved by the sides.

for the government of
the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea

for the government of
the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 2

[Source: AP RF, F. 3, Op. 1, D. 839, pp. 13-14. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Memorandum of the USSR Minister of Armed Forces and the Chief of the General Staff to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers

N° 17064, 20 April 1949

We report information about the situation in Korea at the 38th parallel. After the withdrawal of our troops from North Korea violations at the 38th parallel from the "Southerners" took on a provocative and systematic nature. These violations have become more frequent in the past month.

There were a total of 37 violations committed during the period from 1 January to 15 April along the entire 38th parallel, of which 24 were between 15 March and 15 April.

The nature of the violations is clashes of police security units from company to battalion strength accompanied by small arms and mortar fire and crossing of the 38th parallel by the "Southerners".

In all cases of the violations the "Southerners" opened fire first.

During March and April the "Southerners" moved part of [their] field troops closer to the 38th parallel at the same time as the situation at the 38th parallel became aggravated.

For example, the 1st Infantry Brigade from Seoul has been moved to the area of Kaesong.

According to information which requires confirmation the concentration of the troops of the "Southerners" toward the 38th parallel is continuing.

It is not excluded that new provocations against the troops of the North Korean government might occur from the "Southerners", bringing into action larger forces than what has occurred thus far.

Taking this into consideration, we think it advisable to recommend to the command of the forces of the North Korean government to take adequate measures to be ready to respond to a possibly larger provocative act by the "Southerners".

Vasilevsky
Shtemenko

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 3

[Source: AP RF, F. 4, Op. 1, D. 331, pp. 59-61. Original]

Telegram From the Leader of the Group of Soviet Specialists in Northeast China to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers about the Results of the Chinese-Korean Talks on Military Cooperation, 18 May 1949

N° 14

N° 54611

18 May 1949 1718

Yesterday, 17 May, Mao Zedong asked me to inform you of the following:

1. Kim Il, the Chief of the Political Directorate of the Korean Army, arrived from North Korea (he participated in the partisan movement in Manchuria together with Kim Il Sung). Cde. Kim Il has the authority to discuss the following issues with the CPC CC:

1. The situation in the Orient.
2. The creation of an information bureau.
3. Aid to North Korea with officer personnel and weapons.

Cde. Mao Zedong said that he thinks that the issue of creating an Eastern Information Bureau [*informbyuro*] is still premature [*ne sozrel*]. Of the 12 countries in the Orient the Chinese Communist Party has ties for now with only five: the MNR, Thailand, Indochina, the Philippines, and Korea, and with the others, even with Japan and Indonesia, permanent ties have not been organized. We know little of the situation in these countries. Therefore, he said, it is better to first establish these ties, study the situation, and only then begin creating an Eastern Communist [SIC, *Kominformbyuro*] Information Bureau. [North Korea] ought to limit itself right now to the establishment of mutual [SIC, *vzaimnye*] telegraph agencies with the aid of which ideas on specific issues are exchanged as they arise.

2. As regards helping North Korea with officer personnel and weapons, Cde. Mao Zedong said that such aid would be granted. There are one and a half million Koreans in Manchuria, from which two Korean divisions have been formed (of 10,000 men each). One of them has combat experience. It took an active part in battles with the Kuomintang troops in Manchuria. We can transfer these divisions to North Korea at any time at their request. But as long as the Korean comrades have no need of them we will supply these divisions with everything and train them. In addition, we have also trained 200 officers who are undergoing additional training right now and in a month they can be sent to Korea.

If a war breaks out between North and South Korea we are also ready to give everything that is in our power, especially for these divisions (food and weapons).

The Korean comrades think that the American troops might be evacuated from South Korea in the near future but they are afraid that Japanese troops will come there to replace the American troops with whose aid the Southerners might mount an attack on North Korea.

We advised them to counterattack these troops but when so doing take into consideration the presence or absence of Japanese troops in the South Korean army without fail. If Japanese units take part then exhibit caution and in the event that the enemy has the superior forces then it is better give up part of their own territory to be in more advantageous conditions to surround the invading troops and rout them.

We advised them to prepare the Party, the troops, and the people ideologically that such a situation is possible and that this would not mean the defeat of democratic Korea but only a strategic maneuver.

If the Americans leave and the Japanese do not come, we do not advise the Korean comrades to mount an attack on South Korea in this situation but to wait for a more suitable situation because MacArthur might quickly move Japanese units and weapons to Korea during this attack. We cannot give quick substantial support since all our main forces have withdrawn beyond the Yangtze River.

We think that such a step, an attack by North Korea on the South, might be mounted at the beginning of 1950 if the situation at the beginning of 1950 favors this. Then, in the event of an invasion of Korea by Japanese troops, we will be able to quickly move our crack troops and defeat the Japanese forces.

Of course, added Cde. Mao Zedong, we would take all our steps in this direction only after coordinating them with Moscow.

3. With regard to the establishment of trade relations with North Korea and also the resolution of the issue of the use of the hydroelectric power station on the Yalu River we suggested that Cde. Kim Il to go to Mukden and come to an agreement [*dogovorit'sya*, which can also mean "negotiate"] on these issues with Cde. Gao Gang.

Cde. Mao Zedong passed the information in the presence of Cdes. Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, [Dong Biwu], Chen Yun, and [Bo Yibo].

Kovalev

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 4

[Source: AP RF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 776, pp. 1-21. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Memorandum from the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with a brief description of the political and economic situation in the south and north of Korea.

15 September 1949

As an addendum to my note of 27 August 1949 I submit a brief description of the political and economic situation in the south and north of Korea and information about the relative strength of the contending democratic and reactionary forces and their influence among the people.

The political situation in the south of Korea

The political situation in the south of the country in all the four years since the liberation of Korea from the Japanese is marked by a sharp political struggle between left- and right-wing parties and organizations. The struggle between these two camps in connection with the Moscow decision of the three ministers on Korean issues (1945) has taken on an especially sharp nature.

The sharp political struggle between the left and right in connection with the Moscow decision has to a considerable degree created an opportunity for the Americans to torpedo the Moscow decision on Korea.

The Americans and the South Korean reactionaries, convinced that they will not succeed in creating an anti-democratic government in Korea and seeing that the left enjoys great authority among the people, have waged an active campaign against the Workers Party, the vanguard of all the left-wing parties and organizations.

At the order of the Americans in 1947 the Korean police destroyed all the print shops and closed the left-wing newspapers. An order was issued for the arrest of senior officials of left-wing parties and organizations. The left-wing parties and organizations were forced to go underground as a result of the terror and persecution. Especially great terror was launched against the leftists in 1948 in connection with the arrival in Korea of a UN commission and preparations for separate elections in the south of the country. Many left-wing leaders were arrested. Many were shot without trial or investigation and landowners would not lease land to peasants in the Workers Party and manual laborers and white-collar workers were fired from industry.

As a consequence of such a situation the Workers Party of the South of Korea declined from 900,000 to 240,000 by the end of 1948. A further decline of the Party's numbers is occurring in 1949 because of the departure politically unstable [members] and the repressions which are being employed against members of the Workers Party. A similar situation is also happening in other leftist organizations. However, in spite of the terror and repression carried out by the authorities through the police, the left-wing organizations are managing to hold some of their own events.

The Workers' Party and the leftist organizations associated with it are working among the population of villages and cities: they explain American policy toward Korea to the people and the traitorous behavior of the Syngman Rhee government toward their own people, they denounce activity of the UN commission with respect to Korea, they explain to the people the measures being carried out by the democratic government and the reforms being carried out in the interests of the people in the north of Korea.

When withdrawing their troops the Americans set conditions on the Syngman Rhee government that they could give him weapons only on conditions that the government take measures to suppress the left-wing organizations and eliminate the partisan movement in South Korea.

The government took such measures. Not only police units were enlisted to suppress the partisan movement in March and April 1949 but also selected army units. The minister of war, the minister of internal affairs, and the prime minister went to the island of Jeju to supervise the suppression of the partisan movement and finally Syngman Rhee, to inspect the operations of the military units and the police.

The operation to suppress the partisan movement on the island was actually led by American officers.

Both sides suffered heavy losses as a result of the battles that took place.

According to an official statement of the South Korean government 15,000 rebels were killed during the suppression of this uprising. According to the information of our friends about 30,000 partisans and civilians were killed.

However, in spite of the measures taken by the Syngman Rhee government, this battle did not have success on the mainland. They managed to suppress the uprising on the island of Jeju but this movement is increasingly spreading on the mainland. According to the information of our friends about 2,000 partisans are active at the present time. The partisans have conducted more than 2,000 operations in 1949 and in areas of the operations the population gives aid with food and clothing, informs the partisans of the places of assembly of troops and police which are assembling to fight the partisans. The puppet government itself admits that the troops and police are suffering heavy losses in suppressing the partisan movement.

The greatest difficulties in the partisan movement are a shortage of militarily experienced personnel and a great shortage of weapons and ammunition.

The CC of the Workers Party took steps to eliminate these shortcomings. Command personnel and instructors are being trained for military instruction, and steps have been taken to purchase Japanese and American weapons and ammunition.

The partisan movement is led by the CC of the Workers Party through its representatives. According to a report from our friends all the conditions and prerequisites for a further growth of the partisan movement exist and they are taking the necessary steps to expand this movement.

The political situation is extremely strained for the South Korean government. The fight against left-wing parties and organizations and also against the partisans which they are conducting is not popular among the people and is provoking great unrest among the people.

Syngman Rhee has not yet managed to unite even the right-wing camp around the government. A struggle for power and influence by the parties in government continues among the parties and their leaders in the right-wing camp. In his policy Syngman Rhee depends on the Democratic Party (a bourgeois landowners party) and the organizations

associated with it. A number of right-wing parties oppose the seizure of power by the Democratic Party. The work being pursued at the request of Syngman Rhee to unite the right-wing parties and create a so-called national camp has still not had success.

The Workers Party and left-wing organizations associated with it are skillfully using the differences in the rightists' camp and also the anti-national policy being pursued by Syngman Rhee and his accomplices to the benefit of American imperialism and are attracting to their side a number of centrist and right-wing parties and organizations which are dissatisfied with the government's policy. The leftists have managed to bring over [*peretashchit*] a certain part of the prominent leaders of the centrist and right-wing parties to the north of the country. The Workers Party has skillfully organized work to attract a number of deputies of the National Assembly of South Korea to their side. At the instruction of the Workers Party at meetings of the National Assembly deputies make a number of demands directed at undermining the authority of the South Korean government and American policy in Korea.

The petition of 62 deputies demanding the withdrawal of American troops from Korea, the expression of a vote of no confidence in the government, and a demand for the resignation of all the ministers can be included among such issues. This demand was supported by a majority of the National Assembly. During a discussion of laws they denounce the anti-popular nature of these laws and seek to change them.

Leftist parties and organizations manage to quite successfully denounce the government of Syngman Rhee as an anti-popular government. The practical experience of the work of the Syngman Rhee government during the year it has existed has clearly shown that it is not able to solve a single issue in the interest of the people. The principal and main political and economic issues, the solutions to which are expected by all the people of the south of Korea, have not yet been solved. The land issue is one of these issues. Land reform has not been carried out so far. The land is in the hands of the landowners. The issue of Japanese property has not been solved. The problem of the working day and labor legislation has not been solved. The problem of local government bodies has not yet been solved. There are no elected government bodies in districts and provinces.

The people think that the National Assembly and government are adopting and enforcing only those laws which are to the advantage of the Americans and the government, the laws on taxes from the population, the approval of unequal treaties, etc.

The economic situation in the south of the country is also serious.

The majority of industrial enterprises are not operating because of a lack of electrical power and raw material. Many enterprises bought by Korean capitalists have been closed and the equipment sold off. Unemployment is constantly growing.

Agriculture is declining from year to year. Many landowners, fearing land reform, are taking steps to sell land to the peasants. Peasants are refusing to buy because of a lack of money. Wishing to force the peasant to buy the land, the landowner refuses to lease him the land. Thus, much land remains unworked and fallow and the peasants go hungry. A

second important factor in agriculture is the lack of fertilizer. American firms are supplying fertilizer, however Korean peasants do not want to buy it because of the poor quality and high price. The decrease of cultivated land and production of agricultural output continues as a consequence of such a situation in agriculture. The government rice purchase plan for 1948 provided for purchasing 7,500,000 sek (one sek equals 150 kg) but actually bought 3,700,000 sek, or 49.4%. The reduction of the production of grain has led to the government not being able to ensure the supply of the population with food. According to a statement by the Minister of Land and Forestry the government planned to provide a population of 7,200,000 with a ration of 450 grams a day. However, the food collected is sufficiently only to supply 2,900,000 people with 300 grams a day. Such a serious economic situation of the working class and peasantry creates a hopelessness among them and causes dissatisfaction with the government and the policy it is pursuing. The political situation of the South Korean government is not secure. The so-called National Assembly (parliament) which has been created is not a representative body. Its elected deputies have not a single worker, peasant, or progressive intellectual. It mainly consists of landowners, merchants, and reactionary intellectuals. The government which has been created and its ministers are not popular among the people and do not have the authority and support of the broad strata of the people. Understanding the weakness and the lack of authority of the South Korean government among the broad masses of the people, the Americans are launching a number of measures directed at supporting this government.

With the aid of their satellites the Americans have achieved recognition of the South Korean government at a session of the General Assembly as the legal government, after which America officially recognized this government and exchanged ambassadors. The South Korean government has been recognized by 18 countries with American aid. Much propaganda work is being conducted around this fact in the south of Korea. In recent months the discussion of the issue of granting Korea a credit of \$150 million has been at the center of attention of America and South Korea. All this is being presented as American aid. With the aid of the Americans Syngman Rhee acted as the initiator of the creation of a Pacific Union to fight Communism to raise his prestige among the people. However, the people of Korea regard this measure of Syngman Rhee with mistrust and even irony.

A number of statements by American officials were made in connection with the withdrawal of American troops from Korea that the Korean government would be given aid to protect against an attack by the Northern Communists.

It is evident from those measures which the Americans are taking with respect to Korea that they are interested in Korea not only from an economic point of view, to secure Korea as a market to sell their goods, but also as a strategic bridgehead on the mainland. A number of measures are being taken, primarily of a military nature and the suppression of the forces which are fighting the current regime, in order to strengthen the current puppet government of Syngman Rhee and his regime in the country.

The police measures of the government of Syngman Rhee

The Syngman Rhee government is taking the most brutal measures against left-wing parties and organizations. All the left-wing parties and organizations have been forced underground. Print publications have been closed and printing houses destroyed. When the activity of left-wing organizations is discovered the members are arrested and thrown into prison. Those arrested are subjected to unprecedented torture and shot. For example, according to an official report in the cities of [Riosu] and [Supchen] by decision of a so-called military council 1,170 people were shot from 22 October to 9 November 1948 for participation in an uprising and more than 10,000 were actually shot there. Also according to official reports of the South Korean authorities 1,742 people were killed in March and April 1949 in the province of South Jeolla for participation in the partisan movement. From far from complete information of our friends more than 80,000 people have been killed in the south of Korea in these three years. From January to October 1948 136,000 people were arrested, of which more than 40,000 were tried and thrown into prison.

However, in spite of the repression and terror being carried out the struggle of the Korean people in the south of Korea for democracy and independence continues.

The South Korean government has more than 60,000 police armed with Japanese rifles and American automatic weapons to protect so-called public order and fight anti-national elements.

The condition of the South Korean army

The South Korean army has seven infantry divisions and five independent infantry regiments and battalions. The total strength of the army is 85,000. There is an army to defend the motherland of five brigades of about 50,000 men (a paramilitary organization).

Until 1949 the army was manned on a volunteer basis, however the main backbone of the army is members of right-wing youth organizations who are sons of landowners, merchants, and other reactionary elements. Officers, as a rule, are selected from Koreans who served in the Japanese Army and also the Kuomintang and even American armies. The army is not sufficiently trained in the firing and tactical sense. The experience of combat operations at the 38th parallel shows that the units of the South Korean army are poorly trained tactically, as a consequence of which they suffer heavy losses when attacking. With respect to political morale, the units located at the 38th parallel show themselves to be reliable and voluntarily surrender [only] individually during combat operations. However, the experience of the work of our friends to demoralize the South Korean army by sending their people there and conducting appropriate work shows that work to demoralize the army might have some success. For example, as a result of the work of an agent network sent from North Korea two battalion commanders and a certain group of enlisted men and officers were recruited, as a result of which two battalions deserted to the north of Korea in May 1949.

At the instruction of the Americans in 1948 and 1949 the South Korean authorities did much work to purge the army of unreliable and politically unstable elements.

The army is isolated from the population as a rule and ordinary soldiers deal little with the population.

Political work with the soldiers is done only in one direction, the fight against Communism, the defeat of the army of North Korea, and the destruction of the existing order in the north.

The political and economic situation in the north of Korea

The political situation in the north of Korea is marked by the constant growth of the authority of the bodies of political power and a political upsurge of the popular masses in the struggle to rebuild and develop the economy and national culture.

The existing democratic political parties and public organizations are united in the Democratic United Front which coordinates and directs their activity; the leading political party is the Workers Party, which numbers 900,000. Great democratic reforms have been carried out during the last four years since the country was liberated from the Japanese, that is: land reform has been carried out, former Japanese property has been nationalized, and public education has been reformed. Laws have been published and put into effect about labor and equal rights for men and women. Bodies of political power from bottom to top are elected by the people and all strata of the population are represented in government bodies: workers, peasants, intellectuals, merchants, industrialists, etc.

All the political and economic reforms which have been carried out are secured by the Constitution which was approved by the Supreme National Assembly in 1948.

Both the political and the economic measures being carried out by the government are going successfully.

For example, during the election of deputies to the Supreme National Assembly of Korea in August 1948 there was a 99.9% voter turnout and they gave 98.45% of their votes to the Democratic United Front.

The economic situation in the country is improving from year to year. The economy is operating according to plan for the third year now.

In 1948 the economic plan was fulfilled in all sectors. The 1949 plan was drawn up quite intensively, for example the increase of industrial production in the first half of the year was planned at 50% compared to 1948. The plan was 90.8% fulfilled for the first six months of 1949. However, the increase of production for the first half year in comparison with the first half year of 1948 was 34.6%. Agriculture also has an increase in cultivated land, a growth in the harvest, and an increase in livestock.

The plan for agricultural tax in kind was overfulfilled by the peasants in 1947 and 1948. As a consequence of the successes in agriculture the government created state reserves. The government issues the population food monthly by food ration cards according to established norms and varieties. At the same time there is a sufficient quantity of food in the free market. However, the North Korean market is experiencing difficulties in industrial goods. Market prices continue to remain at a high level as a consequence of the shortage of industrial goods.

In these four years there have also been great successes in North Korea in the growth of the national culture and art.

However, there are a whole series of difficulties in North Korea which have to be overcome by the popular democratic government. These difficulties include a shortage of skilled engineering and technical personnel in industry, transportation, and agriculture and also an insufficient number of experienced and trained personnel in government institutions and public organizations.

In spite of the solidarity of the people around the popular democratic government and the people's support for the measures which it is carrying out there nevertheless is resistance to the current political system from hostile elements.

Among those dissatisfied with the current political system are primarily the former landowners from whom land was taken away, people who actively cooperated with the Japanese, and also a certain portion of specialists who received an education in Japan and, as a rule, come from a bourgeois landowning environment. The division of the country into north and south and the presence of a reactionary government in the south of Korea is a kind of stimulant to the activity of hostile elements in the north of Korea.

There is a growth in political crimes in 1949 compared to 1948. For example, in 1948 the political security organs uncovered 1,248 cases which involved 2,734 people. In the first half of 1949 665 cases were uncovered involving 2,771 people.

In 1949 they are distributed by [the following] types of crimes:

Terrorism -	622
Espionage -	356
Sabotage -	212
Wrecking -	11
Preparing an armed uprising -	221
Distributing handbills and agitating against the current system -	1,133
Treason -	66
Other crimes -	160

The growth in political crimes in 1949 is explained on the one hand by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Korea, which allowed reactionary elements to begin to act more boldly, and on the other by an increase of spies, saboteurs, and organizers of insurrectionist cells sent by South Korean authorities.

The improvement of the work of government political security organizations to identify subversive activity of hostile elements also ought to be noted. The activity of hostile elements is not a great danger to the current system, however the government and the leadership of the Korean Workers Party are taking the necessary steps to combat the activity of all groups of political criminals and work is being done to increase the political vigilance of both workers of government institutions and the people.

The Ministry has about 28,000 police, armed as a rule with Japanese rifles, to preserve public order and protect government facilities and institutions. There are three border detachments and two police brigades with a strength of about 14,000 men to protect the state border with the Soviet Union and China and also to guard the 38th parallel. They are armed with Soviet weapons. Thus, the total strength of the police forces is 42,000.

The Ministry of National Defense

The Korean democratic government has its own national army. The army was created in 1946. The main backbone of the army and primarily of its entire command personnel is former partisans who participated in the war against the Japanese both in Korea itself and in Manchuria. As of 1 August 1949 the strength of the Korean People's Army is about 80,000, including:

infantry divisions - five, with a total strength of 51,000 men.

infantry brigade - one, with a total strength of 6,000.

mechanized brigade - one, with a total strength of 6,000.

The brigade is still not fully equipped with materiel, tanks, and artillery. There is an independent army tank regiment of 33 T-34 tanks.

Independent army artillery units:

1. An army artillery regiment of three battalions, of which two have 76 mm guns and one has 122 mm guns.

2. An army anti-aircraft regiment of three battalions, one has 85 mm and two have 37 mm guns.

Aviation. There is an air training regiment. It is intended to form a composite air division of two regiments.

At the present time there are 24 combat fighters, 24 combat ground attack aircraft, and 18 combat trainers, and eight trainers.

There is a total of 26 pilots trained for flights on combat aircraft. One hundred and fifty pilots are undergoing training and it is expected that 50 will be graduated in October to fly on combat aircraft.

Military Educational Institutions

There is an officer's school which trains line, staff, and artillery officers.

There is a political officer's school which trains political officers for all branches of the Korean People's Army.

There is a tank training school which trains tank crew members, gunner-drivers, and radio operators.

Three Korean infantry divisions, a rifle brigade, a mechanized brigade, and artillery units have been formed along the lines of our tables of organization and equipment and equipped with our Soviet weapons. The personnel are well-trained in both firing and tactics. The training was conducted under the supervision of Soviet officer-advisers and in accordance with our wartime regulations. The officers are trained in drill and tactics, however the headquarters still have shortcomings in battle management and working out coordination between branches of troops.

On a whole the troops have not been tested in a combat sense. However, the participation in battle of one battalion of the 1st Infantry Division in the [Kashinsky] sector shows that the troop will fight well.

Two divisions of 20,000 men arrived in July of this year from the People's Army of China. The personnel of the divisions have great combat experience of participating in battles against Nationalist Chinese troops. Both divisions are equipped with Japanese, American, and Chinese weapons. The command staff has combat experience, however they are insufficiently trained operationally and tactically.

The Navy. The Navy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea does not really exist.

The reasons causing the northerners to raise the issue of an attack on the south.

Kim Il Sung and Pak Heonyeong think that the problem of the unification of the country by peaceful means is impossible in the present situation. The Americans and South Korean reactionaries will not agree to a peaceful unification. Attempts to solve the Korean question during the work of the joint Soviet-American commission and at the subsequent UN General Assembly were unsuccessful. The creation of a patriotic front of representatives of the south and the north of Korea which include left-wing, centrist, and part of the right-wing parties of South Korea also does not guarantee the unification of the country by peaceful means. The appeal of the patriotic front about the peaceful unification of the country was rejected by the South Korean reactionaries. Accordingly,

they were faced with the question of what is to be done about the unification of the country.

They proceed from the position that an absolute majority of the people favor the unification of the country and the elimination of the 38th parallel. While American troops were in the south of the country they told the people that American troops in the south of Korea were preventing the unification of the country. There are no American troops in the country at the present time. Accordingly, this obstacle to unification has been removed. The people naturally ask what is preventing the unification of the country. In the south of Korea the reactionaries are agitating against the democratic government and against Communists, accusing them of being the obstacle to the unification of the country.

Kim Il Sung and Pak Heonyeong evidently are considering the situation and do not want to be responsible for delaying the unification of the country. Without seeing an opportunity to unify the country by peaceful means they have come to the idea of unifying the country by an armed attack against the South Korean government. They think that the people in both the north and south will support this step. Evidently they think that if unification is not done at the present time, even if by armed attack, then the issue of unification will drag on for years. The South Korean reactionaries will manage to stifle the democratic movement in the south and break up and destroy their left-wing organizations. At the same time the South Korean reactionaries are using this time to create a stronger army and might attack the north of the country in order to destroy everything that was created in the north in these years.

In conversations Kim Il Sung and Pak Heonyeong do not want to entertain the thought that Korea should remain divided for an indefinite time. I do not exclude that Kim Il Sung, desiring to begin an attack on the south of the country, is counting on aid from both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party. Evidently he thinks that inasmuch as Koreans participated in battles against the Nationalist Chinese troops consequently the Chinese ought to help them, the Koreans.

My conclusions and my suggestions:

As before, and as I also pointed out in my note, I think that the domestic political situation both in the south and in the north of the country is favorable to our friends. The authority of the left-wing democratic forces who are fighting for the unity and independence of the country is high among the people and the measures they are pursuing enjoy the support of the broad strata of the Korean people.

However, it is necessary to take into consideration the complexity of the international situation in which the start of an attack by the People's Army will be used by reactionary imperialist countries against the Soviet Union.

I do not exclude that the Americans will intervene in this conflict and will give active aid to the southerners. I also think that the numerical strength of the People's Army and the

logistical support which our friends have at the present time will not ensure the complete defeat of the southern army and the capture of South Korea.

I consider it possible and advisable for our friends to generate and give every kind of support and leadership to the partisan movement in the south of Korea.

It is possible under favorable circumstances to conduct a local operation to seize the Ongjin Peninsula and the area with the city of Kaesong. It is possible to use the provocations of the southerners at the 38th parallel for this purpose and to punish them for violations of the 38th parallel and seize the Ongjin Peninsula and the area with the city of Kaesong and thereby reduce the ground front line...

T. Shtykov

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 5

[Source: APRF, F. 45, Op. 1, D. 332, pp. 47-48. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 26 October 1949

MOLOTOV's draft of 26 [October] 1949

Top Secret

to Cdes. MALENKOV, BERIA, KAGANOVICH, and BULGANIN

I submit a draft reply to Cde. Mao Zedong's telegram addressed to Cde. Filippov [Stalin] on the issue of Korea (see Cde. Kovalev's telegram N 234)

V. Molotov

26 October 1949

to KOVALEV and ROSHchIN

Pass the following reply to Mao Zedong in response to his telegram of 21 October:

"To Cde. Mao Zedong.

We agree with your opinion that the Korean Army ought not to pursue an attack at the present time. At one time we also pointed out to the Korean friends that the attack on the south by the Korean People's Army that they had planned should not be undertaken since this attack had not been prepared from either a military or a political standpoint.

In our opinion at the present time the Korean comrades ought to concentrate their efforts in the struggle for the unification of Korea on developing a partisan movement, creating

liberated areas in South Korea, and a comprehensive strengthening of the People's Army of Korea.

FILIPPOV["]

Report by telegraph when this is done.

Gromyko

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 6

[Source: Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), F. 059a, Op. 5a, P. 11, pp. 87-91. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 19 January 1950

Strictly secret.

I report about the frame of mind expressed by Kim Il Sung during a luncheon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. On January 17 the minister of foreign affairs of the DPRK Pak Heonyeong held a lunch attended by a small circle of persons, on the occasion of the departure of the Korean ambassador Li Juyeon to the Chinese Peoples Republic. At the luncheon from the Korean side were Kim Dubong, Kim Il Sung, Pak Heonyeong, deputy minister of foreign affairs Pak Chong-jo,40 Li Juyeon. The trade representative of the PRC Vyn Shi Chzhen attended the luncheon. On our side in attendance were myself and the advisers of the embassy Ignatiev and Pelishenko. The luncheon took place in a friendly, warm atmosphere. Kim Il Sung, Pak Heonyeong and also the Chinese trade representative in their toasts expressed a feeling of love and gratitude toward the Soviet Union and personally toward Comrade Stalin for the liberation [of Korea from Japanese rule] and for the selfless assistance to both the Korean and Chinese people.

Kim Dubong shared his impressions of his trip to the USSR for the 70th birthday of Comrade Stalin. In his account he repeatedly underscored the great interest of the Soviet people in Korea and the numerous wishes for quick unification of the country.

During the luncheon Kim Il Sung and the Chinese trade representative, who was sitting next to him, many times enthusiastically conversed with each other in Chinese. From individual phrases it was possible to understand that they were speaking about the victory in China and about the situation in Korea. After the luncheon, in the reception room Kim Il Sung gave advice and orders to his ambassador to China Li Juyeon about his work in China, and moreover, while speaking in Korean, Kim several times said phrases in Russian about how Li would act boldly in China, since Mao Zedong is his friend and will always help Korea.

Then, after Li Juyeon left, Kim, addressing the advisers Ignatiev and Pelishenko in an excited manner, began to speak about how now, when China is completing its liberation, the liberation of the Korean people in the south of the country is next in line. In connection with this he said:

“The people of the southern portion of Korea trust me and rely on our armed might. Partisans will not decide the question. The people of the south know that we have a good army. Lately I do not sleep at night, thinking about how to resolve the question of the unification of the whole country. If the matter of the liberation of the people of the southern portion of Korea and the unification of the country is drawn out, then I can lose the trust of the people of Korea.”

Further Kim stated that when he was in Moscow, Comrade Stalin said to him that it was not necessary to attack the south, in case of an attack on the north of the country by the army of Syngman Rhee, then it is possible to go on the counteroffensive to the south of Korea. But since Syngman Rhee is still not instigating an attack, it means that the liberation of the people of the southern part of the country and the unification of the country are being drawn out, that he (Kim Il Sung) thinks that he needs again to visit Comrade Stalin and receive an order and permission for offensive action by the Peoples' Army for the purpose of the liberation of the people of Southern Korea. Further Kim said that he himself cannot begin an attack, because he is a communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law. Then he stated that if it is now possible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he will try to meet with Mao Zedong, after his return from Moscow. Kim underscored that Mao Zedong promised to render him assistance after the conclusion of the war in China. (Apparently Kim Il Sung has in mind the conversation of his representative Kim Il with Mao Zedong in June 1949, about which I reported by ciphered telegram.) Kim said that he also has other questions for Mao Zedong, in particular the question of the possibility of the creation of an eastern bureau of the Cominform. He further stated that on all these questions he will try to meet with Comrade Shtykov and to secure through him a meeting with Comrade Stalin.

The advisers of the embassy Ignatiev and Pelishenko, avoiding discussing these questions, tried to switch the discussion to a general theme, then Kim Il Sung came toward me, took me aside and began the following conversation: can he meet with Comrade Stalin and discuss the question of the position in the south and the question of aggressive actions against the army of Syngman Rhee, that their people's army now is significantly stronger than the army of Syngman Rhee. Here he stated that if it is impossible to meet with Comrade Stalin, then he wants to meet with Mao Zedong, since Mao after his visit to Moscow will have orders on all questions. Then Kim Il Sung placed before me the question, why don't I allow him to attack the Ongjin peninsula, which the People's Army could take in three days, and with a general attack the People's Army could be in Seoul in several days. I answered Kim that he has not raised the question of a meeting with Comrade Stalin and if he raises such a question, then it is possible that Comrade Stalin will receive him. On the question of an attack on the Ongjin peninsula I answered him that it is impossible to do this. Then I tried to conclude the conversation on these

questions and, alluding to a later time, proposed to go home. With that the conversation was concluded. After the luncheon Kim Il Sung was in a mood of some intoxication. It was obvious that he began this conversation not accidentally, but had thought it out earlier, with the goal of laying out his frame of mind and elucidating our attitude to these questions.

In the process of this conversation Kim Il Sung repeatedly underscored his wish to get the advice of Comrade Stalin on the question of the situation in the south of Korea, since [Kim Il Sung] is constantly nurturing his idea about an attack.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 7

[Source: AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 5a, D. 3, P. 11, pp. 92. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram from Stalin to Shtykov, 30 January 1950

1. I received your report. I understand the dissatisfaction of Comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to undertake needs large preparation. The matter must be organized so that there would not be too great a risk. If he wants to discuss this matter with me, then I will always be ready to receive him and discuss with him. Transmit all this to Kim Il Sung and tell him that I am ready to help him in this matter.

2. I have a request for Comrade Kim Il Sung. The Soviet Union is experiencing a great insufficiency in lead. We would like to receive from Korea a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. Korea would render us a great assistance if it could yearly send to the Soviet Union the indicated amount of lead. I hope that Kim Il Sung will not refuse us in this. It is possible that Kim Il Sung needs our technical assistance and some number of Soviet specialists. We are ready to render this assistance. Transmit this request of mine to comrade Kim Il Sung and ask him for me, to communicate to me his consideration on this matter.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 8

[Source: AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 5a, D. 3, P. 11, pp. 92-93.]

Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin, 31 January 1950

Ciphered telegram Strictly secret
From Pyongyang
To Comrade Stalin, I.V.

On 30 January I had a meeting with Comrade Kim Il Sung, in accordance with your order. After referring to the conversation that took place on January 17 during the lunch at [North Korean Foreign Minister] Pak Heonyeong's, I relayed precisely the contents of the first point of your orders.

Kim Il Sung received my report with great satisfaction. Your agreement to receive him and your readiness to assist him in this matter made an especially strong impression. Kim Il Sung, apparently wishing once more to reassure himself, asked me if this means that it is possible to meet with Comrade Stalin on this question. I answered that from this communication it follows that Comrade Stalin is ready to receive you. Kim Il Sung further stated that he will prepare himself for the meeting.

Regarding the question of delivering lead from Korea to the USSR, I read the second point of your order. Kim answered that he will take all necessary measures to secure the delivery to the USSR from Korea of the quantity of lead indicated by you. He promised to work out all necessary measures regarding this question in the course of 10-15 days.

31.I.50. [T.F.] SHTYKOV

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 9

[Source: AVPRF, F. 0102 1950i op. 6 p. 21, pp. 84-108. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Memorandum on the Partisan Movement in South Korea, 6 May 1950

USSR Embassy
in Korea
6 May 1950
[handwritten]:
to Cde. Kurbatov

Top Secret
Copy N° 1
[handwritten]: 15/VII 95

[Stamp]:
USSR MFA
SECRETARIAT
Cde. Gr[omyk]o
Top Secret

Incoming N° 4045-?sl?
22.V.1950

TO DEPUTY USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Cde. GROMYKO

Copy: Ts. K.

Cde. GRIGOR'YAN

I am sending material "The Partisan Movement in South Korea"

ATTACHMENT: 24-page text.

1+24
112bs
23 V-50

USSR CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES
IN KOREA

/signature/
A. IGNAT'YEV

Copies to:

- 1 - Cde. Gromyko
- 2- Cde. Grigor'yan
- 3 - to file

[date off the page]-V-50

[Handwritten note]:

To Cde. ?Kalinin?

N. is to check whether it was
sent to Cde. Grigor'yan; if not then
it needs to be sent.

[illegible initials]
20.V

[handwritten]: ref. 4045-?sl?

Top Secret
Attachment to incoming N° 1126s
23/V 1950

THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT
In South Korea

(Memorandum)

After the failure of a number of attempts to suppress the partisan movement in South Korea at the end of 1949, at the beginning of 1950, the South Korean authorities continued punitive expeditions against the partisans and the civilian population, which sympathizes with them. Mass repressions occurred at the same time against supporters of the democratic camp and members of the Workers Party in particular. Reactionaries prepared conditions to hold elections to the so-called "National Assembly," striving to consolidate their dominance in the South and trying to give themselves a free hand to prepare for a vigorous struggle against the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

By February 1950, military units of the South Korean army thrown against partisans numbered 30,500, that is, one-third of the entire army¹.

¹ Information of the Korean Workers' Party CC

Thus, the command of the so-called "army of national defense" has created a 6:1 numerical superiority over the partisans. The advantage is considerably greater in the most important individual sectors.

The total strength of the partisan detachments, which have been active in South Korea, is 5,250.

The partisan strength by provinces is as follows:

Province	Partisan strength
City of Seoul	50
Gyeonggi	90
North Gangwon	150
South Gangwon	50

North Jeolla	300
South Jeolla	1250
South Gyeongsang	500
North Gyeongsang	2050
Gangwon	810
Total	5250

A broader partisan movement has been developed in the northern regions of the province of North Gyeongsang, adjoining the province of Gangwon. There, the third group of partisan detachments was based in the cities of Taebaek and Samcheok which is commanded by Yi Hojae (a member of the Korean Workers' Party CC). The first group of partisan detachments was based in the mountains of Jirisan and Deokyusan (on the border of the province of South Jeolla and South Gyeongsang) under the command of Lee Hyunsang (a member of the Korean Workers' Party CC). The second group was based in the mountains of Songnisan and Minjujisan under the command of Pak Yeonghak.

Communications between the Korean Workers' Party CC and the majority of partisan detachments and local Party organizations in South Korea were broken off in view of the increase of terror and repressions in the South and the vigorous operations of the reactionaries in March directed at suppressing the partisan movement. Therefore, there is no complete information about the state of the partisan movement in South Korea.

Kim Dalsam, the Commander of the First Partisan Corps operating in the mountains of Taebaeksan and one of the most prominent organizers of the partisan movement in South Korea, arrived in North Korea from the South at the end of March. He is widely known in South Korea as the commander of partisan detachments operating on the island of Jeju, which heroically resisted the attack of units of the "army of national defense" from April 1948 to May 1949, during the period of the popular uprising on this island. Kim Dalsam has commanded a large partisan detachment (the so-called First Partisan Corps) operating in the eastern provinces of South Korea since the middle of 1949. South Korean army units and police began combat operations against Kim Dalsam's detachment in September 1949. On 16 November 1949 the Hapdong Agency reported that Kim Dalsam was killed during one of the clashes in the mountains of Ilwolsan (North Gyeongsang Province). At the end of March 1950, South Korean agencies broadcasted a report of the death of Kim Dalsam a second time. The text of a report from Kim Dalsam to the Korean Workers' Party Central Committee, which he wrote on arrival in the North, is given below in which he gives a brief description of the activity of the First Partisan Corps. In spite of a number of inaccuracies and contradictions, the report gives some idea of the partisan movement in South Korea.

The First Partisan Corps of the Region of Taebaeksan²

Report of Kim Dalsam

3 April 1950

² Translated by Cheon Donghyeok, edited by Z. K.

One of the most important tasks of the Corp's command was the establishment of ties with the Party CC and the aid of messengers for a report about the condition of the First Partisan Corps operating in the area of Taebaeksan and the receipt of new instructions. However, this task was not done because of a lack of time. The question of informing the CC became especially serious beginning in January 1950.

All the detachments of the Corps arrived in the village of Gisandong, Subi District, at the beginning of February and stopped there for a long time. A meeting of the Corp's command was held on 23 February at which Commander-in-Chief Yi Hojae, his First Deputy Kim Dalsam, Commissar Pak Chiu, and Chief of Staff Seo Cheol were present. A decision was made there to send messengers to the Party CC with information about the condition of the partisan detachments of the area of Taebaeksan.

A Feature of Enemy Tactics

In July, August, and September, in connection with the publication of the appeal of the YeDOF [United Democratic Fatherland Front], the partisans of the area of Taebaeksan developed active operations and destroyed a number of police stations. At that time, the enemy was limiting himself to only passive measures against the partisans. His units were mainly on the defensive.

Taking advantage of this and inspired by the appeal of the YeDOF, the population left for the mountains en masse. At this time, false propaganda was spread locally among the population; the main point of which was that as soon as 20 September arrived, Korea would be completely liberated and the capital of the republic would be moved to Seoul. This false propaganda was believed not only by the popular masses but some Party members.

The command of the partisan detachments was not able to draw the people, who came to the mountains, into the partisan detachments and train them accordingly. As a result, when September 20 came and the enemy's autumn offensive against the partisans began, the population, including some Party members, came down from the mountains en masse and began to surrender to the enemy. Thus, the revolutionary spirit of the population, which had been raised to the hilt, began to gradually fall. By October, the population's disappointment was so great that it was even difficult to imagine.

For example, in spite of all possible measures taken to arouse the population on 2 October, during the large operation to capture the city of Andong, an extremely

insufficient number of people rose to support the partisans. From this moment, the enemy began an active offensive against the partisans in accordance with their own plan, "autumn operation."

However, the main forces of the First Partisan Corps continued their combat operations after the Andong operation, destroying police stations and enemy army subunits. As a result, enemy punitive operations were not successful. The enemy then mobilized three infantry divisions to defeat the partisans. Kim Seokbeom, the Commander of the 1st Division, was appointed the commanding general of the punitive expedition in the area of Taebaeksan; Song Hoseong, Commander of the 2nd Division, [was appointed] the commanding general of the expedition in the area of Andong; and Yi Eungjoon, Commander of the 3rd Division, [was appointed the commanding general of the expedition] in the area of Yeongnam. The main headquarters of the enemy is located in the city of Daejeon.

The enemy plan consisted of isolating the main forces of our corps from the partisan detachments of the area of Jirisan, cutting off their path to the north and not allowing them to link up with the partisans operating in Gyeongju, dislodging our corps in the area of the east coast and completely destroying it by the end of December. On the other hand, so-called "political departments" were created with the governors of the provinces of North Gyeongsang, Gangwon, and North Gangwon with the goal of "concentrating"³ the population.

³ "Concentration" of the population consists of the destruction of small population centers in areas of partisan operations and forcible resettlement of the residents to large population centers. (Editor)

The punitive expeditions have continued to the present time. At the same time, the concentration of the population, the destruction of villages, and the mass annihilation of people continue.

Beginning in January, the enemy replaced Kim Seokbeom with Yu Jaeheung and Yi Eungjoon with Kim Baekil and increased offensive operations against the partisans using aircraft, tanks, and an additional 500 policemen of Gangwon Province. The 16th, 5th, 25th, and 22nd regiments participated in the autumn and winter operations. The 16th, 5th, 25th, and 21st regiments are taking part in them at the present time.

Before September 1949, in the majority of cases, the enemy committed a platoon into battle. In exceptional cases, they committed a company or a battalion. Beginning in October, the enemy started to step up offensive operations. In November, no less than a company was committed to battle. The enemy held each height with one platoon.

Recently, the enemy has used artillery in battle more often than previously. The soldiers are given 90 rounds per rifle and 1,500 for a light machinegun.

After a battle in the mountains, the enemy does not leave his positions even at night as long as the partisans do not withdraw. To avoid surprise attack from the partisans, when moving, the enemy cuts down trees at a distance of 5-100 meters from the roads.

Before September 1949, the police operated together with the army, but during the autumn and winter operations, the police were on the defensive. Police stations and units have been turned into sort of fortresses. Stone walls nine Cheok⁴ high and six Cheok wide have been erected around them. The ditches in front of the wall have been dug up [SIC] and barricades have been built behind them. Sixteen to eighteen posts have been set up around the police stations and guard duty is performed by young detachments. The police control the concentrated villages and the countryside of the mountainous regions.

⁴ One Cheok = 30.3 cm.

The Concentration of the Population and the Devastation of the Villages

From September to November 1949, the residents of villages in mountainous regions with 20-30 households were resettled to larger population centers located along highways. Peasants were resettled on a massive scale from November 1949 to February 1950.

Documents found on the body of Captain Choe, a battalion commander of the 25th Regiment, state the following:

1. Cut off the routes through which the partisans are supplied with food.
2. Leave only three or four population centers in each rural district where all the peasants of the remaining villages of the rural district can be gathered.
3. Permit each family to have a daily threshing of three to five seung⁵ of grain from the harvest.

⁵ One seung = 1.8 liters

4. Severely punish people who supply food to the partisans.

Three-fifths of the villages in the districts of Bonghwa, Yeongyang, Andong, and Cheongsong have been resettled and so have three-fourths of the villages in Yeongdeok, one half in Uiseong, and three-fifths in Yeongju. The remaining peasant villages are being devastated or wiped from the face of the Earth in order to completely deprive the partisans of shelter. There is literally not a single dwelling within a distance of 40 li⁶ from any mountain. The enemy has burned all the forests in the mountains in the districts of Yeongdeok, Yeongyang, Andong, Yeongil, and Bonghwa in order to deprive the partisans of natural cover.

⁶ One li = 400 meters

No steps are being taken to provide housing for the peasants forcibly resettled to new places. Four or five families are being herded into one room. The living conditions of these peasants are hellish. There is a police station or a military unit stationed at each concentration point. Young detachments perform guard duty there. Earthen walls have been built around the concentration villages. The population centers with the most reactionary-minded population are supplied with models "99" and "38" [Japanese-made] rifles. The remaining population centers are being equipped with iron pikes and other primitive weapons. Messenger-signalmen are being placed on highways at a distance of 50-100 meters from one another. When a partisan appears they immediately signal this to a police station.

Residents do not have the right to go more than 150-200 meters from their village. Two copies of each person's identification are prepared with a photo identity card. One copy is kept at the police station and the other is issued in the established manner.

The harvest was conducted collectively guarded by soldiers. The grain that was collected there was taken away to the police station in a vehicle. The population's food is stored in the police station and is issued in accordance with a set norm.

Robbery, violence, and lawlessness rule in concentration population centers where there are military subunits.

The extermination of the population became more widespread during the autumn and winter punitive expeditions. For example, in the district of Andong 700-800 people were killed in three months, November and December 1949 and January 1950; 2,000 in Bonghwa district; 1,500 in Yeongyang district; 700 in Yeongju district; 2,500 in Yeongdeok district; 1,000 in Cheongsong district; and 400 in Uiseong district. A total of 8,800-9,000 were killed in the seven districts.

In the village of Bunchenwi, Sonen rural district of Bonghwa district, more than 20 people were shot at the same time just because partisans passed through this village.

More than 200 people from 200 households were shot in the village of [Hegudon], Yeongdeok district, because the residents had democratic sentiments. There are very many examples of such mass killings.

Eighteen people were killed who had family ties with the partisan Pak [Ben Do]. In the district of Yeongdeok, all the relatives of our partisans were killed even down to second cousins.

Six of our comrades in the district of [Yenhan], who had fallen into enemy hands, were handed over to German Shepherds to be torn to pieces.

In the district of Bonghwa, the police walked our comrades to a bazaar, forced them to dig a pit in the presence of the population, and then shot them.

There were cases where the heads of our comrades who had died in battle were exhibited at a bazaar in the district of Cheonan.

The Activity of the First Corps

Before 2 October (before the Andong operation), the enemy was still operating passively, and the terror against the population was not so severe. We maintained close ties with the population with the aid of partisan organizations. We developed a partisan movement over an extensive territory of the districts of Andong, Cheongsong, Bonghwa, Yeongju, Uljin, Samcheok, and Munchen.

Large forces were thrown against the partisans during the winter campaign. Repression against the population intensified. The food supply of the partisans stopped completely in connection with the concentration of the population. Individual partisan detachments were isolated from one another. The danger of the defeat of individual detachments approached. It became almost impossible to get food without large armed forces. This forced us to change tactics, that is, grouping our forces to hit the weak spots of the approaching enemy and raiding concentrated villages to get food.

We set as our task during this period, not an expansion of the areas of operations, but the preservation of our strength and the consolidation of all detachments around the command to hit the enemy with relatively large strikes.

The consolidation of partisan detachments was accelerated in accordance with the orders of the Party Provincial Committee and in connection with the upcoming movement of detachments to the north. As a result, on 6 November all the detachments were assembled in the mountains of Ilwolsan. However, the movement north was halted because of a lack of new recruits and the losses of Second Commissar [Song Dya Chan] and other senior officials. By this time, the mountains of Ilwolsan, where we were located, were already surrounded by two or three rings of the enemy. The command then decided to take the city of Taegu where the enemy had only 500 men in a single attack and inspire a popular uprising throughout the entire province of North Gyeongsang. We moved south in the direction of Taegu in two groups. One group advanced through the districts of Cheongsong and Yeongil and the other through Andong and Uiseong. Reaching Gyeongju, we were to have linked up with the Gyeongju partisan detachments and attacked Daegu with combined forces. However, this plan was not carried out because of a crushing blow received by the Gyeongju detachments. In the middle of December, both groups joined together in the mountains of Mujangsan and steps were taken to preserve [our] strength.

Detachments of the 1st Corps conducted 23 large combat operations between mid-July 1949 and 2 March of this year. The detachments received 77 new recruits during this time with the aid of district Party committees. Partisans conducted combat and political training in the mountains of Noeumsan for half a month. The partisans engaged in combat and political training in the village of Gisandong for 20 days. Two issues of the

newspaper "Zvezda [Star]" and five of "Pkyabyak" were published. Political work was conducted amongst the population continuously.

The Mood of the Workers

The partisan movement was not widespread in the cities. The partisans did not often have an opportunity to meet workers; therefore, we were unable to deeply study the condition of the workers. However, there is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of the workers hate Syngman Rhee and sympathize with the partisans. In the words of local partisan officials, the workers are ready to rise up at any time to fight the Syngman Rhee government.

The Mood of the Peasants

The peasants' desire to obtain land is great. Peasant support for the 1st Corps was enormous. They were deeply convinced that the partisans were a reliable support in their struggle for land. The peasantry of South Korea want to become the same masters of land as the peasants of North Korea. The peasants might rise up at any time to fight for land. There are many examples of when partisans appeared in a village, all the peasants went to meet them and held rallies.

The peasants of South Korea are impatiently waiting for the arrival of the People's Army. For example, when the 7th Partisan Detachment arrived from North Korea, the peasants rejoiced, considering the partisans soldiers of the People's Army.

The landowners do not live in the villages. They live in the cities or near police stations.

The partisans were not very worried about food until last September. The peasants brought the partisans food themselves and provided information about the enemy.

Until October of last year, the peasants supported the partisans where the partisan organizations were strong. For example, from the end of September to the end of last October, our headquarters detachment, which numbered 100 men, was located in the area of Yeongdeok. During this time, the peasants constantly supplied our detachment with food.

Support from them almost stopped in connection with the resettlement of the peasants. However, in spite of savage repression, the peasants strive to support the partisans by all possible means. For example, in January, a partisan detachment of 40 men was in the mountains of Yendusan, near the village of [Digenni]. The peasants of this village secretly supplied the partisans with food. There are many such examples.

During resettlement to the concentration villages, the peasants buried surplus potatoes in the ground for the partisans, which helped them a great deal. When meeting partisans, the resettled peasants, with tears in their eyes, asked them to free them. Thus, the peasants might rise up at any time in the event of armed support from the partisans.

The petty urban bourgeoisie also hates the Syngman Rhee clique. They will unquestionably come over to our side when our forces are superior.

The soldiers of the enemy arms are extremely dissatisfied with service conditions. In the words of prisoners, the soldiers eat only twice a day. They are poorly clothed and their morale is low. They often refuse to attack partisans. In response to the question of why the soldiers do not rebel, one of the captured soldiers replied that "it is possible to revolt, but there is nowhere to go." In response to the question 'why do they not cross over to the partisan side,' the prisoner answered that in the mountains, it is cold and hard to live. This is the common sentiment of the soldiers. However, the officers are very reactionary. During attacks, the officers are always in front. The officers behave very badly in the villages. Robbery, violence, destruction, and murder are common occurrences. They often give commands in Japanese. They give the soldiers vodka before an attack. Revolts in enemy units are quite possible when our forces are strengthened.

Shortcomings in the Organization of the Partisan Movement

The biggest shortcoming is the lack of a particular base, a liberated area. Workers, peasants, and even soldiers, the entire people of South Korea impatiently await a revolution. The creation of a liberated area will be the incentive for the people to rise up to fight for a revolution in the South.

With the increase in repression against the population and the offensive against the partisans, it is becoming difficult to establish communications between partisans and the population. The partisans have to fight continuously. The food supply is causing difficulties, and there is no opportunity to treat the wounded. Therefore, the creation of a liberated area is an urgent task of the partisan movement. A liberated area should be created this summer by any means. The next shortcoming is the lack of communications equipment with the aid of which it would be possible to maintain communications with the Party CC and the partisan detachments of other regions. The immediate arming of partisan detachments with modern radios is needed. If there is no opportunity to simultaneously supply radios to all partisan detachments, then the first priority needs to be to at least supply the 1st Corps.

Some Mistakes

The 1st Corps has made many mistakes in its activity from the moment the 7th Detachment crossed to the South (in June 1949) up to the present time.

1. Relying only on Party organizations, the Corps took no steps itself to replenish its ranks. As a result, whereas, on 6 November 1949, the 1st Corps and the 1st Brigade numbered 420 men; on 2 March 1950, they numbered 370, that is, they were reduced by 50 men.

2. We have been too concerned about preserving the main forces of the partisans and paid little attention to a vigorous and bold offensive, thereby giving the enemy the ability to blockade the partisans and increase repression against the population. All the battles during the winter campaign were unexpected with the exception of the one Yeongdeok battle (21 January). We could not take the initiative into our own hands. We could not completely occupy the city during the Andong operation because of insufficient aggressiveness and boldness.

3. The agitprop work among the population, which we conducted, was insufficient. We did not manage to rouse the population to fight the forcible resettlement or against the terror and robbery, and we did not manage to organize and rouse the population to a massive armed rebellion. We are essentially cut off from the population.

In spite of an enormous numerical superiority, the South Korean authorities were unable to suppress the partisan movement or even weaken it during the period from September 1949 to February 1950. This is demonstrated by statements of officials.

On 21 January 1950 Shin Taeyeong, the acting Chief of the General Staff of the South Korean army, declared in Taegu that the punitive expedition "was not going satisfactorily." He pointed out that the partisans were especially active in the area of Andong (Hapdong Agency).

On 24 January Jeong Hyeonmo, the Governor of the Province of North Gyeongsang, left office and Jo Jaecheon, Chief of the Police Directorate of this province, was appointed to replace him. This move was obviously connected with a desire to pursue more vigorous measures against the partisans in a province where they were especially active. The latter was indirectly confirmed by the statement of Shin Seongmo, Minister of National Defense: "Right now, the matter of the defeat of Communist bands in North Gyeongsang and South Gyeongsang is going badly." However, they will soon be completely eliminated (Hapdong Agency, 1 February 1950).

On 11 February, Deputy Chief of the Security Directorate Chun declared during the UN Commission's consultations with him, "Recently, attacks by 'wild boars'⁷ have been constantly increasing" (Hapdong Agency).

⁷ Meaning the partisans.

In spite of the failures during this entire time, the South Korean press and radio have continually published knowingly exaggerated and false information about the defeat of partisans. For example, on 29 January, Seoul Radio reported that 4,382 were killed and 1,645 partisans were captured during 16 months of battles in the area of Yeosu while the "army of national defense" had lost only 193 men killed.

The failure of punitive expeditions has forced the South Korea authorities to throw against the partisans even more police units, which, as Kim [Dalsam] writes, were previously on the defensive. On 7 February, Paek Seongok was appointed Minister of

Internal Affairs, replacing Kim Hyoseok. On 16 February, Roberto, the head of the American military advisory mission, unexpectedly went to an unknown area of military operations...

The "army of national defense" and police managed to inflict a number of serious blows on the partisans during March, which can be judged even from the reports of South Korean telegraph agencies (which, as before, in a majority of cases were exaggerated and false).

On 9 March, the Hanguk Agency reported the defeat of the partisans in the area of Jirisan.

On 14 March, Shin Taeyeong reported that the punitive expedition against the detachment of Kim Dalsam was developing successfully (Hanguk Agency). On 22 March, the encirclement was reported, and on 24 March, the "rout" of the detachment of Kim Dalsam. Finally, on 25 March, it was reported that Kim Dalsam had been killed.

On 27 March, Paek Seongok declared that "public order has already been established" in the regions of Taebaeksan and Jirisan (Hanguk Agency).

On 29 March, Shin Taeyeong declared that "the punitive expedition against the partisans will end as soon as the detachment of Yi Hojae is defeated".

On 3 April, the chief of the punitive detachment operating in the province of North Gyeongsang declared that "the army has completely eliminated the Communist bands" there and that "in the future the peasants will not be resettled from areas of combat operations and those already resettled are already returning to their places of residence" (Hapdong Agency, 4 April 1950).

On 11 April, the defeat of the detachment of Kim [Sen Ho] in the mountains of Odaesan (Gangwon Province) was reported as was the defeat of the detachment of Yi Hojae and his death on the 13th.

However, in spite of the number of blows inflicted on the partisans of South Korea in March, the partisan movement there has not been completely suppressed. This is demonstrated by a report (requiring verification) of the Korean Central Telegraph Agency (DPRK) which says, referring to the newspaper Noryeokja, that during March, the partisans of South Korea conducted 1,038 operations as a result of which the enemy lost 570 soldiers killed.

The fact that the South Korean authorities could not suppress the partisan movement in more than six months demonstrates not only the political instability of the reactionary regime in South Korea but also the military weakness of the so-called "Korean republic."

The South Korean authorities managed to inflict some serious blows on the partisans in April. However, they could not completely defeat the partisan detachments. They only weakened the partisan forces. According to information available to us, Yi Hojae is alive.

The false reports about the death of Kim Dalsam and Yi Hojae and also the enormous number of other exaggerated and false reports demonstrates the desire of the reactionaries of the South to mislead public opinion and create the impression of the complete defeat of the partisans.

The leaders of the partisan movement in South Korea have made a number of serious mistakes, which have led to a weakening of the movement and a number of failures. The following are the main ones:

1. The partisan detachments do not operate vigorously and aggressively. They do not sufficiently search for the enemy's weak spots. To a considerable degree their operations are defensive.
2. The most favorable time to launch a series of serious blows against the enemy (August and September 1949) was lost.
3. Communications between the partisans and local Korean Workers' Party committees and the CC and also ties with the local population were weak.
4. Partisan detachments were not organized from the local population. They are also poorly involved in existing partisan detachments as a result of incorrectly directed political work and because the majority of the South Korea population is not relying on their own strength but on liberation at the hands of the People's Army.

A number of disagreements inside the camp of the South Korean reactionaries, which have sharpened during preparations for elections, are undermining its position and creating conditions to raise a new wave of the partisan movement in the current year.

26 April 1950

/signature/

V. Kiselev

Copy L. S.

Copy - to Cde. Gromyko
Copy - to Cde. Grigor'yan
Copy - to file

[handwritten]:

RF Foreign Policy Archive
F. 0102 1950i op. 6 p. 21 pp. 84-108
6 May 1950

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 10

[Source: Russian State Archive of Social Political History (RGASPI), F. 558, Op. 11, D. 334, p. 56. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram from Roshchin to Cde. Filippov [Stalin], 14 May 1950

Strictly Secret

Cipher telegram

Distribution list numbering

- N1. to Stalin
- N2. to Stalin
- N3. to Molotov
- N4. to Malenkov
- N5. to Bulganin
- N6. to Vyshinsky

from [Beijing] from Roshchin

14 May 1950

Flash [Precedence]
special

for Cde. Filippov

At 1440 14 May I visited Cde. Mao Zedong and delivered your telegram to him. Thanking me for the reply Cde. Mao Zedong reported that in a conversation with him on the evening of 13 May the Korean comrades had informed him in detail about the situation in the country and about the conversation with you. He agreed with the assessments of the Korean comrades of the situation in North and South Korea and also with their assessment of the correlation of forces between the north and the south.

Cde. Mao Zedong then pointed out that he had informed the Korean comrades of the possibility of concluding a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual aid (after unification) on the model of the Chinese-Soviet treaty but that the Chinese government would make a final decision on the conclusion of such a treaty only after consulting with Cde. Filippov.

14 May 1950

Roshchin"

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 11

[Source: RGASPI, F. 558, Op. 11, D. 334, p. 57. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From Vyshinsky to the Soviet Ambassador to [Beijing], 16 May 1950

Top Secret

Enciphered telegram

Vyshinsky to the Soviet ambassador to [Beijing], 16 May 1950

[Beijing]

to the Soviet ambassador

Flash

Special

Inform Mao Zedong that Cde. Filippov and [his] friends consider the opinion of Cde. Mao Zedong to conclude a treaty of friendship, alliance, and mutual aid after unification to be absolutely correct.

FILIPPOV"

Report by telegraph when this is done.

A. Vyshinsky

16 May 1950

to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Molotov
to Cde. Vyshinsky

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 12

[Source: AVPRF, Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Cable

From Shtykov to Vyshinsky, 30 May 1950

[handwritten]: 30 May 1950

Cable

Strictly Secret
reproduction prohibited

Copy N° 1: distribution list
Copy N° 2: Stalin
Copy N° 3: Stalin
Copy N° 4: Molotov
Copy N° 5: Malenkov
Copy N° 6: Beria
Copy N° 7: Mikoyan

Copy N° 8: Kaganovich
Copy N° 9: Bulganin
Copy N° 10: Vyshinsky
Copy N° 11: Gromyko
Copy N° 12: Copy

From PYONGYANG

N° 16030 1340

30 May 1950

16033 16044

Special. N° N° 408-410

SPECIAL
FLASH

To VYSHINSKY (for the Politburo [*instantsiya*]).

I met with Kim Il Sung, at his request, on 29 May. At the beginning of the conversation, Kim Il Sung reported that the weapons and ammunition, which he had requested during [his] stay in Moscow, had mainly already arrived. The weapons had been transported to the newly formed divisions, and the delivery of weapons to the soldiers would be completed by 1 June. He then reported that he had gone to the new divisions and familiarized himself with the progress of military training and thinks that the divisions will be combat-ready by the end of June.

Kim Il Sung reported that, at his order, the chief of the general staff had finished the drafting of a decision in principle for an attack [*nastuplenie*]. The chief of the general staff reported the plan to him together with Soviet General Vasil'yev. He approved the decision, which had been made and the choice of the main blow during the attack. He asked me to meet with him, the chief of the general staff, and Soviet General Vasil'yev in order to look over this decision together. I declined such a joint meeting, referring to the fact that I would be familiarized with the decision by General Vasil'yev.

Kim Il Sung then reported that they are finishing organizational issues in the army by 1 June. The navy is somewhat behind as a consequence of the fact that they had still not received one trawler and one large subchaser [*okhotnik*] from the USSR [Translator's note: "one trawler" and "one large subchaser" are circled]. The crews for these ships have been chosen, but they are not being trained inasmuch as these ships are not available. He asked me to take appropriate measures to speed up the arrival of the ships. I replied that according to the information available to me the ships would be delivered to Korea at the beginning of June. Kim Il Sung then explained that their infantry troops were ready to conduct combat operations. Of the 10 infantry divisions, seven were already completely ready to conduct offensive operations. The tank brigade and the motorcycle regiment are also ready. Three new rifle divisions finish training in June. This suits them since they are designated for the second echelon.

He then explained that the southerners do not have complete information about the People's Army and its combat readiness. However, they are undertaking a series of steps right now to strengthen their army, although there are no large changes in the South Korean army. Taking into consideration that the People's Army is prepared to conduct combat operations, he would like to begin military operations against the South at the end of June. It is disadvantageous for the northerners to put off the start of combat operations further for two reasons. First, the southerners might discover their intentions and take steps to strengthen their army. Second, there might be heavy rains in July and then the attack would have to be put off until September, and this is extremely undesirable. Kim Il Sung then explained that, according to a report of the chief of the general staff, they would need 16 days to concentrate the troops. Accordingly, they should begin to move the troops to the concentration area between 8 and 10 June. Kim Il Sung explained that this issue had still not been put to the members of the Party political council for discussion, and it was planned to raise this in the next few days, depending on the time for the start of operations. I avoided a direct answer to his question about the time to begin combat operations, referring to the fact that this is a serious issue and that he should consult with the military as to how much time they need to prepare the troops and with the political council, and then make a final decision.

Note:

After the conversation with Kim Il Sung about these issues I called in advisers Generals Vasil'yev and Postnikov in order to find out their opinion about the degree of readiness of the troops and the reality of the time to begin combat operations at the end of June. Generals Vasil'yev and Postnikov think that much time will be needed to concentrate the troops and for a detailed working out of the operation with the commanders of divisions and regiments, and consequently, it would be advisable to begin the operation in July. However, taking into consideration that there are heavy rains in July and that having detected preparations for combat operations, the southerners would begin to strengthen their army, they are inclined to [the view] that the preparations of the troops of the People's Army might be concluded and the operation begun at the end of June.

My opinion.

Inasmuch as Kim Il Sung is disposed to begin the operation at the end of June and that the preparation of the troops might be concluded by this time, we might accordingly agree with this time. Kim Il Sung then reported that they and Pak Heonyeong discussed a plan of political measures, which envisions that a peaceful unification of the country is offered to the southerners. In the beginning, they were thinking of acting in the name of the Fatherland Front and then in the name of the government. He asked me to receive Pak Heonyeong and help him draw up these documents. I agreed.

At the end of the conversation, Kim Il Sung addressed a request to take appropriate steps to speed up the delivery of the medicines ordered for the trade mission but not yet received and for delivery of 10-15,000 tons of oil in June and July. Kim Il Sung stressed that they had a serious situation with gasoline. I promised to take appropriate steps.

I support Kim Il Sung's request for medicines, and they also have a great need for gasoline.

I request urgent instructions [be given] regarding the issues that were touched on.

12 copies yan. [SIC]

30 May 1950 SHTYKOV

Printed 30 May 20_20

Distributed

Issued by Rekunov

[Handwritten]: "In reply to your N°. The Politburo [approved]... your proposals. The receipt of medicines and oil will be accelerated. /Vyshinsky/"

[In the lower left-hand corner underneath some illegible marks]: "Here is Stalin's approval"

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 13

[Source: AVPRF, Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

Of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Report, 25 June 1950

TELEGRAM IN THE CLEAR FROM PYONGYANG

to Cde. A. A. GROMYKO

I am sending a report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs transmitted by radio on 25 June 1950

"Report of the DPRK Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Early on the morning of 25 June 1950, troops of the so-called 'army of national defense' of the puppet government of South Korea began a surprise attack on the territory of North Korea along the entire 38th parallel. Having begun a surprise attack, the enemy invaded the territory of North Korea to a depth of one or two kilometers north of the 38th parallel in the area west of [Haeju] and in the areas of [Geumcheon] and [Cheolwon].

The DPRK Ministry of Internal Affairs has issued an order to security detachments to repel the attacks of the enemy, which has invaded the territory of North Korea. At the present moment, the security forces of the Republic are stubbornly resisting the enemy. Security detachments of the Republic have repulsed attacks of the enemy, which has invaded the territory of North Korea in the area of [Yeonan]. The government of the DPRK has charged the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic with warning the authorities of the puppet government of South Korea that if they do not immediately halt their reckless military operations in the areas north of the 38th parallel, decisive steps will be taken to subdue the enemy and that they will bear full responsibility for all the serious consequences of these reckless military operations."

SHTYKOV

Sent by Chichkova
Received by Kirsanova

Authenticated by: [illegible signature]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 14

[Source: AVPRF, Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Note

On the Reception of US Ambassador Kirk, 29 June 1950

[Handwritten]:

to Cde. G. S. Sazhin/Saksin

to Cde. /N. I. Molyakov/

FROM THE JOURNAL
OF A. A. GROMYKO

SECRET
30 June 1950
N° 210/AG

RECEPTION OF US AMBASSADOR KIRK
29 June 1950

Today, I invited U.S. Ambassador Kirk and delivered a statement of the Soviet Government to him in response to the statement of the U.S. Government of 27 June (attached).

Having familiarized himself with the text of the statement, Kirk asked whether this was also a reply to the point in which the U.S. Government asked the Soviet Government to influence the North Korean authorities.

I replied to Kirk that the statement given to him was the response of the Soviet Government to the statement of the U.S. Government of 27 June, including the point mentioned by the Ambassador.

At Kirk's request the text of our reply was (verbally) translated into English for him.

The conversation lasted 10 minutes.

Present at the reception were Cde. V. N. Pastoyev, Assistant to the Chief of the Protocol Department, and N. I. Molyakov, First Secretary of the U.S. Department.

DEPUTY USSR MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

/A. Gromyko/

Authenticated by [illegible signature]

[Handwritten]: Ref N 854/SShA
30 June 1950

Delivered to U.S. Ambassador Kirk
by Cde. A. A. Gromyko during a
conversation on 29 June 1950

In connection with the statement of the Government of the United States of America, which you sent on 27 June, the Soviet Government has charged me with stating the following.

1. According to reliable information of the Soviet Government, the events, which are occurring in Korea, were provoked by an attack on border areas of North Korea by forces of the South Korean authorities. Therefore, the responsibility for these events rests on the South Korean authorities and on those who are behind them.
2. As is well known, the Soviet Government withdrew its troops from Korea before the United States did and thereby affirmed its traditional principle of non-interference in the

internal affairs of other countries. Now, the Soviet Government stands by the principle of the impermissibility of the interference of foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.

3. It is not correct that the Soviet Government refused to participate in the Security Council meetings. Much as the Soviet Government would have liked, it was impossible to take part in the Security Council meetings since a permanent member of the Security Council, China, has not been admitted to the Council by virtue of the position of the U.S. Government, which has made it impossible for the Security Council to make legally valid decisions.



DOCUMENT NO. 15

[Source: AVPRF, Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

On Report of the High Command of the DPRK People's Army, 30 June 1950

in the clear

TELEGRAM

from PYONGYANG
30 June 1950

MOSCOW, USSR MFA, Cde. GROMYKO

I am passing on a 30 June report of the High Command of the DPRK People's Army.

The American imperialists pushing their agents, the traitorous clique of Syngman Rhee, to launch an internecine war, have begun military interference in the internal affairs of Korea in order to colonize our Motherland. American aircrafts began to bomb cities and villages beginning on 26 June. At 1100, 26 June nine American aircrafts attacked the city of Kaesong, which had been liberated by the People's Army. Our aircrafts put them to flight and, pursuing the American aircrafts, shot down two B-29's over Seoul. At 1730, 28 June six American aircrafts penetrated the [Geumcheon] area north of the 38th parallel with the goal of attacking Pyongyang. Our aircrafts in the areas of [Geumcheon] and [Gyedong] immediately engaged the enemy in battle. One American aircraft was shot down as a result of the battle. On the same day, American aircrafts in large formations conducted an air raid of the city of Seoul, which had been liberated by forces of the Peoples' Army. Squadrons of the air force of the People's Army engaged the American aircrafts in battle and forced them to turn back. An American four-engine aircraft, which was patrolling over the Suwon airfield, was also put to flight. Then, four American four-engine aircrafts at the same airfield were bombed. A squadron of the air force of the People's Army lost four aircrafts in air battles. At 1730 29 June 27, American bombers bombed the city of Pyongyang, dropping more than 300 bombs on the civilian population

weighing from 50 to 500 kg. There were casualties among the civilian population as a result of the barbaric bombing.

Report of the Creation of People's Committees in Liberated Areas

Pyongyang, 29 June. In connection with the successful offensive of the heroic People's Army, the population of liberated areas are restoring their bodies of authority, the People's Committees. On 27 June, the People's Committee of the district of [Yenbyak] of Hwanghae Province was restored, and on 28 June, a Provisional People's Committee was created in the district of [Ongjin]. Provisional People's Committees were created at mass meetings and with the participation of representatives of various sectors of the population. The Provisional People's Committees include representatives of workers, peasants, cultural workers, specialists, and representatives of partisans, who are defending the interests of the people and fighting against the Syngman Rhee clique.

Report about Partisan War in the South

Pyongyang, 29 June. The partisans and the population of South Korea supporting the offensive of the heroic People's Army, which, repelling the attacks of enemy troops, is fighting in the name of the salvation of the Motherland and the people, are launching a fierce battle to defeat the retreating puppet army of Syngman Rhee. According to reports, which have been received, the population of the district of [Sancheong] of the Province of South Gyeongsang joined with the partisan detachments, which were operating in the mountains of [Dinsan], are delivering strong blows against the retreating troops of the so-called army of "national defense" of Syngman Rhee, are killing reactionary landowners and policemen, and are expanding the territory of their operations. The partisan detachments of the areas of [Boseong], South Jeolla Province and [Hamyang], and South Gyeongsang Province are expanding the liberated areas with the support of the population and are advancing with fierce battles. A movement of the people is developing in the areas of Busan and Masan together with the partisan movement, which is bringing confusion in the troops of the puppet army and the police.

SHTYKOV

Sosnina
Incoming N° 1228-ag/ns
1 July 1950

Authenticated by: [illegible signature]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 16

[Source: RGASPI F. 558. Op. 11, D. 334, p. 79. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From Stalin to Zhou Enlai, 5 July 1950

[BEIJING], to the SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pass [the following] to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai:

We think it correct to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer operations in North Korea in the event the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. We will try to provide the air cover of these units.

FILIPPOV

5 July 1950

Three copies printed
to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Molotov

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 17

[Source: AVPRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 346, Listy 143-144 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 151. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From Shtykov to Stalin, Transmitting Letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin, 7 July 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 405976/sh

From Pyongyang. Sent 8.7.50. 9:26

Received 8.7.50 11:15

Sent to 8th Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces 8.7.50 11:35.

By telegraph.

To Comrade FYN-SI [Stalin].

I received the following letter from KIM IL SUNG addressed to us.

"To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Generalissimo Comrade Stalin, I.V.

I ask that you accept the expression of deepest respect and gratitude for the invaluable assistance which you, Comrade Stalin, continually render to our people in their struggle for independence.

Being confident of your desire to help the Korean people rid themselves of the American imperialists, I am obliged to appeal to you with a request to allow the use of 25-35 Soviet military advisers in the staff of the front of the Korean Army and the staffs of the 2nd Army Group, since the national military cadres have not yet sufficiently mastered the art of commanding modern troops.

Faithfully, KIM IL SUNG, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers DPRK.
Pyongyang. 8 July 1950.

SHTYKOV

No. 481/sh
8.7.50

Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 18

[Source: RGASPI. F. 558, Op. 11, D. 334, p. 82. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram
From [Beijing] to Soviet Ambassador, 8 July 1950

Top Secret

ENCIPHERED TELEGRAM

[Send] only by landline

[BEIJING], to the Soviet Ambassador

Inform Mao Zedong that the Korean comrades are complaining that there is no Chinese representative in Korea. It would be good to send a representative sooner in order to have communications and to more quickly decide questions if, of course, Mao Zedong considers it appropriate to have ties with Korea.

Filippov

8 July 1950

Distributed to:

Copy N1 - to Cde. Stalin
Copy N2 - to Cde. Stalin
Copy N3 - to Cde. Molotov

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 19

[Source: RGASPI. F. 558, Op. 11, D. 334, p. 85. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From [Beijing] to Soviet Ambassador, 13 July 1950

SPECIAL

[BEIJING]

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Only by landline and cipher

Pass the following to either Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong:

"1. The British have officially turned to us through their ambassador in Moscow and stated that, being bound by the decision of the Security Council, they cannot for the time being give proposals about a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue but if the Korean People's Democratic Republic withdraws its troop to the 38th parallel then a peaceful solution of the Korean issue might be expedited.

The British are asking the Soviet government to state its opinion.

We consider such a demand brazen and unacceptable.

We are thinking of reply that the Korean issue became too complicated after the armed foreign intervention and that such a complex issue can only be solved by the Security Council with the participation of the USSR and China [PRC] and also calling upon representatives of Korea to hear their opinion.

Inform [us] of your views.

As regards the Indian ambassador, we have decided not to reply to him since they have made it clear that his statement is his personal opinion which the Indian government does not share.

2. We do not know [whether] you have decided to place nine Chinese divisions on the border with Korea. If you have made such a decision then we are ready to send you a division of 24 jet fighters to protect these troops.

We are thinking of training Chinese pilots for two or three months with the aid of our pilots and then handing over all the materiel to your pilots. We are thinking of doing the same with the air division in Shanghai. Inform [us] of your opinion"

Report by telegraph when this is done.

13 July 1950

Copy N1 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N2 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N3 to Cde. Molotov

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 20

[Source: AVPRF F. 0102, d. 6, op. 49. p. 22, pp. 130-157. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Decree No. 18 Of the DPRK Military Committee on 17 July 1950

Translation from Korean

DECREE N° 18 of the DPRK Military Committee of 17 July 1950

[Archival information handwritten in the left margin]:
F. 0102. [d.] 6 [op]. 49. [p]. 22. pp. 130-157; the number "130" is circled]

The Food Situation in Seoul

In order to overcome the difficulties in the food situation in Seoul, the Military Committee DECREES:

1. Create a committee to solve the food problem in Seoul with the following composition:

Chairman of the Committee
Committee Members

[Lee Seungyeop]
Pak [Cheonsik]
Kim [Gwangju]

2. Hold the chairmen of the Provisional People's Committee of Seoul, the Provisional People's Committees of the Provinces of Gyeonggi and the southern part of the Province of [Kogendo] [SIC] responsible for conducting a rapid accounting of the availability of food reserves in these provinces.

Suggest that the chairmen of the Provisional People's Committees conduct an accounting of commodities not needed for the People's Army in order to organize their exchange for food.

3. Hold the chairman of the Provisional People's Committee of Seoul responsible for organizing the evacuation of 500,000 people from the city to rural locations and to industrial enterprises of North Korea in accordance with the attached request of Ministries and Agencies.

Suggest that ministers and heads of agencies and also the chairman of Provincial People's Committee and the City People's Committee of Pyongyang accept the necessary number of workers by agreement with the chairman of the Provisional People's Committee of Seoul.

4. Hold the chairman of the Provisional People's Committee of Seoul responsible for drafting measures to ensure the safekeeping of the property of the population evacuated from Seoul.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 21

[Source: RGASPI F. 558, Op. 11, D. 334, pp. 8-9. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

**Telegram
From Mao Zedong to Stalin, 22 July 1950**

The Second Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army [Translator's note: this is the GRU]

Top Secret

Enciphered telegram

Copy N1 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N2 to Cde. Stalin

Copy N 7 to Cde. Kaganovich
Copy N 8 to Cde. Bulganin

Copy N3 to Cde. Molotov
Copy N4 to Cde. Beria
Copy N5 to Cde. Malenkov
Copy N6 to Cde. Mikoyan

Copy N 9 to Cde. Khrushchev

from [Beijing]

22 July 1950

Extremely urgent

to Filippov

At 1430 22 July I received from Zhou Enlai the following telegram to you from Mao Zedong

"To FILIPPOV.

Having considered the issues of the air cover of the group of our forces on the border with Korea, the conversion of our aircraft to jet equipment, and the acceptance of the materiel and equipment of two Soviet air divisions we welcome your offer and express to you and the Soviet Government special appreciation for the air and assistance being offered.

We intend to deploy a jet [aircraft] division designated by you to protect our troops in the area of Mukden, two regiments [in the area] of Anshan, and one regiment [in the area] of Liaoyang, which will allow the problem of protecting our troops and the industrial region of Mukden, Andun' [Dandong], Fushun to be solved in coordination with the fighter regiments of our composite air brigade deployed in the area of [Andun'].

It is proposed to accomplish the issue of converting our fighters to jet equipment in the following procedure - create a retraining center in the next two months from a jet regiment of Batitsky's group.

It is contemplated to first retrain the existing 65 fighter crews of the composite air brigade to train 160 crews on the jet equipment being transferred to us, [then] by the end of their retraining, December 1950 - January 1951, to begin the retraining the second group (of 100 crews) from the January graduates of the combined aeronautical engineering schools of the Chinese NOA [People's Liberation Army]. Thus we can fully complete the acceptance of the new jet equipment in March and April of 1951.

Consequently we can fully complete the work to accept all the new materiel and equipment of two Soviet air divisions only by this date.

It will be necessary to deploy a training center with a capacity to simultaneously train up to 60 men in order to realize the proposed retraining plan in a timely fashion, providing it with training materiel, visual training aids, and the minimum necessary number of instructors.

We consider it advisable to send General-Major of Aviation Prutkov, our air force representative and senior advisor for air forces, to Moscow for the practical solution of these issues.

Please inform me of your decision.

With Bolshevik greetings - Mao Zedong".

Note (of Roshchin):

By the time this telegram was sent to you an order had been received from USSR Minister of Defense Cde. Vasilevsky by the main military adviser and Cde. Batitsky about the retraining and transfer of the all the aircraft of Batitsky's group to the Chinese friends.

In light of this the General Staff together with our military advisers have worked up a proposal to the government stating that the composite Chinese air brigade is to be concentrated in the Shanghai-Nanjing-Suzhou area for retraining. The shortfall in pilots is to be made up from the combined Harbin-Jinzhou aviation school. The transfer of materiel and the concentration of personnel will be complete in November 1950.

This plan will be examined by the government today and a final decision will be made. Evidently Cde. Mao Zedong will inform you later.

ROSHCHIN

N 1503. 22 July 1950

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 22

[Source: AVPRF, Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

**Decree No. 19
Of the DPRK Military Committee on 24 July 1950**

Translation from Korean

DECREE

N° 19 OF THE DPRK MILITARY COMMITTEE, 24 JULY 1950

INCREASING THE PRODUCTION OF AMMUNITION

In order to increase the production of ammunition the DPRK Military Committee
DECREES:

I. Hold the Deputy Minister of Industry responsible for:

a) Organizing the production of ammunition in subordinate plants in accordance with the attachment.

2. Manufacturing five spot welding apparatuses with a capacity of 20-25 kilowatts no later than 30 July 1950 and transferring them to the [Yeongseon] engineering plant and the Pyongyang agricultural engineering plant.

3. Increasing production at plant 65 through the maximum use of the capacity of the shop equipment and, in order to overcome the disproportion in the equipment pool:

a) Mobilizing eight lathes, nine drilling machines, four horizontal mills, and three vertical mills at Ministry of the Industry enterprises;

b) Developing a plan to increase the production of machine tools and submitting it to Gosplan by 1 August 1950 in order to satisfy the need for an additional number of machine tools to produce ammunition;

II. Hold the Deputy Minister of Industry responsible for submitting a request to Gosplan and the Ministry of Trade for the necessary instruments, machines, and an apparatus to analyze metal, metal objects, and chemical products, the need for which is connected with an increase in the production of ammunition, which is not being produced inside the country. The chairman of Gosplan and the chairman of the captured equipment committee are to mobilize these articles from the educational institutions and scientific research institutions of Seoul and also in enterprises which are not manufacturing military products.

III. Hold the Deputy Minister of Industry responsible for providing specifications to the Directorate of Forestry and Gosplan for packing materials for ammunition by 1 August.

IV. Hold the Deputy Minister of Industry and the Chief of the Directorate of Forestry responsible for submitting a plan to the Ministry of Railways by 1 August 1950 to ship the timber and special corking associated with the fulfillment of this decree.

Suggest that the Minister of Railways ensure the timely transport of these goods and assign them to the category of military freight, especially such freight as metals and coking coal, which are intended for plant 65 and other plants producing ammunition.

V. Hold the Minister of Railways and the Minister of Municipal Services responsible for developing measures to produce ammunition at enterprises subordinate to them (in foundry shops) and submit a draft of these measures to Gosplan by 1 August 1950.

VI. Hold the Deputy Minister of Industry responsible for submitting a report to the chairman of Gosplan once every five days about the production of ammunition at civilian enterprises.

VII. Hold the chairman of Gosplan responsible for ensuring the systematic monitoring of the fulfillment of this decree.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 23

[Source: RGASPI F. 558, op. 11, D. 334, p. 90. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From Vyshinsky to Soviet Ambassador Roshchin, 25 July 1950

Top Secret

Enciphered telegram
From Vyshinsky to Roshchin

SPECIAL
FLASH

In reply to N 1503:

At the instruction of Filippov, pass to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai that [we] agree to the proposed procedure and dates for training Chinese pilots on jet aircraft.

Report by telegraph when this is done.

VYSHINSKY

25 July 1950

Copies to:

1. to Cde. Stalin
2. to Cde. Molotov
3. to Cde. Malenkov
4. to Cde. Vyshinsky

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 24

[Source: AVPRF, F. 0102, op. 6, p. 21, d. 47, pp. 29-40. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

**Memorandum
On the Political Situation in Korea during the Period of Military Operations, 11
August 1950**

[Stamp]: USSR MFA
SECRETARIAT of
Cde. GROMYKO
Incoming N° 7556-ag
11 August 1950

USSR Embassy in
Korea
18 July 1950
N° 253

SECRET
Copy 1

TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

[Stamp]:
Secretariat of Vyshinsky
SECRET
Incoming N° 9334-v
11 August 1950

to Cde. A. A. GROMYKO

We are sending a memo "The Political Situation in Korea during the Period of Military Operations" with the following attachments:

Kim Il Sung's address of 26 June
Kim Il Sung's address of 8 July
Pak Heonyeong's statement of 1 July
The 26 June appeal of the CC of the United Fatherland Front

ATTACHMENT: per the text in 64 pages,.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN KOREA

/signature/

T. SHTYKOV

[Scrawled handwriting
partly off the page]:
Kurd[yukov?]. . .
to give a statement]]

3 copies. mp
1st to the address[ee]
3rd to file
Drafted by Petukhov

[Handwritten]:
Statement of the CC . . .
in file N 725
(illegible signature)

Attachment [...] N° 1868s
of 12 August 1950
Secret
Copy N° 3

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN KOREA DURING THE PERIOD OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

On 25 June, an internecine war launched by the South Korean puppet regime of Syngman Rhee broke out in Korea. The South Korean authorities invaded the territory of North Korea but were repulsed by the People's Army, which then went over to a counteroffensive along the entire front and inflicted a crushing blow on the South Koreans.

The report of the start of military operations was greeted by the population of North Korea with complete calm, without any excesses or displays of panic. The calm of the people was demonstrated by its confidence in the forces of the People's Army and the strength of the people's democratic system. Large spontaneous demonstrations appeared everywhere at which the population protested the provocative attack of the South Koreans and demanded that the enemies of the people be answered blow for blow.

"The entire responsibility for the internecine war," declared worker Hwang Eungil at a demonstration of workers at a Pyongyang sugar mill, "rests with the traitorous clique of Syngman Rhee. We have every means of defending the successes of the democratic reforms achieved in the northern part of the republic."¹ At the demonstration, priest Pak Gihwan declared, "The Syngman Rhee clique has wrecked the peaceful unification of our Motherland, which is the desire of all the Korean people, for their personal interests and

in the interests of their American imperialist masters and launched an internecine war. We should respond to this crime through combat and defend our Motherland. Those who believe in the republic will rise together with all the people to fight the Syngman Rhee clique."²

¹ The 26 June 1950 issue of the newspaper Nodong Sinmun

² The 7 July 1950 issue of the newspaper Minju Choson

On the morning of 26 June, Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the DPRK Council of Ministers, addressed the people by radio. He gave a profound analysis of the situation, denounced Syngman Rhee and his clique as enemies of the Korean people and perpetrators of an internecine war in Korea, and exposed the anti-national goals of the military adventures of the South Koreans. Kim Il Sung gave the workers, peasants, partisans, and soldiers specific tasks resulting from the military situation. In conclusion, he called upon the people to rally around the DPRK Government in order to more rapidly defeat the armed forces of the puppet clique of Syngman Rhee and his police state and win a victory which would ensure the unification and independence of Korea.

The speech of Kim Il Sung roused the people and army even more to fight for the destruction of the Syngman Rhee regime. Confidence in victory characterized the mood of all sections of the working population of North Korea. The population has calmly continued its business in spite of the military situation. Efforts at new construction sites have not been halted and in Pyongyang and in other cities, workers have continued to rebuild streets and to prepare to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea. Even the markets have not reacted to the change of the situation: prices have remained at the previous level.

With the start of military operations, the most dangerous reactionary elements were isolated and the rest of the reactionaries, subdued by the unexpected fact of the retreat and collapse of the South Korean army, did not exhibit any activity.

By a 26 June Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea, a Military Council was created under the chairmanship of Kim Il Sung in whose hands all power in the country has been concentrated for the duration of military operations. The Military Council included Kim Il Sung, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and his deputies Pak Heonyeong, Hong Myeonghui, and Kim Chaek; Choe Yonggeon, Minister of National Defense; Pak Ilu, Minister of Internal Affairs; and Jeong Juntaek, Chairman of Gosplan.

On 26 June, a plenum of the CC of the United Democratic Fatherland Front was held, which discussed the situation which had been created in the country as a result of the outbreak of war. The plenum approved the measures taken by the DPRK Government in connection with the war and adopted an appeal to all political parties and public organizations and the entire Korean people to rise up to the defense of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and help the People's Army defeat the Syngman Rhee regime.

Having repelled the attack of the South Koreans, the People's Army had moved 20-25 km south of the 38th parallel by the morning of 26 June and liberated the cities of Ongjin, Kaesong, Baekcheon, and others. After a fierce battle on 27 June, the troops of the People's Army seized the city of Uijeongbu, a strongly fortified position on the approaches to Seoul, and on the same day, engaged in battles on the outskirts of the capital. Seoul was completely liberated on the morning of 28 June. Kim Il Sung congratulated the Korean people on the liberation of the capital of the Motherland by radio and expressed gratitude to the soldiers of the People's Army.

The successful offensive of the People's Army and especially the liberation of the capital of Seoul caused an unprecedented political upsurge and general rejoicing of the people. At numerous rallies on the occasion of the liberation of Seoul, the population of North Korea greeted the People's Army and expressed confidence in the rapid completion of the country's unification. It was clear to the people that the South Korean army had been defeated, the South Korean government administrative apparatus had crumbled, and that the South Koreans had fled in panic. The people saw that the Syngman Rhee regime was collapsing and that the war launched by this regime would soon end in the complete victory of the people's democratic system.

The American armed intervention sharply changed the situation, bringing the Korean people new and difficult tests.

On 27 June, President Truman announced that American armed forces were being sent to Korea to support the South Korean army. On the same day, at the bidding of the Americans, the Security Council approved the aggressive actions of the United States and called upon UN members to give armed assistance to the Syngman Rhee regime. A broad campaign of slander and threats was unleashed against the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Japanese and American radio stations were switched over to molding Korean public opinion, trying to intimidate the Korean people and stifle their ability to resist the invaders.

On 29 June, American aircrafts made the first air raid on Pyongyang after which raids on undefended cities of North Korea became systematic. A large raid on Pyongyang was made on 4 July. The city of Nampo was subjected to strong bombardment on 7 and 8 July. And an even stronger air strike was launched on the city of Wonsan as a result of a series of raids on 8, 11, 13, and 14 July. There are many casualties among the civilian population in all the cities, which were bombed.

Statements of the Security Council in support of the Syngman Rhee regime, radio propaganda of the United States and countries dependent on it, the American intervention, and especially the American air raids had a serious effect on the morale of the Korean people.

The residents of the cities that were bombed (Pyongyang, Wonsan, Nampo, and Hamheung) began to leave en masse for the mountains or to the countryside. The normal

operation of enterprises in these cities has been disrupted. During the first days of the bombing, at several enterprises in Nampo and Wonsan, just 30-40% of the workers remained. In succeeding days, many workers returned to the plant. The enterprises continue to function although their productivity has been sharply reduced. Industry is basically operating normally in areas not hit by American raids.

After the first raids of American aircrafts, fear spread among the population that Korea would not cope with the American invaders without the armed assistance of the Soviet Union and China.

Such sentiments also affected part of the senior DPRK officials. Some of them began to cautiously express uncertainty in victory and dissatisfaction that North Korea had found itself with few aircrafts for protection from American air raids. Succeeding events - the successful advance of the People's Army, the growth of the Korean people's hatred of the American invaders, the statements of the Soviet Government and the international movement of protest against the American intervention in Korea - exerted a beneficial effect on the mood of the DPRK leadership, which had soberly assessed the situation and increased its activity to mobilize the people to defeat the American interventionists.

The American intervention inspired Korean reactionaries. The South Koreans began to rally together, defeat units, and increase resistance to the People's Army. Hostile elements also began to stir in North Korea. Without deciding to act openly, they primarily engaged in spreading false rumors. For example, a rumor was launched that the Americans would drop atomic bombs on North Korea in the event that the People's Army did not halt the offensive. A provocative rumor was spread on 4 and 5 July that the Soviet Government had issued an ultimatum to halt the intervention in Korea by 7 July. Reactionaries from the Protestant community became more active, and Protestant clerics called upon the people to seek refuge in Protestant churches, which they said the Americans would not bomb. Many merchants stopped trading and paralyzed the private market. The DPRK government took repressive measures against part of the private merchants, but this did not produce a marked improvement in the condition of the private market. Valuable manufactured goods have disappeared from the market, and a majority of food products have doubled or tripled in price.

The fighting spirit of the population, which was shaken by the U.S. intervention and especially by the aerial bombing, was again bolstered after an attack by the People's Army, which had been held up by the water barrier of the Han River, developed with new force and after the first attack, was launched against American units south of Suwon (5 July). On 11 July, the People's Army launched a new serious attack on American troops at the approaches to the Geum River, destroying an infantry regiment and 15 enemy tanks. This victory inspired the Koreans, convinced that the vaunted American technology is not able to contain the offensive of the People's Army. In the first battles, the American troops exhibited poor combat readiness and low morale, in spite of their level of technical equipment. The American soldiers surrendered in groups without offering serious resistance. This all strengthened the Koreans' confidence in achieving victory.

The American armed intervention and the bombing of peaceful cities and villages by American aircrafts further intensified the Korean hatred of Americans. On 1 July, Pak Heonyeong, DPRK Minister of Internal Foreign Affairs, vigorously protested the U.S. intervention in the name of the DPRK Government and the entire Korean people and expressed confidence that it would be indignantly condemned by all the peoples of the world.

On 14 July, a Committee of the CC of the United Democratic Fatherland Front was created to investigate the atrocities of the American interventionists and the South Koreans and to ascertain the damage that they had caused. The committee included representatives of political parties and organizations, prominent public figures, and officials of Korean science, culture, and the arts.

Protest demonstrations against the American intervention and the barbarity of the American air pirates are occurring throughout all of Korea. The people are expressing determination to take revenge against the American interventionists and completely expel them from Korea. At a demonstration at the industrial institute in Pyongyang, student Kim Daehyun, expressing the common opinion of the students, declared "We are deeply indignant at the American armed intervention and are ready to launch a crushing blow on the overseas invaders, who are infringing on the liberty and independence of our motherland."³ An Seongwon a worker at the Pyongyang electric light bulb plant, declared at a workers' demonstration, "No one can deprive us of happiness and liberty. We will give all our efforts to the defense of our motherland and our rights³".

³The 7 July 1950 issue of the newspaper Minju Choson

On 1 July, a mobilization into the army of all citizens born between 1914 and 1932 was announced throughout the entire territory of the DPRK.

On 4 July, Kim Il Sung was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the DPRK People's Army by a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. This appointment was greeted by the people as being appropriate: the leader of the government had become the head of the armed forces at a dangerous moment for Korea. On 8 July, Kim Il Sung gave an address to the people and the army via radio in which he unmasked the imperialist goals of the American armed intervention in Korea and called upon the people to defend the Motherland. Kim Il Sung summed up the results of the offensive of the People's Army and gave a high appraisal of the combat operations of individual troop arms. He noted that the Korean people and its army have everything necessary to completely defeat the interventionists and outlined the ways to achieve victory, pointing out that winning the freedom and independence of Korea is the cause of the Korean people themselves. Kim Il Sung's speech promoted a lift in the fighting spirit of the population and an increase in the aggressive spirit of the People's Army.

A volunteer movement has developed broadly throughout the entire country, both in the North and in the South: workers, peasants, students, and the intelligentsia are making collective statements about going to the front. On 6 July, the number of volunteers was

400,000; on 8 July, 665,000; and as of 11 July, already 745,000 (513,270 of them men and 231,730 women). The formation of volunteer units has begun.

The patriotic upsurge is giving rise to mass examples of labor heroism, especially among rail transport workers. For example, during the depot's bombardment by American aircrafts, engineers of the Sopheonyang Depot dispersed four locomotives located next to one another, as a result of which two locomotives were saved and the two others were damaged but quickly repaired. Efforts to restore the [Hymhin] railroad bridge destroyed by American aircrafts have been conducted continuously for three days, and this very important bridge was repaired in record time thanks to the selfless labor of the workers.

The population is gradually becoming accustomed to and adapting to wartime conditions. The flight from the cities hit by air raids has dropped. Discipline has increased on the factory floor. The workers are guarding production sites and population centers, keeping an eye on blackout measures, and organizing the rapid extinction of fires and the repair of facilities, which have been destroyed.

The democratic press of Korea plays an important role in the matter of mobilizing the masses to defeat the American interventionists and their South Korean agents: Minju Choson, the organ of the DPRK government; Nodong Sinmun, the organ of the Korean Workers' Party CC; Choson Minbo, the organ of the Democratic Party, and newspapers and magazines of various patriotic parties and public organizations. With the outbreak of war, all the press has been completely turned into performing wartime tasks (exposing the true goals and nature of the American intervention, propagandizing the liberation mission of the People's Army, instilling militant patriotism, mobilizing the masses to aid the front and to reorganize the economy in accordance with military needs, and popularizing the labor and military deeds of the people). Correspondents of national newspapers and a number of writers and poets have been sent to the front and the liberated areas in order to more fully describe the situation.

However, it ought to be noted that the Korean press is not yet coping with the tasks which have been given it in connection with the war. Its insufficient political maturity, the poor degree of training of its personnel, and the lack of experience in working in military conditions are reflected in the work of the press. The newspapers have not still taken on the military tone required by the war. The question of the mobilization of material resources to pursue the war is being insufficiently, widely, and clearly raised. Easily understandable, stirring forms of presenting materials are not being sought, which call for an inflammation of hatred of the American invaders. Writers and poets are not very attracted to working in newspapers. Some important topics are tardily and poorly covered (for example, the situation in the liberated areas, land reform in the South, etc.). All this reduces the mobilizing value of the press.

The DPRK government and the CC of the Korean Workers' Party are taking energetic measures to organize economic and political life in the liberated area of South Korea.

As individual areas are liberated senior personnel are being sent there to organize government and establish public order: the leaders of local People's Committees and Committees of the Korean Workers' Party, the chiefs of the local police, authorized representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and others. These personnel are being selected from among South Korean Korean Workers' Party officials, who were in North Korea for training and also from among Korean Workers' Party activists and People's Committees of North Korea.

Local government bodies are being created in liberated areas partly by appointment, partly by elections at meetings of the population. A statute is being developed about holding an indirect system of elections to local, district, and city People's Committees with open voting in all liberated areas. Such a system will be temporarily introduced by virtue of the special conditions, which had developed in South Korea.

The People's Committees of the liberated areas are organizing economic and political life at the local level, mobilizing local resources for the needs of the front, aiding the People's Army, and assisting preparations to carry out land reform.

Besides senior officials, more than 1,900 agitprop workers were sent to the liberated areas through Korean Workers' Party channels, pursuing work among the population to expose the goals of the American intervention in Korea, propagandizing the people's democratic system, and explaining the tasks of the population in connection with the war.

According to a decision of the Korean Workers' Party CC, provincial and district Party committees are being restored in the liberated areas. Besides officials sent by the Korean Workers' Party CC, they include local Party officials coopted after coming out from the underground, released from prison, or having returned from partisan detachments. Party members are being registered, and local Party organizations are being reconstituted.

It ought to be noted that representatives of the DPRK Government and the Korean Workers' Party in the liberated areas have encountered great difficulties, which developed as a result of the lengthy police terrorism activity of the Syngman Rhee regime and its malicious and slanderous propaganda against the DPRK.

The South Koreans have managed to intimidate and deceive the people to a considerable degree. In many places, when units of the People's Army approached, the population fled south from the population centers, fearing the atrocities about which South Korean propaganda had shouted. For example, Chan Che, the Korean Workers' Party CC Representative in the city of Chuncheon, reported on 6 July that villages on the way to Chuncheon were completely deserted and that only a few people were left in Chuncheon itself. The remaining population is acting cautiously, except for workers and the working peasantry. However, as the People's Army advances and order is established in liberated territories, this cautiousness of the intimidated sectors of the population gives way to sentiments of active support for the measures of the DPRK Government.

In spite of the ferocious terror against democratic elements and the insidious means of South Korean propaganda against the DPRK and the Korean Workers' Party, the South Koreans have not managed to kill the sympathies for the people's democratic system among the most steadfast part of the South Korean public - industrial workers, the democratic intelligentsia, and the working peasantry. For example, in Seoul, the city population, guided by democratic elements, organized a grand welcome for the units of the People's Army, which had liberated the capital. The festive receptions for units of the People's Army also occurred in a number of other places in South Korea.

Thanks to the active support of workers and the progressive intelligentsia in the liberated cities, normal life is being quickly restored, local bodies of people's power are being created, and local resources are being mobilized to help the front.

In Seoul, the South Koreans blew up bridges over the Han River and cut high-voltage lines during their retreat, as a consequence of which telephones, streetcars, and the water supply ceased to function. All the locomotives were taken south. A large part of the gold reserve and other valuables were taken from the bank. The South Koreans left a large number of spies, saboteurs, and terrorists in the city itself and armed bands in the outskirts of Seoul.

Korean Workers' Party activists released from prison restored the People's Committee and Party organizations following the entry of the units of the People's Army into Seoul. Lee Seungyeop, DPRK Minister of Justice, who had been appointed Chairman of the Provisional People's Committee of the city of Seoul, arrived in Seoul on the same day, and on 29 June, a group of DPRK deputy ministers arrived to organize corresponding departments. On 30 June, a group of DPRK police officials [arrived]. Deputy Prime Minister Pak Heonyeong left for Seoul on 10 June [Translator's note: SIC; the date was circled in the text].

The Provisional People's Committee of the city of Seoul was formed mainly from Korean Workers' Party officials. Two deputy chairmen of the Provisional People's Committee were appointed from the Democratic-Republican Party and Democratic Independence Party.

The Provisional People's Committee has begun tireless activity to organize the political and economic life of the capital, combat hostile elements, and organize aid to the front.

Food is the most burning issue for Seoul as it is for the other liberated cities. There turned out to be no food reserves in the South. The Provisional People's Committee introduced a food ration card system beginning 2 July for workers, specialists, and government employees, and also for members of their families.

Municipal services were restored within several days as a result of the energetic measures taken by the Provisional People's Committee with the support of the working population of Seoul. The street cars began operating on 29 June and the water system on 30 June.

The crossings over the Han River were quickly restored thanks to the labor heroism of the railroad workers.

The situation in Seoul has been completely normalized at the present time. Institutions and stores are operating and the textile and tobacco mills and a number of small enterprises have been started up. Mass protest demonstrations are going on in the city against the American intervention. The youth of Seoul are heading to the front voluntarily.

The Seoul radio station has operated normally from the first day of liberation. The Choson Tongsin state agency created from three private agencies, which served the Syngman Rhee regime - Hapdong Tongsin, Hanguk Tongsin, and Konlip Tkhonsin - oversees radio broadcasting. The agency is headed by a representative of the Korean Central Telegraph Agency.

The powerful Seoul radio station (50 kilowatts) is used to broadcast to areas of South Korea which have not been liberated and abroad. Statements have been organized on Seoul radio by leaders of right-wing political parties of South Korea and the members of the National Assembly of South Korea, who remained in liberated territory and who are declaring support for the DPRK government. The statements of Kim Gysik, a prominent Korean figure and leader of the League of National Independence; [Jo Soang], leader of the Socialist Party and member of the National Assembly; [An Jaehong], former Chief of the Civil Administration of South Korea; [Eom Hangseop], leader of the Independence Party (Kim Gu's party), and others ought to be noted among these statements.

Statements by captured officers and soldiers of the American and South Korean armies, which condemn the intervention of American imperialism and their participation in it, are also being systematically transmitted over the radio. Besides radio, the texts of such statements are circulated among soldiers of the American and South Korean armies in the form of leaflets.

[The following] newspapers are being published in Seoul beginning on 2 July: [Haebang Ilbo], the organ of the Korean Workers' Party committee, and Choson Inminbo, the organ of the Provisional People's Committee. The Constitution of the DPRK and the speeches of Kim Il Sung and Pak Heonyeong were published in full in the first issues of these newspapers.

Seoul printing houses have been switched to the printing of agitprop materials: appeals from DPRK authorities, leaflets for the population of areas not yet liberated and soldiers of the American and South Korean armies, materials on land reform, etc. Portraits of Cdes. Stalin and Kim Il Sung are being duplicated and distributed.

Four theaters have been operating in the city since 4 July. The Soviet films "The Fall of Berlin", "Meeting on the Elbe", "The Battle of Stalingrad", "Aleksandr Matrosov", "Young Guard", "Konstantin Zaslouov", "The Defeat of Japan", and the Korean film "My Motherland" have been shown in them.

The rapid restoration of public order in Seoul is having a favorable influence on the mood of the Seoul population and increases the authority of the bodies of DPRK authority.

The successes of the People's Army have promoted a revival of the partisan movement in South Korea. The partisan movement, which arose in 1948 in connection with the uprising on the island of [Jejudo] and in the city of [Yeosu], gradually spread to many areas of South Korea and became the most widespread in the autumn of 1949. From the statements of those close to Syngman Rhee, who were arrested in liberated territory, the broad scale of the partisan movement prevented the government of Syngman Rhee from carrying out a prepared plan to attack North Korea in the summer of 1949.

Accordingly, on the advice and with the aid of the Americans the government of Syngman Rhee undertook several punitive expeditions in the winter and spring of 1950, forcibly resettled peasants from areas of partisan operations, and devastated these areas, trying to isolate the partisans from the population and to completely destroy them.

The South Koreans did not manage to eliminate the partisan movement in spite of the most savage measures taken against the partisans. However, the partisan movement was dealt a serious blow as a result of the punitive expeditions of regular troops and the main cadres of the partisans were killed and the population was terrorized and intimidated.

Amphibious assault groups were landed in the enemy rear at the start of military operations in coastal regions (in Gangneung, Samcheok, Uljin and in other places), which then linked up with local partisans and began operations in the rear of Syngman Rhee's army. For example, on 28-29 June, members of the assault force and partisans in the area of Gangneung-Samcheok blocked the path of retreating South Korean units and dealt them a crushing blow: more than 600 were taken prisoner, more than 700 were killed and wounded, and much equipment was captured⁴.

⁴ A 1 July 1950 report of the High Command of the People's Army.

The partisans again became active in a mainly partisan area, in the mountains of [Jirisan] (the cities of [Geochang, Hamyang, Sancheong, Hapcheon, and Jinju]).

The partisans destroyed bridges and roads, paralyzing the enemy rear in the areas of the cities of Sobaeksan, Chuphunyon and the outskirts of Daegu and in many other places.

It is impossible to reconstruct a complete picture of the struggle of the South Korean partisans for lack of information from areas of partisan operations. But even Japanese and American information sources note that the South Korean partisans represent a great force, which the American interventionists are forced to take into consideration.

There are a considerable number of hotbeds of partisan struggle in the provinces of North and South Gyeongsang and North and South Jeolla. However, up to now, partisan detachments have limited themselves to attacking local police stations, destroying roads and bridges, and killing traitors to the nation, and not engaging in battle with South

Korean or American military units. This is explained by the weakness of the partisan detachments, a majority of which are small, poorly-armed, and poorly connected to the local population. Partisan actions have not yet grown into a national movement in the rear of the South Korean or American armies.

The prestige of the Soviet Union has grown even further during the war days.

Never have the Korean people listened to the voice of the Soviet Union so avidly as in the war days. For them, the reports of the powerful actions [*vystupleniya*] of the Soviet people against the American intervention in Korea were invaluable moral and political support. The Korean public heartily welcomed the statement of Cde. Gromyko, which exposed the illegality of the decisions of the Security Council on the Korean issue and which condemned the armed intervention of the United States in Korean affairs as an act of imperialist aggression against the Korean people. The statement of the Soviet Government about non-recognition of the naval blockade of Korea was greeted by the Korean people with especial appreciation.

The Korean people are, on the whole, soberly assessing the situation and approve the position of the Soviet Union, which is trying to prevent the outbreak of a new world war. The Korean people are filled with gratitude to the Soviet Union for the enormous aid, which has helped them gain important successes in the struggle for the unification, independence, and democratic development of Korea. It is clear to the Korean people that without the aid of the Soviet Union the economy of the DPRK would not be able to support the People's Army with everything needed for victory.

Hatred of Americans has increased in the broadest sectors of the Korean people as never before along with a growth in the prestige of the Soviet Union. Better than any other means, the ordeals of the war have convinced the Koreans that the American imperialists are the most evil enemies of Korea, striving to enslave the Korean people and not stopping at the most savage means of killing the civilian Korean population.

The American imperialists have not managed to intimidate the Korean people with open armed intervention. Hatred of the imperialist invaders is lifting the Korean people to an ever more vigorous struggle for their freedom and independence.

The continuing offensive of the People's Army is sustaining a confidence in the people that the war will soon end with the complete expulsion of the interventionists from Korea and the victory of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

Counselor of the USSR Embassy in Korea

/signature/

(A. Ignat'yev)

First Secretary of the Embassy

/signature/

(V. Petukhov)

Pyongyang
17 July 1950

3 copies mp/lo

1st - Cde. Gromyko
2nd - Cde. Grigor'yan
3rd - to file

[handwritten]:

AVP RF

f. 0102. op. 6, p. 21, d. 47, ~~pp. 85-97~~, pp. 29-40

18 July 1950

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 25

[Source: AVPRF, Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Memorandum

**On Economic Measures of the DPRK Government and Government Bodies in
Connection with the Military Events in Korea, 11 August 1950**

SECRET

Incoming N° 9365-V

11 August 1950

Secret

[Stamps]:

USSR MFA
SECRETARIAT of
Cde. LAVRENT'YEV
Incoming N° 6552
14 August 1950

USSR MFA
SECRETARIAT of
Cde. GROMYKO
Incoming N° 7560-ag
11 August 1950

Copy N° 1

USSR Embassy
in Korea
N 256

TO DEPUTY USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Cde. A. A. GROMYKOV

I am sending you material from a memorandum of economic measures of the DPRK Government and government bodies in connection with the military events in Korea.

ATTACHMENT: 61 pages

[handwriting in the left margin]:
"to file, 25 August"

[Stamp]:
USSR MFA
GENERAL
SECRETARIAT
SECRET
Incoming N° 5773-I
22 August 1950

USSR AMBASSADOR IN KOREA

T. SHTYKOV

[Handwritten]:
"read [illegible signature
follows], 29 August"

[Stamp]:
USSR MFA
SECRETARIAT
of Cde. BOGOMOLOV
Incoming N° 2521-ab
16 August 1950

[Faded stamp]:
....2004s
29 August 1950

2 copies mp
1st to the addressee
2nd to file

Attachment to N° 2004s
of 28 August 1950

[handwriting in the left margin]:
Familiarize deputies + ...
Cde. Kurd[yukov?];
two possible signatures both with the

date 23 September 1950 and one
signature with the date 5 September

ECONOMIC MEASURES OF THE DPRK GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT
BODIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE MILITARY EVENTS IN KOREA

(Memo)

In the last three weeks of military events, the DPRK Government and government bodies have taken a series of measures in connection with the war launched by the reactionary Syngman Rhee clique and the open armed aggression of American imperialists in Korea for the recovery of industrial production and to restructure the economy to provide for the needs of the front.

The adoption of these measures was primarily dictated by the situation which resulted in the country as events have developed both at the front and in the rear.

During this period, the government adopted decrees regarding the operation of industrial enterprises in the northern part of the DPRK and in the liberated areas and also relating the operation of transportation, communications, trade, and other sectors of the economy for the purpose of vigorous mobilization of all economic resources of the DPRK to satisfy the needs of the front.

I. MEASURES CONCERNING INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORTATION

Government decrees on the following issues were important economic measures in the area of industry:

1. An increase in the production and conservation of materiel and financial resources in wartime.
2. The accounting and protection of industrial enterprises, buildings, and stocks of materials in liberated areas and putting factories and plants into operation.

3. THE WORKING CONDITIONS AT ENTERPRISES AND INSTITUTIONS IN
WARTIME

(The texts of the decrees are attached)

In a decree of the DPRK Military Committee on the question of increasing production and conserving materiel and financial resources, directives were given to Gosplan and ministries concerning the increase of military production at state and cooperative institutions and the involvement of private enterprises in the manufacture of output needed by the front. It was proposed that the leaders of state, cooperative, and other enterprises take urgent measures to conserve raw material, fuel, materiel, and financial

resources, and not permit the accumulation of material resources at factories and plants above the permitted norm. Cease capital construction, which is not directly connected with the manufacture of output for the front; the manpower and material resources released are to be sent for repair work at facilities, which were destroyed in connection with American air raids. Any issue of food above the established rations and the production of various food products from rice have been prohibited for the sake of the strictest conservation of food.

By a decree concerning the issue of the working conditions of enterprises during wartime, an extension of the workday at the expense of overtime hours was permitted, routine leave was halted during wartime, and unexcused absences by workers and employees of enterprises were prohibited in order to prevent a drop in production in connection with the mobilization of part of the workers into the army.

The fact that the operation of a number of factories, which were bombed or which were located in cities which were bombed, were seriously disrupted in connection with the American air raids was a considerable difficulty in the operation of DPRK industry.

Many workers of such factories exhibited panic, left work, abandoned their homes, and went to the hills, and part of the workers stopped coming to work. In the initial period, many local leaders did not take vigorous steps to combat such panic. The appearance of workers [at work] during air raids fell sharply. At Pyongyang enterprises, it was 40%, at Nampo enterprises, 15-20%, and at Wonsan enterprises, 10-15%. At the present time, the appearance of workers in Pyongyang has risen to 75%, in Nampo to 60%, and in Wonsan, which is being bombed more often than other cities, 30-40% of workers came to work. At other factories and mines, which are not being bombed, the appearance of workers did not fall as a rule and at some [the number] even rose. Firefighting and security teams have been created at enterprises, blackouts instituted, slit trenches and shelters dug, and work procedures have been developed during air raid warnings and air raids.

The Military Committee adopted a decree affecting industrial enterprises and stocks of materials in the liberated areas of the southern part of the DPRK [SIC].

It was suggested to the military command that the local People's Committee and the corresponding ministries take stock of all enterprises and stocks of materials, organize their security, and put factories and plants into operation as soon as possible to prevent cases of pilfering and spoilage of enterprises and equipment and also so that these enterprises are put into operation as quickly as possible.

The Ministry of Industry did the following in accordance with the above government decrees:

The workday was extended at all enterprises of the Ministry, an additional four hours of overtime was instituted, and workers were prohibited from leaving enterprises without authorization.

Military orders for the army were placed at 50 enterprises of the Ministry of Industry.

Foundries in Gyeomipo, Gangseon, and Daean are producing metal needed to support the production of ammunition, weapons, [personal] equipment, military accessories, iron pontoon bridges, armored plating, and other articles for the front.

The production of ammunition has been organized at the following enterprises:

The agricultural plant in Pyongyang	- mortar shells
The mechanical engineering plant in Pyongyang	- mortar shells
The central mechanical engineering plant in Pyongyang	- mortar shells
The [Sunan] mechanical engineering plant	- grenades
The [Sopinyan] hardware plant	- grenades
The Pyongyang chemical plant	- grenades
The Pyongyang starch hydrolysis plant	- grenades

In addition, the production and the fillers of mortar shells, grenades, and mine stabilizers are being organized at the group of [Konan] plants.

The manufacturing of iron pontoon bridges and spare trusses and assemblies to repair destroyed railroad bridges are being organized at factories. The manning of two mobile vehicle repair shops, six mobile repair shops with welding equipment, transformers, and motors, and four mobile shops to repair communications lines is being finished at factories to aid the front.

[The following] have already been manufactured at factories:

Mobile kitchens	- 780
Cauldrons	- 65,000
Water containers	- 35,000
Cast iron cauldrons	- 190

And also picks, axes, shovels, stretchers, etc.

A number of enterprises have been damaged as a result of the bombing. Restoration work is being conducted at the present time at all the destroyed facilities.

Concerning the Nonferrous Metallurgical Plant at Nampo:

The zinc electrolysis shop and electricity grid have been destroyed. Two of the four mercury rectifiers have been put out of committee. A sawmill burned down and a club was destroyed. A cadmium shop building, pumping station, sinter plant, water jacket shop, and storehouses were partially destroyed.

One water jacket furnace has been restored and is operating at the present time, and the three remaining furnaces, the zinc baths, and sinter plant will be put in operation in the near future.

THE SHIPYARD IN NAMPO:

The metal framework, mechanical shop, casting shop, offices, storehouses, and living quarters have been destroyed.

The mechanical shop has been restored and is operating at the present time, and restoration work is being conducted on the rest.

THE STARCH HYDROLYSIS PLANT IN PYONGYANG

The boiler room, the oil production shop, the starch production shop, and storehouses were destroyed.

Repair work is being done, and the plant will partially resume operation by the end of July.

THE OIL PRODUCTION PLANT AT NAMPO:

This plant was partially destroyed and, at the present time, has fully resumed operation.

THE OIL REFINERY AT WONSAN:

This plant was repeatedly bombed. The foundry was destroyed. One thousand five hundred tons of kerosene burned up.

The feed tank burned up in which 8,600 tons of Ekhabi oil had been stored.

On 19 July, the chemical plants in Gowon and the lead smelters in Munpyeong were bombed.

The Ministry of Industry has selected and sent a group of 126 workers to liberated areas to organize the stocktaking, security, and setting up of production in these areas.

According to the incomplete information available, the following enterprises are already operating in the liberated areas at the present time:

Two textile mills in Seoul with 57,000 spindles.

The Seoul thermal power station, the tobacco mill in Seoul, the vehicle repair plant in Seoul, the mechanical plant in Yongjin, and a number of small vehicle repair shops. The lead mine in Ongjin and a tungsten mine are being restored.

There are numerous examples occurring of a patriotic upsurge among workers and employees at enterprises of the Ministry of Industry. Prime Minister Kim Il Sung's Address to the people, in connection with the military events in Korea imposed on the Korean people by the Syngman Rhee clique at the behest of the American imperialists, was discussed in meetings at all enterprises.

At these meetings, the workers committed themselves to increase productivity and discipline and to produce more output to aid the front.

These commitments are being backed by deeds. The workers of the [Sinchang] coal mine, having committed themselves to increase the shipment of coal for rail transport, increased the daily shipments to 80 rail cars instead of the 60 shipped in prewar times.

The ratio of the use of machine tools at the Pyongyang central mechanical engineering plant was 64% in prewar times but has now risen to 84%. The appearance of workers [at work] was on average previously 90% and is now 95%.

At the Seonheung, mine borer Hong Seungmu made a commitment and began to operate two hammer drills, fulfilling 300% of the shift norm.

At the Goksan, tungsten mine borer Ho Yon fulfilled 250% of the shift norm in wartime.

At the Wonsan shipyard, foreman [Ki Chon Ki] organized a shock brigade, which considerably over fulfilled the production norms.

Workers and specialists of the Haecheong power station, located in the area of the 38th parallel, installed a 38,000-watt generator in eight days instead of the assigned 15 days.

Workers and specialists working at the restored [Supun]-Seoul power transmission line finished work in 12 days instead of the 30 days in the planned schedule.

It ought to be pointed out that a number of industrial enterprises are experiencing interruptions in operation because of late shipments of raw materials, fuel, and materiel by rail in connection with the frequent American air raids on rail facilities and rolling stock and also in connection with the fact that rail transport is carrying first-priority military shipments.

The production of pig iron at the Gyeomipo metallurgical plant at which coke is being shipped with interruption from the Cheongjin plant has fallen from 800 tons a day to 500 tons. The production of their own coke has dropped because the coal has not arrived at this plant, which, in turn, has reduced the output of coke oven gas for open-hearth furnaces and lowered the production of steel from 400 tons a day to 250 tons a day.

The treatment plant at the Songcheon lead smelter, which is not receiving the necessary amount of ore, is operating with idle capacity. The Pyongyang chemical plant is idle in connection with the fact that the main raw material, cellulose, is not being shipped in.

The shipment of production (carbide, metal, etc.) from plants for export is being delayed.

The government is taking steps at the present time to improve rail shipment of the most important freight for industry.

The Ministry of Industry has mapped out and is taking further steps to improve the production and mobilization of domestic resources to increase aid to the front.

II. MEASURES CONCERNING DPRK RAIL TRANSPORTATION

During the past period of military operations, the operation of the DPRK railroads has, on the whole, been satisfactory with the exception of insignificant interruptions in individual rail sectors as a consequence of the damage caused by American aircraft. About 10,000 rail cars of military personnel trains and military freight were delivered during this period across the 38th parallel in both directions along the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea without counting those made along railroads in the liberated territory of South Korea.

Passenger trains of the Pyongyang-Rajin, Pyongyang-[Manyu], Pyongyang-[Sinmyak], Pyongyang-Sinuiju, Wonsan-Cheongjin, and Pyongyang-Wonsan sectors leave daily. Passenger train travel on the Wonsan-[Chodon] and Wonsan-Yangyang lines has been irregular during periods of increased bombing.

The bombing of railroads, which began on 28 June, has somewhat complicated normal train traffic on the Cheongjin-Wonsan, Pyongyang-Rehen, and Pyongyang-Sinuiju lines.

A temporary interruption of traffic on the Pyongyang-Rehen line occurred after bridges and the Pyongyang station were bombed on 3, 4, and 5 July. The damage was not significant and was quickly repaired (rails, bridge girders, and communications). The biggest interruption of traffic was on the Cheongjin-Hamheung line and lasted from 5 to 10 July as a consequence of the destruction of the large bridge across the Seongcheon River. In addition, six small or medium-sized bridges were destroyed or damaged, which were quickly restored.

Complications in train traffic were caused by the frequent damage to telephone communications at stations and in sectors as a result of bombing. The greatest damage to communications laid on a bridge occurred across the Daedong River (Pyongyang-Seoul), the Seongcheon River, and at the Wonsan station. A shortage of cable and insulated wire was encountered during the restoration. As of 20 July, direct communications with Wonsan had not been restored. A total of 25,000 meters of communications lines were damaged.

The bombing also damaged the route at 35 places in sectors and at stations. A railroad repair regiment of 3,500 men and 2 MPS [Ministry of Railways] repair brigades of 600 men are working on the repair of the tracks and bridges.

Beginning 10 July, a second railroad repair regiment was organized by the MPS, and repair trains were created equipped with machinery (tractors, hoisting cranes, and jacks). The manufacture of components and structures to repair bridges is being organized at industrial enterprises.

The locomotive stock of DPRK railroads has suffered great losses from American air raids. During the period between 28 June and 20 July, 58 locomotives, including 14 which have been rendered completely useless, were put out of commission through damage from bombing and especially machinegun fire. The damaged locomotives are being repaired at the [Soginyan], Cheongjin, and Wonsan locomotive repair yards.

Losses to the rail car fleet on DPRK railroads to the 38th parallel from the operations of American aircraft are insignificant and constitute a little more than 100 rail cars.

The presence of a large number of tunnels allows rail cars with ammunition, tanks, and artillery to be successfully hidden in them in the daytime, as a result of which military shipments are made without loss.

A new Air Defense Instruction based on the Soviet model has been put into effect on the railroads taking local conditions into consideration.

On the whole, DPRK railroad personnel have risen to the occasion and are working selflessly, supplying the front with everything necessary and successfully repairing the damage caused by American aircraft. It needs to be noted that there have been no crashes or accidents on DPRK railroads during the entire period since the beginning of the war.

A Seoul Directorate of Railroads has been created in the liberated part of the South Korean railroads for which the Ministry of Railways sent an operations group of senior officials (in all specialties) headed by Deputy Minister of Railways Kim Hwail.

During this period, five electric locomotives and a small number of freight cars were sent across the 38th parallel from the liberated railroads of South Korea to regulate the rolling stock fleet. The Seoul railroad is experiencing a shortage of locomotives, as a consequence of which it needs to be helped by directing [*komanduya*] locomotives there from the Pyongyang and [Kamhyn] railroads.

The following measures are being taken in order to ensure the normal operation of the railroads:

1. The production of bridge spare parts, which will be transported to the field for the purpose of rapid repair of bridges if they are destroyed by air raids, is being organized at factories of the Ministry of Industry.
2. The production of armor plating to protect boilers and locomotive barrels from aircraft fire is being organized.

3. The staffing of the second railroad repair regiment is being concluded.
4. Measures and a draft Cabinet of Ministers Decree have been developed concerning the shipment of the most important economic freight.
5. Large groups of machinists, railway workers, signalmen, and transport workers have been submitted for orders and medals for excellent work in supporting military shipments and for the rapid repair of damaged rail facilities.

III. MEASURES CONCERNING TRADE AND LOCAL INDUSTRY

The Ministry of Trade has carried out and is carrying out the following measures in accordance with directives of the Military Committee:

1. Measures have been drafted and are being carried out to improve the operation of the Ministry's commercial and industrial enterprises and staff.
2. An order for the Ministry of Trade has been drafted and issued concerning the issue of purchasing and procurement of food, raw material, and materiel for the needs of the front.

A group of 60 officials has been selected and sent to organize procurement work in the liberated areas of the southern part of the DPRK.

3. Measures are being taken to improve the work of the procurement organizations, which procure and process vegetables to support the army and the urban population.
4. The operation of the following 46 enterprises has been switched to the fulfillment of military orders to satisfy the needs of the army:

Sewing shops	- 17
Shoe enterprises	- 11
Bakeries	- 8
Furniture enterprises	- 4
Food enterprises	- 5
Metalware factory	- 1

[The following] have been produced in 20 days:

Hardtack	- 1,050 tons
Soy sauce	- 106 tons
Clothing for the army	- 11,000 uniforms
Underwear	- 16,000 pair
Assorted shoes	- 83,000 pair
Field bags	- 6,300

Other enterprises are also being converted to fulfilling military orders as necessary.

The ministry has made an inventory of and put into operation the following enterprises in liberated areas:

Salt businesses with a daily output of 3,000 tons of salt
A tobacco plant
A brewery
A paint factory
A garment factory
Rubber shoes factory - 4
A distillery
A ginseng production factory
Stores - 32
Hotels - 4.

A group of 260 officials has left to organize trade and production, procurement, and food work in the liberated areas.

IV. MEASURES CONCERNING FINANCIAL AND BANKING OPERATIONS

Government decrees on the following issues were the most important economic measures in the financial and banking sectors:

1. The circulation of currency, the exchange rate between the two currencies, and the protection of banks in liberated territory.
2. The organization of banks and banking operations in liberated territory.
3. The elimination of the Syngman Rhee tax system and the extension of the tax system of the northern part of the DPRK to the southern areas.
4. The procedure for providing the troops of the People's Army with monetary allowances on territory south of the 38th parallel.

(The texts of the decrees are attached)

These decrees and orders of the DPRK Military Committee prohibited the circulation of banknotes of the [Choson] Bank on the territory of the northern part of the DPRK and prohibited private trade between the northern and southern parts of Korea. The responsibility was imposed on military commanders to organize the protection of banks and captured financial resources and to hand them over to representatives of the DPRK Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance was charged with the responsibility of providing the troops with the necessary financial resources.

A directive of the Military Committee established that a Central Branch of the Main Bank of North Korea be opened in Seoul and branches of the Main Bank of North Korea in provincial capitals and large cities, subordinating the latter to the Central Branch in Seoul. The existing eight commercial banks in Seoul and their branches in the provinces have been subordinated to existing branches of the Main Bank of North Korea.

The main task of the branches of the Main Bank of North Korea in liberated territory at the present time are the mobilization of available cash and providing for the army's needs in banknotes.

The Ministry of Finance has selected, instructed, and sent a group of 121 officials to the southern part of the DPRK to organize financial and banking operations.

The Central Branch of the Main Bank of North Korea, having 3 billion won seized by the troops during the capture of Seoul, was opened in Seoul on 4 July 1950.

According to preliminary information, there is about 70 billion won of the Choson Bank in circulation in the south of Korea of which the Syngman Rhee clique took six or seven billion won when fleeing Seoul.

Several other branches of the Main Bank, besides the central branch, have opened and begun operation in liberated areas.

The balance sheets of the banks, the budget of South Korea, and other important documents have been delivered to the Ministry of Finance from Seoul.

The Ministry of Finance has issued an order about wartime operating procedures for financial bodies and banks, the operation of financial bodies in the South is being organized, and the procedure for financing the repair work for sites destroyed during military operations and a number of other measures are being drafted.

A draft decree of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly is being drafted about the introduction of a wartime tax.

V. MEASURES CONCERNING COMMUNICATIONS

In connection with military operations, the DPRK Ministry of Communications handed over operational wires to the People's Army to organize communications through army, navy, air force, and air defense channels. The Ministry of Communications took over the operation of the wires it had handed over to assist the operational units of the army.

Four repair columns, at the disposition of the Ministry of Communications, were deployed to signals construction companies in accordance with an Order of the Military Committee. The companies were formed and began work on 28 June 1950. The mission of these companies is the repair of aerial communications lines on the four axial links to the south behind the movement of military units.

An important circumstance in the matter of organizing communications in liberated areas was the repair of the underground cable between Pyongyang and Seoul as a result of which five telephone channels were gained. The Pyongyang-Seoul and Wonsan-Seoul aerial arterial lines were also repaired.

The aerial communications lines and communications centers are being subjected to frequent bombing, especially in the Cheolwon-Seoul, Kaeseong-Seoul sectors, and the Wonsan, Pyongyang, and Anju regions. [The following] have been destroyed by bombing: a telephone exchange and postal telegraph office in Wonsan, and the post office and telephone exchange in Nampo.

Communications facilities, which have been destroyed, are being immediately repaired, and emergency teams are working satisfactorily and are not displaying cowardice.

Two reserve communications centers for communications in the direction of Seoul are being provided with underwater cable laid across a river away from bridges to increase the reliability of communications in the area of Pyongyang when it is subjected to air raids.

In connection with the frequent damage to main communications arteries from air raids, six mobile emergency repair teams in vehicles are being created to repair communications lines on the main arteries going to the south.

The Ministry of Communications has selected 300 communications specialists and sent them to the army to create new signals units. Four hundred men are being selected for courses at communications enterprises for accelerated training of communications workers, which the army needs.

The Ministry of Communications has sent 223 specialists and administrative personnel to organize the operation of the communications enterprises in Seoul and the liberated areas.

The headquarters of the DPRK Ministry of Communications' authorized representative is being organized in Seoul and provincial offices are being created in liberated areas.

A significant shortcoming in the operation of the Ministry in wartime is the frequent disruption of communications between industrial centers of the northern part of Korea, which creates additional difficulties in the operation of enterprises. The Ministry is taking steps to eliminate these shortcomings.

VI. MEASURES CONCERNING AGRICULTURE AND LAND REFORM FOR THE LIBERATED AREAS OF THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE DPRK

At the present time, the Ministry of Land and Forests is devoting special attention to carrying out all the necessary measures connected with sowing and harvesting of crops in a timely fashion, intending that a reduction in the quality of the field work in connection

with the departure of part of the rural male population to the People's Army is to be prevented.

By a special order of the Minister of Land and Forests, all the workers of local land organizations have been mobilized to handle this task. A group of Ministry officials has been sent to rural areas to help.

The Ministry has sent 220 tractor drivers, 56 tractors, 15 vehicles, 10 mobile vehicle repair shops, and five fuel tankers for the needs of the army.

At the present time, the Ministry has organized the training of 500 tractor drivers for their subsequent transfer to the army.

A group of 30 Ministry officials has been sent to liberated areas of the South.

According to information coming from the South, the peasants of liberated areas are giving considerable assistance to the People's Army in the construction of roads, bridges, and transporting materials and military cargo with their own means of transportation.

The preparation and carrying out of land reform in southern areas of the DPRK, which have been and are being liberated, is the main and most important economic and political measure.

On 4 July 1950, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean People's Democratic Republic adopted a law on carrying out land reform in the southern part of the DPRK.

On 10 July 1950, the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers approved a regulation for carrying out land reform. A group of 511 officials, who had been trained and had attended a seminar, left Pyongyang to carry out land reform.

Rallies and meetings of peasants devoted to the historic law on land reform, adopted by the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly, are being held in villages, districts, and cities of the liberated territory of the southern part of Korea.

Beginning on 9 July, many rallies and meetings of peasants devoted to land reform are being held in many districts in the province of Hwanghae.

Peasants are holding rallies at their own initiative in a number of villages in the district of Chuncheon in connection with the law on land reform. On 14 July, a rally of peasants was held in the city of [Yembek] at which more than 35,000 people were present.

In their speeches at rallies and meetings, the peasants say that their long-awaited dream is being realized, and now they will get land. They say that their actions and uprisings against the Syngman Rhee clique, which oppressed them and took away their harvest,

were brutally repressed and unsuccessful, and only the People's Army had liberated them, and now they will get land.

In resolutions adopted at rallies and meetings, the peasants thank the People's Army and People's Power for their liberation and land reform, and they promise to correctly carry out the land law, work well, and help the People's Army achieve final victory over the enemy of the Korean people.

One hundred and sixty-seven peasant committees have already been created in the province of Hwanghae, which have already begun preparations to distribute land.

At the present time, officials who have come from Pyongyang to carry out land reform along with the officials who were recruited locally have begun mass explanatory and practical work in districts and villages to make the historical land law a reality for the peasants of the southern part of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

COUNSELOR OF THE USSR
EMBASSY IN KOREA

/signature/

(V. PELISHENKO)

3 copies lb/lb
20 July 1950

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 26

[Source: RGASPI. F. 558, Op. 11, D. 62, pp. 71-72. Published in: Andrei Lidovskii, "Stalin, Mao Tsedunh I Koreiskaia Voina 1950-1953 godov," Novaia I Noveishaia Istorii, No. 5 (September-October 2005), 79-113. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Note

On the Soviet Withdrawal from the Security Council, 27 August 1950

Top Secret

Prague, Soviet Ambassador

Please pass Gottwald the following message orally. Put it in writing if he so requests.

"We view the issue of the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the Security Council on 27 June and the events which unfolded afterwards somewhat differently from Comrade Gottwald.

We left the Security Council for four reasons: first, to demonstrate solidarity of the Soviet Union with the new China.

Second, to underscore the foolishness and idiocy of the United States policy of recognizing the Guomindang puppet in the Security Council as the representative of China and not wanting to admit the genuine representative of China to the Security Council; third, to render the decision of the Security Council illegitimate by virtue of the absence of representatives of two great powers; fourth, to give the American government a free hand and give it an opportunity to commit more foolishness using a majority in the Security Council so that public opinion can see the true face of the American government.

I believe that we have achieved all of these goals.

Following our withdrawal from the Security Council, America has become entangled in a military intervention in Korea and is now squandering its military prestige and moral authority. Few honest people can now doubt that America is now acting as an aggressor and tyrant in Korea and that it is not as militarily powerful as it claims to be. In addition it is clear that the United States of America is presently distracted from Europe and the Far East. Does it not give us an advantage in the global balance of power? It undoubtedly does.

Let us suppose that American government continues to be tied down in the Far East and also pulls China into the struggle for the freedom of Korea and its own independence. What might come of this?

First, America, just like any other state, cannot cope with China, a country with such large armed forces at the ready. It follows that America would overextend itself in this struggle. Second, having overextended itself in this matter, America would be incapable of a third world war in the near future.¹ Therefore, the third world war would be postponed for an indeterminate period, which would provide the time necessary to strengthen socialism in Europe, not to mention the struggle between America and China would revolutionize the entire Far East. Does all this not give us an advantage from the perspective of the global balance of power? It unquestionably does.

As you can see, the question of whether or not the Soviet Union participates in the Security Council is not as simple as it might appear at first glance.

By virtue of all this, we cannot say that the “the democratic camp² has no need to leave the the Security Council.” Whether we leave or stay depends on the circumstances. We might leave the Security Council again and come back once again, depending on the international situation.

One might ask why we have now returned to the Security Council. We have returned to continue exposing the aggressive policy of American government and to prevent it from using the flag of the Security Council as a smokescreen for its aggression. Now that America has become aggressively involved in Korea, it would be easier to achieve this goal while

in the Security Council. I think that this point is sufficiently clear and needs no further explanation.

FILIPPOV.

27 August 1950”

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 27

[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 347, Listy 14-15 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a, Delo 4, Papka 11, List 162. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From Shtykov to Stalin Transmitting Letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin, 31 August 1950

CIPHERED TELEGRAM
FYN-SI [Stalin].

I transmit the letter I received.

[According to the report of KIM IL SUNG's secretary, MUN IL, this text of the letter was confirmed by the PolitSoviet of the CC of the Korean Workers' Party.]

SHTYKOV

No. 1011/sh

31.8.1950

Copies to Stalin (2), Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, File of the

8th Department.

"DEAR comrade STALIN, I.V.

We are deeply touched by your attention.

We bring to you, our dear teacher, gratitude for the warm sympathy and advice. In the decisive period of the struggle of the Korean people we have received great moral support from you. We have firmly resolved to win the final victory in the struggle against the American interventionists, who are trying anew to enslave Korea.

In the noble struggle for independence and freedom we constantly feel your fatherly care and assistance.

We wish you many years of life and health.

Yours faithfully,

KIM IL SUNG

(upon committee of the PolitSoviet of the CC [Central Committee] of the Korean Workers' Party of Korea)
city of PYONGYANG
31.8.1950."

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 28

[Source: Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation [TsAMO RF], F. 5, Op. 918795, D. 125, pp. 89-91. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From the Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK to the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs with Information about the North Korean Workers Party CC Meeting, 22 September 1950

N° 79

N° 1258

22 September 1950 2030*

On 21 September 1950 I was visited by Korean Workers' Party CC Secretary Heo Gai (a Soviet Korean).

At the beginning of the conversation he said that he wished to inform me of the Party political council meeting held on 21 September 1950.

The issue of what reply to give to the Chinese comrades in response to Zhou Enlai's inquiry was discussed at this meeting for two and a half hours: the Chinese government's proposal to the Korean government in connection with the situation which has developed.

Kim Il Sung read a report from his Ambassador, Li Juyeon, about a conversation with Zhou Enlai and asked the opinion of the members of the political council.

Those who spoke, Pak Heonyeong, Kim Dubong, Pak Ilu, came to the common opinion that the situation is serious and evidently they cannot cope with the American troops with their own forces, therefore they came to the conclusion to ask the Chinese government to send their troops to Korea.

Afterwards Kim Il Sung spoke and said how can this be, for we thought that we have many people and will be able to cope [with the Americans] with our own forces. The Soviet Union has given us as many weapons as we requested. What are the reasons for turning to the Chinese for aid

Then Kim Il Sung raised the issue of what the consequences might be after the Chinese enter the war on the side of the Koreans. What if this led to a third world war

Kim Il Sung then, supposedly referring to Mao Zedong, said that China is not constrained [svyazan] by international treaties and is not a member of the UN, and this might help.

Then Kim Il Sung supposedly said that, although the Soviet Union and China do not want to start a third world war because of Korea, but inasmuch as Korea is an important strategic point, as the American imperialists tell it, he thinks that the Soviet Union and China will not allow the Americans to occupy Korea completely.

He suggested not to decide to turn to the Chinese government for aid for the time being, but to write a letter to Cde. Stalin and ask his advice as to whether to turn to the Chinese for aid with troops. He allegedly stressed at the same time that the Soviet Union might be offended that its aid and advisers were sort of insufficient.

Kim Il Sung then said that if we had time we could speed up the formation of new units and then it would not be necessary to turn to the Chinese. But they are afraid that there will not be enough time.

No decision was made as a result of the discussion.

In conclusion, Hegai asked what my opinion was on this issue.

I declined to discuss this issue.

In my opinion, Heo Gai came to inform me at the instruction of Kim Il Sung with the goal of finding out my opinion himself.

Shtykov

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 29

[Source: Printed in Voyna v Koree 1950-1953 gg: vzglyad cherez 50 let [The 1950-1953 War in Korea; the View After 50 Years], pp. 84-89. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

From Kim Il Sung and Pak Heonyeong to Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin

29 September 1950

In the name of the Korean Workers' Party we express to you, the liberator of the Korean people and leader of the workers movement of the entire world, deep gratitude for the

sympathy and aid which you constantly show to our people, who are fighting for the freedom and independence of their Motherland.

In this letter we would like to briefly inform you of the situation that has been created at the present time at the fronts of the war of liberation of our people against the American aggressors.

Before the amphibious operations in the area of Incheon (Jemulpo) the situation at the fronts could not be regarded as unfavorable for us.

Suffering defeat after defeat, the enemy was driven into a small territory of the southernmost end of South Korea and we had a great chance of victory in subsequent decisive battles.

Such a situation severely shook American military prestige.

Therefore in the situation which had developed, having mobilized almost all [their] ground, naval, and air forces located in the Pacific Ocean, in order to restore its prestige and carry out their old plans to seize Korea at any cost and turn it into their own strategic military bridgehead the US conducted an amphibious operation on 16 September 1950 and landed a considerable number of troops and equipment in the area of Incheon. Having seized Inchon the enemy is waging street battles right in the city of Seoul.

...The enemy will next undertake an offensive against North Korea. Therefore, we think that if the above events unfavorable to us occur the American aggression will in the final account be crowned with success.

In order to supply the troops with everything necessary and feed the front without interruption we need first of all to have suitable air forces, but we have no trained personnel.

Dear Cde. Stalin! We are fully determined to overcome every difficulty with which we are faced so that Korea is not a colony and military bridgehead of the American imperialists. We will fight to the last drop of blood for the independence, democracy, and happiness of the people. Therefore we are taking determined steps with all vigor to form and train a multitude of new divisions, to use the more than 100,000 troops mobilized in South Korea in the most favorable operating areas, and to arm all the people to be ready for a long war.

In spite of this, if the enemy does not give [us] time to carry out the steps we have planned and, using our extraordinarily difficult position, speeds up offensive operations against North Korea, then we not be in a condition to stop the enemy with our own forces.

Therefore, dear Iosif Vissarionovich, we cannot fail to ask you for special assistance. In other words, at the moment that enemy troops cross the 38th parallel we will be very much in need of immediate military aid from the Soviet Union.

If for any reason this is impossible, then help us create international volunteer units in China and other countries of the people's democracy to provide military aid to our struggle.

We request your instructions concerning our above proposals.

Respectfully,
the CC of the Korean Workers' Party
Kim Il Sung, Pak Heonyeong

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 30

[Source: RGASPI F. 558, Op. 11, D. 334, pp. 97-98. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Letter

From [Beijing] to Soviet Ambassador, 1 October 1950

Top Secret

Passed to Cde. Bulganin [from Sochi] on 1 October 1950

[BEIJING] to the SOVIET AMBASSADOR

To be immediately sent to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai

"I am far from Moscow on vacation and have somewhat lost touch with events in Korea. However according to information which has come to me today from Moscow I see that the situation of the Korean comrades is becoming desperate.

Back on 16 September Moscow warned the Korean comrades that the landing of American troops at Jemulpo [Incheon] had great significance and was pursuing the goal of cutting off the North Korean first and second army groups from their rear areas in the north. Moscow warned [them] to immediately withdraw at least four divisions from the south, to create a front north and south of Seoul, then gradually withdraw the majority of the southern troops to the north and thus secure the 38th parallel. But the command of the 1st and 2nd army groups did not carry out Kim Il Sung's order to withdraw troops to the north and this provided the Americans the opportunity to cut off the troops and surround them. The Korean comrades have no troops in the area of Seoul capable of resistance and the path in the direction of the 38th parallel needs to be considered open.

I think that if you consider it possible in the present situation, help the Korean comrades with troops even just to immediately move at least five or six divisions to the 38th parallel

in order to provide the Korean comrades an opportunity to organize troop reserves north of the 38th parallel under the protection of your forces. The Chinese divisions might figure as volunteers, of course, headed by a Chinese command.

I have communicated nothing and am not thinking of communicating anything about this to the Korean comrades but I do not doubt that they will be glad when they find out about this.

I await your response.

Greetings
1 October 1950

FILIPPOV

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 31

[Source: RGASPI. F. 558, Op. 11, D. 62, p. 73. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Note

From Vyshinsky on Kiselev's Mistake, 1 October 1950

Top Secret

Yesterday during heated debates about the Korean issue in the First Committee as a result of sharp attacks by our opponents and the participation of the Nationalist Chinese [representative] [Tayang] [Jian Tin Fu] in particular, Kiselev probably let drop the following phrase when replying to [Tayang], "...and if Mr. [Tayang] thinks that the thunder of victory can already be heard he is deeply mistaken. He will soon feel this mistake".

[Younger] and [Austin] grasped onto this statement of Kiselev's, noting it in their statements.

After the meeting I pointed out to Kiselev the blunder he had made. In addition, this issue was discussed today at a meeting of the delegation. Kiselev completely admits the slip he made.

VYSHINSKY

1 October 1950

* * *

DOCUMNET NO. 32

[Source: RGASPI. F. 558, Op. 11, D. 62, p. 77. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Note

From Stalin Reprimanding Vyshinsky on Kiselev Issue, 3 October 1950

Special
Flash

New York, to Vyshinsky

You, like all your delegation, have acted incorrectly, having scolded Cde. Kiselev for his attack against the Nationalist Chinese [representative] in the first committee on the Korean issue. It was unquestionably necessary to make a detailed reply with regard to the high-handed gentleman from the bloc of the imperialist camp. Cde. Kiselev did this, and it is very good that he decided to do this. It is not at all necessary that all members of our delegation sing the same tune about all minor issues. "Extremists" are also needed.

Please convey my opinion to Cde. Kiselev's attention.

Stalin

3 October 1950

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 33

[Source: RGASPI F. 558 Op. 11 D. 334 pp. 105-106. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Telegram

Of Mao Zedong's Reply to Stalin's Telegram, 3 October 1950

REPLY OF MAO ZEDONG TO STALIN'S TELEGRAM ABOUT SENDING
CHINESE VOLUNTEERS TO THE KOREAN FRONT

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

Top Secret

ENCIPHERED TELEGRAM

From [Beijing]

3 October 1950

FLASH

to FILIPPOV

I report Mao Zedong's reply to your N 4581:

"Your telegram of 1 October 1950 has been received. We initially planned to move several volunteer divisions to North Korea to aid the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having carefully thought it over, we now think that such an act might provoke very serious consequences.

First, it is very difficult to solve the Korean problem with several divisions (the equipment of our troops is very poor and there is no confidence of the success of a military operation with American forces), and the enemy might force us to retreat.

Second, it is most likely that this would provoke an open collision between the US and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union might be drawn in to the war and thus the problem might become very large.

Many comrades in the CPC CC think that it is necessary to exercise caution here.

Of course, it [would be] very bad for the Korean comrades who are in such a difficult position at the present time not to send troops to help and we are feeling this very much ourselves. If we move some divisions forward and the enemy forces us to retreat, in addition to this provoking an open collision between the US and China our entire plan for peaceful construction would be completely wrecked and a great many people in the country would be discontented (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have still not been healed and peace is needed).

Therefore it is better right now to endure [this] and not actively move troops forward [but] to prepare forces, and that there will a more favorable time during the war with the enemy.

While temporarily suffering defeat Korea will change the form of combat to partisan warfare.

We are convening a meeting of the CC at which senior officials of various (regional and territorial) CC bureaus will be present. A final decision has not been made about this issue. This is our preliminary telegram. We want to consult with you. If you agree, then

we will immediately send Cdes. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao to the place of your vacation by air and discuss this matter with you and report the situation in China and in Korea.

We await [your] reply.

MAO ZEDONG

2 October 1950"

1. In my view Mao Zedong's reply is evidence of a change in the initial position of the Chinese leadership. It contrasts with the previous assessment repeatedly expressed in the conversations between Mao Zedong and Yudin, Kotov, and Konnov and Liu Shaoqi's conversation with me, which was reported in a timely fashion. In these conversations they (Mao Zedong and others) noted that the [Chinese] people and the NOA are ready to help the Korean people, that the fighting spirit of the NOA is high, and that if it becomes necessary it is capable of defeating the American troops, considering them weaker than the Japanese.

2. The Chinese government undoubtedly could send not just five or six combat-ready divisions to Korea but even more. Of course these Chinese divisions need some supplies of technical anti-tank equipment and partly in artillery.

The reasons for the change in the positions of the Chinese are not yet clear to us. It can be assumed that in this particular case the current international situation, the worsening of the situation in Korea, and the intrigues of the Anglo-American block via Nehru, who is calling upon the Chinese for patience and restraint to avoid a catastrophe, have had an influence.

ROSHCHIN

N 2270. 3 October 1950

Copy N 1 - to Cde. Stalin
Copy N 2 - to Cde. Stalin
Copy N 3 - to Cde. Molotov
Copy N 4 - to Cde. Malenkov

Copy N 5 - to Cde. Beria
Copy N 6 - to Cde. Mikoyan
Copy N 7 - to Cde. Kaganovich
Copy N 8 - to Cde. Bulganin

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 34

*[Source: Printed in *Voyna v Koree 1950-1953 gg: vzglyad cherez 50 let [The 1950-1953 War in Korea; the View After 50 Years]*, pp. 84-89. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]*

2 November 1950

Letter from Kim Il Sung to Stalin

To Cde. Fyn Si [Stalin],

By arrangement with the Chinese comrades [the following] Korean reserves of the People's Army are being withdrawn to the territory of Manchuria for future battles: nine infantry divisions, an officers schools, a tank training regiment, and an air division with an air training regiment; six combat divisions will be brought up to strength and trained on Korean territory.

I earnestly request that you, dear Cde. Fyn Si, leave the existing staff of Soviet advisers, with the exception of the military academy, for the training of the above formations and the military school for a short period on Chinese territory and in Korea.

Kim Il Sung

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 35

[Source: Printed in Voyna v Koree 1950-1953 gg: vzglyad cherez 50 let [The 1950-1953 War in Korea; the View After 50 Years], pp. 84-89. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

**Letter
from Kim Il Sung to Stalin, 1 December 1950**

Dear Cde. Fyn Si [Stalin]

I have received your letter of 15 November 1950.

The content of this letter was disclosed at the political council of the CC of the Korean Workers' Party at which all members of the political council unanimously recognized your orders to be correct and meeting the needs of the situation which has developed in Korea.

1. Regarding the issue of troop command and control we made a number of critical decisions to improve command and control. The tables of organization and command elements are being reexamined. The training of headquarters commanders [*shtabnye komandiry*] is being organized. Communications are being put in order.
2. We consider the statement of the issue of a unified command to be correct and timely. Also, the command should undoubtedly be a Chinese and his deputy a Korean.

To coordinate questions associated with the mobilization and training of the Korean reserves and to resolve a number of other issues...

...the enemy rear, strengthening and expanding operations of small partisan detachments led by underground Party organizations of the Workers' Party.

The 5th Army has been ordered to operate in areas northeast and south of Pyongyang. The strength of each army is 30,000 men.

The commanding general of partisan armies and the commanders of detachments have been ordered to immediately commence active partisan operations. We are training combat engineers and equipping and sending them to the rear.

5. The combat training of troops, staffs, and officers is being organized, taking into consideration the experience of past battles, the demands of the situation, the nature of the terrain, and the tactics of enemy operations.

As Communists and your loyal followers, we have taken your instructions and comments as guidelines for our continued work.

We are very grateful to you very, dear Cde. Fyn Si, for the timely aid with advice and hope that we will continue to receive instructions and comments which are of fundamental importance and give us young leaders confidence in [our] work.

Respectfully yours,
Kim Il Sung

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 36

[Source: Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski]

TOP SECRET [stamp]

(January 2, 1951)

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Independent Eastern Department
Head E. Słuczański

Below I am giving a report from my first trip to Korea: [...]

The war and the political situation.

No doubt many dimensions of the current situation will soon change. I am telling how it is currently, with the caveat that most of the data do not come from official statements of the Government of Korea, but instead from unofficial conversations with members of the government and the Party leadership.

At the time when India came up with the known sabotage on UN territory, a certain fear existed in Korean government circles whether this might not bring military action to a halt. A complex came about in some, even serious, Korean personalities: “who knows whether for considerations of higher politics they will not want to sacrifice half of our small country.” Even though they were being persuaded by a reliable source that this will not happen, nonetheless this event was a fact. It coincided with a short pause that came to be between the first and second inflows of volunteers.

The second wave of volunteers dispersed all fears. The preparations for a new strike lifted the spirits of the Koreans. During my stay in Korea, the second offensive was just beginning, and the situation on the front presented itself as follows.

The American “enclave,” which was created as a result of the surrounding of the X Corps in Hamnam district, was eliminated in a way that thanks to incessant attacks by the Koreans and volunteers, both during the day and at night, the Americans were forced to evacuate by sea. This is a serious strategic victory because the Americans had initially aimed to retain the Hamnam bridgehead at any price, so as to broaden it over time and use it as a base for sorties for a new attack, creating a serious center of threat from the northeast. The Americans defended this bridgehead with a large effort. The seriously strong ship artillery conducted an incessant barrage, shielding the cluster of the X Corps. The air force was attacking very intensively, attempting to prevent a massing of Korean and volunteer forces. Despite this, also this time the Americans were forced to give up on their cocky announcement that they would leave Hamnam whenever they felt like it. They incurred great losses in people and materiel and were forced to evacuate quite hurriedly. Although, before the evacuation they had destroyed literally everything that could be burned, exploded, killed.

After significant forces were amassed along the 38th parallel and the forces active on the rears of the enemy’s front (an Army was created comprising four divisions, not counting partisan units) were reorganized, a new offensive was begun. V[ice]-min[ister] of the Armed Forces, Pak Don Co, in sketching out the perspectives of the military actions that are already appearing now, declared: “We will conduct the war until its natural conclusion, which means until we clear our whole country of the enemy. I am able to say this because I know that our friends will go with us to the end.”

In assessing the war situation realistically, one should not expect the current offensive to result in this “natural end” to the war. Perhaps several more offensives will be necessary. And it seems that both sides conducting the war are aware of this. Still, it seems equally clear to both sides that if new elements do not enter the international situation with a much broader range of action, the further course of the war on this terrain

is rather predetermined, thanks to the consistent advantage of land forces gained by the entry into the action of the Chinese volunteer formations.

Another possibility that exists for Korea that I mentioned above, namely the introduction of new elements, but this goes outside the sphere of Korean issues.

On 20-22 [December] the Plenum of the CC of the Party took place, The principal speech was delivered by Kim Il Sung and it covered the course of the war so far and sketched out the tasks for the current and nearest periods.

In his speech, Kim Il Sung divided the course of the war so far into three phases:

1. from the moment of the Syngman Rhee-ist attack until the battle of Pusan. In this phase, the advantage was on the side of the people because the people's armies proved not only militarily better prepared but also because the people trusted the democratic government completely.
2. A strong preponderance of the enemy marked the second phase, caused not only by purely strategic movements but also by mistakes made by the people's camp. Underestimating the enemy backfired, as did the excessive rush to gauge the situation and underestimating the international aspect of the battles in Korea.
3. The third phase was begun by the entry of the Chinese volunteers into the action. This gave not only a numerical change in the relationship of the forces in the war, but also gave the ability to execute a reorganization of the People's Army, a quick but broad training of reserves – over 10 divisions of the first rank. The political effects of these events were demonstrated above all in the activation of partisan fighting in the south.

Kim Il Sung subjected instances of panicking, which appeared here and there in the most difficult period, to sharp criticism. An analysis of the situation shows – despite individual cases of treason – the great cohesiveness of the national front, which passed the test victoriously.

Among the most serious tasks currently facing the leadership – other than continuing to lead the war – is the preparation of the agricultural year. The country is ruined. Fifty percent of cattle, which comprises the basic tractive force in agriculture, has been slaughtered. There are almost no supplies.

The reconstruction of the country is the second, no less important, issue. Industry is virtually destroyed. Only in the northeast a few small factories have survived until now. If assistance is not provided by friendly countries and nations, the population is threatened by hunger and the country by delays in development.

A rather clear picture of the current state of affairs in Korea emerges from conversations conducted by me and Dodin with several leading personalities in leading positions. The army is currently sufficiently supplied with weapons and clothing and food. But the population is deprived of both sufficient nutrition and clothing. There is a

shortage of everything in Korea – this is probably the most precise description of the economic situation.

The question of assistance to Korea.

Already in my first conversation with v[ice]-premier Pak Heonyeong, he let me know that Korea believes that the countries that are friendly to it will rush in with assistance. When I asked him whether he knew that Amb. Li Jiyeon has presented to me the issue of sending aid to Korea, v[ice] min[ister] Pak Heonyeong confirmed it and stated that he is repeating the plea presented by Amb. Li. In the course of the conversation with vice-minister [Pak Don Co], the issue was made even more precise. It is namely a question of aid of a two-fold nature: for the population, which is threatened by formal extinction and for help in rebuilding the country. As for aid to the population, the following things are needed: clothing, underwear, everyday articles for the household, food and especially fats, meat, fish. Also cotton textiles, tools such as hammers, axes, saws and so on. Much of this could be acquired through collections to be organized by social institutions.

As for help in rebuilding, here it is a matter of means of production, railway cars, locomotives and so on, which Poland could deliver on credit in exchange for future deliveries from Korea to Poland. It would be a question of a two-year credit.

Because other countries are also undertaking actions of assistance to Korea, it would certainly be desirable to coordinate the efforts by reaching an understanding among the interested countries.

I believe that for transports from Europe one could use the sea route with trans-shipment in Dalian.

Korea's diplomatic relations.

The following diplomatic representations are present in Korea now:

Soviet	-	embassy
Chinese	-	“
Mongolian	-	“
Polish	-	“
Hungarian	-	mission
Czech	-	“
Bulgarian	-	“

Romania's diplomatic representative has already received his agrément and will soon arrive in Korea.

During my conversation with Min. Pak Heonyeong, it was determined that the Korean embassy will arrive in Poland probably at the end of January 51 with an initial staff of 6-7 persons. This number will later be increased.

Vice-min. Pak Don Co expressed the hope that Poland will send a military attaché.

The embassy's organizational issues.

[...]

[signature]

J. Burgin

Ambassador of RP [Republic of Poland]

Beijing 2 I 1951

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a/a - 1 copy

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 37

[Source: Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. Copy in NKIDP Archive. Translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski]

Polish Embassy
in Beijing

Beijing, 1 February 1951
SECRET [stamp]

Korea, 7 January 1951

REPORT No. 03/4/

1. War situation

After completing the first phase of attack and fortifying the rears, the Korean armies together with Chinese volunteers crossed to the second phase of the attack on 1 January of this year. These actions had been preceded by great activeness of the partisan units. Especially to the north of Pyongyang and in the region of the city of Changchun. These units attacked staffs, tore up bridges, exploded transports with American troops. The partisan units on the east coast, where the cooperation of individual groups was well organized, acted broadly. In the area of Kowon they used human resources in order to prevent the retreat and to destroy the enemy and tear down 10 bridges, 50 communications lines, they exploded over 20 trains with materiel and troops. They attacked a mine in Kowon, chasing away the Syngman Rhee-ites. The partisans in the

Guni region, ca. 50 km. north of Deage, are also very active, where the Americans were forced to deploy the X Corps, which had escaped from Chininm.

As a result of the attack of the people's army, Seoul and Incheon harbor were liberated, as well as the strategically very important point, the city of Chungchun, which allows us to enhance the offensive in the south, on the central front. Right now, the front runs in the west at the city of Suwon, centrally at the city of Chenson and in the east on the same parallel. The attack will probably go only on the western and central sectors, since in the east there are mountains which make an attack impossible and there is a complete lack of roads. We must recognize a new moment during the current offensive, the Americans are retreating almost without fighting, protecting their human resources from destruction. They are probably depositing their troops in the south, where they intend to defend themselves. They are only leaving groups of Syngman Rhee people as shields, so typical for imperialists. The Americans consider the evacuation of their troops from Chingjan as their greatest success, but they suffered fairly serious losses there. It was revealed that the Americans deployed all the forces they could mobilize, i.e., 7 American div[isions], 1 English brigade, 1 brigade of Turks and 6 div[isions] of Syngman Rhee-ites, for fighting in Korea during the November offensive. In that offensive, the Americans suffered approximately the following losses:

	<u>Americans and others</u>	<u>Syngman Rhee-ites</u>
Dead:	8,085 people	7,847 people
prisoners-of-war:	2,272 “	5,353 “

Overall human losses over 23,700.

Captured:

cannon	-	521 pieces
machine guns	-	469 “
guns	-	4,736 “
tanks	-	55 “
cars	-	1,953 “

and other materiel.

Currently, the Americans have begun to bombard the region of the city of Pyongyang and the city of Seoul very powerfully. More and more of the Korean air force is being introduced into the battle, but so far the Americans have a strong preponderance and total control of all roads. The inflow of Chinese volunteers is happening incessantly, it is true, in smaller numbers, but sufficiently big to guarantee fully victorious military actions. Presumably the offensive will continue to develop, especially in the western and central sectors and there will be one more wave of attacks, which needs to be solidly prepared. The Korean army's fighting spirit is on a high level. The fighting conditions are very difficult here because of the terrain and the wilderness and because of quite low freezing temperatures.

In periods of spring and summer, it is only possible to travel on the main roads.

2. Economic questions

It is difficult to say anything about economic questions, since right now there is no economy at all, and plans are being developed.

The country is living on only irregular economic issues, which are intended to help the front and minimally to help the civilian population in their difficult situation, as well as the reconstruction of the destroyed industry and cities in the areas occupied by the People's Army.

The question of raising the productivity of agriculture is being stated widely and the quick rebuilding of railroads is most important.

Competition is beginning to develop in the liberated areas, especially among railroad men who already have some very nice successes behind them. The production of some parts of armaments has even begun.

To this day, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot say concretely what assistance is indispensable to them. They are as detached from the other ministries as we are. In any case, my last note on this question remains topical.

It needs to be said that the Hungarians and Czechs have developed a good reputation here since their assistance, not counting the Soviet Union and People's China, is the most productive. Recently, 24 rail cars carrying medications, gifts for soldiers arrived in Manchuria from Hungary, and a greater number of cars from Czechoslovakia with warm clothing, shoes etc.

Our assistance ought to be quick and it would be worth designating a fast ship. It is a fact that we remain far behind, and we know almost nothing about what has been shipped from Poland and what the whole action has been.

On 31 December 1950 the Khabarovsk radio station broadcast that a large action of assistance for Korea has begun in Poland. I will not fail to convey this information to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK.

3. The political situation.

Mass rallies to mark Stalin's 71st birthday have taken place in the whole part of the country liberated by the people's army. The action of reconstruction is taking place everywhere, workers are taking on obligations to produce.

An incident in Pyongyang is characteristic, where after the entry of the Americans the workers escaped to the countryside taking with them the most valuable work tools and machine parts, and after liberation they made pledges and on 2 January of this year, the factory that makes parts for armaments was opened.

Apart from this, an action is being conducted among the peasantry to increase the harvest, threshing of rice and harvesting it for the military.

Volunteer brigades are forming to repair roads. In the region of Sinuiju alone, by the end of November of last year, the peasants collected 10,200 sacks of rice for the army, despite the fact that they had suffered horribly as a result of military action. An action of aid for the Chinese volunteers is also being conducted, health stations are being set up, special female health brigades have even been created.

The 3rd Plenum of the KWP Party, which took place in Kange, placed Kim Il Sung's speech as the most important issue. (I have no new information to add to the previous piece of news.)

Apart from that, Pak Heonyeong gave a speech about the unity of workers' organizations of north and south Korea. Of organizational issues, 6 members of the CC were moved to candidates. And 9 persons, including Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Don Co, were moved from candidates to members of the CC. Comr[ade] Pak Don An was chosen as secretary of the party. Kuk Mo was chosen to serve as head of the labor department and Kim Chan Chai for communications.

In Korea, they consider CC resolutions to be secret and one cannot get any information from them. It can be seen clearly that the party is taking an increasingly consistent and Bolshevik direction.

Kim Il Sung, in his New Year's speech described the most immediate tasks that stand before the Nation as:

1. Finishing the war victoriously in 1951,
2. Helping the front
3. Strengthening discipline in the rear
4. In the nearest future to rebuild the cities, villages, factories, transportation, schools and cultural institutions in all the liberated regions.
5. Fix the railways quickly and secure quick communications with the front.
6. The peasantry should fight to increase the harvest.

They judge the delivery of the accreditation letters by the Ambassador of the RP [Polish Republic] very positively.

The press is writing about the 2nd World Peace Congress in Warsaw, the letter from Premier [Józef] Cyrankiewicz to Premier Kim Il Sung concerning the taking of Pyongyang has been published.

Of very great importance for Korea is also the moral support of all nations without an exception.

Now that the materials have been received, Polish issues will take up more space here. There are still many points that I am trying to clear up, such as the peasant issue, that of political parties, the Unified Democratic Homeland Front and issues of the anticipated treasons by certain individuals.

I state once again that now the National Front and the party are stronger than ever not only because of the victorious offensive, but also because of the imperialists' amazing barbarisms.

4. The situation of the civilian population.

The situation of the civilian population is tragic, they have no means of minimum sustenance. The Government's help is not yielding any effective results yet.

The Americans, like the Nazis or even better, are herding the population south. Quick assistance is indispensable. Politically, the population is devoted to its people's government.

The facts about American crimes are described in the enclosed note. Issues of Hygiene are catastrophic. The USSR has sent a mission of its Red Cross.

5. Issues of the RP Embassy [...]

St. Dodin
1st Secretary of the Embassy of the RP in Korea
Charge d'Affaires

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 38

Copy N° 1

TO THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY
GENERAL OF THE ARMY

Cde. S. M. SHTEMENKO

Attached is a brief analysis of the losses of American aircraft in Korea for 1951 with some conclusions made on the basis of the results of immediate observation, the interrogation of prisoners, and a study of documents.

ATTACHMENT: An analysis of the losses of American aircraft,
in five pages, to the addressee only

CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER TO THE KPA
GENERAL-LIEUTENANT

[signature]

(RAZUVAYEV)

[Handwritten across the left margin: To Cdes. N. Ye. Sokolov. Show to Cdes.

Kudr[yashov], Luk'yanchenko, Vorontsov, ?, Kostenko.

Use this material in your summarization of the material [illegible signature] 8 February 1952...to Pavlovsky 8 February [illegible signature]]

LOSSES OF AMERICAN AIRCRAFT IN KOREA

The American Air Force suffered considerable losses in 1951. In analyzing these losses one can come to the conclusion that the mastery of the Korean anti-aircraft forces and riflemen hunters over enemy aircraft has grown immeasurably during the period of military operations. The aircraft had previously operated with impunity and started to encounter ever more serious resistance from ground-based air defense.

The insufficient protection of the primary targets and lines of communications by anti-aircraft resources allowed the enemy to launch still more appreciable attacks on the deep rear of the DPRK.

A brief analysis of the losses of American aircraft has been made for the effective organization of air defense in the future. This analysis was compiled from available documents and statements by captured pilots interrogated by the KNA General Staff Intelligence Directorate.

By the end of 1951 the total number of aircraft [shot down] (mainly American) was 11[3]0, including:

B-[2]6 up to 130;

B-[3]6 up to 100;

F-51 up to 75;

F-80 up to 100;

F-84 up to 130;

F-86 up to 75;

Naval aviation of various types was over [2]60 aircraft.

up to 3 0 fighters in reserve at Japanese airfields...[Translator's note: sentence not continued on the next page].

The American command is trying not to allow a reduction of its fleet of aircraft at the front thanks to the timely replacement of the materiel and personnel put out of action and also by bringing reserve units into action.

All combat subunits (with the exclusion of B-29 "Flying Fortress" aircraft based at Kadena and Yokota) are deployed at airfields and landing strips in South Korea, and the main group of aircraft as close as possible to the front line.

Air supremacy has provided an opportunity to make an average of 400 sorties a day and this number reaches up to 1000 sorties on days there are active battles at the front and heavy shipments in the rear of the KNA.

The main missions being performed by enemy aircraft in the rear of the KNA are impacting communications, concentrations of troops in the rear, and the destruction of railroads, dams, tunnels, depots, bridges, and other rear facilities.

The operations of the aircraft at the front directly against troops usually do not exceed [25]% of all sorties.

Enemy aircraft encounter [their] main opposition from ground-based air defense (anti-aircraft artillery and riflemen hunters) and partly the aircraft of the KNA and Chinese volunteers.

From statements of 80 captured pilots interrogated during 1951 by the KNA General Staff Intelligence Directorate it turned out that the main aircraft losses were from ground fire and the overwhelming majority of enemy pilots state that their main fear while airborne was not aircraft but ground fire.

Of the pilots interrogated 72 were shot down by ground fire and only eight by aircraft.

Here are some examples:

... [context lost between pages]

...Sea of Japan, having 82 aircraft on board, lost 50 aircraft in five months (from 1 June to 1 November 1951), 15 from landing accidents and 35 from ground fire (statement of Junior Lieutenant Terry [Clyde]).

The 136th Air Wing (F-84 aircraft) lost 48 aircraft in the six months from June to December 1951. The losses by month are distributed as follows:

	June	July	August	December
from ground fire	8	4	4	1
from aircraft	-	-	-	1

They lost 35 aircraft in September, October, and November, but in view of the fact that captured Lieutenant ROBERT [KAMEN] (shot down on 5 December) these months was on assignment, he does not know the causes.

The 40th Air Wing (F-84 aircraft) lost 30 aircraft from 28 April to 17 September from anti-aircraft artillery and not one from fighter aircraft.

The 4th Fighter Wing (F-86 aircraft) lost eight aircraft between March to June 1951 from KNA aircraft countermeasures.

The above facts indicate that the main losses of American aircraft to F-51, F-80, F-84, and naval aircraft are from ground-based air defense fire. This occurs because that the aircraft of these types operate as ground attack aircraft at low altitude but the aircraft of the KNA and Chinese volunteers have such high flight ceilings that, in the words of the prisoners, they present almost no danger for them.

The F-86 "Sabre" and B-[3]6 suffer small losses [Translator's note: some text lost between pages]...this is explained by their high flight ceiling in the zone of inaccessibility to anti-aircraft artillery but in the zone of operations of the aircraft of the KNA and Chinese volunteers.

CONCLUSION: 1. The maximum proximity of landing strips and airfields for jet aircraft to the front line provides them with an opportunity to stay in the air for a longer time. They have used not only prepared airfields for this purpose but even straight stretches of paved roads during an offensive by ground forces.

2. Having studied the tactical means of waging aerial combat with MIG-15 fighters and their technical characteristics (operation at high altitude) American aircraft, especially F-80 and F-84 jet fighters performing missions as ground attack aircraft have begun to operate at altitudes of 800-600 [SIC] meters. Thus it is possible to observe MIG-15s flying in the air at high altitude and F-80's and F-84's simultaneously operating at medium and low altitude against ground targets.

3. The effectiveness of ground-based air defense fire against all types of aircraft, especially when the enemy Air Force is operating at medium and low altitudes, is confirmed by the experience of organizing combat against American aircraft in Korea.

4. The use of MZA [light anti-aircraft artillery] and large-caliber machineguns with a high rate of fire have shown the greatest effectiveness in combating low-flying jet and ground attack aircraft.

Medium-caliber (85 mm) anti-aircraft guns have proven themselves for shooting down aircraft flying at medium altitude (5,000-7,000 meters).

76 mm caliber anti-aircraft artillery have not shown themselves to be of value.

MAIN MILITARY ADVISER TO THE KNA
GENERAL-LIEUTENANT

[signature]

(RAZUVAYEV)

11 January 1951

[An illegible list of names
to whom this analysis is
to be passed follows,
with a date of 10 February]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 39

[4 May 51]

[Translator's note: some words are assumed or unavailable due to the poor quality of the reproduction]

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON THE CONDITION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY

1. Based on the level of training, weapons, and the state of discipline the KNA troops are fully fit for combat and can [perform] missions in all types of battles.
2. The organizational structure of the army developed by taking the experience of war into account meets all the requirements imposed [on the troops] at this stage. The Korean army has a sufficient number of trained officers. Officers, especially at the platoon-to-regiment level, have received the necessary training and have acquired practical skills in commanding subunits.
3. Staffs at all levels are completely fit for combat in their manning level but the insufficient level of the theoretical training of staff officers and the lack of the necessary experience in practical work is negatively reflected in command and control of troops in battle and in the organization of combat training.
4. Units and formations of all troops arms have obtained great combat experience and are introducing it into the training of newly-formed units. The personnel of infantry units have learned to fight enemy aircraft using small-arms. The fear of aircraft has been reduced to a considerable degree. In the experience of defensive and retreating battles and the operations of partisan detachments they have learned to fight when surrounded and to boldly go into the enemy rear.

5. KNA artillery can successfully handle tasks entrusted to it in all types of battle. The low amount of equipment, control instruments, and tractors sharply reduces the combat effectiveness of the artillery and troops on the whole.
6. Tank troops have been trained in actions in all types of battle and can perform combat missions, but the lack of spare parts, instruments, and assemblies negatively affects the combat readiness of the armored and mechanized forces.
7. In their organizational structure, level of training, and manning the signal troops can support the command and control of troops in all types of battle. The great shortage of communications equipment reduces their combat effectiveness.
8. The engineer troops have been trained to perform combat missions and can support the operations of other troop arms in all types of battle.
9. Rear units and institutions have gained good experience and can perform any mission to support the troops with all types of rations in the complex conditions of a combat situation. The lack of the necessary stocks of materiel hampers the work of the rear and negatively affects the combat activity and training of the troops.
10. The advisory staff has done and is doing much work to give appropriate assistance to the Korean command in questions of planning and training troops, organizing coastal defense, and providing the troops with all types of rations.

The overwhelming majority of advisers working in the armies and central directorates have practical experience in service work [at the regimental level]. Not having the necessary experience in large formations the advisers cannot always [measure up] when solving the tasks with which they are faced.

The replacement of the advisory staff which has begun is proceeding [one word illegible, possibly "calmly"], especially in army headquarters. Three senior combined-arms advisers are needed in an army.

11. Continue the combat training of troops not directly participating in battle in order to further increase the cohesion and combat readiness of the troops. Devote special attention to the training of staffs at all levels. Base combat training on the teaching the operations of troop arms in mountains taking into account the experience of the war.
12. Continue to remove shortcomings in the organization of command and control of troops and strengthen military discipline.

ATTACHMENT: Information about the combat and numerical strength of KNA forces (2 books)

MAIN MILITARY ADVISER

GENERAL-LIEUTENANT

[4] May 1951

[signature]

(RAZUVAYEV)

[Handwritten:]

2 copies made:

Copy N° 1 - to the addressee

Copy N° 2 - to file

Drafted by Kolyakhin

Typed by Gulyaeva

N/R N° 60

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 40

USSR MFA
10th Department

Incoming N° 9818

Received at 0245 6 May 1951
Dispatched at 0615 6 May 1951

Special N° 662-665

CABLE

to [BEIJING], to the SOVIET AMBASSADOR Copy N° 1

PRIORITY
SPECIAL

to Cde. MAO ZEDONG or ZHOU ENLAI

We have worked out our reply to the US government in response to its draft peace treaty with Japan and have decided to deliver it to the US ambassador on Tuesday morning, 8 May. We are sending you the substance of our reply on the morning of 6 May with a request to send your comments no later than the evening of 7 May.

The content of our reply comes down to the following:

1. We criticize the separate way of preparing a draft treaty and demand that the preparation of the treaty be done jointly by the governments of China, the USSR, the US, and Britain, and involving the other interested countries.
2. We demand that the treaty draft note China's undoubted right to Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands.
3. We consider the transfer of the Japanese Ryukyu Islands and others to US control to be incorrect.
4. We insist on a limitation on the size of the Japanese armed forces based on the example of what was done in the peace treaty with Italy.
5. Our reply ends this way:

"Unalterably insisting on the fastest possible conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Government thinks that the peace treaty ought to be worked out on the basis of the international agreements which were concluded between the powers during the Second World War and that preparation of the draft treaty should be done jointly by the governments of the US, the People's Republic of China, the USSR, and Great Britain, involving all member countries of the Far East Commission in this matter.

Accordingly the Soviet Government proposes:

First. Convene a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs composed of representatives of the US, China, Great Britain, and the USSR in July and August 1951 in order to begin preparation of a peace treaty with Japan, intending to involve representatives of all the countries which participated in the war with Japan with their armed forces in the preparatory work to draft a peace treaty with Japan in order that the draft peace treaty be submitted for the consideration of a Peace Conference.

Second. Pursue the development of a peace treaty with Japan on the basis of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Yalta Agreement, guided by the following primary objectives:

- a) Japan should become a peaceloving, democratic, independent country;
- b) the population of Japan should be afforded democratic rights and the existence of such organizations should not be allowed whose goal is the deprivation of the people's democratic rights, whether political, military, or paramilitary, as was provided in the peace treaty with Italy;
- c) as a guarantee against the revival of Japanese militarism restrictions on the size of the Japanese armed forces should be established in the treaty so that they do not exceed the needs of self-defense, as was provided in the peace treaty with Italy;

d) no restrictions are imposed on Japan in the matter of the development of its civilian economy;

e) all restrictions with respect to Japanese trade with other countries will be removed.

Third. Provide in the treaty that Japan will not join any coalition directed against any country which participated with its armed forces in the war against militarist Japan.

Fourth. The treaty should also specify that all occupation troops are to be withdrawn from Japanese territory no more than one year after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan and that no country should have troops or military bases in Japan.

Fifth. Agree that the countries which sign the peace treaty with Japan support Japan's admission to the United Nations.

6 May 1951

FILIPPOV [STALIN]

Telegraph when this is done.

BOGOMOLOV

Seven copies sent. am

6 May 51

Authenticated: [illegible signature]

Copies: 1 - Cde. STALIN
2 - Cde. MOLOTOV
3- Cde. MALENKOV
4 - Cde. BULGANIN
5 - Cde. VYSHINSKY
6 - 10th Department
7 - Copy

Cde. Zorin has seen this

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 41

[Stamp:]

USSR MFA

Secretariat of Cde. Zorin

SECRET

Incoming N° 6520

31 May 1951

USSR Embassy in the DPRK

Secret
Copy N° 1
11 May 1951
N° 93

USSR MFA
to Deputy USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs
Cde. V. A. ZORIN

[Stamp:
USSR MFA
1st Far East Department
17164
Incoming N° 1352s]

I am sending the following materials to you as an attachment:

1. A memo on the DPRK Government's economic measures in the first quarter of 1951.
2. The most important government decrees on economic issues.
3. Materials of a meeting of DPRK Ministry of Industry enterprise managers.
4. Letters and a list of commodities supplied for the DPRK by countries of popular democracy and the People's Republic of China.
5. Materials for the promotion to the next rank of mining director 2nd rank Cde. S. N. [Jojua], who is working as an adviser in the DPRK Ministry of Industry.

ATTACHMENT: as above, 164 pages.

USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE DPRK

(V. RAZUVAYEV)

One copy, to the addressee
to file, gb.

[Handwritten comments across the page: "for annotation and conclusions" and officials' names with dates; "to Cde. Khalin"]

Attachment to Incoming N° 1352s

ECONOMIC MEASURES OF THE DPRK GOVERNMENT IN THE 1ST QUARTER OF 1951

(Memorandum)

Government Decrees

After the liberation of the temporarily occupied territory of the northern part of the country in the first quarter of 1951, with the aid of Soviet specialists the DPRK Government developed and carried out top-priority measures in the area of restoring the economy, which suffered extraordinarily as a result of the American aggression. By the end of 1950, industrial production had completely halted in November and December.

Government decrees and measures set as their goal the restoration of industrial production in the shortest possible time in the conditions of the military situation at surviving and partially destroyed enterprises which are needed for the front and the population and the organization of the extraction of ore and concentrate of non-ferrous metals, the first priority being lead, a strategically important metal.

These decrees also provided for carrying out necessary measures in the area of agriculture, finance, and commerce, and giving urgent assistance to the population which has suffered as a result of the American intervention.

Primary attention was concentrated on top-priority restoration of such economic sectors as energy, rail transport, ore mining, and agriculture in order to solve these problems.

Destroyed machinebuilding, metallurgical, and other enterprises have been adapted for producing possible military production, agricultural equipment, and consumer goods. The organization of the production of various construction material on a considerable scale was envisaged.

The following basic government decrees in the area of the economy have been developed and adopted in the year to date:

A 12 January 1951 DPRK Cabinet of Ministers decree, "Top-Priority Measures in the Area of Restoring the DPRK Economy and Culture".

A 25 January 1951 DPRK Cabinet of Ministers decree, "A Plan to Restore and Develop the Economy in the First Quarter of 1951".

The planned target for the first quarter of 1951 concerning the production of gross output was set at 1,686,000,000 won, which was only 20% of the level of the first quarter of 1950. In the first quarter of 1951 Korean industry did not produce such important types of previously manufactured products as coke, pig iron, steel, rolled metal products, copper, zinc, lead, ferroalloys, transformers, electric motors, chemical fertilizers, carbide, and starch.

With these measures the Ministry and provincial People's Committees committed themselves: to make an accounting of the damage inflicted on the economy and to make a list of the economic and cultural facilities to be restored first; to provide the enterprises being restored with managerial personnel, specialists, and skilled workers, and to organize the training of personnel; to develop a plan to manufacture military production at those state, cooperative, and private enterprises which had previously produced military production and at those enterprises which might be adapted to this without great expense; to restore enterprises producing consumer goods to satisfy the needs of the population and to organize such production in individual shops and workshops at large enterprises that have been destroyed;

To widely expand new production to support repair work with construction materials and to organize the collection at destroyed enterprises of construction materials capable of being put to use;

To repair public health, cultural, and public institutions, and municipal enterprises destroyed as a result of military operations, and to pay special attention to supplying the population with consumer goods and food.

A 25 January 1951 DPRK Cabinet of Ministers decree, "Measures to Help the Population Which Has Suffered During the War". The goal of this decree, which has great political significance, was to give immediate aid to the population of cities and villages which were left without shelter and property as a result of the barbaric bombing and mass looting by the American interventionists. The decree provides for the free issue of wood to peasants for the construction of houses, the granting of credits for the construction of housing, the supply of food to the population which was left without means of sustenance, the organization of free medical care, clothing aid, the temporary halt to the imposition of certain taxes, etc.

A 16 February 1951 DPRK Cabinet of Ministers decree, "Repair Work Concerning the DPRK Power Network".

Repair work in the economy required firstly a constant supply of electric power to transportation, industry, municipal services, and agriculture. The necessary financing, labor force, material, and vehicular transport were allocated for the rapid restoration of the structures and transmission lines of the power system destroyed during military operations and bombing and courses were created to train personnel.

The successful realization of this decree allowed electric power to be given to industrial areas in a short period to restore production, to agricultural regions for irrigation structures, and also to cities and villages for municipal needs.

The 22 February 1951 DPRK Cabinet of Ministers decree, "Improvement of the Operation of Railroads During the War".

During the entire period of military operations rail transportation has operated and is operating in the difficult conditions of constant bombing and the destruction of bridges, railroad stations, and stretches, and operations are mainly performed at night. Korean railroad workers have shown courage and heroism in the matter of supplying the front with the necessary military shipments.

The new situation which was created at the beginning of 1951 required a considerable improvement in the operation of the railroads. The subsequent successful fight against the American troops at the front required an increase in rail shipments at the same time as rail transport was faced with the task of providing shipments for the national economy for the industrial and agricultural production that was being restored.

This decree outlined steps to eliminate many shortcomings in the operation of rail transportation. An improvement in the matter of repairing locomotives and rail cars, communications equipment, and signal systems; regular maintenance of tracks; an increase in the quality of the repair work on bridges and tracks; and the use of mechanization to increase the tempo of repair work on bridges, tunnels, and stations were immediate tasks. The decree also envisioned giving the necessary assistance to railroad workers to perform the tasks facing them.

With the participation of Soviet specialists during February and March the DPRK government developed and energetically carried out broad measures to restore the mining of non-ferrous and rare metal ore and first of all to collect scrap lead, ship lead concentrate (prewar production), and extract lead ore.

The following four government decrees were adopted about this issue during this period:

- "The Extension of Work to Extract Non-Ferrous, Rare Metal, and Other Products of the Mining Industry", 16 February 1951
- "Measures to Develop the Extraction of Lead and the Production of Lead-Containing Materials and Their Shipment", 28 February 1951.
- "The Progress of the Performance of the Tasks of Collecting and Shipping Scrap Lead and Lead Concentrate", 22 March 1951.
- "Measures for the Plan to Restore Lead Industry Enterprises and to Determine a Production Plan for 1951", 28 March 1951.

The important task of collecting and shipping scrap lead and lead concentrate was carried out successfully as a result of daily monitoring organized by the government and the mobilization of industry and transport workers carried out locally by the Workers Party.

The following quantities of scrap lead and lead concentrate were shipped to railroad stations from factories and mines and sent to the [Soviet] Union in a short period, by 20 April 1951:

- scrap lead: 8,210 tons, or 113% of plan;
- lead concentrate: 7,936 tons, or 152% of plan.

To date a number of mines have been put into operation, and new extraction of lead and other non-ferrous ore and their enrichment at restored concentrating mills has begun.

The 22 March 1951 decree of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, "Increasing the Production of Consumer Goods and Increasing Commodity Circulation".

The decree notes the unsatisfactory work of ministries, system of cooperatives, and provincial People's Committees in the area of restoring the production of consumer goods and food for them to supply the workers and for the development of commodity circulation between the city and countryside.

This decree directed special attention to the matter of improving the living conditions of the popular masses. Industry and commerce were faced with meeting the essential needs of the workers, peasants, office workers, and the entire population of the republic in food and consumer goods as one of the most important tasks.

The production plan of consumer goods and food for 1951 was approved in the amount of 6,145,000,000 won. This task was distributed to the Ministries of Industry, Commerce, Internal Affairs, Cooperatives, and Local Industry of Provincial People's Committees.

The 30 March 1951 decree of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, "A Plan to Restore and Develop the Economy and Culture of the DPRK in 1951".

In the decree concerning the economic plan for 1951 the Cabinet of Ministers notes that the successful accomplishment of the task of restoring and developing the economy and culture of the DPRK has great military, political, and economic importance for the entire Korean people.

The primary tasks of the economic plan for 1951 are:

1. The further mobilization of the efforts of the Korean people and the material resources of the republic for the final defeat of the American interventionists and South Korean traitors.
2. The restoration in a short period of the industrial production of military and ore mining output and commodities for the population and ensuring that all agricultural work is successfully carried out.

The following primary targets of the 1951 economic plan were approved:

- Gross output of state and cooperative industry - 15,670,000,000 won.

- Gross grain harvest - 2,907,000 tons.
- Rail shipments - 4,500,000 tons.
- Commodity circulation of state trade and cooperatives - 10,725,000,000 won.
- The number of manual laborers and office workers in the primary economic sectors - 275,000.
- The total wage fund - 3,644,000,000 won.

The 30 March 1951 decree of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, "The Progress of Preparations for the 1951 Planting".

The decree notes that supplying the country with food is the most important task at this stage, for which it is necessary to carry out all agricultural work successfully.

However, substantial shortcomings are being observed in the course of preparing for and carrying out the planting campaign.

Available neglected land is being poorly used for planting and local fertilizer is being poorly used to cover a shortage of chemical fertilizer, and the chemical fertilizer available in small quantities designated for rice seedlings are not being shipped to the designated locations. The seed exchange among peasants is poorly organized, the repair of agricultural implements is going unsatisfactorily, and the planting of early crops, especially summer barley, is going slowly. In a number of locations the necessary measures are not being taken to clean canals and collect water in naturally irrigated fields.

A number of measures have been outlined in order to eliminate the shortcomings and ensure successful spring field work.

The Ministries of National Defense and Internal Affairs have been charged with the responsibility of planting on land abandoned along the front and in coastal regions as a result of the departure of the population, using the personnel of military units stationed in the region.

The corresponding ministries and provincial People's Committees are held responsible for transporting the available chemical fertilizer in a short period and finishing the shipment of local fertilizer to the fields.

The disorderly mobilization of draft animals from the peasantry by individual military units has been prohibited and a procedure has been established which provides for no more than two single mobilizations of draft animals a month, which are to be used within 40 km.

In order to help the peasants with the spring planting it was decided to declare an aid week and send the urban population, workers of political parties and public organizations, manual laborers and office workers, teachers, students, and military logistics units to the villages to directly participate in field work.

The decree obligates the managers of enterprises, organizations, and institutions to improve the material living conditions of manual laborers and office workers and to broadly use subsidiary plots (field cultivation and livestock management) by obtaining vacant neglected land.

THE OPERATION OF DPRK INDUSTRY IN THE 1ST QUARTER OF 1951

The condition of industry at the start of 1951 was described in the previously submitted report for 1950.

The main issues which were decided by the Ministry of Industry in the 1st quarter of 1951 were:

- a) the realization of government decrees about the restoration of ore mining, chiefly the lead mining industry.
- b) the organization of the transport of lead, lead-containing materials, and other output of the ore mining industry.
- c) the organization of the production of agricultural equipment and consumer goods and an increase in the production for the front.
- d) repair work concerning power facilities.
- e) the staffing of enterprises with personnel and the organization of their training.

The gross output of production for the Ministry of Industry in the 1st quarter of 1951 was:

Planned	788,400,000 won
Actual	541,600,000 won
Percentage	68.7

Including production by month:

January	115,400,000 won
February	168,500,000 won
March	257,600,000 won

The level of production of the 1st quarter of 1951 was 200% of the 4th quarter 1950 production, but only 10% of the actual prewar production for the 1st quarter of 1950.

The gross output of production by industrial sector was:

(in millions of won)

	Plan for the 1 st quarter of 1951	Actual	% of plan
Electrical power	59.0	40.7	69.1
Coal	49.9	22.1	44.2
Ore mining	8.03	10.2	126.7
Lead	0.4	1.16	292.3
Metallurgical	36.9	22.2	60.1
Machinebuilding	40.2	45.5	113.4
Chemical	54.1	24.7	45.6
Construction materials	5.9	6.1	102.9
Light	85.1	62.9	93.9
Machine repair	43.6	48.0	110.0
Special industries	405.0	257.8	63.7

Translator's note: the percentage for Light should be 73.9, not 93.9

The fulfillment of the first quarter plan for the ore mining industry in physical terms is expressed by the following figures:

	Plan	Actual	%
Lead (converted to metal)	55 tons	138 tons	252.0
Gold (" " ")	3 kg	4.647	155.0
Silver (" " ")	6.1kg	5.629	92.5
Copper (" " ")	13.5 tons	14.0	104.0
Tungsten concentrate	20 tons	21.1	111.9
Molybdenum concentrate	-	1.3	-

The Ministry of Industry fulfilled the plan for shipping lead and lead-bearing materials for 1950 ahead of time and above target.

As of 20 April [the following] had been shipped:

Concentrate and lump ore 7,936 tons; per plan - 5,215 - 152%
 Primary lead 554 tons; per plan - 285 - 195%
 Secondary lead 7,636 tons; per plan - 7,000 - 109%

The repair work which was done in the last four months of 1951 was primarily in the ore mining industry.

[The following] were repaired during this period: [Kesen] - concentrating mill and a 20 m³ compressor; water was pumped out and the extraction of ore started; at the [Hapun]

lead mine - a concentrating mill; the pumping out of water was finished and the extraction of ore started;

at the [Songchen] lead mine - a concentrating mill was installed, a compressor repaired and installed, and the extraction of ore begun;

at the [Komdok] lead mine - the repair of the concentrating mills is going on, the installation of three mills has been concluded, compressors have been repaired, and the pumping out of water has been concluded;

at the [Holton] gold mine - three compressors and the first stage of a concentrating mill have been repaired, the pumping out of water has been concluded, and the extraction of ore begun;

at the [Sonhyn] gold mine - a works of two mills and three compressors has been repaired, water has been pumped out to a depth of 165 meters, and the extraction of ore begun;

at the [Huchan] copper and gold mine - one section of the concentrating mill has been repaired, the pumping out of water has been concluded, and the extraction of ore begun;

at the [Suan] copper and gold mine - a destroyed mill has been repaired, the pumping out of water has been concluded, and the extraction of ore begun;

at the [Geyudon] gold mine - a concentrating mill has been installed, the pumping out of water has been concluded in shaft N° 1, and the pumping out of water continues in shaft N° 2;

at the [Koksan] tungsten mine - the concentrating mill is being repaired, the pumping out of water has been concluded, and the extraction of ore begun.

Repair work at enterprises of the ore extraction industry is being done in timeframes established by a Cabinet of Ministers decree.

[The following] have been restored in other industrial sectors:

In light industry: the butter production plan in Sinuiju to 30% of prewar capacity; in Nampo to 10% of prewar capacity; [Heryon] paper mills to 100% and in [Kilchu] to 10% of prewar capacity; the silk mills in Pyongyang, Nampo, [Pakchen], [Yongbyon], [Anzyu], [Sopenyan]; the rubber plant in Pyongyang; and the cotton wool production factories in Pyongyang and Nampo have been partially repaired.

In the chemical industry: the plant in [Kiyan] for the production of caustic soda and chlorous acid has been repaired and a carbide plant is being installed in [Chensu].

In the machinebuilding industry: the central machinebuilding plant (Pyongyang) has been moved underground and begun operation. Work at military plant N° 65 has been partially restored.

Conclusions:

1. The Government Decrees in the area of the DPRK economy adopted during the 1st quarter of 1951 directed and organized ministries and workers in the rear to the matter of restoring industrial production in the country and a successful spring planting in wartime conditions.

2. Although the level of industrial production achieved in the 1st quarter of 1951 is still low, one-tenth the prewar level, the state of affairs in industry is characterized by a continued month by month growth trend in the volume of industrial production.

Managers and workers of industrial enterprises, who are gaining experience and toughness in struggling to fulfill production plans and to overcome difficulties, are energetically undertaking creative production work and the restoration of mines and factories, thereby making their contribution to the general cause of achieving victory over the American interventionists.

3. At the present time the recovery of DPRK industry dovetails with the military situation in the country and the needs of the state and the population. Accordingly the energy sector, the ore mining industry, and enterprises less vulnerable to American aircraft are being restored, and small and medium-sized light industrial enterprises whose production is extremely necessary to satisfy the needs of the population are being restored.

Enterprises that produce construction materials which are very much needed to build a ruined Korea are being restored.

Small-scale production is being organized at other destroyed industrial enterprises (without large capital investment) to manufacture military production, agricultural equipment, and consumer goods.

The repair of large enterprises of the metallurgical, chemical, and other industrial sectors is not being done in view of a real danger of their again being destroyed from the air. However preparatory work is being done at these enterprises: technical designs are being drawn up, equipment is being repaired, and individual parts and spare parts are being manufactured so that work can be done in the shortest time when they are repaired.

4. It ought to be pointed out that a number of measures specified in Government decrees on economic issues are still being poorly put into effect because of inadequate monitoring of the performance of government decrees and existing shortcomings in the work of ministries.

As noted above, there are a number of shortcomings during the performance of measures outlined to ensure the spring planting.

The decision about top priority material and technical supply of the ore mining industry and the top priority supply of mine workers is being implemented unsatisfactorily. Planning bodies have not provided the allocation of the necessary commodity funds and the Ministry of Industry has still not organized a distribution network at the enterprises.

The Ministry of Communications has not organized normal communications with lead mines and other enterprises. The Ministry of Health has not organized health services at industrial enterprises.

Industrial enterprises and especially underground work at mines are insufficiently supplied with a workforce. Neither the Ministry of Industry nor provincial People's Committees have taken all the necessary steps to solve this problem. Industrial enterprises and mines feel the shortage of motor vehicles.

5. The elimination of these and other shortcomings in the work of the ministries; the continued, steady rise of the level of industrial production in the country; support of the outlined spring planting plan; the development of commodity circulation to meet the needs of the population - all these are the immediate, next tasks in the area of the DPRK economy.

Counsellor of the USSR Embassy in the DPRK

[signature]

(Pelishenko)

2 copies - la

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 42

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Copy N° 1

CABLE N° 3115

[BEIJING] - to KRASOVSKY
for Cde. MAO ZEDONG

The air battles on the border between Manchuria and North Korea have finally convinced us that MIG-15 jet fighters with good pilots are fully capable of dealing with the best American and British jet fighters and especially with bombers. As regards the MIG-9

fighters they are inferior to the best Anglo-American jet fighters but completely suited for battles with bombers and not fully modern fighters and very convenient for the mass instruction of pilots on jet equipment.

You have 10 fighter divisions received from the Soviet Union at the present time, of which six are MIG-9 and four MIG-15. It is necessary to replace the MIG-9 fighters with MIG-15's in order for Chinese fighter aircraft to be fully effective in combat. Three hundred and seventy-two MIG-15's will need to be shipped to you from the USSR for this. We could not do this until recently in view of a shortage of aircraft but now we have the ability to do this. We are thinking of sending these 372 MIG-15 aircraft at no cost, with payment through military credit channels of only of the cost of shipment from the USSR to China. As regards the MIG-9 aircraft you have, they can remain at your disposal for the mass instruction of pilots on jet equipment and for battles against bombers and less modern fighters. Your pilots who are already flying MIG-9's will very easily learn to master MIG-15 aircraft: it takes no more than 10 days to do this for us in the USSR.

We have adopted the following plan to ship 372 aircraft to China: the first consignment of 72 aircraft will be delivered to you no later than 20 June and the remaining consignments will come in succeeding stages so that you will have all 372 aircraft by the beginning of August.

If you have no comments we will consider the plan [I] have described to have been accepted.

Greetings.

FILIPPOV

22 May 1951

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit of the OS [Special Department]]
VKP(b) CC Incoming N° 404/1713/shs 23 May 1951]

One copy made for Cde. STALIN
Printed by Leshevich 0730 23 May
N° 490 Authenticated: Major [illegible signature] (Sukharev)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 43

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 20080

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 0015 26 May 1951

Copy N° 2

VERY URGENT T[ELEGRAM]

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 411/1748/shs 26 May 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I have received your telegram of 22 May 1951. I fully agree with your opinion about reequipping six MIG-9 fighter divisions with 372 MIG-15 aircraft which you will supply to us at no cost, and also agree with your plan to ship these aircraft to China with payment of the cost for their shipment.

I am very grateful to you for your concern for the cause of building the Chinese Air Force.

Greetings!

MAO ZEDONG

N° 2586
25 May 1951

Deciphered by Chikarev
0030 26 May
Printed by Leshevich
0045 26 May
N° 515

Four copies printed. Copies N° 3-4 filed

Verified: DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT
COLONEL [signature] (Podosinoviko[v])

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 44

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

CABLE 3220

[BEIJING] TO KRASOVSKY

for MAO ZEDONG

Thank you very much for your gratitude, Cde. Mao Zedong.

However, the main thing here is not the gratitude, which we value, but that we Russians made a error in thinking that Mig-9 fighters could compete with the best Anglo-American jet fighters. Now, this is completely clear after the air battles in North Korea. The significant of this error is that it could cause damage to the air defense of China if this error were not corrected. Since the responsibility for this error rest entirely with we Russians, we considered it our duty to eliminate this error by replacing Mig-9 fighters with Mig-15 fighters at our expense, that is, free of charge to China. We could not act otherwise by setting as our goal the strengthening of the defense of our ally, China.

As regards the Mig-9 fighters you have we by right could take them to the USSR, but since you need them much more than we do, we have decided to leave them at your disposal. Let this be our response to the service which you have done us by buying natural rubber for us.

Greetings.

FILIPPOV

26 May 1951
N° 279/sh

One copy printed - to Cde. Stalin
Printed by Shcherbakova at 2320 26 May
N° 910

[seal of the 8th Department, 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff

Authenticated [signature] (Laptev)

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 17641/shs 27 May 1951]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 45

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 20147

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin	N° 7 to Cde. Kaganovich
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin	N° 8 to Cde. Bulganin
N° 3 to Cde. Molotov	N° 9 to Cde. Khrushchev
N° 4 to Cde. Malenkov	
N° 5 to Cde. Beria	
N° 6 to Cde. Mikoyan	

from [BEIJING] received 2000 27 May 1951

VERY URGENT

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 1772/shs 28 May 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I am sending you the text of my 16 May 1951 telegram to Cde. PENG DEHUAI. Please familiarize yourself with it:

"Cde. PENG DEHUAI!

All previous operations have shown that it was difficult for our troops to carry out the mission of destroying enemy troops when conducting large-scale strategic and tactical operations to outflank and encircle several divisions or one division and even one regular regiment of American troops because American troops have increasingly high morale and self-confidence at the present time.

It is not necessary to try to surround and destroy large enemy forces in each operation in order to cut them down to size and achieve their complete encirclement and destruction. It is necessary that each corps destroy one or at most two American, British, or Turkish battalions in a single operation to achieve this. This will be sufficient.

At the present time we have eight corps on the front line. If each corps destroys one battalion each then the enemy will lose a total of eight regular battalions. The enemy will thereby be dealt a serious blow. If each corps can destroy two enemy battalions in each operation then the enemy will lose a total of 16 battalions of regular troops. The enemy will thereby be dealt a more serious blow. If each corps cannot destroy two enemy battalions each then it is necessary to require each corps to destroy one enemy battalion.

It is evident from this that tactics of waging war against Anglo-American troops and the puppet troops should not be the same. One can conduct operations of strategic or tactical importance to encircle a large number of enemy troops in fighting the puppet troops.

As regards fighting the Anglo-American troops it is not necessary to conduct large encirclements for a number of months but [rather] it is necessary to limit ourselves to small encirclements of tactical importance and set the complete destruction of a single battalion or somewhat more than an enemy battalion as each corps' goal in each operation. Thus, four battalions of regular troops in each Anglo-American division will be completely destroyed during three or four operations, which will unavoidably lead to a lowering of morale and will shake the enemy's self-confidence. Then it will be possible to set the destruction of one, two, or even three enemy divisions as our goal in each operation.

The new 1st Army, new 6th Army, 5th Army, and 18th Army of Chiang Kai-shek and also the 7th Army of the Guangxi group were defeated in exactly the same way by switching from defeating a small number to the mass destruction of enemy troops.

The first phase of the tactic of destroying small enemy forces in the course of the five operations conducted by our troops after entering Korea is already complete; however this is not sufficient. Several more operations are needed in order to completely finish the phase of the tactic of destroying small enemy forces and moving to the tactic of mass destruction of the enemy.

As regards the place where operations are to be conducted it is best to conduct them the farther north the better only if the enemy is bold enough to advance; however it is not necessary to allow the enemy north of the Pyongyang-Genzan [Wonsan] line.

Please study these positions and report your point of view".

with Bolshevik greetings,

MAO ZEDONG

N° 2627

27 May 51

11 copies sent. Copies 10 and 11 [were sent to] the 8th Department

Deciphered by Fedyaev at 2130 27 May

Printed by Cheredinkina at 2225 27 May

N° 895

Verified by: Section Chief [illegible signature]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 46

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Copy N° 1

CABLE N° 3272

[Stamp at the bottom of the
first page: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV unit, OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 424/1800/shs 30 May 1951]

[BEIJING]

to KRASOVSKY for Cde. MAO ZEDONG

I have familiarized myself with your telegram addressed to PENG DEHUI about the tactics of waging war against the Anglo-American forces.

The plan described in the telegram seems risky to me. Such a plan might be carried out with success only once or twice. It is easy for the Anglo-Americans to guess such a plan and they can change their tactics and not allow you to withdraw the main forces to the north without loss.

One can still risk such a plan on condition that you have well-equipped first-class defensive fortifications in the immediate rear to where the main forces can be quickly withdrawn. But as far as I know right now there are no such structures in Korea. Therefore there is the danger that, having guessed your plan, the Anglo-Americans will not give you an opportunity to maneuver. And it is not very hard for the Anglo-Americans to guess your plan since it seems that you are using it for the fourth time.

In addition, it is necessary to keep in mind that when moving to the North the Anglo-Americans will build new defensive lines one after the other and thereby make it difficult for you in the event of your offensive to break through the Anglo-American front without colossal losses and this is, of course, undesirable.

The analogy with the forces of Chiang Kai-shek is not convincing for, first, you are now dealing with different forces and, second, there is no reason to assume that the Anglo-Americans are as stupid as Chiang Kai-shek and that they will give you an opportunity to destroy a battalion of their troops of your choice.

Attention also ought to be directed to the fact that if Pyongyang is again surrendered to the enemy then this will not only lead to a decline in the morale of the Koreans and the Korean troops but will raise the morale of the Anglo-American forces.

Apparently you will have to prepare a very large and serious operation, of course not for local maneuvers but for a serious blow against the Anglo-American forces.

FILIPPOV

29 May 1951

One copy sent to Cde. Stalin
Printed by Rubleva 30 May 1951, N° 375

Authenticated: [seal of the 8th Department of
the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff
and the words "for cipher messages", N° 3, May 1951]

[signature] (Laptev)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 47

[June 1951]

THE STATE OF POLITICAL MORALE AND THE ORGANIZATION OF PARTY POLITICAL WORK

The past months of 1951 were a period of further gradual increase in the combat readiness and political morale of the army's units and formations.

During this period a number of steps were taken to strengthen military discipline and the political education of the personnel and increase the organizing role of army Party organizations and political organizations.

All personnel have taken the oath.

The personnel records have been put in order and soldier's pay records, identity cards, and travel orders introduced. Military commandant's offices have been organized in cities and places where troops are stationed.

Political lessons and political information have become higher in quality, the circulation and size of the army newspaper have been increased, and large-edition newspapers have been created in the three field armies.

An all-army conference of regimental and battalion agitators was held in order to strengthen the ideological and political education of the soldiers at which Kim Du-bong, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, reported

about the tasks of agitation work among the troops. All the agitators of the conference participating were given orders and medals.

The Commander-in-Chief and the Main Political Directorate held a conference of writers, artists, playwrights, and composers on the issue of strengthening ideological work in the army.

Instead of political lessons for senior officer personnel a system of Marxist-Leninist training has been introduced which provides for the study of the Short Course of the History of the VKP(b) and the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The Commander-in-Chief has issued an order to eliminate instances of substituting repressive measures for educational work.

Officers' courts of honor have been created and begun to function.

Issues of strengthening military discipline were the subject of discussion at Party meetings and Party activist meetings in March and April. Six hundred and twenty-nine personal conduct cases of Party members violating discipline were examined at meetings of Party commissions.

At meetings of the Military Councils of field armies measures were discussed to prevent extraordinary incidents. All this was favorably reflected in the state of military discipline and an increase in the political morale of the personnel, although the process of instilling personal responsibility for the fate of the Motherland is still going slowly, especially among those who come from prosperous peasant and merchant families.

Whereas there were about 900 desertions during the first period of November-December 1950, the number of desertions declined to 500 during the three and a half months of this year. The number of disciplinary infractions declined by two-thirds.

A clear example which characterizes the growth of the fighting ability and political morale of the personnel is the movement among hunters which has developed to destroy enemy aircraft.

In January of this year detachments to destroy enemy aircraft began to be created in infantry units at the initiative of Party organizations. This initiative at the call of Cde. Kim Il Sung has turned into a mass movement.

Two or three such detachments have been created in each regiment (especially in the First Army in the Seoul sector) which, equipped with firing positions on commanding hills, shoot at low-flying enemy aircraft from various types of infantry weapons. Four hundred and three enemy aircraft have been shot down as a result of this during the January-March period. Feeling the great loss, enemy aircraft have begun to fly considerably higher and to use mainly hazy weather for attacks on troops and various targets.

The results of the hunters' movement are clearly shown in this table:

[illegible] A[rmly]	8 th pd [Infantry Division]	17 th md [Mechanized Division]	19 th pd	3 rd pd	15 th pd	4 th pd	5 th pd	13 th pd	105 th pd	18 th pd	19 th pd	23 rd pbr [Infantry Brigade]
	4		8		6							
	14	6	35	20		1			2	1		
	94	22	68	1		1	2	10	2	8	18	10
	9		5	3		1	7		4	1		
	121	28	116	24	6	3	9	10	8	10	18	10

Many hunting teams have been awarded orders and medals for destroying enemy aircraft.

Party political work on the battlefield has begun to be organized somewhat better. The heroic feats of those who have distinguished themselves in battle have begun to be more widely popularized. Oral and printed appeals to the personnel of subunits going into battle have begun to be employed more often. There are memorials to the specialists of various troop arms. Political workers in a number of formations have acquired the practice of organizing the admission into the Party in a combat atmosphere. All this has promoted the instillation of steadfastness, bravery, and heroism in battle.

The skillful encirclement and destruction of an enemy airborne assault force consisting of a reinforced infantry regiment which the enemy landed in the rear of the 19th pd of the 6th Army testifies to the growing fighting ability and ever-strengthening state of political morale.

As a result, more than 10,000 enlisted men and officers were awarded orders and medals during a period of battles in January and February, of which 20 were given the title of Hero of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

However, many shortcomings which I have noted in a previous report are being eliminated very slowly and still continue to occur, particularly the desire on the part of some officers toward semi-partisan [*polupartizansky*] forms of troop command and control and the education of personnel in armies which had operated together with the Chinese volunteers (3rd and 5th), which became widespread.

In these armies the commanders and political workers do not convey operational orders of the commander to the personnel but, having received one, they discuss at a meeting of the personnel of a subunit "whether it is better to attack or retreat" and seek for the meeting to take the very decision which corresponds to the order of the higher command.

After a battle unit commanders in all units of the 5th Army express "self-criticism" in front of the personnel, that is, repentance about mistakes [they] made.

In many units and subunits of the 3rd and 5th Armies questions about the degree of punishment for a serviceman for an infraction he has committed are decided at meetings

of personnel and meetings are also held dedicated to the Memory of Fallen Soldiers (burning candles and incense) at which servicemen recall the good aspects of those soldiers who have died in battle.

All these distortions in Party political work were criticized at a conference of chiefs of political organizations at the Main Political Directorate; however, the Main Political Directorate and the CC of the Workers Party have not sanctioned the publication of an official governing directive or an order condemning these forms of work in view of the fact that these armies operate together with the Chinese volunteers under a joint command.

Party organizations created in the army are increasingly extending their political activity. Healthy criticism and self-criticism of shortcomings committed by Party members are being developed. However, the development of intra-Party democracy and healthy Party criticism encounter resistance on the part of some senior officials who pretend to be offended, striving to shield themselves from the oversight of Party organizations. In spite of this, the growing political activity of the broad Party masses is helping to throw light on many neglected areas of Party work, expose stagnation, political apathy, and the frankly harmful activity of individuals. This is particularly needed under the conditions of an aggravated class struggle in the country, which has its reflection not only in the army but also in army political organizations.

For example, in April a factional group was uncovered in the Headquarters of the Air Force where the chiefs of the intelligence and construction departments (who had previously actively cooperated with the Japanese) grouped up to 14 Party members around themselves and, by discrediting the elected Party committee, tried to remove it from leadership and to take control of the Party organization in its hands. The leaders of the faction subsequently intended to compromise the command of the Air Forces to put "their" people in these posts (the organizers of the group have been arrested and an investigation is being conducted).

The revival of work of the Party organization helped identify political apathy but [also] the essentially malicious activity of the editors of the magazine "*Voyennye Znaniya* [Military Knowledge]", which placed a series of articles distorting the historical facts about the start of combat operations in Korea. However, the response of the General Staff to the material of the investigation which was conducted with the aid of [Soviet] advisers is going extremely slowly.

The low ideological and political level of senior army cadre continues to adversely affect the leadership of the troops and the education of the personnel. Some officers do not understand the characteristics of the class struggle in Korea and do not exhibit the necessary political vigilance and focus in [their] work.

Questions of class and class struggle, the role of a democratic state in the defense of the Motherland, the war and the army, the Party as the leading forces of the workers of Korea, and imperialism are almost never covered in oral and printed propaganda.

A Party conference of the Korean Workers Party will be convened at the beginning of May to intensify the fight against shortcomings and mistakes in [work], and with the goal of raising the leadership to the level of the tasks being done. We helped draw up a report at the Party conference on the theme of:

"The tasks of the Party in leading the masses and strengthening [ties] with the masses about which Cde. [Translator's note at least one line lost between pages] will speak at the conference.

An article, "Criticism and Self-Criticism is a Powerful Tool to Educate Cadre", has been prepared with the aid of advisers for presentation in the national publication of the Workers Party and the army newspaper.

A report has been prepared about the tasks of Marxist-Leninist education of Party and state leadership cadre which Cde. Pak Heonyeong, Deputy Prime Minister, will deliver.

A cycle of lectures was developed by advisers and is being read at lessons of Main Political Directorate officers about the main issues of organizing Party political work in the army to strengthen the work of political organizations, the political apparatus, and Party organizations of the army.

In May of this year this lecture cycle will be published in a special collection as guidance material for commanders and the army political apparatus.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 48

[June 1951]

THE STATE OF THE AIR FORCES

I. ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES

[1. The following] have been formed:

An Air Forces headquarters with support units;
The headquarters of a fighter aviation division of LA-9 aircraft
A division of two fighter regiments and two air maintenance battalions for instruction on MIG-15 aircraft
An aeronautical engineering school in the city of Yanji
Three air maintenance battalions
The headquarters of an LA-9 fighter regiment

2. The table of organization and equipment of the air maintenance division, which is at the stage of manning and formation, has been approved.

3. The table of organization and equipment of the air maintenance battalions which previously each had 729 men has been reduced; at the present time the [aviation] personnel have been reduced to 503 men per battalion, which is an overall reduction of 824 men.

4. Four-month courses have been created to train 90 division and regimental staff officers and squadron adjutants [and] courses for 70 communications specialists.

Monthly assemblies of the commanders of air maintenance battalions and the supervisory technical staff have been held.

5. The preparation of airfields.

Airfields which have been newly-built and prepared for piston aircraft: Kandon, Idzyu [possibly Uiju], and Kange.

Hardstands have been built on previously operating airfields: [Sin]uiju, Pyongyang, Merim, Pyeongchang, and Onsenri.

Construction has been organized and new airfields built: [1-2 words illegible] Syarpin for piston aircraft and for jet [aircraft] [one word illegible] [city of Pyongyang]. The repair and expansion of previously built airfields are being done: Merim for jet aircraft, and Pyeongchang, Pyongyang, and Onsenri for piston aircraft.

II. EFFECTIVE AND NUMERICAL STRENGTH

1. Flying units

Name of the units and formations	Pilots available	Aircraft available	Home airfield
1. Composite air division:			
IL-10 ground attack regiment	21	30	Sinuiju
Ya-9p fighter regiment	17	30	"
2. <u>Fighter aviation division</u>			
La-9 fighter regiment	23	30	Fonchen
3. Independent squadron			

Po-2 [night] bombers	18	1	Sinuiju
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In addition, [the following] are undergoing training:

a/ An air division has been completely formed in China composed of a division [headquarters], two regimental headquarters, two air maintenance battalions, and 65 MIG-15 pilots [for?] the division of Kozhedub. The training ended on 20 March 1951.

b/ 40 LA-9 pilots, on Soviet territory. The approximate end of training is by 1 April 1951.

c/ 60 LA-9 pilots, on Soviet territory. The approximate end of training is by 1 June 1951.

d/ The aeronautical engineering school in the city of Yanji.

The school includes ground attack and fighter aviation regiments and two air maintenance battalions.

The total number of those being trained are:

student pilots - 570 men
junior aviation specialist students - 964 men

The school's aircraft pool comprises:

15 Yak-18 aircraft, of which 12 have completed their service life.

8 Yak-9v aircraft
5 Yak-9p aircraft
6 Il-10 aircraft
6 IL-10u aircraft
8 La-9 aircraft

2. Rear units

Eight air maintenance battalions which serve [the following] have been formed to support the work of flying units:

a/ Four battalions support the flight activity of line units of the KNA Air Force.

b/ Two battalions serve the aeronautical engineering school.

c/ Two battalions are undergoing training at a jet [SIC] division on Chinese territory.

d/ In addition, individual aviation commandant's offices have been created.

3. Air Force Headquarters

[The following] have been formed at Air Force headquarters:

- two technical battalions,
- aircraft maintenance shops;
- an aviation hospital;
- a signals company.

4. Missions given air units

a/ the ground attack regiment.

- Work on takeoffs in pairs from field airfields and be able to assemble groups in combat formation up to squadron [strength]

- Individual bombing and shelling from a dive and from the "Krug [Circle]" combat formation.

- make [one word illegible]

Make route flights up to squadron [strength], in favorable weather conditions, in daytime, and at medium and low altitudes.

b/ the Yak-9p fighter aviation regiment.

Perform takeoffs in pairs from airfields of limited size and be able to assemble groups in combat formation up to squadron [strength]

Make route flights to escort ground attack fighters.

Conduct visual reconnaissance at medium altitude up to flight [strength] [inclusively].

Work on route flights and fighting air battles in up to squadron [strength] at medium altitude, in the daytime, and in favorable weather conditions.

Scramble alert flights in the shortest possible time.

Be able to operate against enemy aircraft from airfields of the [sad][composite air division].

c/ the La-9 fighter aviation regiment

- Commission young flying personnel, making flights up to flight [strength] inclusively.

- Work on piloting technique and fighting air battles at medium altitude in flight [strength].

- Be able to hit ground targets from a dive with cannon fire.
- Perform route flights in flight [strength] at medium altitude, in daytime, and in favorable weather conditions.

d/ Po-2 night bomber squadron

- Continue to train in a circle and in a zone to work out piloting technique in nighttime conditions.
- Perform one solo route flight at medium altitude, at night.

e/ the aeronautical engineering school.

1. Train [the following] by 1 July 1951:

- 32 La-9 pilots and 122 junior aviation specialists
- 32 IL-10 pilots and 161 junior aviation specialists.

[2.] Train [the following] by 15 December 1951:

- 64 La-9 pilots and 244 junior aviation specialists
- 64 IL-10 pilots and 322 Tu-2 radiomen gunners

3. The remaining pilots graduating in 1952

The fulfillment of tasks assigned to air units

a/ The ground attack regiment

The performance of all assigned tasks

b/ The Yak-9p fighter aviation regiment

The following tasks have not been performed:

- 80% of the pilots have not been trained to fly in pairs from airfields of limited size.
- [2]0% of the pilots have not been trained for flights along routes and fighting an air battle in squadron formation.

c/ The La-9 fighter aviation regiment.

The following tasks have not been performed:

17% of the pilots who have not fulfilled the following tasks have not been commissioned.

Flight routes and shelling of ground targets have not been completely worked on in flight [strength].

d/ The PO-2 night bomber squadron

The assigned tasks have not been fulfilled because of a lack of PO-2 aircraft.

III. THE STATUS OF THE HEADQUARTERS

1. The manning of headquarters and their training.

a/ The headquarters of the composite air division and the headquarters of its regiments [() the ground attack and Yak-9p fighter regiments); fully manned and trained for combat missions in a fully satisfactory manner.

b) The headquarters of the La-9 fighter division is at the stage of completing the manning of officers.

The training of staff officers is satisfactory.

The headquarters of the La-9 fighter regiment is fully manned and has been trained to perform combat missions in a fully satisfactory manner.

c/ The headquarters of the aeronautical school is fully manned and its training is fully satisfactory.

d/ The headquarters of the air maintenance division is being manned. The training of officers to support the [combat] work of the line units is satisfactory.

The headquarters of the air maintenance battalions are manned and the training is fully satisfactory.

2. The organization of the training of staff officers.

The training of staff officers has been done in two areas:

1. For officers who previously worked in aviation units and have experience in staff work lessons have been held to increase their knowledge in this field.

2. For officers newly arrived from other troop arms or who have not previously been in staff work four-month courses were organized to train staff officers.

The courses were held in two groups:

the 1st group - chiefs of staff of divisions and regiments, and chiefs of operations and intelligence sections of divisions.

the 2nd group - staff officers of regiments and squadron adjutants.

After completion of the courses the officers were sent to units for practical on-site training.

The lessons with the staff officers and regimental and division staff officers were held regularly; regular lessons [at] forward airfields were disrupted.

Each headquarters is in two or three locations at the present time and it is impossible to conduct group lessons. If lessons are held, they are not done so regularly.

3. The State of Discipline, the Performance of Orders of Senior Commanders, and the Organization of Monitoring

The discipline of officers, sergeants, and enlisted men is satisfactory.

No immoral incidents have been noted.

All the orders of superior headquarters are being carried out, but with insufficient speed and care.

The basing conditions of unit and formation staffs do not provide an opportunity for timely monitoring of the fulfillment of orders and directives, as a result of the sluggishness and carelessness of the implementation of the latter.

4. The Supply of Communications Equipment

Radio is the main means of communications equipment between units and formations. Landline communications are supplied only within units.

The supply of communications equipment is quite insufficient, both in regiments and in divisions. The available radar equipment cannot support the units' combat work.

Air Force units are 22.5% supplied with radar equipment.

Name of communications equipment	Authorized per the table of equipment	On hand	Shortfall
RAF	28	2	26
RSB	29	14	15
RBM	38	21	17
7[6]	26	6	20

battery-charging stations	18	8	10
TAI-43	406	112	294
PTF	1130	202	928
PK-30, K-10	373	8	29

There are four P-3 radar installations deployed; [one word illegible] at the present time two are for operation and two are on standby.

The radars were installed at the Pyongyang airfield and [one word illegible] operate around the clock; they support the repair work being done at airfields.

Signals subunits are only 60-80% manned.

IV. COMBAT TRAINING

1. The training of personnel

The flight personnel of all regiments having combat experience continue to improve in piloting technique and in performing operational flights.

The remaining personnel (those without combat experience) are undergoing training in piloting technique and in operational use.

Flights are conducted regularly based on flight training plans.

The quality of the ground and pre-flight training of flight personnel has been improved by carefully conducting methodical lessons with supervisory flight personnel.

The problems of organizing the flying day and conducting post-flight critiques at which all the mistakes by the pilots and the shortcomings noted during flight are carefully investigated have been worked out.

2. A description of the preparedness of leading officers

Regimental commanders by their specialty, both as pilots who are well trained and their knowledge of flight operations, can [one word illegible] subordinate personnel.

The primary shortcoming of regimental commanders as leaders is the lack, to a sufficient degree, of [one word illegible] skills in training flight personnel to carry out assigned missions; they do not have sufficient experience in managing units and subunits.

There is no efficiency in the organization of the flying day and still a very [low] exacting attitude toward subordinates.

The low theoretical training, the weak experience in [practical] work, and the low exacting attitude of supervisory personnel is very much reflected in the training of pilots and the overall performance of combat training missions.

The lack of special textbooks (aerodynamics, aerial navigation, bombing, aerial gunnery, air combat tactics, etc.) considerably reduces the improvement of the theoretical knowledge of supervisory flight personnel and does not provide an opportunity to regularly teach the flight personnel subordinate to them.

V. COMBAT READINESS

1. The combat readiness of crews

There are a total of 62 combat ready pilots, of which there are:

21 crews	on IL-10 aircraft
13 crews	on Yak-9p aircraft
18 crews	on LA-9 aircraft
8 crews	on Po-2 aircraft

IL-10 pilots are capable of performing combat missions in squadron [strength] at medium and low altitudes in favorable weather conditions.

Ya-9p fighter pilots are capable of performing missions in squadron [strength] to escort ground attack aircraft, to fight air battles, and perform visual reconnaissance at medium altitude in favorable weather conditions in daytime.

La-9 fighter pilots are capable of performing combat missions up to the level of a flight, to fight an air battle at medium altitude, in favorable weather conditions and in daytime.

Pilots of the Po-2 night bomber aircraft are capable of performing combat missions at nighttime at low altitude.

Alert flights of fighters are capable of flying an alert mission in two to six minutes and receiving a combat mission via radio while in the air.

2. The care of equipment

The equipment is in satisfactory condition and combat-ready. With an increase in meticulousness on the part of supervisory technical personnel the materiel of [aircraft,] engine, and weapons can be brought into good condition.

3. Discipline

The discipline of the flight personnel and also the technical staff officers is completely satisfactory.

VI. THE SUPPLY OF TROOPS WITH ALL TYPES OF RATIONS

1. The two air maintenance battalions which have been formed at Air Forces headquarters have no airfield construction equipment at all, no tractors, graders, rock crushers, concrete mixers, bulldozers, etc.

2. The battalions are adapted only for the repair and construction of dirt airfields and then [only] by hand.

The aviation repair shops subordinate to the Air Forces have very little special equipment, as a result of which [they can] only make the simplest repairs of aircraft and engines.

3. The air maintenance battalions are only 27.5% supplied with technical equipment.

Name of [technical] equipment	Authorized	On hand	Shortfall
[one word illegible] vehicles	190	70	120
Fuel trucks	38	11	27
[one word illegible]-fuel trucks	20	2	18
[one word illegible] tank trucks	84	9	75
[illegible]	20	5	15
[two words illegible] installations	12	5	7

Such an availability of equipment is extremely insufficient to [?fully?] support the performance of a combat mission by all aviation [one word illegible] in the established timeframes.

Units are supplied with aviation fuel and ammunition [as follows]:

- Yak-9p aircraft: based on 20 crews they have been supplied with 34 ammunition loads.

- La-9 aircraft: the 20 crews : based on 20 crews, they have been supplied with 39 ammunition loads.

- Il-10 aircraft: the 23 crews : based on 20 crews, they have been supplied with 26 ammunition loads.

- Aviation fuel: on the basis of 63 aircraft [there are] five refuellings.

VII. THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW MEANS AND METHODS IN THE INSTRUCTION AND USE OF EQUIPMENT

1. In the instruction of flight personnel to train for flights a training exercise is conducted on simulators, and a preflight training exercise is [done] right at the airfield with the practical use of an aircraft adapter [*armatura*].

2. Ground-based flight training ["*peshiy po letnomu*"] is used during training to perform formation flights or for operational use.

Data from radar is used to monitor the accuracy of the performance of the flight when performing training flights and especially of flights on a combat mission.

A careful study of enemy aircraft is conducted [one word illegible] aerial photographs of silhouettes, from practical observations, and [one word illegible] aircraft that have been shot down.

Boundary signs of the runway [are used] at large airfields in order to train [one word illegible] for flights from airfields of limited size.

Assemblies of all specialists with a practical demonstration on [?simulators?] of all means and rules for preparing an aircraft for combat [mission/use] and everyday flights to increase the knowledge of the aeronautical engineering personnel.

Special attention has been paid to monitoring an aircraft [?for takeoff?] on the part of senior engineering personnel.

6. The process of manufacturing special rubber [one word illegible] used in the major overhaul of AM-42 engines has been mastered.

7. Specialists of repair organizations have been trained in the repair of [one word illegible] of duralumin and electric welding work.

8. In view of the lack of APL [aircraft engine heaters] small special preheating stoves for engines have been copied and tested in practice in winter conditions.

9. RSI-6 radios have been installed in a fixed [frame] to direct airfield flights.

10. in order to preserve materiel a new [production] of hardstands has been developed which provides the ability to better protect aircraft during enemy air raids.

VIII. THE MAIN SHORTCOMINGS

1. The flight personnel being graduated from the schools have insufficient training in piloting technique, particularly the pilots [one word illegible] La-9 and Yak-9p aircraft, which undergo a redoubled program of commissioning upon arrival in [line units].

The reasons for the poor preparation of flight personnel [one or two words illegible] insufficient flying time when studying in schools.

The majority of flight incidents during commissioning and when conducting training flights occur due to [poor] piloting technique, especially during takeoff, during final approach, and when landing.

Flight personnel who have already been commissioned based on their [one word illegible] are capable of performing combat missions only in daytime and in [favorable] weather conditions, and only at medium altitude.

2. Spare parts and [one word illegible] materials are extremely insufficient in Air Force units, as a consequence of which a considerable number of [aircraft] are not in operating condition.

Spare parts are not arriving, based on requisitions which have been submitted.

3. There are no laboratories in Korea to produce [one word illegible] fuel. The fuel which arrives does not always have a certificate identifying the quality of the fuel and has to be sent for analysis to Dalniy or Voroshilov, which takes a long time.

4. Air Force units have no medically pure oxygen at all, as a consequence of which the Yak-9P and La-9 fighters are only used at medium altitude.

5. The construction of airfields south of the city of Pyongyang is being done without sufficient protection from the ground and especially the air; as a result all the previously built airfields and re[built] airfields are being systematically destroyed by enemy aircraft.

The airfield construction equipment to repair and build airfields is extremely [in]sufficient, which is very much [one word illegible] on the time to perform the work.

6. There are no textbooks, regulations, and manuals regulating [flight] operations either in Russian or translated into Korean, which does not provide an opportunity [one word illegible] and correctly conduct theoretical training of the flight [one word illegible] of all the officer personnel of aviation units.

IX. SUGGESTIONS

1. Increase the flying time of cadet pilots studying in Soviet schools on condition that they can ferry the aircraft solo to North Korea and take them into battle without additional training.

2. It is necessary to supply the Air Force with [the following] airfield equipment and vehicles for building airfields:

Concrete mixers	- 40
Graders	- 6
Bulldozers	- 4
Metal rollers	- 10
Tractors	- 6
Vehicles	- 600
Rock crushers	- 10

3. Do not build airfields more rapidly throughout all North Korea simultaneously but begin construction from the northwest in individual zones which have maximum protection with anti-aircraft artillery and especially with fighters based at the Dandong and Sinuiju airfields.

After the conclusion of the of the first zone of airfield construction immediately land fighters on them which will be able to operate in the second zone of the airfields under construction.

Such a system of construction will allow the concentration of the maximum amount of equipment, labor force, and anti-aircraft equipment at the airfields under construction and ensure the delivery of the necessary amount of construction material.

4. Bring Air Force units up to strength with vehicles and special-purpose motor vehicles, and [one word illegible] communications equipment in [the following] quantities:

Vehicles	- 120
Fuel trucks	- 27
Gasoline tanker trucks	- 75
Oil servicing truck	- 18
Compressors	- 4
Battery-charging stations	- 4
Laboratories for GSM [fuel and lubricants]	- 4
Lifting cranes	- 4
Oxygen transfer pumps	- 6
Tractors	- 15
RAF radios	- 10
RSB radios	- 6
V-100 radios	- 6
Telephones	- 80
PK-30 [field] switchboards	- 5

5. It is necessary to insert [the following] in the table of organization in order to increase the quality of the operation of KNA Air Force units and to bring them up to strengthen with advisers to the :

1. Chief of staff of the aeronautical engineering school	- 1
2. Radar equipment engineer	- 1

3. Radio technician for land-based radios

- 1

4. Chief of the Air Force GSM

- 1

CONCLUSION:

I. Flying units

1. The Il-10 ground attack regiment is capable of performing combat missions to attack enemy ground troops and operate against roads and river crossings. It will be able to launch bombing attacks on railroad stations and artillery and mortar batteries at OP [firing positions].

2. The Yak-9p fighter regiment is capable of fighting an air battle at medium altitude and escorting ground attack aircraft.

3. The La-9 fighter regiment is capable of fighting an air battle at medium altitude and operating against enemy roads on sweep missions.

All units are capable of performing combat missions only during the day in favorable weather conditions and at medium altitude.

It is necessary to accelerate the training of the flight personnel of the jet fighter division on MIG-15 aircraft.

Increase the flying time of pilots during the period of training at schools in order that the young pilot arriving in a line unit is ready to carry out a combat mission. The commissioning of young flight personnel [of] line units performing combat operations is completely impossible, especially as home airfields are often subjected to enemy air raids.

It is urgently necessary to take steps to deliver ammunition, fuel and lubricants, special-purpose motor vehicles, and radio equipment to Korea in accordance with the requisitions submitted for flying units to perform combat operations.

The available equipment, fuel, and ammunition will be able to support intensive operation for no more than 10 days.

It is necessary to speed up the delivery of materiel based on approved requisitions, for a delay in deliver disrupts work to train pilots in the Aeronautical Engineering School of the Korean Republic.

The construction of airfields is not to be done only under the protection of anti-aircraft artillery but also under the protection of our own fighters, which should systematically patrol not only in the area of the airfield under construction but also at the approaches to it.

Give the flight personnel of line units the category of the position they occupy, eliminate such shortcomings as, for example, the [?adjutant?] of a line unit squadron receiving the same pay as an aviation school instructor.

Add a 25% bonus to the base pay of combat pilots performing combat missions.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 49

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 20406

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 1830 4 June 1951

VERY URGENT T.

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 443/1874/shs 4 June 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Telegram of Cde. PENG DEHAUI to Cde. MAO ZEDONG

Cde. MAO ZEDONG!

1. We have developed some opinions about the issue of organizing and supplying units and about the issue of manufacturing military production with arsenals. Cde. DENG HUA, the commanders of the 42nd, 39th, and 40th Corps, and also the commissar of the 38th Corps will arrive in [Beijing] in a few days and report to you about the above issues.

Not only regiments but also battalions and companies need antitank weapons.

2. The terrain in the area of [Buntori], [Kinka], and [Tetsugen] is good and the field fortifications are also decent. At the present time, when the enemy is using a large amount of artillery, tanks, and aircraft, there are no strong defensive positions there yet; however, using an active mobile defense it is possible to hold out in certain sectors for a while and inflict losses on the enemy in manpower. In the area south of the above line it is probably possible to hold out until 10 June. The second defensive region is located south of the line [Kodzio]-[Kakenri]-[Siodori]-[Heiko]-[Gitsudori], [Ankio], and

[Kinsen], where the enemy can be held until the end June or the beginning of July. The third defensive region is located south of the line [Pusen]-[Wayo]-[Senhori]-[Isen]-[Nansenten], [Seysekitori], and [Kaysyu], where the enemy can be held until the end of July. Three corps of the 9th Army, the 42nd Corps, the 47th Corps, and three corps of the 19th Army (the latter is understrength) will be used to hold the enemy in these defensive regions. If they hold the enemy until the end of July then we will again be able to bring into action the 38th, 39th, and 40th Corps, adding the three corps of YANG CHENG WU to this and then we will be able offer strong resistance to the enemy. Then the strength of our small arms, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft weapons will possibly grow somewhat, and the lines of communications shortened (possibly the difficulties in delivering materiel to the front line will be eliminated to some degree after the arrival of the regiment of porters). It is necessary at the same time to consider the active development of partisan warfare. If the enemy does not greatly increase the numbers of his troops and if we do not make any unforeseen mistakes, then we will be able to ensure that the favorable region to the south of the Genzan [Wonsan]-Pyongyang line is held and in the event that the enemy lands in Genzan steps also need to be taken to hold him at the line [Bunsen]-[Wasokurei]-[Gosanri] (the 7th Corps of the Korean Army has already built several fortifications). Both regions ought to be created successively.

3. In conditions of a narrow front and extended lines of communications; the presence of a large number of enemy troops; great density; an offensive in parallel columns; the lack of wedges and breaks in the front; the enemy's large number of aircraft, tanks, and strong artillery; the Anglo-American troops' comparatively high morale; and in conditions where our troops cannot operate in daylight, at present the problem of a tactic to defeat enemy troops piecemeal has not yet been solved.

By waging an active mobile defense with experienced troops we will be able to achieve a ratio of manpower losses of 1:2 in our favor; however, without experienced troops the personnel, weapons, and positions might easily be lost and the total losses in manpower will be at a ratio of 1:1.

It is necessary to unleash partisan warfare in the enemy rear and disperse the enemy troops. Preparations for this are being made at the present time. However, in the present situation our partisan units have still not been sent into the enemy rear. It is necessary to wait for a moment when the enemy reaches a suitable region, after which it will be possible to begin sending partisans into the enemy rear.

PENG DEHAUI 1 June 1951"

KRASOVSKY

N° 2757

4 June 1951

Deciphered by Araushkin

1945 4 June

Five copies printed. N°N° 3,4, and 5 filed

Printed by Shcherbakova
2035 4 June
N° 1082

Verified: Major
[signature] Laptev

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DOCUMENT NO. 50

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 20412

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 2205 4 June 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 444/1878/shs 5 June 1951]

VERY URGENT T

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Telegram from Cde. Mao Zedong.

"Headquarters of the volunteer forces.

An order to corps commanders [with] a copy to the NRVS [People's Revolutionary
Military Council] concerning fighting battles to impede an enemy advance.

In view of the fact that there are many rivers south of the 38th parallel (the rainy period is coming right now) and the bridges at these rivers are quite flimsy and are often destroyed, and also in view of the fact that the front is far removed, there is a shortage of transport, there are difficulties in food and ammunition supply, and the troops are very tired, a continuation of our offensive to the south will become extremely unfavorable for our troops. We have therefore decided to end the second stage of the fifth operation ahead of schedule and withdraw the main forces of our troops to areas from where we began the first stage of the fifth operation in order to bring the troops in order for a month and a half or two and reinforce and train them to conduct new combat operations.

Each army should leave a quite strong part of [its] forces to wage an active mobile defense in order to ensure a certain amount of time needed for the main forces to rest and re-form by destroying, scattering, and exhausting the enemy forces.

During this period of time the headquarters of the volunteer forces intends to carry out the following measures:

1. Reduce unnecessary institutions, reduce the number of support personnel, and improve the operation of the rear and organizational work.
2. Eliminate the quite serious right-wing sentiments which exist in the troops at the present time.
3. Summarize and systematize the tactical experience of waging war in Korea.
4. Try to get part of the air force, anti-tank reserves, and anti-aircraft artillery to take part in the battles in Korea.
5. Organize and prepare partisan warfare in the enemy rear, force the enemy to lengthen the front, and exhaust and scatter his forces, which will create favorable conditions for the main forces of our troops in the course of succeeding operations.

However, at the present time when withdrawing the main forces to the north and in view of the fact that the commanders of some units did not understand the concept of command sufficiently well and incorrectly used the forces available, consequently in spite of the fact that these shortcomings were detected and were not corrected in time, gaps were formed between individual units, which the enemy used to his advantage.

After our troops, which had been on the offensive for six or seven days, began to experience a shortage of food and ammunition and were tired, the enemy began a pursuit, having prepared a large number of mechanized forces beforehand and taking advantage of the halt of our offensive and the withdrawal of our troops. We have not learned from this.

Further, the troops which have just arrived in Korea do not have sufficient experience in defending against the mechanized forces of the enemy. In addition, some commanders could not personally keep track of troops in the most important sectors, were not able to give timely orders, and were at a great distance from the main forces.

Judging from the reports, some operational plans were very good and had no shortcomings; however they did not correspond to the real position of the troops. Therefore for a period of several days, between 21 May and 28 May, some of our combat units suffered unnecessary losses.

It is necessary to pay attention to the following points in order to firmly hold positions and provide time to put our troops in order, which is necessary to ensure success in succeeding operations and strike the enemy during active, mobile, defensive battles:

1/ Hamper the movement of and destroy mechanized forces on the highways. If enemy infantry moves along footpaths and attacks across mountains then it is even easier to strike them. To do this it is necessary to concentrate various anti-tank guns and also part of the heavy howitzer artillery in concealed locations on both sides of the road in accordance with their range of fire and conduct the necessary engineering work; using the terrain conditions create a fire system and prepare information for firing on the roads and the most probable areas where enemy tanks will appear. At the same time it is necessary to destroy mountain roads in the narrowest locations; it is necessary to place anti-tank mines in the areas between the operational sectors of our anti-tank fire and the destroyed road sectors. Thus, if having encountered obstacles enemy tanks go around [them] they will be blown up on the mines. At this time our troops should use part of the artillery to shell the areas where enemy troops are concentrated. At the same time, subunits armed with anti-tank grenades should move forward. Hiding along both sides of the road the troops selected for the counterattack ought to destroy the enemy partly or completely, taking advantage of the moment that enemy troops panic. If enemy infantry advancing on both flanks tries to make a flanking maneuver along footpaths and strike our troops then it will be even better. In such an event without heavy weapons fire support in mountainous regions the enemy will be forced to attack us on foot and it will be easier to defeat him. Therefore we should have pre-selected forces and light artillery (mobile guns, mortars) and decisively, boldly, and quickly defeat the enemy forces.

During a simultaneous strike on enemy mechanized forces and infantry moving along a road which are attacking on both flanks across mountains our troops should not be dispersed [*deystvovat' nerasschlenenno*] so that each unit carries out a specific mission. It is necessary to have a unified command when this is being done. Only with all the above can we stop an enemy advance and achieve success in battle.

2/ When moving on foot our troops are not able to break contact with enemy motorized forces. Therefore when conducting an active mobile defense it is necessary to have not only a first defensive line but also a second and third defensive line so that if the situation changes for the worse for us at the first line we might hold the enemy at the second and third lines. However, our forces should not be placed evenly on all defensive lines, but should be concentrated depending on the importance of the area being defended, especially in areas of railroad and roads. After our troops withdraw from the first defensive line to the second defensive line, units of the second defensive line should send previously prepared engineering subunits to quickly and completely destroy bridges, narrow passes in the mountains, and place anti-tank mines along the defensive line in order to continue to deter the advance of enemy troops. In the event that our troops or neighboring troops do not manage to complete the withdrawal then enemy motorized and mechanized troops should not be given an opportunity to take advantage of this circumstance to move deeper into our defenses and disrupt the plan of our entire operation; it is necessary for each corps, each division, and each regiment to use a certain

number of men and stop and defeat part of the enemy troops at any cost and thereby ensure their own units and neighboring units a calm and organized withdrawal to the designated areas. Although, in this event the units which are performing this mission to deter the enemy and cover their own units will suffer some losses in personnel their losses will however be justified and bring great benefit to the entire operation.

3/ It is necessary that each commander correctly understand the principle of placing small forces on the forward line and large forces on the rear line and also the principle of organizing strong fire at the forward line and less intense fire at the rear line and the combination of the first with the second. It is necessary to know that the placement of small forces at the forward line and large forces at the rear line during a defense is necessary in order to avoid a strong concentration of forces and to reduce their losses in manpower. Therefore the main forces of our troops should be secretly concentrated on the flanks and in the rear in order to counterattack the advancing enemy at a suitable moment in order to defeat and scatter him and not offer an advancing enemy passive resistance accompanied by a retreat. It is necessary to have not only good fortifications but also sufficient fire support in order to deter the enemy with small forces and draw him in. Therefore it is necessary to organize strong fire at the forward line and less intense fire at the rear line; depending on the properties of the weapons deploy the guns in depth and suddenly shell the enemy briefly but strongly, with the objective of inflicting personnel losses on him and supporting a counterattack of our own infantry. Different units should request artillerymen and help the artillerymen clear the roads, create [firing] positions, and provide them with the necessary time to prepare for combat operations. In turn, artillery should overcome all obstacles and actively help the infantry in battle.

In the course of defending the correct choice of the suitable moment to act is mainly in the ability of each commander to make a decision independently. Each commander ought to create observation posts to constantly monitor the situation on the field of battle and, depending on changes in the position of the enemy troops, make a counterattack at a suitable moment and inflict heavy losses on the enemy in manpower.

Various units should find time to convey to the entire command staff the 8 March and 15 March 1951 orders of the headquarters of the volunteer forces about fighting defensive battles, and also the 6 April 1951 document about the experience of fighting defensive battles in order to study these documents. Commanders at all echelons who have familiarized themselves with the above documents should report to the headquarters how they have understood the documents.

4/ Fight strongly against a casual approach toward matters by commanders and against [commanders] who have a careless attitude with respect to the orders of senior commanders and personnel and people who perfunctorily study the situation.

In view of the fact that troops which have newly arrived in Korea do not have experience in fighting against a technically well-equipped enemy or special experience in fighting defensive battles, and [have] comparatively weak leadership abilities at the lower command level, and also in view of the fact that in comparison with the past the number

of troop arms which have taken part in combat operations has increased, the higher command staff therefore should not allocate units of different troop arms to their subordinate units without thinking about whether they might use these units and lead them.

The entire command staff (especially the mid- and senior [levels]) should study the plans of senior commanders deeply, know the specific situation in detail, study the terrain, and carefully draw up the plans for combat operations. After drafting the plan for the first stage of combat operations it is necessary to outline the plan for the second stage. Only in this event can [the commander] be ready to conduct combat operations and not allow [himself] to be caught by surprise.

At the same time as this in a contemporary situation it is necessary for senior commanders to get deeply into lower levels, perform practical leadership, and help junior commanders find the way out of a situation. Only thus can the attitude of junior commanders toward ideas and plans of their chiefs be identified, the mistakes and shortcomings of junior commanders be corrected, and incorrect provisions in their plans can also be corrected in accordance with the actual situation and discrepancies between reports and the actual situation avoided. This can undoubtedly increase the confidence of subordinates in victory.

At the present time boldness alone is insufficient in fighting a technically well-equipped enemy; daring and wise leadership is needed. Only thus can victory be achieved. This is getting deeply into lower levels, that is, being directly at the front, not just during a defense but also during an offensive.

It is necessary to create good command posts, move together with the units in the main direction, keep track of the situation in a timely manner, and choose the suitable moment for operations. It is necessary to try for the plans and reports to correspond to the actual situation in the future.

We hope that the above instructions will be put into practice by commanders of all military units and also that the operational concepts of the headquarters of the volunteer forces will be orally conveyed to all division and regimental commanders so that all troops perform their missions well in accordance with the overall concept.

Cde. Mao Zedong calls upon us at the present time to defeat the enemy in small battles, weaken him, and lower his morale in order to gradually move to a massive defeat of the enemy.

All that is required from us is for the command personnel at all levels to carefully study the situation, properly deploy the forces, and organize a fire system so that each corps can simultaneously defeat one or two companies of regular troops or one battalion of regular troops of the enemy, which is completely achievable. This is also the most useful driving condition at the present time for defeating the enemy during his adventurist offensive.

We hope that the command personnel at all levels will study these instructions deeply, overcome all difficulties, mobilize all the troops, and exert every effort to carry out the exhortation of Mao Zedong.

Headquarters of the Volunteer Forces 31 May 51 1500"

KRASOVSKY

N° 2759

4 June

Deciphered by [V]aganov 2310 4 June

Printed by Rubleva 0020 5 June

N° 407

Five copies sent
Copies N° 3, 4, and 5 to the
8th Department

Authenticated: Major [signature] Laptev

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 51

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 20622

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin

N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 1900 9 June 1951

SERIES G

T

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 452/1948/shs 9 June 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Both your telegrams (of 5 and 7 June) have been received.

The special aircraft you sent on 9 June has arrived in [Beijing].

Cde Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung have decided to fly from [Beijing] to Moscow on 10 June 1951. If you have no objection, we would like Cde. Lin Biao, who is flying to Moscow at the present time, to take part in your conversations.

Cde. Gao Gang is bringing with him additional requests for weapons and various military equipment.

Please make a decision about them.

A delay on the issue of the requests has occurred in view of the illness of Cde. Zhou Enlai, who is being treated in Dalniy at the present time. [We] finished drawing up the requests only today, therefore we bear the blame for the delay.

The requests being sent with Cde. Gao Gang were drawn up on the basis of an estimate of our needs. The total cost specified in the requests is quite high.

I request that the Soviet government make deliveries based on these requests against the military credit at half price and also defer the payment of this amount. After discussion of this issue with Cde. Gao Gang please report your decision through him. Cde. Gao Gang will also report to you personally the issues of the war and peace and also about the invitation of Soviet advisers to the volunteer forces, so therefore I am not touching on them.

I wish you good health.

MAO ZEDONG

N° 2893

9 June

Deciphered by Prokop'yev 1930 9 June

Printed by Korniyushina 2010 9 June N° 999

Four copies printed. N° 3 and 4 filed

Verified: Major [signature] Chikarev

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DOCUMENT NO. 52

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 20847

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 1800 15 June 1951

Copy N° 2

SERIES G
T

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 4[6]5/2013/shs 15 June 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I report:

1. As of 15 June 1951 [the following] have been trained for combat operations in the Chinese NOA [People's Liberation Army] Air Force: six fighter aviation divisions, of which three are on MIG-9 aircraft, two on MIG-15 aircraft, and one composed of one regiment on MIG-15 aircraft and one on LA-11 aircraft. There is a total of 307 fighter pilots.

- two ground attack aviation divisions on IL-10 aircraft, a total of 107 ground attack crews.

- two bomber aviation divisions on TU-2 aircraft, one of which has materiel for only one regiment.

There is a total of 109 bomber crews of which 14 fly at night.

2. [The following] are at the stage of retraining: five Chinese fighter aviation divisions, 177 pilots. The shortfall of 133 pilots in the divisions will only come from aviation schools by 1 July.

Of the fighter aviation divisions being retrained one on MIG-15 aircraft will be ready for combat operations on 15 July and one on LA-9 aircraft by 1 August.

In connection with the receipt of MIG-15 aircraft the remaining three fighter aviation divisions will arrive for retraining and finish the program on them by 1 October.

- one Korean fighter aviation division. A total of 65 pilots. It will be ready for combat operations on 15 August.

3. I am taking vigorous steps to carry out your directive about preparing the air group of eight fighter aviation divisions for combat operations, for which:

- I am moving the flight operations to retrain the aviation divisions to an hourly schedule.

- I have personally taken charge of the Korean division to monitor the fulfillment of the retraining plan by dates and give on-site practical assistance.

I am sending the chief of staff of the air group to the division finishing retraining on MIG-15 aircraft by 15 July and a group of senior officers to the division finishing retraining on LA-9 aircraft by 1 August.

- I am reconsidering, and will approve the training program in line units and school by 20 June 1951 in the direction of reducing them in conformity with the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Issues which have been placed before the Chinese command for resolution:

1. The acceleration of the construction of airfields in Korea for basing their aircraft. The pace of airfield construction is slowing because of the systematic destruction of the runways under construction by American aircraft.

2. The use of bomber and ground attack aviation divisions against enemy airfields and troops.

3. The improvement of the work of the rear of the Chinese NOA Air Force since with the move to Chinese supply beginning on 1 April 1951 the supply of aviation equipment and GSM has sharply worsened.

4. Please help with the supply of units with:

- 12 UTI MIG-15 trainers;

- 40 RD-10, 200 RD-20, and 30 ASh-21 engines;

- tire casings and tire tubes for MIG-9 and MIG-15 aircraft, 1200 660x160 and 400 570x140 for YaK-17 aircraft;

- accelerate the shipment of aviation equipment on the basis of requests from the Chinese government.

KRASOVSKY

N° 3004
15 June 51

Deciphered by Rudakov
1900 15 June

Printed by Korniyushina N° 1126
1948 15 June
Four copies printed. N° 3 and 4 filed
Verified: SECTION CHIEF .
COLONEL [signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 53

TO THE CHIEF OF THE MAIN OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL
STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

I report my impressions about individual issues which were formed while working in
China from November 1950 to June 1951.

I. The Combat Characteristics of the Chinese People' Army

A familiarization with many documents and also conversations with both Chinese and
our comrades who have had the opportunity to be closely concerned with the Chinese
People's Army testify to the quite good combat characteristics of the latter.

For the most part, the soldiers and the commanders are hardy, resolute, and persistent in
battle and capable of patiently enduring all the deprivations and burden of military life.

The troops deftly operate in mountainous terrain and broadly use night and bad weather
in battle. At the same time the Chinese army is not adapted to wage combat operations in
winter conditions as a consequence of a shortage and sometimes a completely lack of
winter clothing and also a lack of experience in using means of fighting frostbite.

The superlative combat characteristics and high morale of the troops is supported by the
well-delivered political work in the army. This is primarily explained by the fact that, in
spite of sometimes great losses and all sorts of deprivations, the troops maintain fighting
ability and readiness to quickly move from defense to a counteroffensive. The
"Americaphobia" which in the beginning existed in the army as a result of the victories
which were won, has mainly been overcome. It is true that recurrences of
"Americaphobia" were exhibited during the spring operation. This found its expression in
a desire to avoid those sectors of the front occupied by the Americans. If it was necessary
to attack these sectors of the front a hesitancy was often displayed and the battle was not
always carried through to the end. In many cases persistence was not shown in destroying
encircled units and units of the American troops. Sometimes the latter were intentionally
provided an opportunity to escape encirclement in order to avoid large losses and the
expenditure of scarce reserves of ammunition.

II. A Description of Combat Operations in Korea

Two primary circumstances leave their mark on the nature of combat operations in Korea: 1) the poor level of equipment of the troops compared to the Americans and 2) the poorly organized rear.

In spite of the existence of sufficient food supplies and ammunition, the growth needs are being met by no more than 40-50%. Troops at the front are undernourished and in a number of cases are frankly going hungry. As a consequence of this they are not in a condition to not only successfully carry operations which have begun to the end but to even hold territory which has been won. The reasons which are responsible for the inadequate supply of the troops are: 1) the effect of American aviation on communications, as a consequence of which railroads and other forms of transportation, as a rule, operate only at night; 2) a shortage of motor vehicle and animal-drawn transportation; 3) the poor organization of the entire system of the rear.

Until recently the Commanding General of the Northeast Military District was responsible for transporting food and ammunitions directly to the troops. Peng Dehuai has not examined the matter of the rear himself. Only at the end of May was it decided to create front, corps, divisional, and regimental rear units and to subordinate the entire rear area up to the Yalu River to Peng Dehuai.

In addition, steps have been taken to increase the amount of motor vehicle and animal-drawn transportation. In particular, the manufacture of lightweight iron pushcarts has been widely supplied. They should be mainly used by the regimental and divisional rear units.

The reorganization of the logistical system, an increase in transportation equipment, and also an increase in air defense lines of communications ought to have a positive effect on the conduct of operations in the near future.

The Chinese People's Army has been forced to resort to the following tactical methods in connection with the poor technical level:

- a) as a rule, combat operations (let alone troop movements) are conducted only at night, in connection with which the troops quickly tire;
- b) small forces are kept in contact with the enemy; the main forces are positioned beyond enemy artillery range and in areas inaccessible to tanks;
- c) a solid front is not created in the defense. Roads along which attacks by tanks might come are not occupied by troops. A defense is created in elevated locations adjacent to the roads;
- d) as a rule, an offensive is begin not from a location of close contact with the enemy but from a distance of 5-15 km;
- e) it is considered inadvisable to wage positional battles since they lead to losses and the rapid expenditure of ammunition.

It is considered more advisable to wage battles of maneuver (surprise counterstrikes on an attacking enemy).

In connection with the troops' poor supply of materiel offensive operations are characterized by:

- a) the short duration (five or six days), which is a consequence of the soldier's ability to lift food and ammunition for only five or six days of battle;
- b) insignificant depth (30-50 km);
- c) the limited number of goals - chiefly of a tactical nature;
- d) an inability to develop a tactical success that has been achieved into an operational one. After five or six days the troops are withdrawn to bases for rest, bringing up to strength, and replenishment of supplies.

The following negative aspects in the troops' combat activity stand out:

- a) the organization of battle (offensive and defensive) is quite primitive, without preliminary reconnaissance, scouting of the ground, or organization of coordination;
- b) tactical control is insufficiently centralized, which leads to matters taking their natural course in the development of the battle and units and even formations changing position on the field of battle;
- c) a withdrawal of troops to the initial position and a reconnaissance of the enemy in force is not practiced before going over to the offensive;
- d) attention is not paid to securing the flanks and [unit] boundaries;
- e) support to a withdrawal of troops, which is such a common practice, is not organized;
- f) artillery is insufficiently used both in an offensive and on defense. The main amount of the artillery reserve is not used because of an insufficient number of shells and the lack of skill to use it en masse;
- g) three tank regiments in Korea have not yet been used in battle because of a fear of losing the materiel (they are being held in the areas of Wonsan and Pyongyang);
- h) the use of obstacles in defense and when withdrawing in order to impede an enemy advance is very insufficient;
- i) command and control of troops is one of the weakest places in the Chinese People's Army. And in the past (when fighting the Kuomintang) headquarters were not true command echelons but were not endowed with corresponding authority and did not have authority among the troops. The situation has not yet improved.

As a rule, reconnaissance in force is done by commanders of formations, and headquarters remain in the rear and play no role in the command and control of the troops. In the last (spring) operation, for example, the commanding general of the 3rd Army exercised control from the command post of the commander of the 12th Corps. The Army headquarters remained in the rear (about 100 km from the front) and did not know the situation, as a result of which not one report came from this army during the entire time of the operation.

Radios are used as the only means of communication. Other means of communication, including mobile ones, are not used. The loss of communication with the troops does not disturb anyone and does not cause any worry.

III. The Role and Place of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Army

Although the General Staff formally exists, it has not yet found its place and does not play a proper role in the leadership of the armed forces and military operations.

There is an operations directorate in the General Staff (also named the Operations Directorate of the People's Revolutionary Council) which means a group of 10-12 officers and engages in compiling information reports for senior comrades from the government and CPC CC.

A study of the situation and the drawing up of proposals is not part of the function of this operations directorate. It is passively satisfied with the information received and does not consider it necessary to verify or find out anything. It is thought that if any information did not come in it is obviously not at Peng Dehuai's headquarters.

The operations plans which are submitted are not studied and no views about them are reported. It is thought that it is clearer to Peng Dehuai how to proceed in a given event. Moreover, he is the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and inasmuch as the Commander-in-Chief Zhu De has stepped aside from command and control of the troops because of illness and other reasons only Cde. Mao Zedong had the right to give any orders to Peng Dehuai. However, Cde. Mao Zedong does not consider it necessary to get involved in Peng Dehuai's plans, also thinking that it is clearer to Peng Dehuai what to do on the spot.

Cde. Nie Yunzhen [Translator's note: SIC; Rongzhen is correct], the acting Chief of the General Staff, is comparatively young among military leaders and by virtue of traditional Chinese overscrupulousness and avoids any actions capable of damaging relations with them.

As a result of this he does not feel confident in his role as Chief of the General Staff and does not even try to raise the question of defining the role and place of the General Staff in the system of command of the armed forces.

IV. The Role of Our Military Advisers

The Chinese comrades have a good attitude toward our advisers on the whole. They listen to any statements and views carefully but also regard them cautiously. This especially concerns issues associated with the war in Korea. On issues of waging the war in Korea the Chinese comrades are afraid that we are imposing our methods of operation on them which do not correspond to the level of development and equipment of their army. When this seems [SIC, *kazhetsya*; perhaps *pokkazhetsya*, "is pointed out", was intended] to them they are not reluctant to say, "We have a different view on these issues than you" (Nie Rongzhen). In one case Peng Dehuai declared that he would not stop even at withdrawing troops to the Yalu River since in this case he would have better opportunities to defeat the Americans by relying on very short lines of communications.

The Chinese comrades are afraid of the landing of enemy assault forces in their rear and therefore hold many troops on the coast, but also do not want to get deep into South Korea. Half-jokingly and half-seriously they speak of a 10-year war in Korea, grinding down the enemy forces in the course of such a protracted war, thinking that are not able to accomplish the defeat of the enemy in a short period.

Dissatisfaction is expressed, although in very cautious form, that they are not being given more modern equipment (100-mm anti-aircraft guns and also various models of automatic weapons which are as good as the Americans').

All the aspects indicated and also the existing sluggishness and the pattern in the organization and tactics of the troops as experienced during the civil war should have attracted the fixed attention of our advisory staff. However, this is not being sensed.

Our advisers do not exhibit the proper persistence in overcoming the existing incorrect views in the area of the organization and tactics of the troops and put up with the current situation when coming across the Chinese "*mamandi*" (let's wait, we won't hurry).

The infusion of our military experience into the troops of the Chinese People's Army is not being sensed. This especially affects issues of command and control, the organization of battle, and the use of artillery, tanks, and other troop arms.

Advisers who operate on the periphery are left to their own devices. During all the time in China the main military adviser has made only one field trip [*vyezd*] (to Mukden) and, in addition, one meeting of advisers has been convened to exchange work experience.

GENERAL-MAJOR [signature] (KOCHERGIN)

16 June 1951

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 54

Independent Eastern Department [stamp]

Warsaw, 5 September 1951

SECRET [stamp]

Comr[ade] Min[ister] St. Skrzyszewski

In the building

The Independent Eastern Department is sending a report from the Embassy of the RP [Polish Republic] from Korea dated 30 June 1951.

1) In connection with the recommendations made by Comr. Deperasiński SWW [Independent Eastern Department], I propose:

a- that the funds of the Committee of the Defenders of Peace be devoted not only to buy medicines, but also to buy other objects, which are discussed in the recommendations,

b- to ask the authorities who make political decisions to order the organization of an action to collect money with the goal of fortifying the funds of the Committee of the Defenders of Peace.

2) The SWW is making a request about the dispatch copies of this report to the following persons: President of the RP, Premier, Minister of National Defense, Comr. Berman, Comr. Mazur, Comr. Zambrowski, Comr. Dłuski, Comr. Mencil.

HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT

[signature]

E. Słuczanski

Korea, Pyongyang, 30 June 1951

REPORT

1.- A year of time has passed since the moment when war broke out in Korea. The front is being maintained around the 38th parallel. And thus, while every average Korean talks about how they must press, push the americans [sic] all the way to the sea and further, the american [sic] prisoners are stubbornly claiming that the war will end soon at the 38th parallel. The prisoners do not have the conviction to the least degree that the americans [sic] will win the war. They claim that they have come to Korea because they were sent without being asked because they wanted to earn dollars. I will not write about the war situation because this is the task of the Military Attaché, who goes to the General Staff and to the front. In the period of his absence, i.e., in the month of June, there were no major changes at the front. Only on the eastern front, the people's army won certain victories. What is new is that night bombers entered the action on the side of the people's army, and they are bombarding ports and the massed American troops. On the other hand, small air fights have begun over the territory of People's Korea. Chinese sappers have rebuilt all the rail bridges on the Nampho-Pyongyang line and the rail line is operational. It is worth stressing, for example, such a fact that the border rail bridge to Tsyang has not only been rebuilt, but the Chinese sappers have at the same time built 4 other wooden bridges, very low ones, 2 of them are rail bridges and the remaining ones are for vehicular traffic. They are practicing more or less in the same way also in other rail hubs, which I was able to see personally. Talking about bombardments, I must add that in comparison to May, the area around Pyongyang is being bombed much more by the American air force during the day and at night. Driving to Pyongyang by night (I have driven 3 times), I saw unending columns of Chinese troops headed in the direction of Pyongyang, and back from Pyongyang hundreds of American prisoners were being led. The whole traffic on the big and little roads takes place only at night. In the daytime one is inevitably threatened by an air raid. And so, during the move of the Czech mission, on 22 June at 20:00, a car column of the armies of the Chinese volunteers left the town of

Chi Chen, and it was assaulted by 7 airplanes, and as a result there were 3 killed, 16 grievously wounded and many lightly wounded. In all the cities and towns, the recruitment of volunteers for the army is taking place. The volunteers are leaving for military schools. The balance of the year-long fighting on the Korean front presents itself thus:

- a. killed and taken prisoner.....598,567 people
of this number, taken prisoner...108,157
- b. captured:
 - pistols.....980 pieces
 - guns.....119,412 “
 - automatic.....20,156 “
 - light automatic rifles.....3,683 “
 - heavy machine guns.....1,629 “
 - anti-tank weapons.....58 “
 - anti-aircraft machine guns439 “
- c. captured or destroyed various higher-calibre weapons
3,900 “
- captured or destroyed various smaller-caliber weapons
2,938 “
- d. captured or destroyed cars.....9,145 “
- e. captured or destroyed tanks and armored vehicles
1,797 “
- f. captured telephones and radio-telephones.....2,963 “
- g. airplanes:
 - shot down.....1,632 “
 - captured.....98 “
- h. warships:
 - sunk larger ones, such as torpedo boat.....75 “
 - sunk smaller ones, like torpedo boat.....47 “
- i. captured various ammunition.....120 rail cars.

The Korean press has also written about the outcome of the operations of partisan units not indicating for which period.

- a. Killed americans [sic] and Syngman Rhee-ites..3,300
- b. Taken prisoner.....500
- c. Captured:
 - light machine guns.....480 pieces
 - light automatic rifles.....73 “
 - anti-tank guns.....21 “
 - mine-throwers.....17 “
 - various ammunition.....251,000
- d. Destroyed various military buildings or stations.....40

2.- The main issues that the rear of the front is living by are: a. sowing, b. transportation, c. help for the families from which the men have gone to the front, d. help for the soldiers at the front, e. organizing the population to recruit volunteers and dig

shelters, f. immediate construction of the earth shelters for the people who remain without a roof over their heads after bombardments. It is clear from the conversations I have conducted with employees of ministries, leading Party members, workers, craftsmen and peasants, and also on the basis of the daily press, that the sowing was completed 20 days earlier than had been foreseen in the plan. And qualitatively and quantitatively, the rice crop depends on early sowing. No wonder then that the peasants say proudly that if the americans [sic.] don't burn the crops, the population will manage somehow with food. They speak with fear about frost, because of a complete lack of clothing. One can hear everywhere: "we are counting on our friends, they will help us." The early completion of the plan for sowing was an effort of the whole Korean nation. Groups were formed in villages, which went from house to house and together tilled the soil. People were released from ministries and offices to help the peasants, and especially those families in which there are no male hands because the men are at the front. And now the employees of ministries are being released to work in the countryside, to weed. As an illustration, I am enclosing a translation into Russian of one of the communiqués regarding the above-mentioned issue. It can thus be said clearly that the fight for early sowing was fully won. Transportation is perhaps the hardest and most difficult task to achieve. Putting transportation on a good level required the reconstruction of hundreds of big and little bridges, with which mountainous Korea is covered. Thousands of men's hands and tons of materials are needed for this. I can state from my own observations, as well as on the basis of statements from Korean comrades, that it was the Chinese volunteers who rebuilt the bridges. Korea has only 2 main railway lines in the direction of China, one from Pyongyang through Sinuiju to Andong and the other from Pyongyang through Manpo to Jian. The second line was started in the month of June. Currently both are working, but as always they work only at night. The enemy's air force does not permit starting transportation during the day. Vehicular traffic is also completely not working during the day. I was in a machine hall, where about 40 machine tools (this is a part of the huge railway workshops transferred from Pyongyang). The factory was built high up in the mountains. A huge piece of the mountain was cut out, the wooden hall is again covered up with soil, and the slope of the mountain is the roof. The work always takes place there with electric light. The machines are Soviet, Japanese and American. Naturally such a factory is dark, stuffy and without ventilation. The workers are working there with great eagerness, fully understanding the importance of their effort to the victory. I asked a few workers what they needed the most. The answers were: blades for the lathes and scraping machines, and also clothing, and we will manage with our other needs. The rail depot is working both day and night. This depot has been bombed several times, but after every bombardment the railway men take off the rubble and resume work. Recently, the railway workers built a field depot at the Yalu River. A barracks was built between the river and the slopes of the mountains, it is well camouflaged and 4 locomotives can be restored there at one time. A few machines for metal processing were also placed there. During the day, all the steam locomotives and cars stand in the tunnels, of which there are as many in Korea as there are bridges. The railway workers in Korea are the pride of the working class, everywhere they are shown as models and examples, and they are not spared praise, awards and assistance. Also, all sorts of appeals to the nation flow from the railway workers. Work in transportation in Korea is the most difficult and demands the greatest sacrifices. There are few roads, and the ones that are there are in the mountains,

bad and dangerous. Practically the whole population is engaged in assisting the families whose men have gone to the front. First, the Party, and together with it various organizations, such as, for example, the National Councils, the Union of Democratic Women and so on. The assistance looks as follows: if a city is bombed, then the families whose men are at the front receive the earth shelters built by the workers' brigades, as well as clothing and food. I have talked to several district secretaries of the Party, they explained to me that one of the Party's important duties in the rear that is being developed is help for the families, and that this help makes the mobilization for the front, to recruit volunteers seriously easier, and that it helps to cement the country in its resistance and effort. The next task by which the rear lives is help to the soldiers on the front. Women in the rear collect edible grasses and hand them in to the National Committees, which send them to the army. They start by organizing mass and individual exchanges of letters with the soldiers, they organize houses of help for the soldiers who are on leave or passing through especially closer to the front, such as in Pyongyang. They produce socks or handkerchiefs and send them as gifts. I am enclosing one of the notes from the press on this issue in Russian translation. The organization of the population by the party to recruit volunteers for the army, to dig shelters, for the quick unloading of transports, bringing wood to hospitals and performing a range of other work of a purely military character continues to be an important and still relevant task for the Party. The recruitment of volunteers takes place like this: after many appeals and rallies, pioneers (usually) march for a few days with flags and banners calling for volunteering for the army. The newly recruited volunteers are usually very young people. Their departure is very ceremonious. Speeches, bestowing of gifts and letters. They all leave for military schools. Shelters are being dug in Korea incessantly and in many different ways. Miners blow up rocks with dynamite, peasants dig shelters in the ground. The population, most often women, builds shelters for hospitals, and for state and social institutions the shelters are built by the employees of those institutions with the assistance of society. The transportation of wounded soldiers takes place on stretchers for lack of ambulances. The director of a military hospital, in which there are 1,000 wounded, told me that people carry the wounded on stretchers from the front to Pyongyang, from village to village, where ambulatory stations have been created, and from Pyongyang on by train at night. From the station to the hospital, again they carry the wounded on stretchers. For this reason, the transportation of the wounded from the front to the hospital in Manpho takes about 6 weeks. From this, it can be seen how great is the shortage of means of transportation, and especially ambulances. To have wood for heating, the hospital in Manpho is forced to organize brigades which walk a dozen kilometers into the mountains and pull down the timber or, at best, carry it by bull. He suggests that the hospital in Manpho be sent a gift from Poland: 1 ambulance and 1 truck. The director of this hospital informed me that they are also forced to use bulls to carry the seriously wounded for serious operations to the Chinese border. The bombing of cities, towns and villages by the American aviation has created the issue of lodging people deprived of roofs over their heads. This is one of the important questions for the rear with which the Party is preoccupied first of all, and with it the whole society. In this case, as in the previous ones, the Party created groups of people who, immediately after the bombings, dig earth shelters, others pull down timber from the mountains and in this way quickly deliver lodging that can be used.

3.- I arrived at the RP [Polish Republic] embassy in Korea, Manpho, in the night of 22 April. The director of diplomatic protocol was waiting for me at the station with his car. Next evening instead of a reception they organized a concert. I learned later that they did not organize a reception because they had nothing to put on the table. After the concert, I invited the whole group of artists together with the director of protocol to the embassy for dinner. The reception was very warm. Already then I found out that the Koreans are afraid of mass deaths from hypothermia because of the freezing temperatures and shortage of clothing. [Trans. note: omit diplomatic receptions.] The meeting at Kim Il Sung's was very friendly, he said that in response to our gifts, the Korean army will give a present to all the democrats and strike the death blow to the enemies at the front. [...] The Embassy's move from Manpho to Pyongyang took place on 16 June in the evening. [...] I learned that the city of Chin Chen, with a population of 60 thousand has no civilian hospital and it was bombarded more powerfully than Warsaw in 1945. The hospital consists of rooms reserved in different places, in which the ill are, and the doctor goes from room to room. Recently typhus was widespread in this town. Many women are still ill. After familiarizing myself with the situation, I deposited 3 million JMP [KPW?] for assistance to the sick. In the town of Chi Chen everyone agrees that the nearest winter will be a difficult period for us to live through. The shortage of clothing makes them fearful that, like typhus today, the cold will take people away forever. They are counting on help from their friends. [Trans. note: description of embassy and embassy district, where they arrive, horrible conditions.] The number of air raids and bombardments around us takes place a dozen times a day and, despite this, diplomatic life goes on, there are meetings, receptions, conversations and visits. The mood among all the employees of the missions of the countries of people's democracy is full of optimism and certainty that the army of People's Korea will be victorious. [...]

4.- My suggestions on the issue of Korea are as follows: [Trans. note: this information continues to repeat itself.]

[signature]
R. Deperasinski
2nd secretary of the Embassy of the RP in Korea
(Charge d'Affaires ad in.)

Pyongyang, 30-VI-1951

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 55

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 21497

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 2100 5 July 1951

Copy N° 2

SERIES G

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 575/2280/shs 5 July 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I am sending you for [your] information the draft text of an agreement to cease military operations in Korea.

"An agreement to cease military operations in Korea (draft).

The warring parties in Korea, the Commander-in-Chief of the UN forces General Ridgway (on the one side), the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Korea General Kim Il Sung and the Commanding General of the Chinese volunteer forces General Peng Dehuai (on the other side) are authorized to assign representatives to take part in a meeting about the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace in Korea.

The representatives of both sides have agreed to the following:

1. 'On ...day...month 1951, both sides will simultaneously issue a cease-fire order. After the cease-fire order is issued the ground, naval, and air forces of both sides within Korea will cease fire and other hostilities.
2. The ground, naval, and air forces of both sides will withdraw 10 statute miles from the 38th parallel. A buffer zone should be created in the region 10 miles to the north and south of the 38th parallel. Civil administration in the buffer zone will be restored as it was before 25 June 1950: to the north of the 38th parallel, under the jurisdiction of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, to the south of the 38th parallel, under the jurisdiction of the South Korean government.
3. Both sides will cease sending (including ground, naval, and air shipments) weapons, troops, or replacement personnel from outside Korea.
4. Both sides will repatriate prisoners. In the three months after the cessation of hostilities each side is to achieve a complete exchange of prisoners in individual groups.

5. All the foreign troops fighting in Korea, including the Chinese volunteer forces, should be completely withdrawn in units from South and North Korea within a period of two to three months.

6. Within four months refugees from South and North Korea should be returned to the areas where they previously lived"

MAO ZEDONG

N° 3349
5 July 1951

Deciphered by Vaganov 2225 5 July
Printed by Chesnokova 2300 5 July N° 1395
Four copies printed. N° 3 and 4 filed

Verified: Section Chief
COLONEL [signature] (MAKAROV)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 56

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 21632

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 1015 10 July 1951

Copy N° 2

SERIES G T

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 526/2326/shs 10 July 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I am sending you the text of a 9 July 1951 telegram from Cde. Li Kenong about a meeting of liaison officers of both sides in the city of Kaesong on 8 July.

"To Cde. Mao Zedong.

I am reporting the progress of the meeting of liaison officers on 8 July 1951.

1. In the morning the enemy liaison officers talked mainly about questions of setting the time of the meeting, the place of the meeting, and an exchange of lists of conference participants.

In the afternoon our liaison officers announced the list of conference participants, after which they stated their opinion about the questions raised by the enemy liaison officers.

All issues were resolved successfully if one does not count the small differences about the issue of ensuring the security of the corridor from Pyongyang to Kaesong. The enemy liaison officers twice thanked us for our concern for their safety and the concern about supply. At the end they stated that they had hopes that the conference would also be prepared well. The liaison officers of both sides did not greet one another during the meeting. After the meeting the Americans greeted us by saluting and we reciprocated.

2. The Americans' communications were well-organized during the meeting. They got in touch via radio with their rear three times. During a break in the morning they reported to the rear: "We expressed our opinion, they did not make any reply to us. [We'll] have to wait".

In the afternoon, after receiving orders, the enemy liaison officers said three times that their representatives will return to [Bunsan] after the conference to rest. There was no firm response from our side.

During the meeting at approximately 1000 24 American aircraft flew over Kaesong in two groups for demonstration purposes; however, we did not pay attention to this. One aircraft circled in the air all the time. It was evidently maintaining communications with the ground and photographing.

3. As soon as the American liaison officers left the aircraft they felt extremely tense. Immediately after arrival at the meeting room the constantly asked which of those present were our liaison officers. The South Korean liaison officer fell off a chair when yielding his place behind the table to an American officer.

During the meeting the Americans behaved cautiously and did not want to directly state their opinion. In view of the fact that the announcement of the list of enemy representatives by the liaison officers was not immediately followed by our response the enemy liaison officers regretted that they had done this first and were afraid of falling into a disadvantageous position. However, then an American officer, abandoning any ceremony, passed the text of his statement to an interpreter for reading.

In the morning the atmosphere at the meeting was comparatively tense in the first two hours and only after a break did it begin to relax. In the afternoon the atmosphere was calm.

Our side announced the list of our participants in the conference and thereby dispelled the enemy's doubts. Although some differences occurred they were however insignificant.

4. Before the meeting we repeatedly studied the substance of the issues being raised, the form of the meeting, and exchanged opinions. Mainly the liaison officers of the Korean side spoke during the meeting. Our liaison officer helped them and suggested what was necessary at the proper time. Relations were good.

Li Kenong, Qiao Guanhua 9 July 1100"

MAO ZEDONG

N° 3421
10 July 1951

Deciphered by Fedyaev
1130 10 July Four copies printed. N° 3 and 4 to the 8th Department
Printed by Rubleva 1205 10 July
N° 782

Verified: Section Chief Colonel
[signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 57

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 21680

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 1750 11 July 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 532/2343/shs 11 July 1951]

SERIES "G" T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Cde. Filippov!

I am sending you the texts of four telegrams of 10 July which I have received from Cde. LE KENONG.

Please familiarize yourself with them:

"To Cde. MAO ZEDONG. Copies to Cde. KIM IL SUNG and PENG DEHUI.

I am submitting a brief report N° 1 to you about the progress of the conference:

The five American representatives and 48 support personnel arrived at the city of Kaesong at 0912 in helicopters and motor vehicles. After a brief rest the conference opened at 10 o'clock.

At first the representatives of both sides exchanged the documents authorizing them to conduct negotiations. An enemy representative spoke first at his own initiative (the text of his statement is attached separately). We did not stop him.

After statements by Cdes. Nam Il and Deng Hua the American representative said, "I am only authorized to discuss military issues affecting Korea. Do you agree to discuss only military issues about Korea at this conference? If you agree, then please sign the corresponding document" (At this moment he passed our representatives a previously printed written document and asked it be signed).

Cde. Nam Il replied there was no need for this.

Cde. Deng Hua added, "All three of our proposals touch on military issues relating to Korea. You can state your opinion with regard to these proposals".

The American representative repeated, "We can discuss only military issues touching on Korea and we have no authority to discuss other issues. Your proposals contain political issues besides military issues."

Cde. Nam Il asked, "Please indicate specifically, what issues are political?"

The enemy representatives did not reply but showed the text of the draft agenda for the next meeting of the conference and asked that the agenda be adopted first (the draft text is attached separately).

Cde. Deng Hua asked the enemy representatives to explain points 4 and 5 of the draft agenda. The enemy representatives replied that the details ought not to be discussed at this meeting and asked us to send them our three proposals in writing.

The enemy representatives then said that if we have differences about the agenda they proposed then their counterproposals need to be presented in writing.

We replied to this favorably. Our side proposed to continue the meeting at 1500. We are studying the agenda and the other issues raised by the enemy representatives.

Li Kenong. 1145 10 July".

"To Cde. Mao Zedong. Copies to Cdes. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

As a result of study we intend to offer the following agenda at a meeting at 1500 on 10 July: (we will report the results of the meeting in addition).

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. The main provisions of the cessation of hostilities in Korea: the establishment of a military boundary between both sides along the 38th parallel and the creation of a buffer zone.
3. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korean territory.
4. The taking of specific steps about the issue of a ceasefire and an armistice in Korea.
5. Measures regarding POWs after the cessation of hostilities.

Le Kenong. 1200 10 July 1951"

"To Cde. Mao Zedong. Copies to Cdes. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

I submit attachment N° 1 to brief report N° 1.

The agenda for the second meeting of the conference proposed by the American representatives:

1. Adoption of an agenda.
2. The location of the POW camps and the right of representatives of the International Red Cross to visit the POW camps.
3. Discussion at this and subsequent meetings of the conference of issues of a purely military nature and involving only Korea.
4. A cessation of hostilities in Korea on condition there is a guarantee of preventing the resumption of hostilities in Korea.
5. The achievement of an agreement about the creation of a buffer zone passing through the territory of Korea from east to west.
6. The organization, rights, and functions of a military commission concerning the cessation of hostilities.
7. The achievement of an agreement in principle that military observer groups subordinate to the military commission conduct observations within Korean territory concerning the cessation of hostilities.
8. The functions of the above military observer groups.
9. Steps with regard to prisoners.

Le Kenong. 1145 10 July 1951"

"To Cde. Mao Zedong. Copies to Cdes. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

I submit attachment N° 2 to brief report N° 1.

An abbreviated text of the first statement of Joy, the head of the delegation of the UN forces headquarters (the morning of 10 July 1951):

"At the present time the delegation of UN headquarters forces represents the UN headquarters forces and acts in its name.

Knowing that the results of these negotiations will benefit the people of the entire world, our delegation will work productively and seriously. Everyone undoubtedly knows this. Until achievement of an agreement by both sides about the conditions for a cessation of military operations hostilities may continue as before in all areas except the neutral zone created by agreement of both sides. The delegation of UN headquarters forces is ready to exert its efforts to realize a cessation of hostilities and of the creation of military conditions which ensure the resumption of hostilities. Our delegation came here just to achieve this common goal. The delegation will only discuss military issues of Korea alone. Our delegation will not discuss any political or economic issues and will also not discuss military issues unrelated to Korea.

The success and failure of the negotiations which have begun today will depend on the realistic intentions of those delegations present here. If both sides have sincere intentions an atmosphere of mutual understanding can be created. If there is such an atmosphere we have good reason to hope for success. There is such an atmosphere where truth prevails.

As head of the UN forces delegation and as the immediate representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the UN forces I want to clearly state that the UN delegation has the most sincere intentions so that every person have this in mind if he is not intent on consciously creating misunderstanding.

We think that the representatives of the Korean and Chinese armies will act in the same way. Before discussing specific issues the UN forces delegation proposes that this conference be limited to the discussion of military issues concerning only Korea'.

Li Kenong 10 July 1951".

MAO ZEDONG

N° 3444

11 July

Deciphered by Vaganov
1850 11 July

Printed by Chesnokova 1955 11 July Verified: MAJOR [signature] (RUDAKOV)

N° 1503

Four copies printed. N° 3 and 4 filed

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 58

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 21677

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin

N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 1700 11 July 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 533/2344/shs 11 July 1951]

SERIES "G" T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I am sending you brief report N° 2 from Cde. LE KENONG of 2400 10 July for your information.

"To Cde. MAO ZEDONG. Copies to Cde. KIM IL SUNG and PENG DEHUI.

Brief report N° 2 about the progress of the conference.

The meeting resumed at 1500. Our representatives submitted for consideration the agenda indicated in the previous telegram and criticized the agenda offered by the enemy representatives.

The enemy representatives agreed to submit for discussion points 1, 4, and 5 which we had proposed, however they vigorously opposed point 3, which provides for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. They explained this by the fact that foreign troops were sent by various countries and therefore this issue can only be discussed with the consent of the governments of the various countries and the UN. They repeatedly asked questions about this point.

Finally, the enemy representatives moved to minor issues (for example, freedom of communications) in order to stall for time and not reveal their platform.

They took the draft of our agenda with them for discussion. In addition, the enemy representatives offered a proposal to increase the number of support personnel to 120, including 20 correspondents.

As regards the arrival of correspondents we politely declined because we are not prepared for this.

In the afternoon the atmosphere was good. Cde NAM IL felt at ease at the meeting. The meeting ended at 1700.

The enemy delegation left on aircraft and motor vehicles. A new meeting will be held tomorrow at 0800. This evening we discussed the program for tomorrow twice.

LI KENONG. 2400 10 July 1951"

MAO ZEDONG

N° 3457

11 July 1951

Deciphered by Vaganov 1920 11 July Four copies printed.
Printed by Stepanova 1940 11 July N° 3 and 4 to the 8th Department
N° 839

Verified: Major [signature] (Rudakov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 59

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 21726

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 0100 13 July 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 542/2370/shs 13 July 1951]

SERIES "G"

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Cde. Filippov!

I am sending you brief report N° 3 received from Cde. Le Kenong for your information.

"To Cde. Mao Zedong. Copy to Cde. Kim Il Sung.

I submit brief report N° 3 about the progress of the conference.

Minor issues were resolved first at today's meeting of the conference (the issue of communications) but as before the fight was mainly waged about the issues of the 38th parallel and the withdrawal of troops from Korea.

Below I cite an abbreviated transcript of the statement of Joy, the head of the American delegation. In his statement at 1100 11 July 1951 Joy said:

"I want to dwell on the criticism to which your side subjected the agenda we proposed. The Communist representatives stated that our second point of the agenda does not correspond to the formulation of the issue at this conference. This issue is about the right of the International Red Cross to visit POW camps. Putting off the resolution of this issue for one day can increase the unnecessary suffering of the prisoners by a great deal. The activity of the Red Cross covers all prisoners and is done in the interests of all prisoners regardless of their citizenship. This organization's aid to prisoners is based on the principles of humanity and is not of a military nature. The mutual exchange of prisoners is a military issue, but the work of the Red Cross contains nothing military.

In July 1950 the North Korean government declared that it wanted to implement the principles of the Geneva Convention about prisoners into effect. One of the principles of the Convention says that the representatives of the International Red Cross are permitted to visit POW camps. The Korean government should have implemented this principle long ago, however it has not done this.

As regards the statement that your delegation considers it unnecessary to include the third point in the agenda which we proposed about limiting discussion to just purely military issues regarding Korea, our delegation proposes to include this point in the agenda and thereby limit a review of the issues at the conference in order not to lose sight of or go beyond the limits of the discussion of the issues which require resolution. Therefore no one should oppose inclusion of this point in the agenda.

Your representatives think that the fourth and fifth points we proposed are superficial. The nature and the wording of the agenda we proposed is general because we think that the work will thus promote an expedient pace for the conference.

Special attention ought to be devoted to the fourth point of the agenda we proposed. In offering the point about ceasing hostile and armed actions it is necessary to ensure conditions in which hostile or armed actions cannot be resumed. Such a guarantee is

needed. Of course, this point will contain a great many issues which are impossible to give in detail and therefore we are providing a general wording.

As regards the fifth point, we already explained it at yesterday's meeting and are giving a more detailed explanation right now.

The UN delegation thinks that both sides should first of all agree on general issues without getting into details and only then discuss them in detail during the formulation of general issues.

For example, among such issues is the issue of forming a buffer zone. You propose creating a definite boundary and a definite buffer zone. We think that it is first of all necessary to decide about the common desire of both sides to create a boundary and a buffer zone and the possibility of agreeing on this issue. Then, after obtaining the agreement of both sides, [we] can move to the discussion of the issue of creating a boundary and a buffer zone and thereby achieve agreement.

We should not seek details in the agenda. Thus a decision about exactly where there should be a buffer zone should be made during the next discussion. Such an agenda does not obligate either of the sides to confine itself to its details.

We know that both sides have agreed to create a buffer zone and therefore this issue should be in the agenda as one of the general issues.

Although according to the agenda a definite decision about a buffer zone might be achieved in subsequent meetings it is however necessary to understand that the delegation of UN forces headquarters has no interest in an arbitrary boundary passing from east to west which has no military significance, does not offer any guarantee, and has not relation to the military situation in Korea (Our representatives asked the enemy representative to repeat this phrase in English).

As regards the sixth point proposed by our delegation, your side said that this issue is not at all important.

In our view, if a plenipotentiary commission concerning a cessation of hostilities is not created with an equal number of participants from both sides, then it is impossible to ensure that there will not be a resumption of hostilities and it will also be impossible to guarantee the observance of the armistice conditions.

As regards the seventh point of the agenda our delegation proposed, namely the military observer groups, these groups with an equal number of participants from both sides will be the eyes and ears of the ceasefire commission. The very important work of the ceasefire commission cannot be performed without observation. The armistice conditions will also be impossible to perform.

As regards the eighth point of the agenda we proposed this point implies a discussion of the organization of military observation groups, their authority, the facilities they observe, and to whom they submit reports. Without a discussion of these issues and without making corresponding decisions about them a delay in work might result and misunderstandings are also possible.

We think that these issues cannot be viewed as secondary and excluded from the agenda.

As regards your point about the withdrawal of foreign troops we think that this issue should be resolved at higher government levels, for it goes beyond the bounds of the range of issues which ought to be discussed at this conference.

The representatives of UN forces headquarters oppose the inclusion of this point in the agenda because we are not authorized to discuss this issue. Our authority has been received only from the UN forces command.

As regards the second point proposed by your delegation we are prepared to accept it. The creation of a buffer zone is necessary. However, we think that we came here for talks about a ceasefire in a military sense. In our understanding a cessation of hostilities means an agreement by both sides to cease hostilities on certain conditions. Such an agreement about a cessation of hostilities between military leaders does not at all affect an agreement which might be reached by governments about political or territorial issues. Therefore the commander-in-chief of the UN forces is not interested in any arbitrary line on a map which has no military significance for the current situation.

It is not in our interest to hold talks on military issues about an arbitrary line which has no relation to either tactics or the current military situation, nor also the ground relief".

(Having said this, Joy continued: "We only agree to include your points in the agenda". When the head of our delegation demanded the last phrase be repeated, Joy immediately declared that he was taking his words back).

Nam Il asked:

1. I do not understand at all what relation there is between a visit to prisoners by Red Cross representatives and the issue of the cessation of hostilities. Please explain what is better for the prisoners, a visit to them by Red Cross representatives or the quickest possible return home?

2. As regards the third point you proposed which provides for the discussion of issues relating only to Korea, what other issues besides Korean ones might be discussed at this conference?

3. I do not understand at all what you mean by enemy when speaking of hostile and armed acts mentioned in the fourth point of your agenda.

4. Analyzing your fifth point, you said that it is impossible to achieve a ceasefire without provisions ensuring that hostilities and armed actions would not resume. What does this mean? We want to know, how a ceasefire can be ensured without a withdrawal of foreign troops?

5. What is a ceasefire commission and observer group? Without a clarification of these concepts there will be difficulties when discussing the agenda (Soon afterwards a one hour 35-minute break was announced until 1300).

Joy said, "I want right now to reply to the questions asked by the head of your delegation this morning. You ask, is a return home better for the prisoners or a visit by Red Cross representatives. You think it is impossible to do this simultaneously. That is wrong. Our delegation supports the proposal that Red Cross representatives visit prisoners, but also that prisoners return home. If you agree, then Red Cross representatives can visit them beginning tomorrow and while the prisoners await repatriation.

On 13 July 1950 in a telegram addressed to the UN Secretary [General] the North Korean government expressed readiness to implement the principles of the Geneva Convention. One of these principles is permission for Red Cross representatives to visit prisoners. We do not understand why you disagree [*protivorechite*] with these decisions and principles of humanity.

You ask for an explanation of what hostilities and armed actions mean. In our understanding a cessation of hostilities means a ceasefire in Korea in all forms, a ceasefire means a halt to an increase in the strength of armed units (including their plans, relocation, rearmament, and replacement) and of the threat of armed attack".

Nam Il interrupted Joy, saying, "It seems to me that you did not correctly understand the question I raised. We understand very well what a cessation of hostilities and a ceasefire mean. I am interested in what you have in mind by measures and conditions to ensure that the hostilities you mentioned in your statement are not resumed".

Joy said, "I will respond to that question later. An agreement alone about a cessation of hostilities being put into effect on the basis of conditions agreed to by both sides will possibly allow both sides to increase their strength during an armistice. Therefore if only ceasefire measures are carried out and there are no provisions guaranteeing the hostilities will not be resumed then the hostilities which resume after an armistice might be more severe.

You ask what might guarantee that hostilities do not resume in the event that foreign troops are not withdrawn from Korea.

We think that this guarantee consists of the following:

1. In the creation of a military ceasefire commission and a corresponding number of observer groups.

2. In the creation of a buffer zone.
3. In the achievement of an agreement between the commanding generals of both warring sides about the ceasefire conditions (including the authority of the ceasefire commission) in order to ensure the observance of the decisions made by both sides.

The ceasefire commission should be created by agreement between the commanding generals of both sides with the participation of an equal number of representatives from both sides.

Within the boundaries of the established areas commission members should have the right of free movement in order to be able to monitor the implementation of the joint decisions of both sides about the ceasefire. The commission should report instances of violations of the ceasefire agreement to the headquarters of both sides at the same time as work is done to observe and provide assistance.

The military observation groups are bodies attached to the ceasefire commission which observe whether real work is being done by both sides to carry out the provisions of the ceasefire agreement".

Joy said, "I understood that you do not want to change the wording of the second point of the agenda you proposed. You do not want to attach a general meaning to it".

Nam Il asked, "What is your opinion?"

Joy said, "By general meaning I have in mind the fifth point of the agenda we proposed. This is the point about the buffer zone. You are proposing a line; in reality there are very many possible lines".

Nam Il said, "We have already proposed our own line to you. What line can you propose?"

Joy replied, "We are not proposing any line because essentially the issue already touches on this. As we understood, you don't want to amend the second point of the general meaning of the agenda you proposed".

Nam Il said, "Our proposal already has a general meaning".

Joy said, "As regards the second point of the agenda you proposed we cannot agree that the point you offered about some definite line be included in the agenda. We can agree to include the issue of the creation of a buffer zone in the agenda. The issue of the location and the boundaries of this zone should be resolved during the substance of the discussion of this issue. I again want to stress that this meeting does not pursue the goal of resolving issues, for example, regarding the issue of this definite line. Such issues ought to be discussed at subsequent meetings".

Nam Il said, "The 38th parallel is not any imaginary line, the 38th parallel already existed. Military operations began at this very line and therefore a ceasefire agreement also should be based on the 38th parallel. Thus this point has to be included in the agenda".

Joy said, "You have given me to understand that you are refusing to attach a general meaning to the agenda you proposed. I cannot interpret this otherwise". Li Kenong. 0130 12 July".

MAO ZEDONG

N° 3490
12 July 1951

Deciphered by Fedyaev at 0200 13 July
Printed by Lavreshina at 0215 13 July N° 1087
Four copies sent. Copies 3 and 4 [were sent to] the 8th Department

Verified by: Major [signature] (Chikarev) 0230

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 60

Copy N° 1

CABLE N° 4109

[To] [BEIJING]
to Cde. MAO ZEDONG

Thank you for the information about the armistice negotiations.

FILIPPOV

12 July 1951

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit of the OS [Special Department]]
VKP(b) CC Incoming N° 584/2334/shs 12 July 1951]

One copy printed for Cde. Stalin
Printed by Korniyushina at 1755 12 July 1951 N° 1600

Authenticated:

SECTION CHIEF
COLONEL [signature] (Makarov)

12 July 1951

[Stamp of the 8th Department, 2nd Main Directorate of the USSR General Staff]
[Translator's note: the department of the GRU responsible for cryptographic matters]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 61

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 21756

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received 1500 13 July 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 545/2384/shs 13 July 1951]

SERIES "G"
T

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Cde. Filippov!

Regarding the ceasefire negotiations in Korea, during two meetings the Americans deliberately raised the issue of the presence of correspondents at the conference in order to cause a recess during the conference for the purpose of stalling for time, creating public opinion, and finding out our plans. However this was a stupid venture which was easy to expose.

We will vigorously insist that no correspondents or representatives of the press can be allowed south of Kaesong by unilateral coercive action without the agreement of both sides.

If the Americans arrive in a day or two to conduct negotiations then we are thinking that after the negotiations resume of first adopting the agenda after which allowing an equal number of correspondents of both sides to come to the area of Kaesong but not letting them into the conference room. If the Americans insolently violate the principles of

agreement by both sides and cannot arrive without correspondents then we will hold to our decision no matter what and not retreat one step.

As regards the fight over the issue of the agenda, in his statement at the first meeting Cde. Nam Il offered three proposals about a cessation of hostilities and thereby our side took the initiative. Therefore, after the resumption of the negotiations as a result of a further detailed analysis and struggle we want to propose the following general points of the agenda:

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. First of all, adopt a decision about a military boundary between both sides and the creation of a buffer zone in order to implement a ceasefire and institute an armistice in Korea.
3. Adopt a decision about a withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities in Korea.
4. Specific measures to implement a cessation of hostilities, an armistice, and observation.
5. Measures regarding prisoners after a cessation of hostilities.

The agreement of the Americans to discuss the point about the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea needs to be sought in the above agenda. We can agree to it on the condition that the point about the creation of a specific boundary along the 38th parallel is not included in the agenda but this point is left until discussion of specific issues about the agenda. At the same time as this the general issue about observation is included in the fourth point of the agenda in order that other specific issues can be added during the discussion of it.

If the Americans reject the inclusion of the point about the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea in the agenda then we will insist on the agenda of the five points which we previously proposed without change. Cde. Kim Il Sung let Cde. Le Kenong know that if there is agreement between both sides about the withdrawal of their troops from the 38th parallel then the issue of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea can be deferred.

However, based on the overall situation we think that it is necessary to insist on the 38th parallel and the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and it is necessary to indicate the general meaning only in the wording of these issues but it is necessary to resolve the issue of the 38th parallel in the course of the discussion of the substance of the issues.

As regards the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea this can be done in separate stages.

The implementation of observation can be entrusted to neutral countries which did not participate in the war but the delegations of both sides to conduct negotiations should only perform the task concerning a cessation of hostilities.

As regards the issue of an exchange of refugees, as a result of study Cde. Kim Il Sung came to the conclusion that it disadvantageous for North Korea and therefore this issue was not in the agenda.

Is all the above correct?

Please send your instructions after studying [the above].

At the present time our troops are as before waging an intense battle with the enemy and preparing to conduct military operations for several months if the negotiations collapse in order to inflict great losses on the enemy in manpower and make a turnabout in the war in our favor.

MAO ZEDONG

N° 3511
13 July

Deciphered by Sudev 1615 13 July
Printed by Korniyushina 1645 13 July N° 1675

Four copies printed. Copies N° 3 and 4 to file

Verified: SECTION CHIEF
 COLONEL [signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 62

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Copy N° 1

CABLE N° 4153

to [BEIJING]

to KRASOVSKY for MAO ZEDONG

"Cde MAO ZEDONG!

We received your cipher message N° 3511 of 13 July. We discussed all the facts in detail which relate to the issue of the negotiations with the enemy and have come to the unanimous conclusion that your point of view in the 1[3] July telegram is absolutely correct.

FILIPPOV 14 July"

Telegraph when this is done.

One copy printed - to Cde. Stalin
Printed by Lavreshina 14 July 1951 N° 1118

Authenticated: Section Chief
Colonel [signature]
(Makarov)

14 July 1951

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit of the OS [Special Department]]
VKP(b) CC Incoming N° 545/2394/shs 15 July 1951]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 63

Polish Embassy
in Beijing
085/1/51[added by hand]

Beijing, 8 August 1951

BY COURIER [tilted stamp]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Independent Eastern Department
Head E. Słuczanski

The Embassy of the RP [Rzeczpospolita Polska—Polish Republic] in China is enclosing an official note together with annexes sent by the Embassy of the RP in Korea

St. Dodin
Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the RP
in China

Pyongyang, 15 July 1951

Copy

Official note

Conference in Kaesong

The talks in Kaesong on the issue of a truce are a preamble to talks about peace in Korea. According to information I have from unofficial conversations, the condition for beginning a peace conference is the fulfillment of the following conditions by the American-Syngman Rhee side:

1. A ceasefire on land, sea and in the air
2. An exchange of all prisoners of war (here, people add that it is not to be one for one but all for all).
3. The freeing of all political prisoners in South Korea.
4. Keeping the transportation and machinery plundered by the Americans in Korea (it is a question of steam locomotives, train cars, cars and machinery, which were taken out during the retreat).
5. The creation of a neutral zone, a 20-km. strip, i.e., 10 km. to the North and 10 km. to the South of the 38th parallel.

The question of withdrawing the American troops from Korea has left the agenda because the Americans claim that they cannot decide since these are League of Nations [sic] troops and not American ones, which is why one must talk with the League of Nations. The conference in Kaesong has just been suspended, formally for two reasons:

a) because of the arrival of 20 journalists without approval from the delegates of the DPRK and the failure to reach an agreement concerning a neutral zone, since the Americans want to count 20 km. from the highest point of the front in the North. At the same time, a joint administration is being formed for the city of Kaesong and surrounding area within 5 kilometers. There has already been a statement from Kim Il Sung regarding the issues in dispute, in which he said that these are trifles and that the conference should not be suspended over them. The dominant belief is that the talks will be restarted and that an agreement will be reached. It needs to be noticed that the last two communiqués of the KAT talking about the front were formulated in this way: “the troops of the League of Nations” and not, as has been so far, American and Syngman Rhee troops. (Of course, if our interpreter translated it well, we drew attention to this, he said that it was written like that). Taking part in the conference from the DPRK are: Minister Pak Don Co, Head of the General Staff Na Mir, General Li Can Zo and delegates of the volunteer Chinese armies, General Dyn Chua and Gen[eral] Che Ban and others.

Diplomatic issues [...]

Various [...]

Deperasiński Ryszard

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 64

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

Copy N° 1

CABLE N° 4277

to Cde. MAO ZEDONG

We have received your cipher message of 20 July. We consider your point of view about not insisting any more on including in the agenda the point about the withdrawal of foreign troops to be correct. The point about the withdrawal of foreign troops has been sufficiently well used by you in the negotiations to demonstrate your peacefulness on the one hand and the American reluctance to expedite the matter of peace on the other. Now this point can be deferred to another time without damage to the cause and it can be agreed not to include it in the agenda.

21 July 1951

FILIPPOV

One copy printed - to Cde. Stalin
Printed by Lavreshina 22 July 1951 N° 1238

Authenticated: Major [signature] Chikarev

22 July 1951

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit of the OS [Special Department]]
VKP(b) CC Incoming N° 546/2491/shs 22 July 1951]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 65

N° 979

The Embassy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the USSR presents its respects to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK has the honor to ask that the favor of rendering assistance in the receipt of material associated with the practice of administering military prisoner of war camps according to the attached questionnaire not be refused.

Hoping that this request will be granted, the Embassy expresses its gratitude in advance.

Moscow, 31 August 1951

[Korean-language seal]

[Handwritten in the left margin:

AVPRF

F. 0102

Op. 7

D. 2

p. 25

pp. 69-70]

TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR

1. The experience of exchanging and releasing German and Japanese POWs by the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War.
2. The provision concerning POW camps in the Soviet Union.
3. The provision concerning joint administration of German POWs by the Soviet Union and allied countries. For example, if the Soviet Union controlled German POWs captured by the Polish Army, what was the procedure for their control?
4. What work did the International Red Cross (in Geneva) do with regard to POWs and the warring sides, and how did both warring sides react to this work and what steps did both warring sides take?
5. How was the issue of indemnity during the release and exchange of POWs solved?
For example, what indemnity was demanded for POWs who died in an enemy POW camp?
6. What measures of punishment were employed against criminals who committed crimes in a POW camp?
7. Materials regarding the resolution of controversial issues regarding POWs which arose between the warring sides during the war.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 66

Embassy of the
Polish Republic
in Korea

Pyongyang, 1 September 1951

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Independent Eastern Department
Head SŁUCZANSKI

I am enclosing a report from the Embassy of the RP [Rzeczpospolita Polska—Polish Republic] in the DPRK for the reporting period of July-August 1951 together with 11 annexes.

R. Deperasinski
2nd secretary of the Embassy of the RP in Korea
Chargé d'Affaires ad in.
Korea, Pyongyang 1 September 1951

REPORT

1.- The July-August reporting period in Korea was marked by waiting for the results of negotiations on a truce in Kaesong, intensified bombardments by the American air force and increased efforts by the working class and peasantry to boost production.

The recently intensified bombing has caused very many victims, for instance, the bombing of Pyongyang and its area alone on 30 July had 10 thousand victims. On 31 July and 1 August they bombed non-stop, and on 1 August they used gas bombs in Enan. Also on 7 August they dropped gas bombs in Dynanson province. In both incidents there were 22 poisoned soldiers, of whom 8 died and their bodies turned black. On 14 August, i.e., on the eve of the celebrations of the 6th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation, some 500 planes bombed Pyongyang nearly all day long. The last daytime air raid was at 17:00 hours. I was in Pyongyang at 19:00. A picture of despair that is impossible to describe. Even though I know the city well already, we could not find the street. It needs to be added that there are very few houses left in Pyongyang, only one-level ones are left, and ruins of one- and two-storey buildings are a rarity. The wounded and corpses were being carried out from under the rubble. We saw scenes of despair, for example, children who were pushing aside the rubble with their little hands in search of their mothers. The bombing of Pyongyang had nothing to do with strategic bombing. They bombed, for example, two bazaars and there were very many victims. They also intensified night air raids in such a way that a plane comes every dozen minutes, and if he notices a light somewhere he bombs or shoots. The Americans are also dropping saboteurs on the territory of the Republic. Here we were officially informed on 31 July that in the mountains that surround our valley there is a larger unit of saboteurs. They communicate by imitating the voices of birds and they give light signs to the air force. We have been forbidden to go outside in the evening without guards, and if we go out even with a guard then we are to have weapons on us. During the day we are also not allowed to go into the mountains without letting the guard unit know.

2.- The beginning of talks in Kaesong, intensified bombardments and sabotage have had no demobilizing influence on the Korean nation whatsoever. On the contrary, the effort and sacrifices of the nation are getting stronger. This example is characteristic:

peasants who have no money, in response to numerous appeals on the radio calling for giving donations for airplanes and tanks bring rice and edible grasses they collect.

Production – the struggle to increase productivity to assist the front.

Workers in factories (the locations of all factories are being kept secret) are straining all their forces in order to increase production. Party Committees are constantly coming up with new methods that would explain as clearly as possible in order to intensify the effort during production. For example, the chief of a railway station, Kim Sun Pe, in close cooperation with the party organization and with workers increased the safety of transport on his segment. The railway workers of this station are working as they remember the slogan, “let’s quickly send arms and ammunition, which will destroy the enemy, to the front. Because of the bombardments they are working only at night, but during the day they inspect the tracks and the nearest railway bridges, and this way are working faster. With great vigilance, they guard the cars loaded with ammunition at the station from potential sabotage. In their free time, they clear the shattered cars off the tracks. Once a week, the skilled railway workers devote 5 hours per day to teach the unskilled. Once a week, the Party Committee of this station organizes production meetings with the goal of exchanging experiences at work and the experiences of leading workers, announcing their names in wall bulletins, urging competition and imitation of the leaders. This is how the railway workers are fighting the battle to improve transportation. The state, for its part, rewards the railway workers first. On 4 July 150 railway workers, with the Minister of Railways at the lead, were decorated for their heroic deed and their tenacious work to improve transportation. Factory workers and miners are fighting similarly. A certain coal mine, where Kim Chun Yong is the chairman of the Party Committee and Pak Son Chi the manager, executed 101% of its plan of extracting coal in the month of May, and then they seriously raised and surpassed the pre-war levels despite unfavorable conditions. The Party Committee played a huge role in this work, it organized the workers and engineers for the joint overcoming of all difficulties. There were great difficulties stemming from a shortage of work force and the insufficient mastering of techniques. Before the war, 20% of the needed workforce was missing, and on the day the war began 40% of the needed workforce was missing. Currently, the missing workers have been replaced by women. At first, the new female miners, unused to this work and not understanding the necessity of this work, had an unwilling attitude toward it. The party took on the duty of increasing productivity. It took on the political and technical training of the new women workers. The secretary of the cell, Wi In Ok organized meetings with women, explained the situation on the front, the importance of the mine to the front, and the duties of the working class toward the front. It taught them to think not only about their family and their husbands, but also with their soldier-husbands and soldier-sons to think of the victory as the most important task. And they all understood it, and since then they have been unear to work above ground and were raring to work underground in the mine. The skilled miners taught techniques to the unskilled miners, women and men, so that now 41 new women-workers are working on an equal footing with the old miners on the machines. Despite the conditions of hardship, this mine’s Party Committee takes great care of all its workers. When one of the best workers reduced his output, the comrades from the cell visited him at home and it turned

out that this worker was living in very bad conditions, which worsened in connection with the birth of yet another child. The comrades immediately organized assistance for his family, and the productivity of this worker's work rose again. This fact elevated the Party's authority among the new women-miners and the mine's successes grew so that it executed 120% of the plan.

In one of the factories a department needed 6 women to perform certain work. The workers reorganized the work and currently only 4 women are needed for it. 2 workers went to different work. This brigade, headed by Jan Byn Ok, every day fulfills 16% of the plan. As a result of production meetings, exchanges of experiences, critique and self-critique this factory has obtained a 35% increase in production.

2.- Agriculture. The Secretary of the Party Committee of the Province (voivodship) of Pyongyang explained to me that the peasants who have land in the lowlands deliver 27% of their crops, those who have land on slopes up to 15 degrees give 10% of their crops, and those who have land on slopes of over 15 degrees give the state nothing. He explained to me further that some People's Committees have not adhered to the principle of the peasants giving the state 27% of crops and took 27% from everyone, not honoring the difference in fertility of the soil. Such incidents were stamped out by the Party and the state and the difference was returned to the peasants. This stand by the Party and state strengthens the peasants' attachment to the country and increases their effort at work.

The peasants are executing their most active work currently on the eve of the harvest, pulling up weeds. The Secretary of the Party Committee of Pyongyang province told me that, for example, in the town of Ko Ana (Den Ju district) the peasants pulled up 13 tons of weeds on the 6th anniversary of the liberation of Korea. In many localities, the population of cities, the army and Chinese volunteers are helping them in their work. The pulling up of weeds is the realization of the Party's slogan about increasing harvests, about delivering food for the army and the population.

The peasants of Zagan province have given the state their villeinage of potatoes and barley 10 days earlier than before the war. As for the barely and potato harvest, I have news from some provinces that it was better than had been expected. But rice, corn, millet etc., which had promised to be very good because of the spring sowing campaign, are threatened by the rains that lasted 6 weeks, which at times took on the dimensions of a typhoon.

These rains were a real natural calamity, they destroyed roads, tore down bridges and seriously slowed down transportation. For example, on the Chzonchzongan river, cars cross on barges as bombs are dropped. No wonder that there are serious losses. During such a crossing, Choe Hon, chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly, the father of the Minister of Propaganda and Agitation (a woman) perished. The roads have been damaged to such an extent that vehicular access to the Embassy, which lies on a side road, was impossible. The lake's banks broke, the water tore up the road, in some places 2 meters deep, and made a channel for itself out of this road.

3.- Women. Korean women are being broadly pulled into work in factories. During the month of July alone, 150 women were promoted to factory directors or upper-level factory workers. Women are also working as engine drivers on the railroads. According to data of the Korean Central Telegraph Agency, alone in the province of north Hangeon during the anniversary action, 19,000 women were pulled into industry. It needs to be added here that the Korean woman was exceptionally oppressed during the Japanese occupation, so the current pulling them into industry is a great achievement of the Korean woman and a gain of new forces to strengthen the rear. Women, as part of the anniversary action of the 5th anniversary of equal rights, in northern Pyongyang province created 2 creches. Women alone take care of the wounded and they work hard and selflessly. Walking to Pyongyang, one can see them carrying the wounded on their backs to ambulatory stations and from there by a variety of random means of transportation. The Korean nurses follow the example of the nurses of the Soviet Red Cross. Here is the latest fact of 2 August. An ambulance was driving from the front to Pyongyang, a Soviet nurse was in it with the wounded, and she did not abandon them when the car was attacked by an American airplane and she perished together with them. This fact was widely discussed. A monthly has been published entitled "Korean Women."

4.- Education and culture. The preparatory action to open schools on 1.IX.51 is being widely planned. A preparatory course for teachers of 5-grade people's schools has been created, and it lasts from 1 March to 1 September, 4,600 teachers are training. In July a 2nd course of this type was opened for 3,200 teachers with a deadline of finishing in November. In Sinuiju, a Pedagogical Institute has been created, where 280 teachers are training for elementary middle schools (end of middle school exam). At the same time 590 professors are being prepared for high schools (end-of-high-school exam) and technical schools. Following a directive from the Ministry of Education, 25 thousand teachers and professor for different types of people's schools, high schools and universities are undergoing 3-month training. They are old, professional teachers. The preparation of the buildings themselves is being performed by the population of cities, towns and villages. The slogan has been issued: "Our school that is built by us." The peasants are building schools with their own efforts, thus they bring wood from the forest, offer smaller building materials, pioneers are collecting old nails, the peasants are working for free and often donate their last savings. During meetings and rallies, calls are issued to make an effort to build schools. The People's Committee stated that one of the peasants offered materials, which he had saved for his adolescent son, for the construction of a 4-room school. Pioneers in the same province collected 50% of the needed nails, and thus by 20 July they had executed 90% of their commitments. Half of the rooms are being built underground in shelters, so that during alarms lessons can be conducted. Teams of Chinese volunteers are assisting in the construction of the schools, especially the shelter-schools, just as they are helping with harvests or with pulling up weeds, and so on. The Chinese-Korean brotherhood and friendship can be noticed everywhere. On the 24th anniversary of the existence of the Chinese People's Army, workers and Korean women sent many letters and gifts to the Chinese volunteers.

The opening of schools on 1 September is a courageous and difficult undertaking of the DPRK Government. The Minister of Education has told me that the difficulties that are emerging in connection to the opening of the schools fill many people with pessimism. Later in our conversation, he implied that he is counting on Poland to help school youth of the DPRK materially. Then he presented the issue of education in numbers. Before 25 June 1950, 1.5 million children of 7-13 years of age went to school. Now, the register conducted by 1 July yielded the number of 1,080 thousand children. There are 7,600 orphans among children of school age. Minister Pak Ham Un said that they must immediately provide clothes and, what is most important, shoes for 450 thousand children, and apart from that he fears that during winter in freezing temperatures many children will have to interrupt school for lack of clothing. To print school text books, they immediately need 200 tons of paper. They also need 11,230 thousand notebooks, 2.5 million dip pens with nibs, 15 million pencils and the same number of erasers for pencils, chalk for writing on blackboards, school bags, ink. Korea itself can deliver only 50% of chalk, ink and school bags. Further, they need towels, handkerchiefs and medicines for first-aid cases. The minister also told me that supplementary feeding of children in schools needs to be organized, and for now no one knows where they can get the appropriate amounts of products for supplementary feeding.

On 2 July, a so-called war industrial school was opened in north Pyongyang province. It is called "war" because so far only war invalids or the sons of those who fell defending the motherland can go to it. Five military schools were recently opened in the territory of the DPRK.

Kim Il Sung, in his speech directed to writers and artists, said that in their daily work they should in writing demonstrate numerous examples of the heroism of the Korean nation, demonstrate the manliness and heroism of the army. In writing about heroes to demonstrate their working class or peasant origins. To write and show the barbarism of the Americans and Syngman Rhee-ites. The writers' and artists' appearances and works should be characterized by sacred patriotism. Writers and artists should utilize criticism and self-criticism. As they write, they should model themselves on the works of the leading country, the Soviet Union, and the people's democracies.

5.- National Holidays and Celebrations/ The July-August reporting period was rich in numerous celebrations and national holidays. Taking into account that before the outbreak of the war there were only 3 diplomatic posts in Korea, and now there are 7, this was the first time that such populous and ceremonious commemorations took place for in Korea.

On 1 July, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China organized a banquet on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the creation of the Chinese Communist Party. About 40 persons were present. Politburo member, minister of finance Choe Changik (he was in the delegation to Poland in the month of March of this year) spoke on behalf of the Workers' Party. Present were representatives of all diplomatic posts. The DPRK government was represented by the vice-premier, minister of propaganda and minister of security. The Chinese ambassador gave a 15-minute speech, then representatives of the

diplomatic posts in turn took the floor and raised toasts to honor Mao Zedong, Stalin and Kim Il Sung.

On 11 July at 21:00 hours, the Embassy of the Mongolian People's Republic put on a ceremonious celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Republic. Some 200 people were present. The reception took place in the hall of the CC Workers' Party. There was not a single speech, which looked a bit strange in view of the importance of the celebration. Present were: the whole Government, Pak Jeongae, a few members of the CC of the Party, representatives of the press, Lab[or] Un[ions], Women's, Youth Un[ions] etc.

On 22 July, the Embassy of RP [Polish Republic] in the DPRK organized in the CC of the Party hall in Pyongyang, deep underground, a celebration of the National Holiday of the Rebirth of Poland. The room was decorated with: portraits of President Bierut, Stalin and Kim Il Sung, flowers, little flags of the countries of people's democracy whose representatives are present in the DPRK, so the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the Mongolian People's Republic, the People's Republic of Hungary, People's Republic of Romania and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, stood on the main table. Little Polish flags and a lot of flowers stood on all the tables.

Over a hundred people were present, including the whole Government with president Kim Dubong and vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs Pak Heonyeong in the lead, members of the CC of the Party, Pak Jeongae, members of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army, Chinese volunteers, members of the Central Council of the Council of Lab[or] Un[ions], Un[ion] of Dem[ocratic]Wom[en], Youth, labor heroes, peasants' delegates, artists, the press, the Korean Central Telegraphic Agency and the diplomatic corps. The presence of the Ambassador of the Soviet Un[ion], Razuvaev, who apart from our reception was present only at the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Mongolian People's Republic and the 6th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation. Kim Il Sung was absent, as during all the celebrations, but his secretary, Mun Il, apologized twice for Kim Il Sung's absence, adding that he had wanted very much to come especially to the Poles', but the arrival of Gen. Nam Il from Kaesong because of a [no number]-day break impeded him. I made a 10-minute speech in Russian to open the reception. In the middle of the reception, which lasted 4 hours (receptions last a long time here) the film "Wide Road" was shown. After the film I invited all the guests for black coffee, fruit liqueurs and sweets. Polish ham, vodka, cigarettes and sweets were greatly appreciated. The evening ended in a joyful mood with the singing of revolutionary and national songs.

The National Holiday of the Rebirth of Poland met with lively interest in the DPRK. The Korean press ran many articles in which it presents the history of the liberation of Poland as well as achievements in industry, agriculture, construction etc. to its readers. (We will include a translation into Russian of an article from the central organ of the Workers' Party, Rodong Sinmun.) Our film "Wide Road" won great recognition. A few days later, I was told that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs put on a special discussion evening devoted to this film.

On 1 August a celebration of the 24th anniversary of the creation of the Chinese People's Army took place. About a hundred people were present, including numerous representatives of the Chinese volunteers and of the Korean People's Army. Present were all diplomats, apart from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. On that day, Pyongyang and the surrounding area were powerfully bombarded. Because of the bombardments and the poor state of the roads, the reception began 1.5 hours late. The Chargé d'Affaires of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic did not come to the reception, explaining that one should not be late. The hall was decorated with a large number of photographs illustrating the fighting of the Chinese volunteers in Korea. During the reception, a documentary film about the celebration of the creation of the People's Republic of China was shown. The Chinese Ambassador, and no one of the military people, was the host of the reception.

On 15 August, the 6th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation, was celebrated solemnly.

The working class and the peasantry have documented with their anniversary actions that they are prepared for further fighting to defend the sovereignty of their country. The government gave numerous awards for service to raise the output of work, increasing assistance from the rear to the front and for various heroic deeds of the civilian population on the 6th anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation. Railway workers were decorated first of all, already on 4 July, then social workers, [industrial] workers, peasants, writers etc. 150 railway workers, 101 social workers and 1,251 others were decorated.

The decorations are as follows: (1) Order of the National Flag, I, II and III class, (2) Order of Labor, (3) Freedom and Independence Order, (4) Order of Heroic Fighter, (5) Medal for Heroic Deed, (6) Medal for Service.

The central celebration of the anniversary took place in Pyongyang. The celebration of the anniversary was to comprise 3 parts: an exhibition of the achievements and accomplishments of the DPRK, a celebration and a reception. The organization of the exhibition was begun formally and practically on 1 August. The exhibition was to have a section on the countries of people's democracy. The Ambassador of the RP [Polish Republic] in Korea gave photographs, books in Polish about Korea, propaganda materials, 2 films ("Wide Road" and "Chronicle"), a state flag and portraits. For their part, the Koreans also gave examples of Polish gifts to Korea to the exhibition. The exhibition was to be opened on 14 August. On that day, Pyongyang experienced the most powerful bombing since the beginning of the war. The exhibition was bombed, and 13 people, employees of the Ministry of Propaganda and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were busy preparing the opening of the exhibition, perished. The solemn commemoration took place on 14 August at 20:00, and 800 people were present. The commemoration took place in a newly built theater 40 meters underground. The roster of those present included: Kim Il Sung, Dubong, all members of the Government, representatives of the army, a numerous delegation of Chinese volunteers, representatives of social organizations, the diplomatic corps, and so on. Kim Dubong opened, Kim Il Sung made the programmatic

speech, all the representatives of diplomatic posts and army also spoke. The commander of the 4th Army spoke on behalf of the army. At the end of the official part, telegrams were sent to Stalin, Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong. After the official part, artistic performances took place and the film “Young Partisan” was shown. On the 15th in the evening at 19:00 a reception took place. 400 persons were present. During the reception, telegrams from Stalin and Vishinsky arrived. The reception lasted until 4 in the morning.

On 13 August at 13:00 a solemn women’s Celebration took place in Pyongyang. All the women from the diplomatic corps were invited. Pak Jeongae was present. After the Celebration, a film about the 2nd World Peace Congress in Warsaw was shown, in Russian translation. Pak Jeongae said that she had received this film as a gift from the Soviet Embassy.

On 22 August a celebration of the 2nd anniversary of the constitution of the People’s Republic of Hungary took place in the hall of the CC of the Party. About 100 persons were present, including 25 Hungarians (18 doctors and 7 people from the dipl[omatic] mission.) The Hungarian envoy, Pastor, made a 3-minute speech. Of the most important personalities, present were: Kim Dubong, Pak Heonyeong and Pak Jeongae. The Hungarian health team formed a chorus and made the evening pleasant with the singing of national and revolutionary songs.

The Hungarians possess a hospital for 3,000 people in Korea with its own full equipment, ranging from bedroom slippers and dressing gowns to surgical tools and x-ray machines. The hospital is systematically supplied with necessary medicines by Hungary. A part of the hospital with 1,000 beds is located at a dozen or so kilometers from Pyongyang. They are closing down the hospital they have in Manchuria and developing the hospital they have near Pyongyang. The whole Government, party and state activists use the care provided by this hospital.

Recently, a delegation of Hungarian women came from Hungary, and with them 2 journalists and one film operator. Apart from them, a Hungarian reporter arrived in Kaesong.

The Hungarian Diplomatic Mission is richly supplied with means of transportation, gasoline, it also possesses an and so on.

On 23 August in the hall of the CC of the Party a celebration of the national holiday of the People’s Republic of Romania took place. Over a hundred people were present, including the whole Government, President Kim Dubong and many other personalities. In the middle of the reception, 2 Romanian documentary films were shown, one about an exhibition about Korea in Romania and the second about the celebration of the national holiday in 50 in Romania. Both films were received by those present with great interest.

The Romanians possess in Korea, in Sinuiju, a hospital for 3,800 people, fully equipped with their own inventory, drugs, operating rooms and so on, and staffed by a

Romanian health crew of 22 people, including 8 surgeons. The hospital is supplied systematically with necessary medicines by Romania. According to a statement by a Romanian doctor, mortality in this hospital is 0.5%.

6.- Activities of the RP Embassy in Korea. [...]

7.- Offers: a. They are again sending signals about the great need for clothing in Korea. The situation has worsened even more because of the typhoon which struck Korea. Thousands of people are being incessantly tormented by bombardments, which, apart from human losses, take away roofs over their heads and their whole, already miserable, belongings. Right now, the typhoon has taken the homes and total belongings away from more thousands of people. The typhoon destroyed many agricultural fields and brought huge losses in production because many factories, which are usually located underground, have been flooded. In Pyongyang, a bomb destroyed a dam and the water flooded parts of the city. The situation of the population is very difficult. Half-naked people and naked, haggard children are nesting in caves in the hills.

b) I suggest that we take care of the school-age children, so help with clothing, shoes, writing materials, medicines and food.

c) I suggest that because of the great shortage of transportation we send ambulances for the health service. I believe that we must continue to send all medicines, and especially vaccinations against tetanus.

d) I suggest sending spades, pickaxes and hoes because I have seen myself many times how in Pyongyang following bombardments people removed the rubble with their hands. The need for these tools also stems from conversations I have conducted with various employees of ministries. I also suggest sending pneumatic hammers and drills. Shelters are still being built in Korea for various goals and tools that they are using in construction are the hammer and steel cutter. Building a shelter with such tools requires a lot of time and many hands.

e) I believe that there should be a permanent ambassador in Korea. All the diplomatic posts, except for the Polish and Czechoslovak ones, are staffed by ambassadors or envoys. Comrades from the Soviet Union and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have questioned me whether an ambassador has been nominated yet.

Deperasinski [signature]

R. Deperasinski

2nd secretary of the Embassy of the Polish Republic in Korea
Charge d' Affaires ad in.

List of Enclosures.

[...]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 67

[Stamp: Secretariat of Cde. Vyshinsky

SECRET

Incoming N° 5508-v

10 September 1951]

SECRET Copy N° [1]

10 September 1951

N° 1417/1dv

**RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DPRK EMBASSY
COUNSELLOR LI [DON GEN]**

10 September 1951

Li [Don Gen] called today and at the instruction of the Ambassador reported that the Ambassador had authorized Embassy Counsellor Li [Don Gen] to become acquainted with materials regarding the issues of the administration of POW camps.

Assistant Chief of the 1st DVO [Far East Department]
[signature] F. KHALIN

Distributed [to]:

[Copy] 1 - to Cde. Vyshinsky

2 - Cde. Zorin

3 - Cde. Podtserob

4 - to file

[Partially legible handwritten comments in the left margin]

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AVPRF

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Op. 7

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p. 26

pp. 38-41

FROM THE JOURNAL OF

F. P. KHALIN

[repeated heading information from the previous page but with serial N° 1418/1dv]

**RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DPRK EMBASSY
COUNSELLOR LI [DON GEN]**

7 September 1951

In accordance with the instructions of Cde. I. I. Lobanov I invited Li [Don Gen] and informed him that in connection with Embassy note N° 979 regarding receiving materials associated with the practice of administering POW camps in the USSR the appropriate department can verbally familiarize the Embassy with the available materials about this question. After the Embassy reports the name of the Embassy representative who is authorized to familiarize himself with these materials we can inform [him] of the time and place where the Embassy representative will obtain the corresponding information about this question.

Li [Don Gen] promised to report about this message to his Ambassador and to also report the name of the Embassy representative.

Assistant Chief of the 1st DVO
[signature] F. KhALIN

Distributed [to]:
[Copy] 1 - to Cde. Vyshinsky
2 - Cde. Zorin
3 - Cde. Podtserob
4 - to file

from the journal of
[F.P.] Khalin

Secret Copy N° 4
13 September 1951
[N°] 1449/1dv

RECORD OF A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DPRK EMBASSY
COUNSELLOR LI [DON GEN]

13 September 1951

1. In accordance with an agreement between the USSR MFA and the USSR MVD today MFA representatives Cdes. Kobulov, [D]enisov, and Mayorov met at [illegible time] with DPRK Embassy Counsellor Li [Don Gen] and gave detailed replies to questions in accordance with the questionnaire attached to note N° 979 of the DPRK Embassy regarding the practice of administering POW camps in the USSR.

With the agreement of Cde. Kobulov Li [Don Gen] made some notes for himself that he needed. At the end of the conversation, which lasted [three] hours, Li [Don Gen] thanked the MID representatives for the information.

I was present at this conversation at the instruction of Cde. V. V. Vas'kov.

2. Li [Don Gen] said that the Ambassador had charged him with finding out in the [one word illegible] what was the term of the agreements concluded with the Korean workers who were recruited in Korea for work in the Soviet fishing industry. The counsellor explained that he [asked] this question [because] letters come to the Embassy from Korean workers in the fishing industry in the Far East in which they ask the Embassy to help them return to Korea since the term of the agreements with them has expired but, in spite of this, they are not being sent to Korea.

Li [Don Gen] was told that the issue of the extension of the term with the Korean workers working in the Soviet fishing industry was raised with the DPRK government and they had given consent to extend the agreement with these workers for another year.

Li said that if the DPRK government had informed the Embassy about the fact that they had given their consent to extend the labor agreements with these workers the Embassy would not have raised the issue with the MFA.

The conversation ended with this.

Assistant Chief of the 1st DVO [signature] F. KhALIN
[Distribution, as above]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 68

Received by diplomatic pouch from
Cde. Razuvayev, the Soviet Ambassador
to the DPRK, 2 October 1951

Top Secret
[handwritten:] 10 September 1951

[Handwritten:]
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POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND KOREAN-CHINESE RELATIONS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE ARMISTICE TALKS

Political Attitudes

The proposal about armistice negotiations was greeted with some caution by the Korean leaders, without straightforward or outspoken statements.

Although the majority of them understood the situation which has developed and agreed on the need for an armistice nevertheless the conclusion can be drawn from personal observation that the Korean leaders were depressed by the realization that the war which has ruined the country has not led to the unification of Korea and that now they have been forced to reconcile themselves to the restoration of the prewar status quo in considerably worse conditions.

The statement of Cde. Malin was viewed by the Koreans as an expression of the evident desire of China to seek an armistice and free itself from the burden of aiding Korea. This desire was noted by Kim Il Sung with great disappointment as a result of a trip to [Beijing] in July. At the same time Kim Il Sung objectively evaluated China's strength, capabilities, and interests along with Korea's role in the overall struggle of the democratic camp. Warning of the desire of some comrades to ask for aid from the Soviet Union Kim Il Sung repeatedly spoke in the tone that the Soviet Union represents the main reserve of the democratic camp for which it is premature to enter the fight.

The same ambivalence has also been observed in the attitudes of the broad circles of the Korean public. On the one hand, a general war fatigue and a desire to avoid further ordeals have been sensed. On the other, feelings of disappointment have become widespread that the armistice proposal was taken as a crushing of the hopes for final victory.

The spread of similar attitudes has been promoted to a considerable degree by the fact that for several days after Cde. Malin's statement the North Korean press and other propaganda organs did not explain the significance of his proposal and did not comment on it at all. Only after the address of Ridgway and Kim Il Sung about the start of negotiations did the Korean press devote a number of articles to Cde. Malin's proposal, welcoming it, and until recently systematically covered the negotiations and the issues associated with it in the spirit of the above proposal.

The Koreans have done much propaganda work around the negotiations, exposing the aggressive position of the Americans through the press and radio, inciting public opinion against them, and providing substantial support to the Chinese-Korean delegation at Kaesong. (We have not cited the response of the Korean press to the armistice negotiations inasmuch as they have been widely reproduced by the Soviet press).

It ought to be pointed out that the attitudes against an armistice noted above turned out to be fluctuating and quickly changed in favor of ending the war. This was facilitated by many circumstances: the calamities endured by the population, general war fatigue, the wrecking of the economy, and an increase of American air raids, the prolonged lack of success at the front, the influence of democratic propaganda, etc. During the negotiations at Kaesong the Koreans have become accustomed to thinking of a possible end to the war and breakdowns in the negotiations are received by the Koreans with alarm and disappointment every time.

In South Korea Malin's proposal was greeted with open hostility by the Syngman Rhee regime, which had cherished hopes that it would spread its authority to all Korea with help from the interventionists. The South Koreans organized protest demonstrations against the armistice negotiations. At the end of June the National Assembly of South Korea opposed ending the war at the 38th parallel.

Although a representative of the South Korean army was included in the delegation to conduct negotiations at the instructions of the Americans the Syngman Rhee government did not stop opposing an armistice. On 31 July it organized a mass demonstration under the slogan, "Unification or death!". At the same time it undertook a number of diplomatic demarches in the same direction. For example, at a press conference on 10 August [Li An Muk], the South Korean envoy to London, spoke of his appeal to the British government:

"I request that the British government not try to establish a false peace in Korea. The real situation needs to be studied for this. A fierce war is unfolding in Korea right now and there cannot be talk of peace at this time". [Li An Muk] declared that his government considers the disarmament of the Communists of North Korea necessary and for such a situation to be ensured through the UN in which third countries cannot give North Korea military, economic, or other aid.

The hostile attitude of the South Koreans to the armistice negotiations is evidently explained not only by the fact that in an armistice they see the collapse of their plans to seize North Korea but also that their position completely suits the Americans. The latter, [to put] pressure on the Chinese-Korean side during the negotiations, second, to put pressure on their satellites who are insisting on an armistice and, third, to raise the [political] prestige of the South Koreans in the event of a collapse of the negotiations.

Chinese-Korean Relations

During the entire history of the negotiations a difference can be observed in the approach to them by the Chinese and the Koreans.

Recognizing the military and political necessity of concluding an armistice, Kim Il Sung and other Korean leaders considered it mandatory to hold negotiations in order not to damage the honor and undermine the prestige of the DPRK. The Chinese were inclined to make concessions to the Americans just to obtain an armistice agreement.

When doing so the Chinese have not always strived to coordinate their position with the Koreans in a timely or tactful fashion, which has often caused the latter obvious irritation. For example, the Koreans sent to [Beijing] their draft reply to Ridgway's first speech, which was essentially little different than [Beijing]'s draft. The Chinese did not reply to the Korean draft but on the evening of 1 August they simply reported that the text of a reply from Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai cited in a telegram would be transmitted over [Beijing] Radio at a certain time and which should be simultaneously transmitted over Pyongyang Radio. Inasmuch as the telegram was sent late Pyongyang Radio broadcast [it]

an hour later than [Beijing] [Radio], which was immediately noticed by American propaganda. Naturally, Kim Il Sung was upset about such a method of cooperation.

[Beijing] sent to Kaesong a large group of diplomatic and military officials headed by [Li Kuo Nyn]*, a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the CPC CC Department of Information. This group also included Chao, deputy chairman of a government commission on foreign affairs (Zhou Enlai is the chairman). The Chinese warned the Koreans that, besides instructions from above, their representatives should also be guided the decisions of the joint working meetings of the Chinese and Korean representatives which would be held daily under the chairmanship of [Li Kuo Nyn]. Later, Nam Il complained that he differed on a number of issues with Li, who displayed excessive amenability and complacency with regard to the Americans.

* The writing of the Chinese names is possibly inaccurate.

Li drew up draft replies to both Joy's speeches as well as Ridgway's statements. However, not all of his drafts were approved by Mao Zedong, especially recently. At the end of August Mao Zedong rebuked Li in connection with the fact that in his formulation of a position he was making the Chinese interest in ending the war too obvious to the Americans and as a consequence this reduced the hope of success in the negotiations.

In connection with the 12 July incident (the issue of not allowing foreign correspondents into Kaesong and the reconsideration of the agreement about the neutral zone) Kim Il Sung prepared his own reply to Ridgway in which he simultaneously exposed the baselessness of the accusations raised by the Americans, while meeting Ridgway's insistence halfway. However, the Chinese, without asking the opinion of Kim Il Sung, simply informed him of the text of Ridgway's reply [SIC, *otvet Ridzhuehya*; should be *otvet Ridzhuehyu*, "to Ridgway"] for transmission via Pyongyang Radio at a certain time. The Chinese reply did not satisfy Kim Il Sung inasmuch as it lacked criticism of Ridgway's purely propagandistic statement. The incident essentially was explained not as a violation of the agreement between liaison officers by the Americans, but simply as lack of agreement and Ridgway's demands were accepted as justified and well-founded. However, Kim Il Sung was deprived of an opportunity to express his opinion.

On 27 May Mao Zedong informed Kim Il Sung that if the Americans insist on recognizing the current front line as the demarcation line the Chinese consider it possible to make the concession to the Americans. Mao Zedong asked Kim Il Sung to report his opinion about this question. Kim Il Sung replied to Mao Zedong immediately that he considers such a tactic impossible because it would mean a serious political blow to the DPRK and also because the regions of North Korea occupied by the Americans have great economic and strategic value.

After Kim Il Sung's reply to Mao Zedong, frustrated, he declared in a conversation with Pak Heonyeong, "I would sooner agree to continue the war without Chinese aid than to make such a concession. It makes no difference, we don't need such a Korea". Evidently, this reply was not casual. It was an expression not only of national sentiments but also of

certain political calculations. Kim Il Sung is not inclined to seek an armistice through concessions which undermine the prestige of the DPRK, hoping that in the final account China and the Soviet Union will not allow the DPRK to be defeated.

After the American representatives made an excessive demand about the establishment of a demarcation line in the rear of the people's forces [*narodnye voyska*], on 28 July Mao Zedong sent Kim Il Sung a telegram in which he recommended the American proposal be categorically rejected, to word it strongly, and to remind them that their supremacy at sea and in the air did not prevent the KNA troops from being in the area of Taegu and twice south of Seoul. Mao Zedong's telegram was greeted by Kim Il Sung with great enthusiasm.

The decisive position of the Chinese with respect to recent American provocations in the region of the negotiations also lifted the Koreans' mood.

Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that recent months have brought a cooling in relations between the Koreans and the Chinese and a further strengthening of the Koreans' orientation toward the Soviet Union. The retreat from Suwon to the 38th parallel at a moment when the Americans were already preparing for an evacuation from Korea, the abandonment of large offensive operations, the constant references to the unpreparedness of the troops for an offensive, the clear desire to end the war at the 38th parallel, all this seriously undermined the authority of the Chinese in the eyes of the Korean leaders, although the latter realize what difficulties China encounters.

The failure in negotiations only strengthens these attitudes. The Korean leaders think, first, that thanks to the Chinese the intentions of the Chinese-Korean side and its interest in peace were too fully identified during the negotiations. All the proposals were described in final form at the very start of the negotiations, which deprived [them] of an opportunity for further bargaining and mutual concessions. Second, Kim Il Sung and Pak Heonyeong are cautiously expressing the opinion that [Beijing] is pursuing an inconsistent policy. All this, in the opinion of the Koreans, explains the uncompromising position of the Americans and their desire to impose the shameful conditions of an armistice.

At the present time a desire is being observed among the Korean friends to possibly achieve an armistice more rapidly.

USSR AMBASSADOR in KOREA

10 September 1951

V. Razuvayev

Authenticated: [illegible signature]

Distributed to

Cdes: Stalin

Molotov

Malenkov

Beria
Mikoyan
Kaganovich
Bulganin
Khrushchev
Suslov
648-VK
V.X.51

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 69

Secret
Copy N° 1

USSR EMBASSY TO THE DPRK

N° 184 11 September 1951

TO THE CHIEF OF THE 1ST FAR EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA

to Cde. G. I. TUNKIN

Attached I am attaching a memorandum to you, "The Political Attitudes of the Population of North and South Korea in Connection with the Negotiations in Kaesong", compiled by A. Shemyakin, attaché of the USSR Embassy to the DPRK.

COUNSELLOR OF THE USSR EMBASSY TO THE DPRK

[signature]
(V. IVANENKO)

[Stamp:]
USSR MFA
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MEMORANDUM

THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF THE POPULATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS IN KAESONG

1. The Political Attitudes of the Population of the DPRK

1. At the start of the negotiations

On 23 June 1951 USSR Representative to the UN A. Ya. Malik made a proposal via radio about opening negotiations between the warring sides in Korea on the question of a ceasefire and the establishment of an armistice in Korea with a mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.

The vital, fundamental interests of the Korean people are peace, freedom, and independence of the country and therefore all the Korean people who are striving for a peaceful solution to the Korean problem eagerly supported the Soviet proposal about a ceasefire in Korea and the establishment of an armistice on condition of a withdrawal of the forces of both warring sides from the 38th parallel.

On 30 June American General Ridgway, the Commanding General of the so-called "UN Armed Forces" in Korea, turned to Kim Il Sung, the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Dehuai, the Commanding General of the Chinese volunteers, with a proposal to begin negotiations about a ceasefire and the conclusion of an armistice in Korea.

In their 1 July 1951 reply to Ridgway Kim Il Sung, the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army, and General Peng Dehuai, the Commanding General of the Chinese volunteers, agreed to open negotiations concerning a ceasefire in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice and, in turn, proposed that negotiations begin in the city of Kaesong (on the 38th parallel) from 10 to 15 July*.

* The newspaper [Choguk Chonson], 5 July 1951

On 10 July 1951 negotiations on a ceasefire in Korea and the conclusion of an armistice began in the city of Kaesong (on the 38th parallel) between representatives of the American General Ridgway and representatives of the Main Command of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers.

The Korean people have always strived and are striving for a peaceful solution to the Korean problem, the problem of creating a united, independent, democratic Korean state.

The Korean people want peace and therefore welcome the opening of the negotiations in Kaesong.

The first step toward a peaceful solution to the Korean problem is a ceasefire and the establishment of an armistice in Korea. But the basis, the basic condition for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and for the establishment of peace in the Far East, is the following necessary aspects:

1. The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and a halt to the US armed intervention in Korea,
2. Granting the Korean people the right to determine their fate themselves.

This was the unanimous opinion of the Korean people.

It was expressed by the Korean press. The newspaper Minju Choson devoted its entire lead article, entitled "A First Step to a Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Issue", to this question in its 3 July 1951 issue.

The response of the population was as follows.

Some examples.

For example, worker Kim [Sok Phan] (from the headquarters of the Pyongyang Railroad) said about this:

"I completely support the statement of Kim Il Sung.

During these negotiations we should solve all problems on the basis of the following principles:

A withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and the solution of the Korean issue by the Korean people themselves".

The Korean people regarded the proposal of the American imperialists about a ceasefire and the establishment of an armistice in Korea as an admission by the American imperialists themselves of their military and political failures and the collapse of their attempts to seize North Korea and subjugate the Korean people by armed force. The Korean people were not intimidated by threats, were not subjugated by the interventionists, they continued and [still] continue to wage a heroic struggle for the honor, freedom, and independence of their native land, displaying steadfastness, courage, and heroism.

In light of this [Hen Hun], the Chairman of the CC of the united trade unions of Korea, speaking on the pages of the newspaper Minju Choson, said the following:

"The armed American imperialist invaders dreamed of subjugating the Korean people and turning our Korea into a strategic military base to achieve their expansionist ends in the Far East through the mass killing of civilians and the barbaric destruction of our cities, villages, mills, factories, and enterprises.

Therefore they unleashed an expansionist war and in one year of war have inundated Korea with the blood of the Korean people and turned our country into ruins.

However the Korean people have won a great victory in a military and political sense in displaying unprecedented courage and heroism in the fight against the interventionists, waging battle in the ruins, ashes, and a sea of blood.

During this time the Korean people, the nucleus of which is the working class, firmly rallied its ranks together as never before. And aid to the Korean people increased from the peaceloving countries of the world at the same time.

And, on the other hand, just the reverse, the attempts of the interventionists to subjugate the Korean people in a lightning war failed. The interventionists were met with hatred not only from the peaceloving peoples of the world but even from the people of their own country, and their isolation is increasing.

In such circumstances they were forced to come to the realization that their attempts to subjugate the Korean people by force of arms had completely failed and to the understanding that it is useless to continue the war in Korea.

The US government was forced to make an official proposal to open negotiations on the issue of ending hostilities and about an armistice in Korea".

Continuing further, he declared total support for the peace negotiations:

"The united trade unions of Korea, which represent the workers of Korea, think that the negotiations about ending hostilities and an armistice can bring great benefit to the prevention of a new war and creating peace throughout the entire world and therefore support these negotiations".

But he added that in undertaking peace negotiations it is necessary to be especially vigilant with regard to the American imperialists:

"However, in undertaking negotiations about ending hostilities and an armistice, we should increase our vigilance even more since the perfidious imperialists might prepare some new plot by making use of the moment of the negotiations"*

* The newspaper [Minju Chonson], 6 July 1951

The leading sections of the population also recognize the fact that in connection with the fact of peace negotiations themselves between the armed forces of the US and

representatives of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers the authority of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the international arena increases.

Printing house worker Li [Syn The] said:

"This time the prestige of Korea has increased even further.

The Americans should accept our proposals and we will persistently offer to solve some issues in these negotiations".

But the people have also seen difficulties in the path to solving the Korean issue.

A special difficulty in this path is the American imperialists, who are striving to seize and enslave all Korea, and who do not want a peaceful solution to the Korean issue.

Worker Kim [In Chan] (headquarters of the Pyongyang Railroad) said [the following] about this:

"The issues of peaceful resolution of the Korean issue has been raised several times in the past. However, as a result of the fact that obstacles were created by the Americans, the solution of these issues was frustrated.

They will act the same way this time.

The popular masses regard the Americans with great mistrust and they do not believe them since they might be deceitful.

For example, city dweller [Dzoy Yen Ge] (Pyongyang city, Kenrimni Quarter) said:

"We do not know what perfidious ideas they have under the mask of 'peace'. If this is not so, then I think that the peace negotiations are a good thing".

A mistrustful attitude toward the Americans has spread both among the urban population and among the peasants. Peasant Choe [Dzyn Su] (Mirimni Village, Pyongyang city) said, "The Americans are offering to end hostilities but, judging from the experience of the work of the joint Soviet-American commission, it is difficult to believe in the success of these negotiations".

Pak [Ken He], Chief of the Criminal Department of the Supreme Court, said on 1 July 1951:

"The Soviet representative made a proposal to end the war in Korea so that the destruction of people does not continue and in order to bring peace.

But the war is not stopping since the American imperialists do not agree with this proposal".

Thus it needs to be noted that the Korean people do not believe the "peace" statements of the Americans and do not believe in the sincerity of their statements.

Representatives of various social strata of the population were united in their fervent desire and demand that the American troops leave Korea.

Pak [Gi Hwan], Secretary of the League of Protestants, declared:

"As a pastor, I have always defended peace. Since the American imperialists began the war first they should be the first to throw down [their] arms and leave Korea. Only then will the Korean issue be solved".

Representatives of various political parties and public organizations pointed in their statements to the need to increase vigilance with regard to the enemy.

For example, Pak [Nam Un], Minister of Education (a member of the Workers Party), regarded the American proposal to open armistice negotiations as a step having "the goal of winning time. Their aggressive ends remained unchanged. Although the negotiations about ending the war and an armistice are being held we should be making use of this time to further strengthen our armed forces".

The idea is advanced in statements by senior officials that it is necessary to be especially vigilant even after the conclusion of an armistice agreement and vigilant with respect to rising Japanese imperialism, since the US is now rearming Japan.

For example, Choe [Ryan], Deputy Chief of the Directorate of Propaganda of the Ministry of Culture, said:

"We cannot rest content even after the conclusion of an agreement to end the war, for the US is now rearming Japan".

But at the same time excessively optimistic attitudes have appeared among a certain part of office workers and merchants in connection with the news of the opening of negotiations. Those who hold such opinions, overestimating their own strength, viewed the American proposal about negotiations as their capitulation and thought that the war would end soon.

Merchant [Sin Chon Gir] (Samri Quarter, north region of Pyongyang city) said: "Today at the bazaar many people say that the war is ending".

Officer worker [Hen Ho Bom] (western Pyongyang) spoke this way: "The Americans proposed halting military operations first because of their weakness.

From ancient times the weak are the first to propose ending a war and raise [their] hands. Our demands in these negotiations ought to have the goal of forcing the weak to capitulate".

The Workers Party has done much political educational work among the population.

Rallies have been held on the issue of the peace negotiations in units of the People's Army, at mills, factories, mines, on the railroad, at enterprises, and in the countryside to further raise the vigilance of the people with regard to possible provocations from the American imperialists.

The main ideas of the statements of senior government and Party officials were these:

- 1) Negotiations about ending hostilities and concluding an armistice should become the basis for the establishment of peace in Korea, for a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, and to stop the threat of a new world war;
- 2) The withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea is an essential condition for a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue;
- 3) When entering into negotiations the Korean people should triple their vigilance, and rally more closely around the popular democratic government and the leader, Kim Il Sung.

The broad agitation and explanatory work which has been conducted has promoted an increase in political consciousness and increased the vigilance of the popular masses.

For example, worker Kim [Hen Sik] (35 years old) said the following:

"I listened to Malik's speech on 26 June while reading the newspaper.

It became clearer to me why the American imperialists are killing Korean people and turning our homes into ashes. I gritted my teeth from anger.

I will exert all my efforts in the struggle to expel and defeat the enemies, I will fight to exceed my work quotas".

Expressing the opinion of the soldiers of the People's Army, [An Syn Hak], a soldier of Korean People's Army Military Unit N° 895, said the following:

"The American imperialists do not have the ability to win on the Korean front. Therefore they have now made such a proposal in order to win time and get out of a situation which has become difficult for them. They need to be strongly pressed at such a moment so that they do not rear their heads any more".

Ridgway's proposal is nothing other than an attempt for the US to pose as a peacemaker and restore its prestige".

In the working class, in the poorest and middle strata of the peasantry and also in the Korean People's Army the primary attitude and desire was to fight for the freedom and independence of the native land, fight the enemy, and "grit [their] teeth", until victory.

In the petty bourgeois strata and among intellectuals and merchants, at the same time as a desire for a final solution of the Korean issue there was a desire for the fastest possible end to the war.

The general demand was the demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea as the main condition for a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.

The political attitudes of the population reflect the fierce class struggle going on in the country.

Elements of domestic reaction and agents of American and South Korean intelligence continued to pursue subversive work against the popular democratic system.

At the same time as espionage and subversive activity is being conducted reactionary elements are trying to spread various provocative and false rumors about the supposed "weakness" of the USSR, the "inability" of the USSR to resist the American armed forces, rumors about the "strength" and "might" of the US, of the allegedly numerous supporters of Syngman Rhee, etc. and thereby try to spread decadent sentiments and sow lack of faith in their own strength among the masses.

An example:

Protestant pastor Kim [Su Ip] (Pyongyang city) spoke this way:

"I also support Malik's speech. Among other opinions there is the opinion that the Soviet Union is striving for peace because it is difficult for them to resist the armed forces and material resources which the American imperialists will create by concluding a separate peace treaty with Japan and rearming Japan. Finally, a third world war will break out as a result of rearming Japan".

Domestic reactionaries, supporting Malik's speech in words, are in reality waging a campaign of slander against the USSR.

The enemy agent network is spreading false rumors that "the Korean people are supposedly an unlucky people", that "many Koreans have died in the war and that many more will die", etc.

But the Korean people are confident in their strength, believe in the strength of the peoples of the Soviet Union and all the peaceloving peoples of the world, and in spite of

all the enemy intrigues, are courageously continuing to wage a heroic struggle for the freedom and independence of their native land.

2. During the Negotiations

A certain insincerity of the Americans on the issue of ending the war and establishing an armistice in Korea has been observed from the very beginning of the Kaesong negotiations and their desire to drag out and wreck the negotiations (the issue of foreign correspondents, the issue of the neutral zone, etc.) has been revealed.

During the negotiations American aircraft continued and even increase the barbaric bombing and shelling of the peaceful villages and cities of the country.

The unfounded and brazen demands presented by the Americans during the negotiations (about a military demarcation line, etc) and the open provocations have greatly hindered the negotiations in Kaesong and in the final account led to an impasse. Their further direction is not yet clear.

The expansionist ambitions of the American imperialists with respect to Korea were exposed during the Kaesong negotiations.

All the sectors of the population were incensed and expressed their angry protest against the provocative actions of the Americans.

Reflecting public opinion, the Party and democratic press have widely published responses and statements by representatives of various social strata and representatives of the public.

Here are some examples of the statements:

Worker [Chan Su Nam] declared:

"The perfidious American imperialists, seeing our constant efforts to establish peace, think that all is happening as though from our weakness. And at the same time, when armistice negotiations were going on in Kaesong, they attacked the Kaesong neutral zone and even bombed the area where our representatives were located in order to kill our representatives. At the meetings they stubbornly kept to their position on the issue of establishing a military demarcation line with which we could never agree".

In conclusion worker [Chan Su Nam] declared, "I hate the American invaders who are behaving very insincerely"*.

* Rodong Sinmun, 26 August 1951

Peasant Pak [Yen Su] ([Wasani] village, [Limwon] Rural District, [Dedon] District, South P'yongan Province) declared:

"We fervently want peace but in wanting peace we cannot tolerate American aggression in our Korea. The Korean people want a genuine peace which provides freedom and happiness. But the American imperialists consider themselves to be 'victors' and are openly pursuing expansionist ends during the negotiations".

And further, continuing, Pak [Yen Su] declared that if the American imperialists are not exhibiting sincerity during the negotiations then they will have to bear all the responsibility for ending the armistice negotiations and all the consequences resulting from this"*.

* Op. cit.

Cde. [No Ir Sen], an instructor at Primary School N° 6 of Pyongyang city, said:

"The American invaders have become the hated enemies of all honest people who love freedom and peace.

The have lost all the reason which ordinary people have. They are cynics who openly commit barbaric crimes and provocations without any conscience in order to wreck the peace negotiations being conducted in Korea.

The American invaders are barbarians who have lost the last bit of conscience"*.

* The newspaper Rodong Sinmun, 26 August 1951

The Workers Party has done much political explanatory work in the masses, among the population exposing the expansionist plans of the American imperialists.

This has further promoted an increase in the political consciousness of the popular masses and the closer consolidation of the ranks of the Korean fighters.

The activity of the workers in the struggle is growing and their unity is increasing.

It has become clearer to the broadest sectors of the DPRK population that the American imperialists are bringing slavery and death to the Korea people in light of the recent events of the period of the Kaesong negotiations. Recognition is growing of the fact that the salvation of the motherland from rule by the American armed interventionists and their agents, the South Korean bands, is the greatest cause and common duty of all the Korean people.

The movement for the creation of "A League to Struggle for the Salvation of the Motherland Against American Imperialists and National Traitors" ([Hanmi Thoyok Kuguk Tonmen]) has strengthened in the country. The League sets as its goal a struggle to defeat the American invaders who have invaded Korea's land; for the defeat of their

lackeys, the South Korean bands; and for the unity, freedom, and complete independence of their native land.

II. Political Attitudes of the Population of South Korea in Connection with the Kaesong Negotiations

The population of South Korea, yearning for an enduring peace to be secured and an end to calamities and suffering, supported the proposal to open negotiations concerning an end to hostilities and the conclusion of an armistice.

The broad popular masses favor the withdrawal from Korea of American troops and the troops of the other interventionists.

The popular masses want the Korean people to decide their fate themselves.

The traitorous clique of Syngman Rhee which was put in power in South Korea by the American imperialists immediately sharply opposed the opening of armistice negotiations. This clique is striving not to establish peace in Korea but to further inflame the war.

But the opinion of a bunch of South Korean traitors differs sharply from the opinion of the entire Korean people.

In his 25 June radio speech devoted to the first anniversary of the start of the war in Korea Syngman Rhee, the traitor of the Korean people and the puppet South Korean "President", declared:

"I oppose any agreements which are not directed at the unification of all the Korean people".

On 27 June a session of the puppet South Korean national assembly was held which heard a report from [Di Te Hen], Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission, [entitled] "The International and Domestic Situation in Connection with the Question of Ending the War".

After the report 11 deputies of the "National Assembly" spoke. One of the speakers, [Hwan The Din], declared that, "Ending the war means a defeat for the Republic of Korea" and suggested opposing the proposal to end the war; he proposed sending an "Appeal Against Ending the War" to the UN and the governments of the US government and the other countries who had sent their forces to the Korean front.

This proposal was adopted by the session. The practical implementation of this proposal was entrusted by the session to the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Commission.

On 1 July the South Korean authorities held a rally against ending the war in the city of Busan.

In order to expand such a movement throughout the entire country the chief of the information directorate of the South Korean government gave all provincial governors instructions to develop a mass movement and organize protest rallies against ending the war.

On 30 June, after General Ridgway made his proposal about conducting negotiations, the Syngman Rhee clique proposed the following conditions as so-called "conditions to end the war":

- 1) the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops from Korea,
- 2) the disarmament of the North Korean troops,
- 3) a halt to aid to North Korea, etc.

These so-called "conditions to end the war" were clearly calculated at wrecking the peace negotiations.

The Syngman Rhee clique also held the same position of wrecking the peace negotiations in August, opposing the establishment of peace in Korea.

Li [An Muk], the new envoy of the Syngman Rhee clique to Britain, declared at a press conference on 10 August that a fierce war is developing in Korea and there can be no talk of peace. He directed a request to the government of Britain not to try to establish a false peace in Korea but rather to first study the real state of affairs in Korea. He declared in the process that the government of the Republic of Korea (that is, the Syngman Rhee clique - Sh. A.) thinks that a halt to military operations at a certain line in Korea will restore political obstacles to the establishment of peace in Korea*.

* Radio London, 11 August, United Press radio monitoring

On 3 September Syngman Rhee made the following statement at a press conference in the city of Busan:

"I completely support the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Forces which he has taken in the Kaesong negotiations"*.

* Radio London, 3 September, UP, radio monitoring of 4 September 1951.

This is one more confirmation that the Syngman Rhee clique is against the armistice negotiations and against the establishment of peace in Korea, and it is for fomenting war.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Summing up the above, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The expansionist plans of the American imperialists with respect to Korea and the Korean people were once again exposed during the Kaesong negotiations (July and August 1951).

2. The movement among the popular masses of Korea against the American expansionists and their agents has strengthened.

The movement for the creation in Korea of "A League to Struggle for the Salvation of the Motherland Against American Imperialists and National Traitors" is a direct political expression of this process. The "League" sets as its goal a struggle against the American interventionists and their agents for the unity, freedom, and complete independence of their native land.

The memorandum was drawn up by
Attaché of the Soviet Embassy in the DPRK

[signature] (A. SHEMYAKIN)

Official responsible for the memorandum
Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in the DPRK

[signature] (V. IVANENKO)

3 copies. go.

- 1 - to Cde. Gromyko
- 2 - to the 1st DVO
- 3 - to file

[Faded archival stamp, filled in by hand:]

F. 0102

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1 August 1994

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DOCUMENT NO. 70

[Source: TsAMO RF F. 64 IAK. Op. 173543. D. 73. pp. 22-69. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

[NO DATE: written after 15 September 1951]

Memorandum for the Record on the Condition and the Results of the Combat Operations of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps During the Period from November 1950 through September 1951.

I. The Composition, Grouping, Means of Utilization, and Combat Capabilities of Enemy Aviation

The total strength of enemy combat aircraft as of 1 September 1951 is up to 1,650 aircraft, including more than 200 bombers, up to 600 fighters, up to 100 reconnaissance aircraft, and up to 800 naval aircraft of various types.

The basing of enemy aircraft is distributed [as follows]:

on Korean territory: 400 fighters, up to 40 bombers (predominantly night [bombers] of the B-26 type), 60 reconnaissance aircraft, and 150 naval aircraft.

on the Japanese islands: 190 fighters, 170 bombers, including 60 B-29's on Okinawa and 30 B-29's, 70 B-26's, and up to 20 reconnaissance aircraft at Japanese air bases.

on seven aircraft carriers in the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, up to 620 aircraft of various types.

The main fighter forces, whose total strength is up to 300 aircraft (including up to 80 F-86's, 34 F-84's, 23 Gloster Meteor-4's, more than 100 F-80's, and 60 F-51's, are based at the main forward airfields of Korea (Kimp'o, Seoul, and Suwon).

Mainly reconnaissance aircraft of various types and night bombers and also up to 150 naval aircraft are based at rear airfields.

The main principle for the employment of American aircraft in this theater is the massing of its forces in the main sectors of combat operations of the ground forces against the primary rear installations and lines of communication with close coordination with all branches of aviation. The ground attack operations of the fighters, which take on the nature of a constant effect on Chinese-Korean troops beyond the area of combat operations of the corps, find the broadest use of enemy aircraft in combat operations. In regions protected by the corps' formations, the enemy ground attack and bomber air operations have the nature of periodic echeloned and concentrated attacks, massed efforts of predominantly ground attack fighters under the protection of a large number of fighters with a ratio of 1:2.1 [and] 1:3. When doing this the favorite method of supporting the ground attack aircraft and bombers is sending fighter "screens" into the area where our fighters are likely to appear. In air battles with our fighters the enemy mainly uses F-86 and partly F-84 aircraft, striving in all cases to create a numerical superiority. Other types of enemy fighters avoid combat with us as a rule. If there is an unfavorable correlation of forces or tactical position, in every case they do not accept battle and withdraw to the sea or beyond the range of our fighters.

Suffering significant losses in battles with our fighters, especially in the last four months, the enemy tries not to make patterns in the use of his aircraft and reacts very quickly to

our operations, while trying to understand the positive aspects of the tactics of our fighters.

Considering the basing, the total strength, and the nature of the operations of enemy aviation [the following] can be expected in the area protected by the corps:

- in the area of Dandong - periodic mass air raids in group of from 30 to 70 B-29 bombers or F-80 and F-51 ground attack aircraft protected by from 60 to 150 F-86, F-84, and Gloster "Meteor" fighters; during the day there might be no more than one raid of a large group or two raids of smaller groups, totaling up to 220 bombers, ground attack aircraft, and fighters;
- in the area of [Sensen], [Ansyu], and [Bugdin] - periodic bombing and ground attack operations in groups of from four to 16 B-29 bombers and F-80 and F-51 ground attack aircraft closely escorted by 12-30 F-84's and a screen of 30-60 F-86's and Gloster "Meteor"s in the area of [Syarenkan], [Sensen], and [Kidzio]. In individual cases the composition of the ground attack aircraft group may reach 24-30 aircraft. There might be a total of two concentrated raids a day with an overall total of up to 200 aircraft;
- in the area of [Ansyu], Pyongyang, and [Kaysen] - systematic bombing and ground attack operations in groups of from two to 12 B-29, B-26, F-80, and F-51 aircraft protected by close escort groups of 8-12 F-86's and F-84's, and in individual cases up to 20-30 bombers and ground attack aircraft under the close escort protection of 20-30 fighters. As a rule, in this event a fighter screen of the above composition will be active in areas north of [Ansyu]. A total of from 200 to 500 aircraft may possibly be active during the day in this area;
- the night operations of lone bombers and reconnaissance aircraft throughout the entire territory of North Korea with a total strength of up to 20-30 aircraft during the night, including 8-10 aircraft in the area of Dandong;
- in Northeast China in the Mukden sector probable mass air raids of bombers of up to 70 B-29 bombers protected by up to 150 F-86 and F-84 fighters. One air raid of a large group is possible during the day with a total of up to 220 bombers and fighters;
- in individual cases, depending on the ground and air situation, the enemy might concentrate considerable forces of his strategic, tactical, and naval aviation in the corps' area of combat operations.

II. The Combat Mission, the Conditions of Accomplishing it, and the Combat Capabilities of the Corps

The combat mission of the corps assigned by the Minister of War is to protect the bridges, river crossings, hydroelectric stations, and airfields in the area of Dandong-[Siodzio] against enemy air strikes and also the rear installations and lines of communication of the Korean-Chinese troops on the territory of North Korea.

At the same time the corps is to be ready to repel possible enemy air strikes against the main administrative and industrial centers of Northeast China in the Mukden sector in coordination with Chinese air units. The conditions of performing the combat mission are determined by those circumstances in which conditions the corps has to operate.

Such circumstances primarily include:

- the restriction of the corps' area of combat operations to the boundary line of Pyongyang, Wonsan, and the coastline, which to a considerable degree inhibits the full use of the combat capabilities of our aircraft;
- the need to wage combat operations against considerably superior enemy air forces with only our own divisions, with a complete lack of support from Chinese and Korean aircraft, not counting cases of the possible repulsion of enemy air strikes against Chinese targets. Some Chinese divisions involved at the present time are going through the process [*prokhodyat*] of engaging in battle and do not yet provide significant support to the corps' formations;
- the extremely limited nature of the airfield network in the area of combat operations which completely precludes the possibility of performing an airfield maneuver, especially ahead and along the front;
- the factor which considerably makes the corps' performance of the assigned mission easier is that the home airfields of our aircraft remain outside the impact of enemy aircraft by virtue of the current political situation in the Korean theater of military operations.

The listed characteristics of the corps' combat operations lead to the need to concentrate its main efforts only against the main groupings of enemy aircraft since a scattering of its forces against all enemy aircraft groups which appear in the area of combat operations might lead to the combat mission not being fulfilled.

With their existing disposition, the corps, composed of three IAD's, one OIAP [independent fighter aviation regiment], and two anti-aircraft divisions, is able to:

- protect installations in the area of Dandong from both echeloned and concentrated enemy air strikes on condition that the entire corps is involved in doing this;
- protect rear installations and lines of communication in the area north of the [Ansyu] line from strikes by the main enemy air groups, using two first-echelon IAD's to do this, leaving two or three squadrons of a first-echelon division and the entire second-echelon division as the corps commander's reserve to protect the home airfields and installations in the area of Dandong;
- protect rear installations and lines of communication in the area of [Ansyu] and Pyongyang from strikes by individual enemy air groups, using no more than three and, in extreme cases, four regiments of first-echelon divisions for this, leaving the remainder of the first-echelon division and the entire second-echelon division as the corps commander's reserve to protect against possible enemy air strikes against home airfields and installations in the area of Dandong-[Ansyu]. The corps' strength is insufficient for reliable and complete protection of installations in the area of [Ansyu]-Pyongyang.

In the event that the second-echelon division (the 151st IAD) leaves, the combat capabilities of the corps will be reduced.

III. The Basic Principles of Combat Use and the Means of Operation of the Units and Formations of the Corps

From the fact that the corps is waging battle with considerably superior enemy air forces alone, without having support from either Chinese or Korean aviation, an acute need results for a concentration of its efforts against only its main groupings and not permitting a scattering of its forces. It follows from this that the corps should not act against each, especially small, group, but conduct periodic concentrated strikes of large groups of our fighters only against the main targets of the enemy air forces, which primarily include the groups of his bombers and ground attack aircraft. It needs to be stressed that these strikes be periodic since the corps does not have enough forces to conduct them systematically and daily.

Such strikes should be timed to the periods of greatest activity of enemy aircraft and should be conducted by large groups of at least regimental size. Flights in small groups, not counting sweep mission flights, lead only to a scattering and useless depletion of our fighter strength.

Thus, the mission assigned to the corps should be performed by massing its operations and launching periodic, pre-planned, concentrated strikes of large groups of fighters against the main groupings of enemy aircraft.

The main means of combat operations of the corps are:

- flights of small groups to intercept enemy aircraft from an alert posture at an airfield;
- flights of small groups (a flight or a squadron) on a sweep mission;
- in individual cases protection of installations by patrolling.

IV. The Organization of Command and Control

The command and control of fighters, anti-aircraft artillery, and searchlights is performed centrally from the command post [CP] of the corps commander. Depending on the situation, guidance is done from the corps CP, the CP of the air division, or from the VPU [auxiliary CP] of the IAK [fighter aviation corps]. Fire control of ZA [anti-aircraft artillery] and anti-aircraft searchlights is done from the command posts of the commanders of the anti-aircraft divisions and the searchlight regiment.

The command post of the corps is deployed in the region of the Dandong airfield. The command posts of the air division commanders are in the areas of their airfields. The command posts of the commanders of the anti-aircraft divisions are [as follows]: the 92nd Zen. AD - at Dandong, the 87th Zen. AD at [Hakusen], and the 10th Searchlight Regiment at Dandong. The VPU of the IAK is organized [as follows]: N° 1 in the area of [Futsiori], N° 2 in the area of [Hakusen]...

The target acquisition system allows an enemy to be intercepted at medium altitude at a range of 250-270 km.

The transmission of data about air targets to the GP VNOS [main post of the air warning network] of the IAK is done [as follows]: from the VPU - via radio links, from the RTS

[radar equipment] of the airfields - by direct telephone lines and with the aid of A-7b short-wave radios from Chinese radars via telephone and radio.

Warnings to formations and units of the corps are made from the GP VNOS IAK by radio broadcast.

Besides RTS, visual guidance radios located in the regions of [Syarenkan], [Sakusyu], and [Eydzyu] are used to guide our aircraft to enemy aircraft.

V. Brief Results of the Combat Operations of the Corps

The results of combat operations in the period from 1 November 1950 to 15 September 1951 come to:

[Translator's note: neither the web nor Word version of the text are in tabular form; the following places the data in a table:]

Types of combat work.

28 th IAD	50 th IAD	151 st IAD	324 th IAD	303 rd IAD	IAK
Length of combat operations (days)					
30	68	82	166	131	320
Number of combat sorties					
151	1196	993	2731	3757	8828
Enemy aircraft shot down					
16	61	39	82	102	300
Our losses in pilots					
2	5	5	6	7	25
Our losses in aircraft					
2	7	6	17	15	47

The period of combat operations of the corps from 1 November 1950 to June 1951 is characterized by a negligible amount of forces involved in performing combat work simultaneously. This is explained on the one hand by a lack of airfields in the area of the Chinese-Korean border and on the other by the incidental performance of the mission to retrain Chinese and Korean pilots by corps units.

Beginning in June 1951, after the Miaogou airfield was put into operation, the opportunity was presented to concentrate two divisions at the Dandong airfield complex at the same time, which allowed the activity of our fighters to be sharply increased and forced enemy aircraft to considerably curtail operations in the region north of the [Ansyu] line. In spite of the exceptionally difficult conditions of the air situation resulting chiefly from the overall air superiority of the enemy, the units and formations of the corps performed much combat work, achieved good overall results, and dealt enemy aviation appreciable losses. This was in many respects facilitated by the good flight training of our pilots, the excellent combat characteristics of the MIG-15, the selfless work of all the

personnel of the corps, and their correct understanding of the important combat missions assigned them. In a majority of air battles our pilots exhibited great courage and heroism, exhibited skill in the correct use of their aircraft, and came out of these battles as the victors, despite the numerical superiority of the enemy. The commanders of formations and units and their staffs also obtained considerable combat experience and learned to more correctly organize and carry out combat work. Accordingly, corps operations became more purposeful in the latter period, and planning was considerably improved and conducted in regimental, divisional, and corps groups.

The combat mission assigned them to protect installations of the rear and lines of communication in the region of Dandong-[Sensen] was mostly performed as a result of the work done by units and formation of the corps, and recently enemy aircraft have not managed to have any noticeable impact on these installations.

The corps has not managed to fully perform the combat mission to protect installations in the region of [Ansyu]-Pyongyang, and until very recently enemy aircraft continued to systematically launch bombing and ground attacks on these installations, thereby creating great difficulties in the operation of the rear of the Chinese and Korean troops. The main reasons for the incomplete performance of the combat mission by the corps to protect installations in the region of [Ansyu]-Pyongyang are:

- the insufficient strength of the corps since in these conditions these installations can only be reliably protected by patrolling;
- the remoteness of the home airfields of our fighters from these installations;
- the limited abilities to detect enemy aircraft, which precludes protection of these installations by intercept from an alert posture;
- the difficulties of determining the true targets (intentions) of groups of enemy aircraft crossing the scramble line of our fighters (approximately the 38th parallel), ensuring the intercept of these groups in the designated area since this line passes through the area of the main combat operations of enemy aircraft;
- the limitation of our ability to protect these installations, mainly only by sweep tactics.

Along with the positive results in the work of units and formations of the corps there were a number of large shortcomings, primarily including:

- in a number of cases the absence in some commanders and their staffs of a practice of daily deep analysis of the tactics of enemy air operations with the goal of working out and countering these tactics in a timely manner with new methods and means of their own fighters' operations.

This situation often led to a sameness and stereotypical nature of the tactics of our fighters, which made it easier for the enemy to fight them and lowered the overall result of the corps' combat work. In individual cases commanders directing the combat operations of fighters from their CP, do not correctly and carefully enough assess the strength and the intentions of the enemy air groups which appear, which as a rule led to an inaccurate determination of the main enemy grouping together with incorrectly scrambling their fighters and mistakenly guiding them and, as a consequence of this, a great expense and unnecessary exhaustion without inflicting appreciable enemy losses;

- an excessive enthusiasm for combat with the enemy aircraft protecting the operations of their bombers and ground attack aircraft, and sometimes an inability to tie them down in battle with an insignificant part of our own fighters led to losing sight of the main goal of our operations - the destruction of his bombers and ground attack aircraft;
- during the first period of operations combat with enemy fighters operating in the screen method was done in a number of cases without a plan that had been developed and studied with group leaders beforehand, which unavoidably led to a lack of proper purposefulness, and hence [a lack of] effectiveness of the operations of our fighters. This shortcoming has been eliminated at the present time.
- the lack of sufficient experience in the command and control of large groups and in the guidance of several groups simultaneously from the ground and in the air, as a result of which only part of the groups encountered enemy aircraft and engaged in combat when flying to intercept at the same time as other groups in the same area did not encounter the enemy and could not help their own fighters which were engaging in combat with the enemy;
- there is still not the necessary precision in the work of the air warning service. Data about an overflight of a target from the VPU and GP VNOS often arrived late and with considerable inaccuracy about the composition and altitude of their flight. A large part of the RTS operators are untrained in the work, especially in conditions of strong interference;
- an incorrect evaluation of the strength and composition of enemy air groups by commanders of squadrons and regiments (group leaders) in the air, and also by commanders guiding fighters to the enemy from their CP's; in a number of cases it led to our fighters engaging in battle with considerably superior enemy forces, which often led to unsuccessful battles and to unnecessary and unwarranted losses;
- the existence of cases of our groups hastily engaging in battle without ensuring themselves a favorable initial position for an attack which, as a rule, led to the first, most reliable attack being ruined, disruption of the group's combat formation, scattering it into separate pairs or even aircraft which often lost sight of one another, which created favorable conditions for the enemy since our aircraft which had broken off were attacked by him and they suffered losses;
- individual pilots allowed to open fire on enemy aircraft from great distances at large target aspects and without the use of a moving automatic reticle led to a pointless expenditure of ammunition and a low effectiveness of the attack of our fighters;
- in a number of cases attacks on the enemy were not brought to the point of decisive defeat and pursuit of the enemy was far from always being done, by virtue of which a battle which had begun was not seen through to the end and the enemy, in an unfavorable position or relative strength, broke off combat without hindrance;
- command and control of battle in the air has been insufficiently worked out so far and coordination between groups and within groups is often disrupted; the commander of a squadron and especially the commander of a regiment often do not find their place in combat formation and are turned into commanders only of flights or even the pairs which they are immediately leading, and in individual cases into an ordinary pilot;
- caution while searching, approaching, and in battle often is poor, which leads to surprise attacks on our aircraft by the enemy;

- disengagement from battle is often not done simultaneously and some pilots (pairs) loiter in the area of the battle and are attacked and pursued by the enemy after the command to disengage from battle;
- in a chase for personal success individual pilots are ignoring the overall combat formation of the group, are disrupting it, and are themselves attacked and suffer unwarranted losses;
- when approaching the enemy some group leaders maintain high speed and maneuver sharply, by virtue of which the groups break up;
- radio discipline is insufficiently observed while working in the guidance network, which strongly interferes with command and control when one frequency is being used.

The following measures have been carried out in formations and units of the corps to eliminate shortcomings and increase the effectiveness of the operations of our fighters:

- an increase in the quality of the critiques of combat flights and air battles;
- primary variants of air battles have been developed according to which crews are prepared on the ground beforehand;
- special meetings have been held with senior officers of units and formations with a critique of the shortcomings of combat work and an analysis of the reasons for unsuccessful air battles;
- lessons are systematically held with flight personnel to study the tactics of enemy air operations and the combat experience of corps units, primarily on non-flying days;
- the conferences which have been held in all regiments and divisions (the 324th and 303rd IAD) and also in the corps to summarize and study combat experience have played a great role in the matter of increasing the quality of combat work;
- much work is being done to improve the detection and warning system, the combat crews of the PUN [control and vectoring post] and VPU have been brought up to strength, control posts have been equipped with the necessary charts [*skhemy*], desks, and communications.

Anti-aircraft units shot down 17 enemy aircraft during the period of combat operations from 10 June to 15 September 1951; during the same time anti-aircraft units had [the following] losses: eight killed and 21 wounded.

An important shortcoming in the work of anti-aircraft units in the first period of operations was the insufficient cohesiveness of combat crews and the crews of command posts, which was reflected in the quality of actual firing to a considerable degree. At the present time this shortcoming is being gradually eliminated after conducting additional lessons and special training exercises.

VI. The Fighting and Numerical Strength of the Corps as of 15 September 1951

Aviation formations:

- the 151st IAD: 52 MIG-15 aircraft. The remainder of engine service life is 48%. Sixty-one pilots, of which 11 have been temporarily removed from flights due to [their] state of

health and one is not trained for combat operations. There is a total of 49 combat-ready crews. The division is prepared for combat operations in regimental strength in daytime at medium and high altitude and in favorable weather conditions. At the present time the division is handing over its materiel to a Korean IAD.

- the 303rd IAD: 85 MIG-15bis aircraft, of which four aircraft have no boost control and are not used for combat missions. There is a total of 79 combat-ready crews. The division is prepared for combat operations in regimental strength in daytime at medium and high altitude and in favorable weather conditions.

- 324th IAD: 52 MIG-15bis aircraft. The remainder of engine service life is 49%. There are 54 pilots, of which 22 have been removed from flights due to illness and overwork. There are 42 combat-ready crews. The division is prepared for combat operations in regimental strength in daytime at medium and high altitude and in favorable weather conditions and in squadron strength in daytime in unfavorable weather conditions; 20 crews are trained for combat operations at night in pairs but have had a five-month break in flights at night.

The division has been conducting constant combat operations for five and a half months, by virtue of which the flight personnel are very fatigued.

- 351st IAP: 20 LA-11 aircraft, of which four are inoperable and require replacement of the engines. The remainder of engine service life is 35.8%. There are 30 pilots. The regiment has 30 crews trained for combat operations in favorable weather conditions at medium and high altitude, 22 crews in unfavorable weather conditions squadron [strength], and 20 crews at night, solo and in pairs.

The corps has a total of 189 MIG-15 aircraft with 2% inoperable and an average remainder of engine service life of 48%. The shortage of aircraft is: 10 MIG-15, 17 MIG-15bis, and one LA-11.

Units and formations of the corps are at 93.6% strength and generals and officers are at 93.7% strength.

The qualitative condition of the personnel fully ensures the successful accomplishment of the assigned combat missions.

Anti-aircraft and searchlight units:

...Anti-aircraft formations and units and the searchlight regiment are combat-ready, and the level of training of staffs, combat crews, and the personnel of all specialties is fully satisfactory.

VIII. Material and Technical Support

The 18th ATD [Air Maintenance Division] is composed of six OATB [Independent Air Maintenance Battalion], two OBATOAP [Aviation Regiment Independent Airfield Technical Maintenance Battalion], and one motor transport battalion. The listed units are fully prepared to support the combat work of corps units in their manning and in the experience of their personnel...

The availability and condition of aircraft maintenance equipment, weapons and ammunition, and motor vehicles ensures the uninterrupted training and combat work of the corps' units. The quartering of personnel has been organized in military housing areas in one-, two-, and three-story buildings of the Japanese barracks type. The majority of facilities are dirty and require the repair of doors, floors, windows, whitewash, and glazing. There is no water supply, sewer system, or lighting in a number of buildings. In many units there are no training classrooms or clubs. Most of the buildings have not yet been prepared for winter. Feeding of the personnel is organized through Chinese reception centers. Food units are also served by the Chinese comrades. Food for the personnel of military commandants' offices located on Korean territory and the VPU is delivered from Dandong.

Personnel are fully supplied with winter army and flight uniforms, shoes, and bedding. Winter army clothing will be received at the end of September; winter flight clothing has already been shipped to the warehouses.

IX. The Aviation Engineering Service

The Aviation Engineering Service of corps units is fully trained to support the accomplishment of combat missions.

The MIG-15 aircraft has exhibited high combat characteristics, reliability in operation, and simplicity in maintenance.

In air battles with American aircraft armed with large-caliber machineguns the MIG-15 aircraft is resistant to damage or an outbreak of fire in flight. The engine continues to operate reliably [even] with serious damage to its assemblies. Individual aircraft have received up to 30-50 bullet holes in combat and returned safely to their home airfield.

...The ejection system in the aircraft works reliably and has saved the lives of 18 pilots. Ejection is possible at any altitude and in different attitudes (spin, inverted flight, diving at a speed of 950 km/hr).

...The range and flight duration of a MIG-15 aircraft have been:

- radius of operation without wing tanks - 130 km; with wing tanks, 190 km;
- flight duration without wing tanks - 45 minutes; with wing tanks, one hour;
- the average hourly fuel expenditure without wing tanks, 1160 kg, with wing tanks, 1380 kg.

The average time to prepare a MIG-15 for a second combat flight is:

- in squadron formation without wing tanks, 40 minutes; with wing tanks and reloading the cannon, 55 minutes;
- in air regiment strength without wing tanks, one hour; with wing tanks and reloading the cannon, one hour and 20 minutes.

The time for a regiment to take off at readiness N° 1 is two to four minutes, from readiness N° 2, six to eight minutes, from readiness N° 3, 12-14 minutes.

X. Medical Support

The degree of fatigue of flight personnel was not taken into consideration when forming units and a medical consultation was not done before departure on special assignment. The 151st IAD can serve as an example. Its personnel, having arrived in China in August 1950, were not examined by aviation medical boards before departure and have not had leave since March 1949.

The flight personnel of the 324th IAD were also not subjected to medical examination before departure.

Flight personnel arriving to augment units have also been sent without consideration for [their] state of health or have arrived without any medical documents about fitness for flight work. All this negatively affects the combat activity of the units and has led to part of the personnel being prematurely incapacitated.

The main factor influencing the state of health of flight personnel is the work associated with waging combat operations. It has not been possible to identify any specific illnesses associated with the characteristics of performing combat work and Chinese living conditions when analyzing the rate of illness of flight personnel. There was no illness rate associated with performing high-altitude flights, the use of oxygen, an oxygen breathing apparatus, or the physical and hygienic conditions of an aircraft cockpit. Determining factors in the issue of the state of health of flight personnel are: nervous and emotional tension, the fatigue factor, and the presence of chronic illnesses.

Mental stress is especially exhibited in the first period of combat operations; with time the symptoms of mental stress disappear or are not exhibited to a marked degree. The fatigue factor is the main cause in the change of the state of health of flight personnel.

The tension of waging combat operations, constant duty at the airfield for a long period, two or three combat missions a day, and the disruption of routine, all this unquestionably causes symptoms of fatigue over time, which leads to a lowering of resistance of the pilot's organism and to an aggravation of chronic illnesses. As a rule, these symptoms begin to be exhibited three or four months after beginning combat work and then grow sharply.

The state of health of the flight personnel of the 324th IAD after five and a half months of combat work is described as the majority of them having symptoms of fatigue and an increase in the aggravation of chronic illnesses (of the gastrointestinal tract, the cardiovascular system, and illnesses of the ear, nose, and throat). Of the total number of flight personnel 16% need to be urgently sent for hospital treatment; 22% are entitled to being sent to a hospital or sanatorium, 40% have signs of fatigue, and only 22% have been found to be healthy.

For the 303rd IAD, after four and a half months of combat work the state of health of the flight personnel presents the following picture: healthy - 58%, have signs of fatigue - 35%, needing hospital treatment - 7%.

Considering the above, the conclusion can be drawn that it is advisable to grant flight personnel one month's leave after three months of combat work.

[Translator's note: section XI is either missing or there has been an error in numbering; there is no indication of an ellipsis]

XII. The Organization and Performance of the Corps' Flights

Based on an assessment of the air situation in the Korean theater of military operations the need to use our fighters in corps groups was obvious to the corps command long before we began to make such flights in practice. However, a number of reasons did not allow us to move to this before the beginning of September. Such reasons include:

- before June, in view of the lack of a sufficient number of airfields in the area of Dandong, we could use no more than three regiments, that is, only one division, to conduct immediate combat operations. The ability to concentrate two divisions in the area of Dandong at the same time appeared only in the first days of June, after the Miaogou airfield began operation;
- the entire month of June and the first days of July went to putting the units of the 303rd IAD into battle and practical training to conduct flights and wage air battles in regimental and divisional groups. This mission was done according to a special plan, was performed under the protection of the 324th IAD, and was done successfully;
- by the end of the first half of July the corps was ready to perform flights and wage battles using two divisions at the same time, with them being protected by the third division in the second echelon. But a sharp worsening of weather conditions beginning in the second half of July until the beginning of September did not allow us to fully begin to perform flights and wage battles in corps strength.

During this period, using individual days with good weather, we made a series of flights in more than division strength, which was preparation for conducting corps flights in full strength. At the same time, making use of non-flying weather, regimental and divisional tactical flight conferences of the 303rd and 324th IAD's were held as well as a corps conference to summarize combat experience.

These conferences provided exceptionally rich material for the best organization of combat work of the corps' units and formations, including for conducting corps flights and waging air battles. Thus, by the beginning of September preparations for conducting corps flights were entirely complete.

At the beginning of September enemy aircraft began to systematically conduct concentrated bombing and ground attack strikes on river crossings over the [Seysen-Ko] River in the area of [Ansyu, Kaysen]. With the beginning of the rebasing of units of the 87th Anti-aircraft Division to the areas of [Ansyu and Taysen], enemy air operations were simultaneously shifted to lines of communication in this region. On average, 20 B-29's and up to 30 F-80 and F-51 ground attack fighters participated in each such raid.

The operations of the bombers and ground attack aircraft were supported by up to 40 F-84 close-in protection fighters and by sending a fighter screen of up to 30, and in individual cases, up to 60 F-86's to the area of [Sensen], [Teysyu], and [Kidzio].

The bombers operated at an altitude of 6000-7000 meters, the ground attack aircraft at 4000-2000 meters down to treetop altitude, the close-in protection fighters 6000-8000 meters, and the fighter screen, 7000-11000 meters.

The main sectors of enemy air flights were:
bombers - Wonsan-[Ansyu]; [Tetsugen-Ansyu]; ground attack aircraft - Seoul [Eddzyu]; close-in protection fighters - from the south across Pyongyang; the fighter screen - Seoul-[Tsinnampo], [Kakusan] Station. After accomplishing the combat mission the enemy air groups, as a rule, went toward the sea. Up to two such flights were conducted daily. The average time of an enemy raid was: the first in the period 0900-1100 and the second, 1500-1700.

In order to protect the river crossings in the area [Ansyu], [Kaysen] and the units of the 87th Anti-aircraft Division marching along the roads [of] [Singisyu, Sansen, Teysyu, Ansyu] and [Teysyu, Kaysen] from the above enemy air strikes, we conducted six corps flights in the period 9-13 September on the basis of the orders of Cde. Krasovsky, the Commanding General of the Air Forces Operations Group, in the process of which five corps air battles were waged with enemy ground attack aircraft and fighters. In one case (12 September 1951) enemy aircraft did not engage in battle when approaching our fighters and left for the sea. If they have not appeared in the air, enemy bombers turn around when our fighters scramble and go back without reaching their targets. Without dwelling in detail on a description of these flights inasmuch as they have mainly been conducted in accordance with one plan with some changes of only individual means and methods of our fighters' operations, I am giving a description of only the first of them, which was conducted on 9 September 1951...

Units and formations of the corps were assigned the following missions:

- the 303rd IAD: a strike group of two regiments, tying down close-in protection fighters in battle, is to destroy enemy bombers and ground attack aircraft in the area of [Eydzyu,

Dzisan, Osori, Kaysen, Teysyu, Ansyu] without permitting them to attack river crossings and lines of communication in the area of [Teysyu, Ansyu, Kaysen]. One regiment is to be in the IAK commander's reserve to escalate efforts and protect the disengagement of the strike and delaying groups. The sortie rate is 75 sorties, two regiments in readiness N° 1 and one regiment in readiness N° 2;

- the 324th IAD: a delaying group of two regiments to tie down in battle and destroy the enemy fighter screen in the areas of [Sensen, Teysyu, Taysen, Kidzyo] with the mission of not letting them influence the strike group of the corps. The sortie rate is 43 sorties, with both regiments in readiness N° 1;

- the 151st IAD: two regiments are to be in the IAK commander's reserve to protect the landing airfields and installations in the area of Dandong from possible strikes against them by enemy aircraft. By 7 September 1951 the 28th IAP was to be rebased to Dandong Airfield. The sortie rate is 44 sorties. Have one regiment (Anshan Airfield) in readiness N° 1 and one regiment (Dandong Airfield) in readiness N° 2;

- the 351st IAP is to be in readiness to repel and destroy enemy bombers during their possible strikes against installations in the area of Dandong. The sortie rate is 25 sorties and the regiment's readiness is N° 1.

Units were brought into the above states of readiness at the codeword message "Torpeda" issued from the CP of the IAK 30 minutes before the probable appearance of enemy aircraft at the radar range perimeter.

The flight route of our aircraft was set as - strike group: [Gematan] Station, [Siodzio, Unzan, Kaysen, Kidzyo], Dandong; delaying group and airborne reserve (one regiment of the 303rd IAD): [Uenhari, Sinseng, Tayseng, Taysen, Ansyu], Dandong; for the 351st IAP - Anshan, [Fynhuanchen], where the regiment patrolled at an altitude of 5000-6000 meters until receipt of special instructions...

The takeoff of the regiments of each group (strike and delaying) was conducted from different starts (southern and northern). Their assembly was done by turning 180 degrees. The regiments of the groups gathered together in pursuit [formation]. H-hour was set - the take off of the first regiment of the strike group. The division commanders decided that the strike group was first, the 17th IAP, and second, the 1523rd IAP. The delaying group was first, the 176th IAP, and second, the 196th IAP. Command and control of the fighters was organized as follows:

- scrambling and guidance of the fighters in the air was done from the CP, the VPU of the IAK, and the CP of the IAD. Lt. Col. Seregin, the navigator of the 303rd IAD, was located at IAK VPU N° 2 ([Hakusen]).

A P-3-a radar was sent to the area of [Yotoku] for the duration of corps flights in order to increase the range of detection of enemy aircraft coming from the east. However, the VNOS radar position in the area of [Yotoku] did not completely justify its assignment;

the range of detection of its radar was insignificant in view of the mountainous terrain of northeast Korea. The Chinese comrades did not recommend placing this position closer to the coast in the area of Wonsan because of the turbulent situation in this region. Therefore the interception of enemy bombers at the [Ansyu, Eydzyu] line when they are flying from the direction of Wonsan is not ensured by the detection capabilities. This forced our fighters to scramble earlier, from the appearance of a fighter screen, with the expectation that the bombers would appear immediately behind them. But this did not always demonstrate its value since in a number of cases the bombers were not active.

The strike and delaying groups of the corps operated in a "column of regiments" combat formation at a distance of two to four km, with a vertical separation of the tail regiment of 200-1000 meters; the regiment in the "broken file of squadrons [*zmevka eskadriliy*]" combat formation had a distance between air squadrons of 800-1500 meters, a spacing of 600-800 meters, and a vertical separation of 800-1000 meters; the squadron in the "trailing formation of flights [*peleng zven'yev*]" combat formation had a distance and spacing of 400-600 meters and a vertical separation of 400-600 meters.

The air situation on 9 September 1951 developed in the following manner:

The enemy in groups of four to six fighters performing preliminary reconnaissance tried to launch a ground attack between 1125 and 1235 against troops on the march and other targets on roads in the area of [Ansyu, Sensen, Kidzyo, Taysen].

Up to 50 F-80 and F-51 ground attack fighters participated in the raid, operating in groups of from eight to 16 aircraft at medium and low altitudes. The operation of the ground attack aircraft was supported by a fighter screen consisting of two groups of up to 60 F-86's in all. The fighter screen was going to the region of [Teysyu, Sensen, Kidzyo] 10 minutes ahead of the ground attack aircraft and patrolled there at an altitude of 9000-12000 meters.

The first groups of enemy fighters appeared in the area of [Kosyu, Tsinnampo] at 1125. [The following] were scrambled to intercept and destroy the enemy fighters: a strike group (two regiments of the 303rd IAD) totaling 54 MIG-15's from 1121 to 1128, a protection group (two regiments of the 324th IAD) totaling 34 MIG-15's from 1123 to 1127, and a reserve group (22 MIG-15's) at 1145, a total of 110 MIG-15's.

The delaying and strike groups encountered an enemy fighter screen between 1140 and 1145 in the area of [Teysyu, Ansyu, Taysen, Hakusen], which drew off to the northeast with the takeoff of our fighters and engaged in battle with them. The battle occurred at an altitude of 9000-12000 meters. The protection group engaged in battle for 20 minutes and the strike group for 12 minutes.

As a result of the battle, according to reports of IAD commanders, [the following] were shot down: 324th IAD - four enemy F-86's and the 303rd IAD - five F-86's. Our losses were: Sr. Lt. Andryushko, a pilot of the 196th IAP of the 324th IAD, did not return from the combat mission...

Conclusions and Suggestions

1. Over the past period of combat operations the units and formations of the corps have gained rich combat experience, and have significantly improved the planning and organization of their work and also the tactics of our fighters; they successfully switched from operations in small groups to operations in regimental, divisional, and corps groups. As a result of this significant losses were inflicted on the aircraft of the Anglo-American aggressors.

2. Some changes occurred in the combat readiness and combat abilities of the units of the corps as a result of the deliberate combat work over a long period of operations:

- the combat readiness of all units has improved considerably from the point of view of the speed and precision of scrambling groups of our fighters, the overall smooth functioning, and the results of their operations;
- the combat readiness of units of the 324th IAD has declined in connection with the great fatigue of the flight personnel, and the number of combat-ready crews of the division is an average of 50% in relation to the authorized strength. The withdrawal of the division for a long rest is required and the flight personnel and materiel [needs to be] brought up to strength or replaced;
- by virtue of the same reasons the combat readiness of the 303rd IAD has declined, although insignificantly so far, and the division is fully capable of successfully performing the combat missions assigned it. It needs its material brought up to the authorized level.
- the combat readiness of anti-aircraft and searchlight units remains as before and they can successfully perform their assigned missions.

3. In connection with the impending return of the 151st IAD to the Soviet Union there is an extreme need to bring a new (third) division into the corps. If this step is not done the combat abilities of the corps will be considerably lowered and it will be completely deprived of the ability to maneuver its forces.

4. In their combat characteristics MIG-15's are better than the best US or UK aircraft. The aircraft is simple to operate and sufficiently durable in battle...

5. Special attention needs to be devoted to [the following] when training flight personnel in peacetime conditions:

- practicing takeoffs, assembly, and climbing in regiment formation in a minimal time;
- practicing takeoffs with a following wind of 20 meters/second with wing tanks and without them;

- practicing the maximum rate of climb to the practical ceiling from pair to regimental strength;
- practicing group formation flying and in combat formation in large groups;
- the ability of pairs to perform an entire set of piloting [skills], including a loop and an Immelman turn;
- a training exercise for endurance [*dlitel'noe prebyvanie*] and waging an air battle at an altitude of 13000-15000 meters;
- practicing piloting techniques at high speeds, the ability to wage a battle with a "wing-heavy" aircraft at maximum Mach values;
- determining the distance of firing on a B-29 or a B-36, for which there are to be full-scale mockups of these aircraft at [aerial gunnery] ranges and airfields so that pilots can be trained daily aiming at various distances and target aspects;
- the ability of pilots to make attacks on a maneuvering target at maximum speed;
- rehearsing long dives at an angle of up to 80 degrees using air brakes;
- the ability to direct aimed fire in group firing in flight and squadron formation.

6. [The following] are needed to improve command and control and the combat readiness of signals units:

- send one mobile maintenance and repair shop of the 155 KRAS type to the corps for two or three months with the necessary spare parts and measuring apparatus;
- add one SON-3 radar to the 87th Anti-aircraft Division and perform a major overhaul of 14 Cummins diesels and three Litser [SIC, should be Lister] diesels;
- bring a signals company of the corps up to strength with one radar station;
- speed up the dispatch of spare parts and communications equipment in accordance with requisitions from the 18th ATD.

7. [The following] are necessary to produce an improvement in the problems of material and technical support of the units and formations of the corps:

- add a shipments section into the table of organization of the headquarters of the ATD N° 29/80 composed of a section chief, officers, and clerk;
- transfer all OATB to the table of organization of the OBATO AP N° 29/33;

- add three AKZS-40 [vehicle-mounted oxygen-charging station used at airfields] into the table of organization of the OBATO AP, one for each squadron, and a 15-kilowatt station for recharging batteries;

- have [the following] repair shops at the ATD: for the repair of the optics of the anti-aircraft divisions [SIC, *divizii*; probably should have been *diviziony*, "battalions"], for the repair of ground artillery weapons; three shops for the repair of communications equipment - power, radar, and telephone-telegraph; the division automotive repair shop needs to be expanded at the rate of making 70 intermediate repairs a month.

Medical support:

[The following] are required to ensure normal clinical care:

- the additional development of treatment facilities: one medical battalion and one infectious military hospital;

- a systematic and timely supply of medicines and disinfectants;

- one mobile X-ray unit and a clinical laboratory with the necessary personnel and equipment at the disposition of the corps;

- equip a branch of the aviation hospital with physical therapy equipment [*fizioapparatura*] and an X-ray machine;

- inoculate personnel against infectious diseases before sending them on special assignment.

Commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps
Guards General-Major of Aviation (Belov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 71

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 24110

Copies to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Molotov
to Cde. Beria
to Cde. Kaganovich

to Cde. Bulganin

from [BEIJING] received 2130 20 September 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 757/3232/shs 20 September 1951]

Series G T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Cde. FILIPPOV!

I have received your telegram of 12 September 1951.

I thank you for granting our request to grant us additional military credit in the amount of 600 million rubles and sending Soviet specialists to the Chinese volunteer forces in Korea.

Regarding the assignment of the military advisers to the Chinese volunteer forces, besides the five advisers which you agreed to send to the headquarters of the volunteer forces I am asking you to study the possibility of an additional assignment of five military advisers to be sent to the headquarters of the five armies if needed. If you agree with this I hope that the 10 military advisers will be able to arrive in [Beijing] at the end of September or the first 10 days of October after which they will be sent to the front.

We know that a certain amount of time is required to produce and ship the military equipment specified in the telegraphed request of 8 September and therefore it cannot be delivered at the same time as the previously ordered weapons and equipment for the six of the 10 divisions which remained.

We have drawn up a combat training plan for the 10 divisions formed in accordance with the new authorized organizational structure on the basis of the previously established delivery times for the weapons and equipment for the 10 divisions and this plan was put into effect beginning in August.

If the weapons and equipment delivery plan for the 10 divisions does not change then our combat training plan will be put into effect without change.

Thus, in March 1952 the training of the divisions formed in accordance with the new authorized organizational structure will be completely finished. If the war continues they can then be used in military operations. Based on this we think that it is inadvisable to change the weapons and equipment delivery plan for the 10 divisions. However we are asking the Soviet Government to deliver ammunition and military equipment costing about 1/5 of the total cost of the military equipment indicated in the 8 September request to us at the end of 1951 in order to meet the needs of the front in the last two months of this year and to strengthen the air defense of the lines of communications in Korea. We

mainly need artillery shells, anti-aircraft artillery, and ammunition for it. A detailed request is attached to this telegram.

We ask the Soviet Government to deliver us the military equipment and motor vehicles for military needs at a cost equal to 4/5 of the total cost stipulated by the 8 September request in the first half of 1952. If you agree, then we will send an additional detailed request.

Please study my telegram and report your decision.

The request.

1. 120 85 mm anti-aircraft guns
2. Ammunition:

shells for 122 mm howitzers: fragmentation - 19,000; armor-piercing - 1,000,
122 mm shells for IS-2 [a type of heavy tank]: fragmentation - 5,000; armor-piercing - 5,000,
122 mm shells for ISU [a type of assault gun]: fragmentation: 1,250; armor-piercing: 1,250,
shells for 76.2 mm guns: fragmentation: 40,000, armor-piercing: 60,000,
shells for 85 mm anti-aircraft guns: 140,000, shells for 37 mm anti-aircraft guns: 2,000,000,
mortar shells for 107 mm mortars: 20,000

3. Tires:

for 122 mm howitzers - 50, for 122 mm howitzer limbers - 50,
for 76.2 mm guns - 50, for 76.2 mm gun limbers - 50,
for 57 mm anti-tank guns - 78, for 57 mm anti-tank gun limbers - 78,
for 85 mm anti-aircraft guns - 100,
for 76 mm anti-aircraft guns - 100,
for 37 mm anti-aircraft guns - 500.

4. Anti-tank grenades - 100,000

Greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

N° 4726
20 September

Deciphered by Araushkin 1840 20 September
Printed by Leshevich 2000 20 September
N° 1449 Twelve copies printed. N°N° 10,11, and 12 filed

Verified: Section Chief
Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 72

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

OUTGOING N° 5542

Copy N° 1

CABLE N° P83/615

Ref. p.615/op/Politburo minutes N° 83

[BEIJING]

to Cde. KRASOVSKY
for Cde. MAO ZEDONG

"Cde Mao Zedong!

We report the following in connection with your telegram of 20 September about military advisers and the delivery of additional weapons:

On the question of the advisers. With regard to the five military advisers for work at the Main Headquarters of the Volunteer Forces in Korea we have given instructions to the Military Ministry to select suitable candidates and send them as specified with arrival in [Beijing] during the first 10 days of October.

Regarding the sending of military advisers for work at the headquarters of armies we stand by our previous opinion of not sending military specialists to armies. In doing this we proceed from the belief that the appointment of military advisers to an army, especially under conditions of combat operations, will not promote an improvement in the command of an army since military advisers in such formations [*soyedineniya*, SIC; an army is an *ob'yedinenie*] and bearing the responsibility for the combat operations of an army will unavoidably embark on the path of undermining the authority of the commanders of these formations and this is unacceptable.

On the question of the delivery of ammunition and military equipment by the end of 1951 against an additional credit (600 million rubles). As we informed you, based on production and shipment conditions, it is impossible in practice to ensure the additional deliveries by the end of this year in the amount you are suggesting of one-fifth of the cost

of the entire 8 September request and at the same time to deliver weapon and equipment for six infantry divisions.

We can accept your additional order about the delivery of military equipment in 1951 equal to one-fifth of the total cost of your request only on the condition that the delivery of weapons and military equipment for the six divisions be delayed by half a year as we have informed you concerning this.

We will examine your request about deliveries in 1952 against the credit indicated above when we receive it from you and afterwards we will inform you of the ability and timeframe to grant it.

FILIPPOV"

26 September 1951

Two copies sent. Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N° 2 to the 8th Department of the 2nd Main Directorate of the
General Staff of the Soviet Army with N° P83/615
Printed by Kornushina 1745 26 September N° 2653

Verified: Section Chief
Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

26 September 1951

[handwritten:
AVP RF
F. 0100
Op. 44
Por. 11
Pap. 322
pp. 1-3, 89-92]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 73

[Handwritten note at the top containing the time 1345 5 October and reference to a possible Cde. Kozlobin]
SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 24547

Copies to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Stalin

to Cde. Molotov
to Cde. Beria
to Cde. Kaganovich
to Cde. Bulganin

from [BEIJING] received at 0230 5 October 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
Incoming N° 800/3414/shs 5 October 1951]

Series G T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

[We] have received the 26 September telegram about the military specialists and the requests for military equipment. We agree with your opinion.

1. Please send five military specialists to work in the Main Headquarters of the Volunteer Forces in Korea in the first 10 days of October and [you] need not send military specialists to the armies.

2. I request that the Soviet Government send us 120 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, seven kinds of artillery ammunition, six kinds of tires for artillery guns, and 100,000 anti-tank grenades which we very much need at the present time before the end of 1951, that is October-December, in accordance with the request attached to my telegram to you of 20 September (the cost of this request is approximately one-fifth of the total cost of the 8 September request).

We agree to stop the delivery of weapons and military equipment for the remaining six divisions beginning in October and the complete delivery of this equipment I April-June 1952.

3. I request that the Soviet Government in January-March 1952 complete delivery of all other objects of military equipment the cost of which is four-fifths of the total cost of the 8 September request. We will send a detailed request by telegraph.

Please begin the delivery of the weapons and military equipment for the remaining 15 divisions beginning July 1952.

In accordance with your previous message the delivery of weapons and military equipment for all the 60 divisions should be concluded in the first half of 1954. Now, in view of the postponement of the deadline for the delivery by half a year, is it advisable to also postpone the timeframe for the conclusion of the delivery of the weapons and military equipment for all 60 divisions for half a year, that is, to conclude delivery at the end of 1954

Please report your opinion so that we can prepare for this.

4. While Cde. Gao Gang was holding talks in Moscow in June of this year about the delivery of weapons and military equipment for the 60 divisions agreement was reached to set the total cost of the above weapons and military equipment against a military credit which will be repaid by the Chinese government on a schedule after eight years.

Recently our Ministry of Trade received a message from the Soviet trade mission in China that representatives of corresponding Chinese organizations had concluded a commercial agreement with it for the delivery of 3,510 motor vehicles and 1,900 bicycles (these vehicles and bicycles are included in the military equipment of the first ten divisions).

I request that the Soviet Government examine the possibility of including the cost of the vehicles and bicycles which are part of the military equipment for the 60 divisions against the military credit; if this causes problems for you then please inform [us] about it so that our representatives conclude a commercial agreement for the above number of vehicles and bicycles with the Soviet trade mission in China.

Please study my telegram and report your opinion.

Greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

N° 4933
4 October

Deciphered by Sadovnikov 0020 5 October
Printed by Leshevich 0430 5 October
N° 1585 Eight copies printed. Copy N° 8 to the file

Verified: Major [signature] 0500 (Chikarev)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 74

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

CABLE N° 57??

Copy N° 1

[BEIJING]

to Cde. KRASOVSKY
for Cde. MAO ZEDONG

"Cde Mao Zedong!

We received your telegram of 4 October. We are replying to the questions raised in it.

About the five military advisers. The advisers for work at the Main Headquarters of the Volunteer Forces in Korea will be sent to [Beijing] in the next few days.

About the delivery of weapons. The 120 85 mm anti-aircraft guns, the shells, mortar shells, the anti-tank grenades, and the tires for the guns against an additional credit of 600 million ruble in accordance with your 20 September request (the cost of which is 109 million rubles, one-fifth of the total cost of the request) will be delivered to you by the end of 1951, that is, in the period we specified.

Concerning the period of delivery of military equipment in 1952 against the credit indicated above, the cost of which will be equal to four-fifths of the total cost of the request, we will report after receiving the request from you.

Military equipment for the remaining six divisions, the delivery of which was postponed by half a year, will be delivered by July 1952. Consequently, and also because we will have to provide new, large deliveries at an additional credit of 600 million rubles the period of delivery for the weapons and military equipment for 50 divisions will also have to be postponed by half a year, that is, to be concluded at the end of 1954.

You raise the question of us examining the possibility of including the cost of the motor vehicles and bicycles being delivered for the divisions against the military credit.

According to the current military credit agreement of 1 February 1951, up to now the settlements for automotive equipment have been made according to the terms of the trade agreement.

[Stamp at the bottom of the first page:

SUBJECT TO RETURN

to the IV Unit of the OS [Special Department]]

VKP(b) CC Incoming N° 8[7]1/3445/shs 8 October 1951]

The payment procedures of which you speak would contradict the current agreement and the practice of settlements which has developed on the basis of this agreement. Our financial and military organizations find no basis for reexamining the existing conditions and object to changing them. We agreed with them.

FILIPPOV".

7 October 1951

Two copies printed.

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N° 2 to the 8th Department of the 2nd Main Directorate of the General Staff of the
Soviet Army
Printed by Chesnokova 8 October
N° 2332

VERIFIED: MAJOR [signature] (CHIKAREV)

8 October 1951

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 75

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 25025

Copies to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Molotov
to Cde. Beria
to Cde. Kaganovich
to Cde. Bulganin

from [BEIJING] received at 1135 19 October 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
757

Series G.
T

Incoming N° 254/3612/shs 19 October 1951]

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Cde. FILIPPOV!

I am sending you the text of my telegram to Cde. Li Kenong of 0530 18 October 1951 for
[your] information.

"Cde. Le Kenong, copy to Cdes. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

I have received your telegram of 0115 18 October.

At the present time at the meeting of liaison officers our side should keep to an approach
which promotes the rapid resumption of the work of the conference. We should both not
be in a hurry and not waste time.

We should at our initiative and at an opportune moment propose means with which both sides could agree in order to solve some secondary issues.

As regards measures or secondary issues which we intend to change we should not make changes right away; at the same time we should not reveal at the first meetings or in the press that our point of view is absolutely inflexible. On the contrary, we should prepare the ground for a subsequent change so that at the moment the change is made it does not appear sudden, as if we are making a big concession.

Therefore your intention of giving instructions to correspondents to place a report in the press that the proposal our side has offered about the reduction of the Kaesong-Bunsan neutral zone and the neutral strip along the road between these points is a great concession is extremely inadvisable.

The proposal we have offered is not any serious concession.

In the event that the enemy does not agree we intend to reduce the neutral zone still further. Will this be a still greater concession after the great concession that was made? It is politically disadvantageous to make such a statement in the press this way.

In reality, in the opinion of the enemy the move of the conference to [Hamonten], the responsibility of both sides for security, and the expansion of the neutral zone to Bunsan has not given them anything good.

On the contrary, in this event enemy aircraft cannot fly over Bunsan, which is not in the enemy's interests. Therefore, since 7 October all the enemy press and public opinion has not considered this a concession by us, but on the contrary they note that there will be more trouble at [Hamonten] than at Kaesong.

As regards the enemy, as before he is interested in using the meeting of liaison officers in order to stall for time and conduct intelligence.

We should also act cautiously in order not to reveal our plans, which is to our advantage during the subsequent struggle at the conference.

However, of the four alternatives proposed by the enemy it is apparent that the enemy is increasingly disinclined to reject the resumption of the work of the conference.

Please be guided by my instructions.

MAO ZEDONG 0530 18 October"

MAO ZEDONG

N° 5205
19 October

Deciphered by Fedyaev 1205 19 October
Printed by Korniyushina 1250 19 October N° 3007
Eight copies printed

Verified: Section Chief Colonel
[signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 76

[Handwritten at the top: [reply]] of 13.XI[SIC].51[to]] N66[1]6/3940shs]
SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 25187

Copies to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Stalin
to Cde. Molotov
to Cde. Beria
to Cde. Kaganovich
to Cde. Bulganin

from [BEIJING] received at 1940 24 October 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
[Incoming]] 862/9672shs 24 October 1951]

Series G T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

1. At the present time the main efforts of enemy aircraft in Korea have been directed at the destruction of the lines of communication of our forces.

The air unit led by General Lobov and the Chinese air units have achieved great successes in the air battles which have been fought. The anti-aircraft units of the Soviet Union and China have also achieved good results in directing anti-aircraft fire. They are playing a great role in protecting the lines of communication. However, the strength of our forces is insufficient and they cannot secure communications traffic more reliably, therefore I am asking you to study the possibility of the Government of the Soviet Union sending one more three-regiment anti-aircraft division to North Korea to reinforce the air defense of rail shipments and the airfield network in the area of [Ansyu].

2. The majority of Chinese air units which have completed combat training are concentrated in northeast China to prepare to take part in combat operations in Korea, and therefore the air defense equipment in the interior of China is insufficient. In addition, 463 YaK-11 pilots will complete training in Chinese aviation schools in November-December 1951.

According to the plan you earlier indicated it is intended to form three MIG-9 fighter divisions, one TU-2 bomber division, one IL-10 ground attack division, two LA-11 reconnaissance regiments, one LA-9 fighter regiment, and one LI-2 transport regiment.

Considering the current state of our Air Force the Chinese comrades will not be able themselves to cope with the task of training personnel to become proficient in combat aircraft within the periods desired by 15 March 1952, after the formation of the above divisions and regiments. Therefore I request the Government of the Soviet Union give the following aid:

1. Send three jet fighter divisions and three air maintenance battalions to China with equipment to train three Chinese IAD [fighter aviation division] and six MIG-9 air maintenance support detachments, and also to reinforce the air defenses of the [Beijing], Shanghai, and Canton regions.
2. Send the personnel to China of one regiment (without materiel) and one air maintenance battalion with equipment to train two Chinese reconnaissance regiments and two LA-11 air technical maintenance detachments.
3. Send the personnel to China of one regiment (without materiel) and one air maintenance battalion with equipment to train one Chinese ShAD [ground attack division] and two IL-10 air technical maintenance detachments.
4. The Chinese Air Force will be able to cope with the formation and training of one TU-2 BAD [bomber aviation division], one LA-9 IAP [fighter aviation regiment], and one LI-2 transport regiment themselves, however I request that 14 advisers be sent for the bomber division and five advisers for the LA-9 fighter regiment by December 1951.

With your permission, the remaining advisers will be selected from the divisions and regiments which are being trained.

Please report your decision about the above questions.

Greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

N° 5281
24 October 1951

Deciphered by Prokop'yev 2050 24 October
Nine copies sent. Copies N°N° 7, 8, and 9 to the 8th Department

Printed by Shcherbakov 2200 24 October
N° 3016

Verified: Section Chief
Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 77

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 25219

Copies N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin
N° 3 to Cde. Molotov
N° 4 to Cde. Beria
N° 5 to Cde. Kaganovich
N° 6 to Cde. Bulganin

from [BEIJING] received at 1315 25 October 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
862/3685shs 25 October 1951]

Series G T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

Cde. Filippov.

I am sending you a telegram of Cde. Li Kenong of 2300 22 October for [your] information.

"To Cde. Mao Zedong. Copies to Cdes. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

I think that you have received my telegram of 1800 22 October.

1. We studied Joy's letter again. Although Joy did not express a definite opinion in this letter about whether an agreement of liaison officers is an agreement of the delegations of both sides and also whether other issues unrelated to the second point of the agenda can be discussed after the resumption of the work of the conference, however it is possible

that he will consider our reply insufficiently clear and propose first resuming the work of the subcommittee and not the work of the conference right away.

This might have been done by him to resolve issues which we might raise.

If the enemy offers such a proposal then we think that it can be agreed to.

We should also raise issues that are necessary for us in meetings of the subcommittee.

2. The situation has promoted the creation of a certain body by the representatives of both sides. We think that the enemy will easily agree if we call this body the joint staff of the liaison officers.

In this event meetings of liaison officers will be held at the request of one of the sides.

All liaison officers from both sides will be present and therefore there is no need to create any other permanent body.

3. After the subcommittee begins discussion of the 2nd point of the agenda we will stubbornly insist on the enemy offering a compromise proposal first. If the enemy as before insists on its own [proposal] and does not offer a new proposal then we are thinking of taking the initiative in order to sound out the enemy.

In the past during study we came to the conclusion that it wouldn't be bad to initially offer a first draft, namely: withdraw the troops of both sides to the north and south of the 38th parallel and create a buffer zone in the region of the 38th parallel. However, considering the big difference in the territory we occupy to the south of the 38th parallel and that the enemy occupies to the north of the 38th parallel (we occupy about 2,640 square kilometers without counting the islands we occupy located south of the 38th parallel west of the river [Rinsin-Ko], and the enemy at the present time occupies an area of about 5,364 square kilometers north of the 38th parallel in the region east of the river [Rinsin-Ko]), it can be said that enemy will not agree with our proposal.

We think that offering such a draft will lead to a useless waste of time and therefore it would be better if we immediately offered a second draft, namely the draft proposed by Cde. Kim Il Sung on 16 August of this year, taking into consideration your instructions of 17 August.

During the explanation of our draft we can point out that it contains changes which take the present front line into account. Thus we can still play for time after which we will offer a third altered draft which provides an end to hostilities where the front is at the present time.

The enemy has recently had progress in the region east of the river [Rinsin-Ko] and therefore changes will be made to the third draft.

We will send it in a day or two.

4. Request your instructions about the above questions.

Le Kenong. 2300 22 October 1951"

MAO ZEDONG

N° 5293
25 October

Deciphered by Prokop'yev 1425 25 October
Printed by Leshevich 1510 25 October
N° 1786 Nine copies sent. Copies N°N° 7, 8, and 9 to the 8th Department

Verified: Section Chief
Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 78

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 25407

Copies N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin
N° 3 to Cde. Molotov
N° 4 to Cde. Beria
N° 5 to Cde. Kaganovich
N° 6 to Cde. Bulganin

from [BEIJING] received at ??50 31 October 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
885/3762shs 31 October 1951]

Series G
T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I am sending you the 0900 25 October 1951 telegram received from Cde. Kim Il Sung for [your] information.

"Cde. Mao Zedong! I have received your telegram of 24 October in which guidelines were given with regard to conducting negotiations. I agree with you.

Kim Il Sung 0900 25 October"

MAO ZEDONG

N° 5392
31 October

Deciphered by Araushkin
1415 31 October
Printed by Korniyushina
1435 31 October
N° 3162

Nine copies printed. N°N° 7-9 filed

Verified: Section Chief
Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 79

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 25465

Copies N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received at 1730 1 November 1951

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
900/3783shs 1 November 1951]

Series G T.

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I am sending you for [your] information my 31 October telegram to Cde. LI KENONG.

"To Cde. LE KENONG.

Copies: to Cdes. Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai.

I received your telegrams of 0200 30 October and 2120 30 October. I agree with your telegram of 0200 30 October in which you suggest that at the 31 October meeting at our initiative our side declare a cessation of hostilities where the front line is at present, making some changes.

If the enemy objects to this and insists on the draft he proposed on 25 October then our side should sharply criticize it immediately or at the afternoon meeting and publish a communiqué and information of the correspondents in order to expose the enemy's reluctance to cease hostilities and to establish a military boundary line where the front line is at present, and also [to expose] the enemy's attempts to establish a military boundary line deep in our rear in order for it to be a weapon in our hands and so that it would be to our advantage on 1 or 2 November to offer our specific draft and force the enemy to agree with our draft.

If the enemy agrees with our proposal then we can offer our specific draft at the 1 November meeting and thereby take the initiative in our hands.

As regards a specific draft, we agree with the six points you proposed and also with the southern and northern boundaries. If the enemy insists on exchanging territory in the area of Kaesong for territory in areas south of Kaesong and [Kindzyo] then it will be advantageous for us to simply offer a draft to cease hostilities where the front line is at present, to establish a southern and northern boundary of the withdrawal of the troops of both sides at two kilometers, and force the enemy to accept this draft and not have further arguments about the issue of exchanging territory.

MAO ZEDONG 0130 31 October"

N° 5422
1 November 1951

Deciphered by Araushkin 1840 1 November
Printed by Leshevich 1930 1 November
N° 1889
Eleven copies printed. N°N° 3-11 filed

Verified: Section Chief
Colonel [signature] (Makarov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 80

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

CABLE N° 66??

Copy N° 2

[BEIJING] to Cde. KRASOVSKY
for Cde. MAO ZEDONG

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
3940shs 14 November 1951]

Cde. MAO ZEDONG!

We have received your telegram of 24 October. Since I am far from Moscow my reply is being sent late.

1. We think that the security of communications in North Korea ought to be performed mainly by fighter aviation for which we urgently recommend that the construction of airfields in the area of [Nansi] and [Taysen] be accelerated so that Chinese air units are landed there in the immediate future.

It is necessary to protect only the main important facilities with the anti-aircraft artillery, which at the present time is being done with the two Soviet Army anti-aircraft artillery battalions which are protecting the airfield complex and the bridge across the Yalu River in the area of Dandong-Sinuiju and the construction of airfields of northwest part Korea in the areas of [Nansi] and [Taysen].

An increase of this anti-aircraft artillery protection in connection with the existing situation in Korea is desirable and we think that it necessary that the Chinese command might take 180 guns and several anti-aircraft machineguns for one division from the 1,854 anti-aircraft guns and 3,268 anti-aircraft machineguns which were delivered from the USSR. In December we should be delivering you another 120 85 mm anti-aircraft guns against an additional military credit as has been stipulated.

2. As regards sending three jet fighter MIG-9 divisions from the USSR to China with flight personnel and three air maintenance battalions with them, we cannot fulfill this request since we no longer produce MIG-9 aircraft and we have none of them. If, however, there is a need to further engage our flight personnel to train Chinese MIG-9 pilots then the instructional staff of the three Soviet fighter aviation divisions might be used for this purpose for three months which are located in Canton, [Tanshan], and [Gunjulin] which have completed the program of instruction and are preparing to return to the USSR so that they return to the USSR no later than the middle of March 1952.

Regarding the training of the personnel of one ground attack air division our military thinks that the Soviet pilots serving as advisers at the 5th and 11th Chinese Ground Attack Air Divisions in China can successfully perform this task.

We will select instructors from the reconnaissance regiment of General Lobov's corps in China to train the two Chinese reconnaissance regiments.

Nineteen advisers for the TU-2 bomber aviation air division and the LA-9 aviation regiment will be sent to you.

If you agree with your decision then we will give the corresponding orders.

for KRASOVSKY ONLY

We hold you responsible for seeing to it that our pilots who are being temporarily left to train Chinese on MIG-9's return exactly on schedule.

FILIPPOV

13 November 1951

Three copies printed

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N° 2 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N° 3 to "ZA" [Beijing]
Printed by Rubleva N° 2022

Verified: [illegible signature]

14 November 1951

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 81

Copy N° [handwritten: N° 2 to Cde. Stalin]

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

subject to return in six days

[Letterhead:] 8th Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces

CABLE N° 102522

PYONGYANG

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
961/3932shs 14 November 1951]

to Cde. RAZUVAYEV

Visit Cde. KIM IL SUNG and read him the following telegram from Cde. FILIPPOV.

Cde. KIM IL SUNG, I have already been far from Moscow for some time. Therefore my reply about the delivery to Korea of weapons for three divisions in Korea has been delayed.

During our meeting in Moscow it was said that the Chinese comrades will receive weapons for 30 divisions, of which they should select weapons for THREE Korean divisions. Cde. GAO GANG agreed to this.

Then a decision was made that the Chinese comrades would receive weapons not for 30, but for 60 divisions. I think that in view of this that the Chinese comrades could moreover have allocated you weapons for THREE divisions.

If, however, the Chinese comrades refuse for some reason to grant your request please inform me about this. 13 November 1951

P.S. Report the time the telegram was sent.

MATVEYEV

N° 4/4374
13 November 1951

Two copies printed. Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

Verified: CHIEF OF THE 4th DEPARTMENT OF THE 8TH
DIRECTORATE OF THE SOVIET ARMY GENERAL STAFF
[signature] (BUDILEV)

Printed by Budanova 0025
14 November 1951

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 82

COPY OF AN OUTGOING TELEGRAM

CABLE N° 684?

Copy N° 1

[BEIJING]

to Cde. KRASOVSKY
for transmission to Cde. MAO ZEDONG

"Cde Mao Zedong!"

We have received your telegram about questions of the armistice negotiations in Korea.

We agree with your assessment of the current state of the negotiations.

The entire recent course of the negotiations shows that although the Americans are dragging out the negotiations they nevertheless are more in need for them to conclude very quickly. This follows from the current international situation.

We think it correct for the Chinese-Korean side, while carrying out a flexible tactic in the negotiations to then pursue a firm line without displaying haste and not disclosing an interest in a very rapid end to the negotiations.

We think your position in establishing a demarcation line and the establishment of observation in one or two border points to be correct. We also agree with you about the composition of the commission to perform the observation functions.

Your position on the issue of exchanging POWs is absolutely correct and it will be difficult for the enemy to challenge it.

As regards possible alternatives to convening a conference to subsequently solve the Korean issue, after the conclusion of an armistice the convening of a conference of political representatives of both the sides conducting negotiations with the mandatory participation of representatives of North and South Korea seems to us to be the most advisable at the present time.

FILIPPOV".

19 November 1951

Two copies printed. Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
Copy N° 2 to the 8th Department of the 2nd Main Directorate of
the Soviet Army General Staff to "ZA".
Printed by Sigayeva N° 2964

Verified: [illegible signature]

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
982/4021shs 20 November 1951]

20 November 1951

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 83

DECREE
OF THE DPRK CABINET OF MINISTERS

N° 367

The Implementation of Financial and Economic Measures in Liberated Areas

People's power is being restored, democratic rights are being provided to the people, and conditions are being created for the free life of the people in the districts of South [Yonbek], [Onjin], and in the area of Kaesong, which have been liberated from the rule of the American armed invaders and the South Korean traitors.

In order to put the economic situation in order and stabilize the life of the people in these areas the Cabinet of Ministers decrees:

1. Hold the chairman of the board of the Main Bank of North Korea responsible for creating bank branches in the districts of South [Yonbek], [Onjin], and the city of Kaesong in order to put the financial system in order and ensure the normal economic life of the population.
2. Hold the Minister of Trade responsible for organizing state trading organizations, ensuring the free buying and selling of goods, and organizing commodity circulation between the city and the countryside in order to satisfy the supply of the population with consumer goods.
3. Permit the population to organize cooperative organizations at their initiative: consumer cooperatives, and fishing and handicraft work associations. Local government bodies and the Main Bank of North Korea should give the cooperative organizations the necessary organizational and financial aid.
4. Introduce the current tax system in the country to the above areas. Beginning with the 4th quarter of 1951, impose income and local taxes and a turnover tax. Do not impose an inheritance tax, a property acquisition tax, a home ownership tax, a transportation equipment tax, or a land tax for the time being.
5. The turnover of state and cooperative organizations and also the imposition of taxes is done by banknotes of the Main Bank of North Korea.

Permit the population of the liberated areas to pay local taxes with agricultural products.

Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers

Kim Il Sung

29 November 1951

4-li

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 84

Secret Copy N° 1

[Handwritten in the left margin:
"to Cde. G. I. Tunkin"]

USSR EMBASSY in the DPRK

N° 258 12 December 1951

to DEPUTY USSR MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Cde. A. A. GROMYKO

I am sending you a memorandum "The Progress of the Collection of Agricultural Taxes in Kind".

ATTACHMENT: eight pages, as above

[Stamp:
USSR MFA
1st FAR EAST DEPARTMENT
148 SECRET Incoming N° 3734s
28 December 1951]

USSR AMBASSADOR
to the DPRK

[signature]

(V. RAZUVAYEV)

[handwritten: to Khalin 28 December;
another illegible annotation, possibly "to the file"]

2 copies. gb

1 - to the addressee
2 - to file

Secret Copy N° 1

THE PROGRESS OF THE COLLECTION OF AGRICULTURAL TAXES IN KIND
IN THE DPRK IN 1951
(brief memorandum)

The main form of agricultural tax in the DPRK and also of the creation of food reserves in the country is the agricultural tax in kind, and therefore in the conditions of a long and difficult war the collection of agricultural taxes in kind is a very important task in the

business of supplying the front and the rear with food. The DPRK government is paying special attention to the country's agriculture and is giving the necessary aid to peasants who suffered from the war and flooding.

Considering the importance of this measure, through its decision of 30 August 1951 the government sent special agitators to the countryside who were charged with the task of conducting cultural, educational, and explanatory work among the peasants concerning all issues in order to ensure the timely delivery of the agricultural tax in kind to the state.

From the very first days of the war the American interventionists tried to disrupt the country's normal supply of food and are trying to destroy the reserves of grain by every means. Enemy aircraft have exhibited especial activity during the planting campaign, by virtue of which the peasants were forced to work only at night. In spite of the great difficulties, the spring planting was finished 15-20 days earlier than last year. The situation was more unfavorable later on. Enemy aircraft disrupted the normal work of caring for the crops, disrupted irrigation, and the heavy rains in July and August in turn caused great harm to the crops.

The acute shortage of labor is being felt in the countryside and therefore in its Decree N° 325 of 1 September 1951 the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers proposed mobilizing all the male and female population of the countryside and also the urban population, office workers, teachers, students, MVD workers, and soldiers of rear units for the harvest campaign. Only thanks to the timely assistance of all sectors of the population of Korea was the harvesting done more or less satisfactorily.

It also ought to be noted that the rear units of the Chinese volunteers also helped the peasants of Korea in gathering and threshing the harvest.

Through the above decree the Cabinet of Ministers held the Ministry of Land and Forestry, the chief of the Food Procurement Directorate, and the chairmen of the Peoples Committees of the provinces responsible for finishing the determination of the crop yield (inasmuch as the tax is imposed on 27% of the gross harvest on irrigated and 23% on unirrigated fields) and the collection of taxes in kind on various crops by 15 September 1951 and to conclude the collection of the tax in kind on late crops by 30 November 1951.

The need for this decree was caused by the fact that the revision of the planting area and that the determination of the crop yield for early crops was not done on time. As a result, the harvest was collected but the taxation did not come in normally since a considerable portion of the peasants tried to avoid [the tax], declaring that the harvest was lost as a result of the flooding.

Through this same decree the government held the corresponding authorities responsible for putting the work of the staff for tax collection, reception points, storehouses, and their security in order.

The acute shortage in the countryside of transportation equipment is a considerable hindrance. The main type of tractive force in the Korean countryside is draft animals; however, during the occupation of the northern part of Korea the American imperialists and the South Korean bands killed and drove many draft animals to the south.

The Progress of the Collection of Taxes in Kind Based on Data of Gosplan Expressed in the Following Values (in tons)

[Translator's note: the first part of the first column was not on the reproduced page]

Name of the crop	Early crops			Late crops			Note
	Plan	Collected as of 30 September	% fulfilled	Plan	Collected as of 9 November	%	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
...	-	-	-	306222	97561	31.8	
? grain	-	-	-	231634	131844	55.9	
? beans	33266	33193	96.7	-	-	-	
?	-	-	-	78324	6390	8.0	
?	18360	18319	92.7	-	-	-	
?	14000	13987	99.8	-	-	-	
[Gymnospermous]	35	35	100	-	-	-	
...	869	869	100	-	-	-	
?	1	1	100	-	-	-	
?	73192	55196	75.5	50205	32775	64.8	sweet potatoes are included in the late crops
? beans	260	125	75.1	-	-	-	

It ought to be stipulated that the actual collection of the tax was considerably higher, however more complete data is not available due to unsatisfactory communications with places from which summaries are arriving with a great delay.

The collection of the tax is going very unevenly by province, which the data cited below distinctly shows: the collection of the tax in rice: Pyongyang City - 5.8%; South P'yongan - 2.1%; North P'yongan - 14.2%; [Tyagan] - 32.1%; Hwanghae - 12.4%; Kangwon - 65.3%; South Hamgyong - 91.1%; and North Hamgyong - 57.5%.

This is chiefly explained by the fact that a number of provinces are located in the area of the 38th parallel where military operations have been going on for a long time and also by the special activity of enemy aircraft.

The province of South Hamgyong is first in the fulfillment of the tax in kind and then the provinces of Kangwon and North Hamgyong.

It also should be stressed that some chairmen of provincial Peoples Committees who are authorized by the Directorate of Food Procurement were not able to organize work to collect the tax in kind in accordance with the 1 September 1951 DPRK Cabinet of Ministers decree.

Conclusions:

1. The spring planting work and the care of the crops occurred in a difficult war situation, with constant enemy air raids. In addition, the crops were considerably damaged by the August floods.
2. Local authorities have not done timely work to account for the cultivated area and to determine the crop yield, which has created great difficulties in harvesting the early agricultural crops.
3. A considerable amount of the shortcomings were eliminated. However, many of them still remained and need to be eliminated thanks to the constant attention of the government and the Workers Party.
4. The public gave the government much help in the business of collecting the tax. There are many cases when active and conscientious peasants not only handed over the tax completely and on time but gave more than the established amount, and also gave donations for the Army.

- ATTACHMENT:
1. Summary table of the progress of the collection of the tax in kind in early crops as of 30 September, on one page.
 2. Summary table of the progress of the collection of the tax in kind in late crops as of 9 November, on one page.

Compiled by 3rd Secretary of the
USSR Embassy to the DPRK [signature] (G. SOLDATOV)

Two copies. gb

- 1 - to Cde. Gromyko
- 2 - to file

MEMORANDUM

ON THE PROGRESS OF THE RECEIPT OF TAXES IN KIND ON LATE CROPS AS
OF
9 November 1951

(in tons)

Provinces	Rice			Other grains			Beans		
	Plan	Actual	%	Plan	Actual	%	Plan	Actual	%
Total	306,222	97,561	31.8	231,634	131,844	56.9	78,324	6,390	8.2
Pyongyang City	935	54	5.8	1,400	695	49.6	137	1.8	1.3
South P'yongan	51,464	1,079	2.1	55,620	18,132	32.8	15,684	1.7	0.1
North P'yongan	78,316	11,116	14.2	58,954	29,579	51.9	14,224	700	4.9
[Tyagan]	8,417	2,700	32.1	16,448	10,478	63.7	4,307	858	19.7
Hwanghae	72,238	8,944	12.4	50,407	33,067	65.6	22,759	659	2.9
Kangwon	15,260	9,966	65.3	8,083	4,536	56.1	3,910	448	11.5
South Hamgyong	54,684	49,742	91.0	26,829	26,089	97.3	9,198	2,319	25.1
North Hamgyong	24,888	13,960	57.5	15,893	9,268	58.3	8,105	1,403	17.3

MEMORANDUM

CONCERNING THE PROGRESS OF THE RECEIPT OF TAXES IN KIND ON
EARLY CROPS AS OF
30 September 1951

Provinces	Total legumes			Wheat			Barley		
	Plan	Actual	%	Plan	Actual	%	Plan	Actual	%
Total	33,266	33,193	96.7	18,380	18,319	92.7	14,000	13,987	99.9
Pyongyang City	176	176	100	39	39	100	138	138	100
South P'yongan	8,787	8,734	99	4,489	4,493	100	4,156	4,165	100
North P'yongan	1,180	1,177	99.7	360	360	99.9	811	816	100
[Tyagan]	244	244	100	3	3	100	241	241	99.9
Hwanghae	15,268	15,266	99	12,889	12,885	99	1,841	1,852	100
Kangwon	842	829	98.2	474	432	90	159	131	82.4
South Hamgyong	2,684	2,683	99.9	99	99	99.9	2,577	2,577	100
North Hamgyong	4,085	4,085	100	7	7	100	4,077	4,077	100

MEMORANDUM

CONCERNING THE PROGRESS OF THE RECEIPT OF TAXES IN KIND ON
EARLY CROPS AS OF
30 September 1951

Provinces	Gymnospermous barley			Oats			Potatoes		
	Plan	Actual	%	Plan	Actual	%	Plan	Actual	%

	35	35	100	1	1	100	73,192	55,193	7
	-	-	-	-	-	-	70	61	8
	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,593	2,635	4
	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,893	2,616	6
	-	-	-	-	-	-	924	296	3
Total	35	35	100	1	1	100	4,627	2,532	5
Pyongyang City	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,279	6,500	8
South P'yongan	-	-	-	-	-	-	35,320	35,320	1
North P'yongan	-	-	-	-	-	-	13,526	5,236	3
[Tyagan]									
Hwanghae									
Kangwon									
South Hamgyong									
North Hamgyong									

[Stamp: AVP RF
Fond 0102
Opis' 7 Por. 54
Papka 30
pp. 228-236

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 85

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 16002

Copies N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin
N° 3 to Cde. Molotov
N° 4 to Cde. Malenkov
N° 5 to Cde. Beria

from [BEIJING] received at 1750 31 January 1952

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
63/373shs 31 January 1952]

Series G
T

to Cde. FILIPPOV

I am sending you for [your] information the text of an agreement reached about two orders of business.

"Point two of the agenda: 'The establishment of a military demarcation line between the two sides in order to establish a demilitarized zone as the main condition for a cessation of hostilities in Korea' (agreed on 23 November 1951).

1. The principle has been adopted that the actual line of contact between the sides will become (by what is described in point two or three of this agreement, depending on how circumstances require it) the military demarcation line and at a time indicated which will be indicated in the signed armistice agreement; the armed forces of both sides will withdraw two kilometers from this line in order to establish a demilitarized zone during the armistice period.

2. The subcommittee of representatives of both sides should determine the current line of contact as a military demarcation line and the midline of the demilitarized zone in accordance with the above principle. No corrections should be made to this military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone regardless of any changes in the actual line of contact on condition that the military armistice agreement is signed within 30 days after the plenary meeting of the delegations approve this agreement and the exact location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone mentioned above.

3. In view of the fact that hostilities will continue until an armistice agreement is signed, in the event that the military armistice agreement is not signed within 30 days after plenary meeting of the delegations approves this agreement and the exact location of the military demarcation line and demilitarized zone as mentioned in point 2 of this agreement, before the signing of a military armistice the subcommittee of representatives of both sides should immediately make corrections in this military demarcation line and demilitarized zone in accordance with the actual line of contact so that the corrected military demarcation line between the two sides which exists at that moment will become the military demarcation line during the military armistice['].]

Point 3 of the agenda: 'Working out practical measures to implement a ceasefire and an armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of the staff to observe the implementation of the ceasefire and armistice conditions' (agreed to 12-29 October 1951).

1. All armed forces under the control of each side, including regular and irregular units and also the armed personnel of ground, naval, and air forces, should cease all hostilities within 24 hours after the signing of the armistice agreement.

2. All armed forces under the control of each side should be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within 72 hours after the armistice agreement is signed and goes into effect.

No armed forces of either side, with the exception of those armed forces of a police nature regarding which both sides will come to a special agreement between themselves, should enter the demilitarized zone from this time; no armed forces of either side should commit any acts of armed violence toward the demilitarized zone.

Each side should conduct administrative affairs in that part of the demilitarized zone which is on its side of the demarcation line in accordance with the conditions of the armistice agreement.

3. All the armed forces - land, naval, and air - under the control of each side should be withdrawn from rear and coastal islands and the waters of the other side within five days after the armistice agreement is signed and goes into effect. (There will be a special agreement about islands previously under the control of the other side and all other islands).

If these armed forces are not withdrawn within the time indicated and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay of their withdrawal, the other side shall have the right to take any action against armed personnel which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order.

4. In order to ensure the stability of the military armistice in order to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference by higher level representatives, both sides are obligated not to deliver to Korea any military personnel, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, tanks, weapons, or ammunition after the armistice agreement is signed and goes into effect.

Any rotation of military personnel on a mutually agreed scale should be reported to the military ceasefire commission in order that upon authorization the neutral nations supervisory body can perform its mission to conduct on-site supervision and inspection of the rotation at mutually agreed points of debarkation in the rear.

5. Both sides should appoint an equal number of members for the creation of a military armistice commission which will bear responsibility for observing the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the settlement of any violations of the ceasefire agreement through negotiations. As stipulated in the agreement, the functions of supervision and inspection should be carried out in accordance with the two provisions below:

a) the military armistice commission, which will operate through joint teams sent directly by it, should bear responsibility in the demilitarized zone itself;

b) outside the demilitarized zone upon authorization a supervisory body consisting of representative of neutral countries should bear responsibility where violations of the armistice agreement occur at mutually agreed points of debarkation in the rear and on the spot.

Direct inspection should be done by a supervisory body consisting of representative of neutral countries every time both sides or one of the sides of the military armistice commission addresses a request to it to investigate a violation of the armistice agreement.

6. Both sides agree to address a request to neutral nations who are not participating in the Korean war and which might be acceptable to both sides to send an equal number of

representatives to create a supervisory body with their agreement. This supervisory body authorized by the military armistice commission should bear responsibility for performing the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in point 4 and in paragraph "b" of point 5; every time both sides or one of the sides of the military armistice commission requests such an investigation the supervisory body consisting of representatives of neutral nations should immediately send inspection teams to mutually agreed debarkation points in the rear or at locations outside the demilitarized zone where the violation of the armistice agreement occurs, should perform the functions of supervision and inspection as stipulated in the armistice agreement, and report the results of such supervision and inspection to the military armistice commission.

Both sides should give inspection teams consisting of representatives of neutral nations everything necessary to perform the above functions on the main lines of communications, regarding which agreement will be reached by both sides."

MAO ZEDONG

N° 325
31 January

Deciphered by Prokop'yev 1835 31 January
Printed by Korniyushina 1940 31 January N° 491
Six copies printed. Copy N° 6 filed

Verified: Section Chief
Lt. Col. [signature] (Gerasimov)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 86

CABLE

Copies N° 1 to file
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin
N° 3 to Cde. Stalin
N° 4 to Cde. Molotov
N° 5 to Cde. Malenkov
N° 6 Copy

from [BEIJING] N° 6957 0210 10 March 1952

Copy N° 3

Spets N° 323

PRIORITY
SPECIAL

Ref. your N° 325

I am sending a telegram from Mao Zedong to Cde. Filippov:

"Cde Filippov.

On 9 March Cde. Roshchin handed over a report from Moscow [*tsentr*] that Cde. Peng Dehuai intends a local operation against one of the American divisions and about the inadvisability of this operation at the present time. We have not received such an operational plan from Cde. Peng Dehuai. If he spoke about this issue with a Soviet adviser then we would also consider conducting such an operation to be inadvisable at the present time. We informed Peng Dehuai of this opinion. We are also reporting to you about this.

Greetings. Mao Zedong

10 March 1952"

10 March 1952 ROSHCHIN

NOTE: N° 325 (outgoing N° 5319) of 9 March 1952.
Cde. Gromyko gave instructions to tell Mao Zedong
or Zhou Enlai about the report that had been
received that Peng Dehuai is planning a local operation
against one of the American divisions and that conducting
such an operation at the present time raises doubts

6 copies ab
Printed 10 March 0445
Done by Nikitin

Authenticated: [illegible signature]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 87

237-XXII-484

Pyongyang, 13 March 1952

Comrade Feder,

I am taking advantage of Comr[ade] Wasilkowska's departure and am sending you some news from Korea.

1.- War situation. There are no major changes on the front. Here and there, one of the sides captures some mountain peak or comes down from one, but the front line remains at

essentially the same positions. It was the Americans' intention to take the Anju-Wonsan frontline, and recently they have again been putting strong pressure on the western bank of Nampho and eastern Wonsan. This frontline tempted them very much. But our armies pushed back all their attacks. And as vice-premier Pak Heonyeong announced, today we are prepared not only to repel all attacks, but also to conduct an offensive. The American air force is bombing the rears non-stop and inflicting serious losses on the civilian population. The American air force has now switched to increased night bombardments. During the day, they suffer large losses from anti-aircraft artillery, from the volunteer anti-aircraft rifle teams and from our aviation. There are many of our airplanes these days and they nearly always take on air battles. Thanks to the actions of our aviation, the Americans have completely stopped using the heavy B-29 bombers (flying fortresses) and B-26 bombers during the day. There were days when 8 of them would be lost in one day. During the day, fighter planes and ground attack aircraft, which can take on a small supply of bombs, fly. At night they bomb rail lines, road transportation and everything that shows any sign of life. Whenever the least little light appears, a bomb drops on it immediately. Recently, the American used bacteriological weapons. They massively drop flies, mosquitoes, ants, mice infected with cholera, typhus and the plague. They also drop insects that harm plants, such as our potato beetle in Poland.

The government of the DPRK has undertaken the appropriate preventive measures. They have disinfected the areas where the insects have been dropped, mobilizing for this work the whole Party, Un[ion] of Democratic Women, Un[ion] of Democratic Youth, Ministry of Public Security, military and civilian Health Service. Enhanced help is also arriving from abroad. A sanitary team of 2 thousand people is arriving from People's China, bacteriologists have arrived from the Soviet Un[ion], Hungarian bacteriologists are on their way. A few days ago I spoke with Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Li Don Gen (recently appointed to replace Pak Don Tso, who perished near Pyongyang), who told me that Korea is not threatened by an epidemic and the situation is under control. We have enough bacteriologists for now. But disinfection substances, vaccinations against typhoid in particular and also cholera, this we need very much. The American air force has recently been dropping large numbers of barrels filled with flammable substances and burning forests. Every night there are fires. The Koreans, taking advantage of the quiet on the front, are quickly training military cadres. The number of American troops engaged in Korea today is calculated at 250 thousand (Soviet comrades gave me this figure). Apart from this, there are the Syngman Rhee armies and the armies of other nationalities.

2. Negotiations in Kaesong-Panmunjom. Right now, there is a dispute about 3 fundamental questions: 1. The Americans do not want to accept the Soviet Union's participation in military inspections. 2. The Americans are demanding that the repatriation of prisoners-of-war take place voluntarily, so that in this way through terror and deceit they could hold on to every prisoner who is inconvenient to them. 3. The Americans are demanding that the DPRK not build military airports. All other issues are less important and do not present insurmountable difficulties. But at the same time Vice-Premier Pak Heonyeong said that "the war in Korea will be a long war."

3. The domestic situation in Korea. The DPRK government estimates that more or less since June of last year, life has stabilized in Korea. The frontline is not changing. The daytime air operations have seriously diminished. The old order has been restored, i.e., during the day people work and during the night they sleep. Even a year ago there was such a situation that the American air force executed so many raids every day that it was simply impossible to work. Every few minutes we needed to run to a shelter. Even driving through the city of Pyongyang during the day was dangerous. Today the situation has changed. Offices are functioning normally, various workshops and little factories are working. The mail is working. The government is planning to reconstruct industry and transportation by 1952. They have begun to build 3 metal factories underground, in which they will produce machines for processing metals. The Korean government is trying to bring industry up to such a level as to be able to conduct renovations of the means of transportation as quickly as possible. Right now, 100% of industry is damaged and everything that needs to be renovated must be taken to China. The second burning issue which the Koreans are addressing is the reconstruction of railroads. The Koreans have ordered many materials for communications in Poland (I have sent a list of these materials to the Foreign Ministry). The Koreans are counting on getting the materials they have ordered in Poland. In 1952 the Koreans plan to sign a trade agreement with Poland. They will want to pay with the raw materials and high-value ores which they possess in Korea. The Korean Trade Attaché is soon supposed to travel to the Embassy of the DPRK in Warsaw.

They are placing great stress on the development of education and culture. The schools are functioning, albeit in very difficult conditions, but they are open. The Kim Il Sung University is open, and for now it is located near the Chinese border, but they have announced that they will move it to Pyongyang soon.

The Koreans are working a lot to develop the theater. [...]

The Party and Government are paying much attention to the Korean countryside. They have recently issued a decree according to which democratic agit-points will be created in villages. The directors of these agit-points are being trained in the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda and are dispatched to the villages permanently. Their task is to inform about the government's goals and efforts in the war against the American aggressors and about the direction of politics, and overall to raise the political level, they are calling for vigilance and an intensified effort in the current year. In 1951 the Americans dropped over a dozen thousand of Syngman Rhee's military and political saboteurs, most of whom settled in villages. The captured saboteurs have been judged publicly.

The Korean countryside is preparing for the spring sowing. Over a million men mobilized by the party in the cities helped in the sowing work last year. In the Korean countryside the Korean woman is the main workforce. Men are either in the military or they have been abducted by American and Syngman Rhee's armies. Three times a year, the party mobilized people in the cities to send them to assist the countryside: sowing, replanting rice and the harvest. Office workers and workers from the ministries and

various institutions are mobilized, and for a period of a week or two they go to the countryside. Vice-Premier Pak Heonyeong has announced to us that the harvest of 1951 was very good, despite the typhoon and despite the shortage of hands to do the work, because the Korean nation worked a lot and well.

M[inistry] of F[oreign] A[ffairs] here has appealed to our Embassy in writing to ask for note sheets for Polish songs as well as Korean songs translated into Polish. [...]

4. Assistance to Korea. Our assistance to Korea is very modest and insufficient. The Koreans expect greater help from us, a country of 25 million. I want to tell you how other countries are assisting them, but I will not bring up the USSR and People's China.

Hungary. There has been a Hungarian hospital in Korea which can accommodate 3,000 patients for 20 months. The full equipment and constant supplying of the hospital with drugs is paid for by the People's Republic of Hungary. Everything beginning with bedroom slippers for the patients to the most modern apparatus is imported from Hungary. The team of doctors consists of 22 persons. The Hungarians have also given a lecturer to Kim Il Sung University, they ride trains transporting ammunition as heads of health teams. The Democratic Women's Union of Hungary has sent 4 trainloads of clothes in the last half-year. They are sending radios, cameras etc. 200 orphans and 21 students have gone to Hungary and to our country. The state song and dance ensemble, which was in Hungary, brought back many gifts.

Romania. Also has a hospital for 3,000 people, is also supplied by everything that a hospital needs by Romania. Doctors' team of 20 people. 500 orphans have gone to Romania. Apart from this they have sent no less clothing in 1951 than we did. They have also donated the full equipment for the hospital to Korea.

Czechoslovakia. This month a doctors' team is coming and opening a hospital in the same way as the Hungarians and Romanians. 20 students and 200 orphans have gone to Czechoslovakia. They are sending huge quantities of medicines.

Mongolia. They have sent 7,000 horses to Korea, and in January of this year they have sent 500 tons of meat, 40 tons of butter, 5 thousand sheepskin coats, many pairs of shoes and various clothing. In January of this year, a Mongolian delegation was in Korea, headed by a member of the Party Politburo. I have listed only the most valuable gifts that have been sent. Apart from them, numerous smaller things are being sent, which are of significant importance.

In light of the assistance of these countries, our help (that I know about) is very modest. The Koreans are currently planning to renovate their industry, and it would be good for, for example, the Central Council of Labor Unions to conduct a collection and send some dozen machines for processing metals and to send them together with master craftsmen and locksmiths who would set up the machines and teach the Korean teams to work at these machines. This would be both nice and useful.

It is too bad that Comr. Wasilkowska did not bring a serious gift from the Women's League for the use of Pak Jeongae, so that Pak Jeongae could distribute them to the work leaders, or, let's say, some model female workers.

Embassy issues. Our Embassy in Korea is the smallest and we do not look serious.
[...]

We have one more difficulty in our work. No foreign-language press appears here.
[...]

With a proletarian greeting

Deperasinski [trans. note: this is a signature that is not very easy to read]

(Translated by Maya Latynski)

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 88

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET ARMY

CABLE N° 18901

Copies N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

from [BEIJING] received at 1910 22 April 1952

Copy N° 2

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
212/1487shs 22 April 1952]

Series G
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to Cde. FILIPPOV

1. We agree with the decision of the Soviet Government about the delivery of various types of aircraft for 15 air regiments to the Chinese Air Force in 1952.

By the end of this year flight and technical personnel for 26 regiments will be graduated from the eight aviation schools which exist at the present time. In addition, one more bomber regiment does not have aircraft.

Therefore, besides the aircraft ordered in the Soviet Union for 15 regiments and also the four regiments of MIG-9's at depots there still remain 8 regiments of flight and technical personnel which do not have materiel. These regiments can be distributed throughout corresponding units to undergo flight training (three pilots for each two aircraft).

2. Of the 19 MIG-15 fighter regiments available at the present time 15 regiments based at airfields in and around Dandong are taking part in combat operations in Korea. Because of losses suffered in battle and during training the 19 fighter regiments have a shortage of 154 MIG-15 aircraft (based on 31 aircraft per regiment).

In order to increase combat effectiveness, support the continuation of combat operations, and also to provide flight personnel with the appropriate number of aircraft to continue to increase flying proficiency we request the Soviet Government permit the Chinese government to obtain an additional 100 MIG-15 aircraft in 1952 beside the aircraft designated to equip the 15 regiments indicated by you in the 9 April telegram.

We hope that you will possibly send them to China more quickly.

Inform [us of] your decision about this issue.

3. A detailed request for the necessary number of various types of training aircraft in 1952 has already been sent to you via Cde. Krasovsky.

We hope for your agreement to the number of aircraft indicated in the request in order to ensure that flight training of aviation schools is conducted normally.

Greetings.

MAO ZEDONG

N° 1246
22 April

Six copies printed

Verified: MAJOR [signature] (RUDAKOV)

Deciphered by Fedyaev 2200 22 July

Printed by Prokudina 2020 22 April N° 1498

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 89

[Source: TsAMO RF. F. 16. Op. 3139. D. 157. pp. 36-38. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Draft Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers on Measures to Increase the Effectiveness of the Combat Operations of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps.
May 1952 Moscow

USSR Council of Ministers
Decree N° ...of...[date]
Moscow, the Kremlin

On Increasing the Effectiveness of the Combat Operations of the Units of Cde. Lobov's Corps

In order to increase the effectiveness of the combat operations of Cde. Lobov's units the Council of Ministers of the USSR decrees:

1. Hold the USSR Ministry of War (Cdes. Vasilevsky, Zhigarev, and Govorov) responsible for:

a) replacing the 97th Fighter Aviation Division with the 133rd Fighter Aviation Division by 15 June 1952. Move the 97th Fighter Aviation Division to the second echelon to the Anshan and Liaoyang airfields and charge it with protecting the takeoffs and landings of our fighter aviation divisions based in the area of Dandong, and replace it with the 216th Fighter Aviation Division of the Baku Air Defense Region by 15 June 1952;

b) replace the 190th Fighter Aviation Division with the 37th Fighter Aviation Division of the Port Arthur air defense border region by 15 June 1952.

After replacement base the 190th Fighter Aviation Division in the area of Port Arthur in place of the 37th Fighter Aviation Division;

c) replace the technical personnel of the 97th and 190th Fighter Divisions as the same time as the flight personnel are replaced;

d) send the personnel of the 216th and 37th Fighter Aviation Divisions in Soviet military uniform but on arrival in China change into Chinese military uniform;

e) have two complements of flight personnel in the 37th, 133rd, and 216th Fighter Aviation Divisions, and bring [them] up to strength by 15 June 1952 from fighter aviation divisions of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army and the fighter aviation of the Air Defense Forces of the Country;

f) have 12 MiG-15bis reserve aircraft in each of the 37th, 133rd, and 216th Fighter Aviation Divisions.

g) set the tenure of the flight personnel in Cde. Lobov's corps at no more than six months;

h) redeploy the 87th Anti-aircraft Artillery Division from the area of [Taysen, Nansi] (Korea) to the area of Dandong, Miaogou (Manchuria) to strengthen the protection of the home airfields of the units of Cde. Lobov's corps;

i) strengthen the headquarters of Cde. Lobov's corps by increasing the [number of] authorized positions of senior headquarters commanders and appointing better-trained officers from the Air Force and Air Defense of the Country staffs to senior positions;

j) send one Periskop radar and Yasen' control equipment to Cde. Lobov's corps in June to be used only on Chinese territory.

2. In accordance with this Decree distribute the standard amount of monetary allowances set by USSR Council of Ministers Decrees N° 4949-2147 of 16 December 1950 and N° 3237-1537 of 1 September 1951 to all personnel on assignment in China.

Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
Administrator the USSR Council of Ministers

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 90

[Source: TsAMO RF. F. 16. Op. 3139. D. 157. pp. 27-35. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

[NO DATE: May 19 – June 15 1952]

to Cde. Stalin

We report the condition of the corps of Cde. Lobov and measures to improve the effectiveness of the combat operations of this corps and the replacement of the air divisions of which it is formed.

The combat work of the corps, the condition of the air divisions, and also the reasons for the recent increased losses were studied on site during the period between 23 April and 17 May of this year. With this purpose on 21 April we sent to Cde. Lobov General-Lieutenant of Aviation Cde. Agal'tsov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army; General-Lieutenant of Aviation Cde. Savitsky, Commanding General of Fighter Aviation of Air Defense of the Country; and General-Lieutenant of Artillery Cde. Gorokhov, Commanding General of Anti-Aircraft Artillery of Air Defense of the Country, who returned from Cde. Lobov on 19 May.

Having investigated the situation and directly studied the nature of the combat operations of American aircraft and our fighter aircraft Cdes. Agal'tsov and Savitsky took a number of steps on the spot to remove deficiencies in the combat use of our fighter air divisions

and, on return from the assignment, reported their conclusions about increasing the combat activity of Cde. Lobov's corps.

From the reports of Cdes. Agal'tsov and Savitsky it follows that the increased activity of American aviation that has been recently noted in the area of the home airfields of our aircraft has the goal of supporting the operations of their ground attack aircraft over the field of battle by tying down our MiG-15bis aircraft in battle with their F-86 fighters and by shutting down [*blokirovanie*] our airfields during the entire time the American ground attack aircraft are conducting operations. The enemy is often able to do this since our airfields of Dandong and Miaogou, located 8-14 km from the Korea Bay, are very visible from the Bay from the air.

Despite protection of the takeoffs and landings of our fighters the Americans make high-speed dive bombing attacks from the direction of the Korea Bay on MiG-15bis aircraft during takeoff and especially when landing, when the aircraft are returning from a combat mission and are low on fuel. If there is a danger of being attacked themselves the Americans immediately leave for Korea Bay, which is a total of 30-60 seconds flying time away. Our aircraft are prohibited from approaching the Bay since if they were knocked out of action or shot down the aircraft and crew might end up in enemy hands in view of the fact that the enemy has command of the sea, Korea Bay is very shallow in a number of places, and it is easy to get an aircraft from the bottom.

It also should be reported that the Chinese have five divisions in this area and use them very cautiously, operating mainly against F-80's and F-84's but do not as a rule engage in battle with American F-86's. The Korean MiG-15 fighter division does not operate at all, being prohibited by their Government.

Thus, of the nine available fighter divisions in the region of Mukden-Dandong, only our two divisions actually operate against American aircraft as a consequence of which as a rule the Americans have a numerical advantage in battle and our pilots are forced to operate in very unfavorable conditions...As a consequence of the deficiencies listed above in the last three months the corps has irretrievably lost 48 MiG-15bis aircraft and 16 pilots, of which 23 aircraft and seven pilots, that is, about 50% were shot down by American fighters over our airfields. A significant incapacitation of personnel due to illness is being noted in connection with the great stress in combat work. Cdes. Agal'tsov and Savitsky carried out the following measures on site in order to improve the combat work of the corps of Cde. Lobov:

- a detailed critique of the tactics of American aircraft and our fighter aviation has been held with flight personnel of the air division;

- instructions have been given and pilots have already begun to conduct the combat operations of our fighters in small groups and to increase formation flying in pairs and flights; as a result of this our fighters have started to reach American ground attack aircraft and shoot them down;

- the organization of the support of takeoffs and landings of our aircraft has been improved;
- commanders of fighter regiments have started to take part in the combat operations of their regiments;
- measures have been taken to organize night flights of our aircraft;
- [a limit] of no more than two combat flights a day has been set for pilots.

On the basis of the report of Cdes. Agal'tsov and Savitsky we consider it necessary to carry out the following measures to improve the effectiveness of the combat operations of our fighters against American aircraft:

1. The 97th Fighter Division, many of whose pilots have already made 80-90 combat flights and are exhausted, is to be replaced by the 133rd division, which arrived in Mukden in April of this year, by 15 June 1952 and the 97th Division is to be moved to the second echelon to the airfields of Anshan and Liaoyang and charged with protecting the takeoffs and landings of our two divisions in the area of Dandong.

In connection with the fact that enemy aircraft do not fly to the area of Mukden do not base our aircraft in this area for the time being.

Withdraw the 97th IAD to the Soviet Union in July and replace it with the 216th IAD of the Baku Air Defense Region.

2. Replace the 190th Fighter Aviation Division with the 37th Air Force Division from Port Arthur by 15 June 1952 and put the 190th IAD in the area of Port Arthur, that is, have the divisions switch places.

3. Replace the technical personnel of the above divisions at the same time as the flight personnel are replaced.

4. All three fighter divisions of Cde. Lobov's corps (the 216th, 37th, and 133rd) are to have two complements of pilots. The second complement of pilots is to be sent from the fighter aviation divisions of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Country.

5. Have 10-12 MiG-15bis reserve aircraft in each division of the corps.

6. Redeploy our 87th Anti-aircraft Division protecting airfields on Korean territory in the area of [Nansi, Taysen] which were ruined by American aircraft to the area of Dandong-Miaogou in June to reinforce the home airfields of Cde. Lobov's corps with anti-aircraft protection.

7. Strengthen the headquarters of Cde. Lobov's corps by increasing the [number of] authorized positions of senior headquarters commanders and appointing better-trained officers from the Air Force and Air Defense of the Country staffs to senior positions.

8. Move all the divisions of Cde. Lobov's corps to short-wave communications since at the present time there are short-wave communications only in the 97th Fighter Aviation Division, which does not allow immediate coordination to be organized between aircraft in flight.

9. Send the Periskop radar and the Yasen' control equipment to Cde. Lobov's corps to be used only on Chinese territory.

10. Through our Main Military Adviser request the Military Command of the Chinese People's Army:

- to create conditions for the maneuver of the units of Cde. Lobov's corps, build an additional three airfields with concrete runways in the area north and northwest of Dandong suitable for flights of jet aircraft, with one airfield to be ready in June, a second in September, and a third at the end of this year;

- step up the operations of Chinese fighter aircraft and commit them to assisting our divisions which are fighting in the area of Dandong and in Korea.

11. At the same time Cdes. Agal'tsov and Savitsky report that MiG-15bis aircraft are superior to American F-86 fighters in armament, rate of climb, and slightly [better] in level flight, but are inferior to them in range and duration of flight, horizontal maneuverability, diving, and the gunsight.

The VK-1 engine operates dependably. The operation of the engine at full power is limited by the designer to no more than 45% of the time. In combat conditions pilots fly at full power no less than 80% [of the time]. Therefore the time of the engine's operation at full power needs to be reexamined in the direction of an increase.

Comments relating to the MiG-15bis aircraft and the VK-1 engine are being studied right now by the Ministry of War together with the Ministry of the Aviation Industry and the Chief Designer, and the necessary measures concerning this issue will be reported to the Government within two weeks. We are submitting a draft Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers. Please examine and approve [it].

Vasilevsky
Shtemenko
Zhigarev
Ref. N° 48321

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 91

[Source: TsAMO RF. F. 16. Op. 3139. D. 157. p. 28, Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Report of the USSR Ministry of War to I. V. Stalin about measures to improve the effectiveness of the combat operations of the 64th IAK

N° 48321 28 May 1952. Moscow

to Cde. G. M. Malenkov
to Cde. L. P. Beria
to Cde. N. A. Bulganin

We submit a copy of a report which we sent to Cde. Stalin about measures to improve the effectiveness of the combat operations of the corps of Cde. Lobov and the replacement of the air divisions which make up this corps.

Vasilevsky
Shtemenko

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 92

[Source: TsAMO RF. F. 16. Op. 3139. D. 125. pp. 15-18. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

Directive of the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army V. D. Sokolovsky to L. A. Govorov, the Commanding General of Air Defense of the Country, and P. F. Zhigarev, the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force of the Soviet Army about the procedure to replacing two fighter aviation divisions in the 64th IAK

N° 48852 2 July 1952
Moscow

to Marshal of the Soviet Union Cde. L. A. Govorov, Commanding General of Air Defense of the Country

to General-Colonel of Aviation Cde. P. F. Zhigarev, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force of the Soviet Army

Copy: to the Chief of the Main Organizational Directorate of the General Staff

The Minister of War has ordered:

The Commanding General of Air Defense of the Country is to:

1. To replace the 97th Fighter Aviation Division on special assignment, beginning 2400 10 July 1952 transfer the 216th Fighter Aviation Division on the spot from the Baku Air Defense Region consisting of a division headquarters and three fighter regiments with technical personnel without the materiel, and maintenance and support units and subunits, to the Air Force of the Soviet Army.

The division is to have 120 pilots, of which 28 are reserve [pilots]. The shortfall in pilots is to be made up from designated divisions of the Baku Region of Air Defense of the Country.

2. Send the 216th Fighter Aviation Division in the above composition via passenger rail to Mukden for duty with the 64th IAK of Cde. Lobov no later than 15 July. The deadline for the 216th Fighter Aviation Division to assemble at the new location is no later than 1 August.

Send an advance group by aircraft to Mukden to organize the quartering of the division at the new place of deployment and to study the situation [as follows]: from the division - the commander of the division, the chief of staff, the chief of communications, the navigator, the engineer, and the chief of intelligence; from each regiment - the commander of the regiment, the navigator, and the engineer.

3. Be guided by the following when sending the division:

- select the best, tested personnel. Replace individual servicemen who for various reasons cannot be sent on special assignment from personnel of the designated divisions of the Baku Air Defense Region.

- leave unit banners, classified and unclassified documentation, training aids, literature, personnel files, seals, and stamps in the actual name of the units at home.

- leave the families of servicemen home at the deployed locations of the division's units, assigning them the housing they occupy.

- conduct explanatory work with the personnel of the units that are departing about keeping military secrets and observing military discipline both en route and at the new place of deployment.

- provide the senior officers of the groups of each aircraft and the chief of the troop train with passes across the state border in a timely manner.

- issue all personnel leaving on special assignment travel allowances for the journey to the state border and leave their families paybooks and authorization for the right to receive pay.

- send the personnel in Soviet military uniform. Flight personnel are to take warm clothing and pilot's headsets with them.

- organize the meals for the personnel during the journey to the state border through the restaurant car; beyond the border meals will be organized by instruction of Cde. Krasovsky.

4. By 1 August transfer 16 pilots from fighter aviation of Air Defense of the Country to the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force of the Soviet Army to fully supply the 216th Fighter Aviation Division with reserve pilots.

5. Submit a requisition for rolling stock to the chief of the Main Directorate of Military Transportation of the General Staff of the Soviet Army no later than 7 July.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force of the Soviet Army is to:

1. Receive the 216th Fighter Aviation Division on site in the Baku Region of Air Defense of the Country beginning 2400 10 July.

2. After it is assembled in the area of Mukden, the 216th Fighter Aviation Division is to be incorporated into the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. The personnel are to change into Chinese military uniform.

3. Remove the 97th Fighter Aviation Division in full strength from the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps on 1 September without materiel, maintenance and support subunits and units and send it to the Baku Region of Air Defense [of the Country].

4. In accordance with this directive give all the necessary instructions about the procedure for replacement of the 97th Fighter Aviation Division and commitment of the 216th Fighter Aviation Division to battle.

The replacement of the divisions is to be made while maintaining their constant readiness to perform combat missions.

Monitoring of the timely and precise accomplishment of this directive is entrusted personally to the chiefs of the Main Staffs of the Air Defense Forces of the Country and the Air Forces of the Soviet Army respectively.

Report when this is done.

Signed Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army
Marshal of the Soviet Union Sokolovsky
Authenticated: General-Major (Sokolov)

* * *

to Cde. V. M. MOLOTOV

[Handwritten at the bottom of the first page: N623-VK 7 July 1952]

1. The new proposals of the Chinese-Korean delegation concerning an armistice in Korea made on 3 July 1952 touch on the issue of POWs.

Before the meeting which was held on 3 July the Chinese-Korean side advocated their following position in negotiations on the issue of POWs:

"We propose the adoption of the following agreement about the principles of the settlement which contains specific conditions regarding repatriation while adhering to the general principles described in our proposal of 21 March:

a) All non-Korean POWs of the United Nations command and all Korean POWs whose place of residence was located in areas of your side which the Korean People's Army and the Chinese people's volunteers have should be repatriated; all POWs who are Chinese people's volunteers of non-Korean nationality and all Korean POWs whose place of residence was in areas of our side which the United National armed forces have should be repatriated.

b) All Korean POWs should be repatriated who the Korean People's Army and Chinese people's volunteers have and whose place of residence is in areas of our side and also all Korean POWs who the United Nations command has and whose place of residence is in areas of our side with the exception of those who wish to return to the place of their original residence; there is no need to repatriate the latter".

The above proposal is contained in the draft Agreement about the principle of settling the issue of the repatriation of POWs which was offered by the Chinese-Korean side at a meeting of staff officers on 27 March 1952. (TASS Far East Official Information Bulletin of 10 May 1952, pages 1-3d).

On 3 July 1952 General Nam Il, the head of the Korean-Chinese delegation, made a new proposal about the issue of POWs. The main provisions of Nam Il's 3 July statement come down to the following:

The main contentious issue, declared Nam Il, is the following: the results of our inspection of the lists of POWs are not in conformity with the principle about which we have agreed. We have always thought that inasmuch as both sides guarantee the non-involvement of POWs in the Korean War after repatriation in accordance with paragraph 52, the prisoners of both sides "should just be permitted to return home to a peaceful life". Thus, the prisoners of both sides should be reclassified and the lists of POWs verified, taking the nationality and place of residence of the prisoners into consideration. This

would simplify the repatriation of all POWs, as was provide for in paragraph 51, that is, all foreign armed personnel (of the armed forces of the United Nations and the Chinese people's volunteers) taken prisoner by any side should be repatriated; all Korean armed personnel taken prisoner by any side (of the South Korean forces and the Korean People's Army) whose residence is in areas of the other side should be repatriated, but personnel whose residence is in areas of the side that took him prisoner might be permitted to return home directly and there is no need to repatriate him. (TASS Far East Official Information Bulletin of 4 July 1952, pages 17-20d).

This statement was made by Nam Il in accordance with an instruction from Mao Zedong about which Cde. Razuvayev informed us in telegram N° 2118.

2. It follows from the above that from 27 March to 3 July the Chinese-Korean delegation had insisted that after the conclusion of an armistice:

- a) all POWs of Korean nationality should be repatriated;
- b) Korean POWs whose place of residence is on the territory of the opposing side should be returned to their place of residence;
- c) Korean POWs whose place of residence is on the territory of the side that took them prisoner should be left on that territory if they wish it.

On 3 July the Chinese-Korean delegation offered a proposal so that Korean POWs would be returned to their place of residence regardless of their wishes.

The position of the Chinese-Korean delegation with regard to the POWs of non-Korean nationality remained as before.

Thus, the new proposal of the Chinese-Korean delegation affects only Korean POWs and intends that Korean POWs should be returned to enemy territory if their place of residence is there but that all Korean POWs who lived on the territory of the side which took them prisoner before mobilization should be left on that territory, released, and sent home.

[signed] A. A. VYSHINSKY

7 July 1952

Authenticated: V. Vasil'yeva

Two copies printed

1 - to Cde. Molotov
2 - to file

AVP RF
F. 07 op. 24 p. 46 d. 223 pp. 4-7

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 94

REPORT

of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
for the period of 25 June 1952 to 25 July 1952

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea

Pyongyang, 8 August 1952
BY COURIER [stamp]
SECRET [stamp]

242/4/52

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Warsaw

SECRET [crooked stamp]

I am enclosing 5 copies of the report from the Embassy of
the People's Republic of Poland in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the
period of 25 June to 25 July 1952.

Góra Józef
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
of the Embassy of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in the DPRK

REPORT
of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
for the period of 25 June 1952 to 25 July 1952

There is insufficient material to analyze the political, economic and military situation of fighting Korea, and this is why I am only giving the general outlines of the situation in this report. But I am able to discuss in detail the assistance of the Countries of People's Democracy to fighting Korea, which I know about from information from heads of diplomatic missions and the press.

The bombing of 4 large hydro-electric power stations on Yaluchan River (Chinese-Korean border area) on 20-23 June of this year deprived all of North Korea and a part of North-Eastern China of electric energy, that is, industry stopped almost completely, some rice fields that were artificially irrigated and cities remained without water. Electrification is universal in Korea, and therefore a shortage of electric energy is felt so strongly. Around 20.VII. electric energy came from the shattered power plant, and it was first of all given to industry, and then the water supply system was made to work and light was given to those who work underground and to the Embassies. Right now electric energy is being delivered in limited quantities and with interruptions.

In industry, until recently, the situation was very serious because of a shortage of rain, which normally starts to come down in June, and this year it began in the second half of July and not everywhere. The fields have been seeded and cultivated by women, old people and children. During the draught, the population carried water in little pails and watered the rice fields. Currently, as Vice-premier Pak En Yen claims, the danger of draught has passed.

Using the example of the actions (Three-anti and Five-anti campaigns) conducted in the People's Republic of China, the government of the DPRK will also begin an action against bureaucratism and waste of state property. Two groups of 5 people each, including the deputy to the general prosecutor of the Republic, have been executed by firing squad for theft and squandering of state property, while the general prosecutor was also dismissed and imprisoned. The total amount of losses incurred by the state through the criminal activity of only one of these groups reached 130 million wons. The majority of these criminal deeds were committed in the period of the retreat in 1951.

There is no question that the current action of purging the state and economic apparatuses is strengthening them, at the same time as it raises consciousness and activity of the masses.

The front has stabilized and currently the air force, which has recently changed its tactics (see note of 15.VII.), is especially active, striking massively and often effectively in a single place.

A difficult problem with which the DPRK government continues to struggle is transportation. The enemy knows that almost everything for the front needs to be transported from the north, and therefore he is trying to destroy the transportation system

with exceptional fierceness. From time to time, the trains to Pyongyang are interrupted, but further to the south everything is transported by car or carried by people.

Exhaustion from the war is quite universal, even among the cadres there are illusions regarding talks about a truce. People would like to reach a break for even a short rest. The Workers' Party is combating this kind of mood, because it discourages the nation.

The attitude toward the Soviet Union and the Countries of People's Democracy is good, including also toward Poland. But among the broader masses Poland is less well known than the other countries of People's Democracy, and this is because of the very broad assistance that the other countries of People's Democracy are giving to fighting Korea.

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 95

[handwritten instructions across the top of the page for this to be shown to Molotov, Sokolovsky, and possible a third person]

to Cde. I. V. STALIN

I am sending you a telegram received from Cde. Mao Zedong with an attachment to a 24 August telegram of Cde. Kim Il Sung.

If you agree with their request then please give instructions about sending a special aircraft to [Beijing] to unofficially deliver Cdes. Kim Il Sung, Pan Hon-Yong, Peng Dehuai, and eight others.

Please report your opinion.

With Communist greetings!

ZHOU ENLAI

3-en

Cde. ZHOU ENLAI!

I am sending you a telegram of reply from Cde. Kim Il Sung. I also consider the visit of Cde. Pak Heonyeong to Moscow to be useful. I hope that you will direct Cde. Stalin's attention to the request to send a special aircraft to deliver Cde. Kim Il Sung and his five other comrades, Cde. Peng Dehuai, and one Chinese comrade to Moscow.

MAO ZEDONG

24 August 1952

"to Cde. MAO ZEDONG

In accordance with your telegram of 23 August we have decided to go to Moscow accompanied by Cde. Pak Heonyeong.

The Main Adviser, Cde. Razuvayev, will come with us to resolve a number of issues about the structure and weapons of the Korean People's Army. He is asking permission about this from Moscow. We agree with your opinion that our trip should be secret. Five other people are coming with me.

If you agree with this, we intend to leave immediately. Request your reply.

KIM IL SUNG

24 August 1952"

3-en

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 96

[Source: Translated for CWHIP by Gary Goldberg]

Record

Of a Conversation between Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and Peng Dehuai, 4 September 1952

4 September 1952

Present:

from our side: Cdes. Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Beria, Bulganin, and Kaganovich

from the Chinese and Korean sides: Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun, Zhang Wentian, Su Yu, and Pak Heonyeong.

Interpreters: Mun, Shi Zhe, and Fedorenko.

Stalin. What is the mood of the Korean population?

Kim Il Sung. The mood is good.

Stalin. Does Pak Heonyeong agree?

Pak Heonyeong. Yes, the mood is good.

Stalin. And in the troops?

Kim Il Sung. And the mood in the troops is good.

Stalin. But what does Peng Dehuai think?

Peng Dehuai. Good.

Kim Il Sung. The overall situation is favorable if the bombing is not considered.

Stalin. Do you have fighter aircraft?

Kim Il Sung. There is one division.

Stalin. It is difficult for China to engage their aircraft since everyone can say that these are no longer volunteers but government troops. Volunteers do not have their own aircraft. We can ask, "will this be to the advantage of the democratic camp?" In my opinion, it is disadvantageous to declare that the Chinese volunteer troops are waging war. Kim Il Sung needs to have Korean aircraft.

Kim Il Sung. If material conditions permit, then we could create one or two air divisions.

Stalin. Even though the Korean people are tired of war they are deservedly called a heroic people. Since the Korean people have suffered we are ready to dismantle one or two of our own divisions for Korea.

Kim Il Sung. Thank you.

Stalin. Do you have a fighter division?

Kim Il Sung. Yes.

Stalin. It can be moved.

Kim Il Sung. There is also one division in a [training] school.

Stalin. We can provide materiel for one to three divisions.

Kim Il Sung. We could supply the people for three divisions.

Stalin. Good, we will provide the materiel for three divisions.

What else is Korea lacking?

Kim Il Sung. As a consequence of the fact that enemy bombing is constantly increasing we need to increase our anti-aircraft artillery. Not long ago we asked for five regiments of anti-aircraft artillery but we need 10 regiments. We are asking you for five, Cde. Stalin, and five from the Chinese comrades. Mao Zedong said that it is not possible for China at the present time to grant this request from Korea. Therefore we are asking you to give us 10 regiments of anti-aircraft artillery.

Stalin. How many ground divisions do you have?

Kim Il Sung. Eighteen divisions.

Stalin. And how much [anti-aircraft] artillery?

Kim Il Sung. We have several regiments but they are underequipped.

Stalin. There are two [anti-aircraft] artillery regiments in each of our divisions. It's also the same situation in China. What about you?

Kim Il Sung. We have the same system.

Stalin. If you lack something draw up a respective list.

Kim Il Sung. Such a list has been drawn up.

Stalin. Do you have mortars?

Kim Il Sung. Yes, 122-mm's.

Stalin. We'll give you materiel for 10 anti-aircraft artillery regiments.

Kim Il Sung. Thank you, Cde. Stalin.

Regarding ground troops, we do not have enough 122-mm howitzers and other weapons. We could submit additional requests.

Stalin. What else is lacking?

Kim Il Sung. The situation is especially critical with support to the engineer and signals troops. There are great shortfalls here. It's the same situation in aviation. We have a shortage of equipment and materials. This is what will force us to halt production of 122-mm shells in a month.

Stalin. Send us a list of materials which you need.

Kim Il Sung. A list has been drawn up.

Stalin. What's the situation with food, bread and rice?

Kim Il Sung. The harvest was good this year but there is not enough until next year. Mao Zedong has promised to supply us with food and clothing.

Stalin. Do you eat bread, or only rice?

Kim Il Sung. At the most difficult moment you, Cde. Stalin, sent us 50,000 tons of food as a gift. Our people love wheat flour. Overcoming difficulties at the present time, the Korean population is making ends meet but we are poorly supplied with transport and we are not able to solve this problem by ourselves. We would like to receive motor vehicles, tractors, and chemical fertilizer from the Soviet government.

Stalin. Send us the respective list. They say that you, the Koreans and the Chinese, have some differences with respect to the issue of how you ought to conduct yourselves in talks with the Americans. Is this true?

Kim Il Sung. In my opinion, we have no differences of principle. We agreed with those alternatives which the Chinese comrades proposed but in view of the serious situation in which the Korean people have found themselves we are interested in the quickest possible conclusion of an armistice [*peremirie*]. The Chinese comrades are also interested in this.

Stalin. We have discussed this issue with the Chinese delegation here. A proposal was made not to agree to the conditions about POWs offered by the Americans and to insist on our own. The opinion was expressed that if the Americans do not wish to return 20% of the Chinese and Korean POWs then 10% of the Americans ought to be held until the Chinese and Korean POWs are returned, or to say that if they do not return these 20% of Chinese and Korean POWs then 20% of their POWs will not be returned as long as they hold the Chinese and Korean POWs. It is possible that this position is even better.

One could stop with this and reach a cease-fire. Continue the talks about the unreturned part of POWs after a halt in combat operations, after a cease-fire.

I do not know what your attitude is, but I think that in such a situation everyone would be convinced of the correctness of your position.

The Americans might say that that 20% of the Chinese and Korean POWs do not want to return to their homelands. In this event it ought to be declared that we do not believe this.

In such a gambit the issue of the 20% is put off and 80% are returned. This is the essence of the proposal.

The Chinese comrades also think that at the present time [we] ought not submit any new proposals and that [we] ought to wait until new proposals are made by the Americans in order to make our own changes. Do you know about this?

Kim Il Sung. We heard about it from Mao Zedong.

Stalin. What did Mao Zedong say about this?

Kim Il Sung. In the conversation with us Mao Zedong suggested several alternatives: first, continue to adamantly insist on the return of all POWs; second, resolve the issue of all POWs after an armistice; third, inasmuch as the enemy is holding our POWs we should also hold a corresponding number of enemy POWs.

Thus, Mao Zedong's point of view coincides with your point of view, Cde. Stalin.

We think that these three alternatives are the most suitable. But I would like to ask your advice on what step we ought to make to achieve a solution to the problem.

Stalin. In my opinion, [you] need to continue to insist on the return of all POWs for some time (a month or several weeks). If this is not successful, then propose 20%. This is not about alternatives here, but positions. The first position is the return of all POWs; the second position is the non-return of 20% of the POWs of each side.

It is true that here yet one more issue arises: whether [you] ought to offer some new proposal or wait until the Americans make a new proposal. I think that nothing new ought to be offered. It is necessary to insist on a complete exchange of POWs and see how the situation develops.

The second position is advantageous both to us and your propaganda. They don't return 20% of the POWs to you and you don't return 20%. The second position will introduce demoralization into the American camp. Sentiment for the return of the POWs and ending the war will grow. This would be to your advantage.

That's our opinion about this.

How are the Americans conduct themselves in battle, are they fighting well?

Kim Il Sung. The Americans' weakest feature is their poor morale.

Stalin. The reason for this lies in the fact that the war is unpopular. I would like to know how they fight: with enthusiasm, with great proficiency, with the superiority of forces?

Peng Dehuai. The Americans conducted more than 200 offensives in January and February but their successes were only 1%. We conducted about 30 offensives in a month, of which 80-90% were successful.

Stalin. How were these successes reflected?

Peng Dehuai. We managed to destroy small enemy subunits, a platoon or a company.

Stalin. Do you agree, Kim Il Sung?

Kim Il Sung. Of course, I agree.

Stalin. Are the Americans' fortifications strong?

Peng Dehuai. Recently the fortifications have become considerably stronger but ours have also increased. The Americans' structures themselves are weaker than ours but their equipment is better.

Stalin. What is the number of fortified lines?

Peng Dehuai. Three lines.

Stalin. But how many lines of fortifications do you have?

Peng Dehuai. Essentially two lines, but a third is just being created.

Stalin. Do you have minefields?

Peng Dehuai. We have few mines and barbed wire obstacles. We seize them from the enemy and use them against them.

Stalin. We developed the practice of minefields extensively during the war. There were special maps indicating the passages for our troops. We think that it is impossible to fight without mines and minefields.

Peng Dehuai. We have a very small distance between our forward line and the enemy, about 300-500 meters in all.

Stalin. It is evident that your forward line is too far advanced.

Peng Dehuai. Possibly this is caused by the fact that we have been constantly been moving forward since April.

Stalin. What is the distance between the fortified lines?

Peng Dehuai. The distance is short. It depends on the terrain. In some places the lines merge and in some the distance is up to 20 kilometers. At the present time we are creating reinforced concrete structures.

Stalin. Do you have trenches?

Peng Dehuai. Yes.

Malenkov. What explains the fact that we take few prisoners but the enemy takes many?

Peng Dehuai. On the whole we have taken more prisoner than the enemy.

Stalin. How many Chinese and Koreans are prisoner?

Peng Dehuai. According to our estimates there are 12,000 Chinese prisoners but according to American reports, 20,000. The number of Korean prisoners is larger, since before October 1951 the Americans were able to capture a large number of Korean prisoners. The Americans also captured many prisoners from reserve brigades during an offensive.

Twelve thousand prisoners have been captured from the time the Chinese volunteers entered the Korean War, of which 8,000 are Americans. The number of South Korean [*lisymanovskie*] POWs is 40,000. However, many of the foreign POWs have died in view of the difficult material conditions.

Kim Il Sung. According to the list which we have submitted we have taken a total of 12,000 men prisoner, of which 4,416 are foreigners and the rest South Koreans. Among the prisoners are 300 American pilots, of which more than 30 are officers. About 27,000 South Koreans have transferred to units of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. These POWs have not been reported in the press.

Malenkov. Are the Chinese volunteers at the front being rotated?

Peng Dehuai. Yes.

Malenkov. Does this mean that the Chinese units receiving the opportunity to train?

Peng Dehuai. Yes. All volunteer units in Korea will be replaced by August 1953. The entire command staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (army, corps, division) will have completely rotated through the Korean front.

Stalin. Do you have Katyushas?

Peng Dehuai. One division at the front, another in the rear.

Stalin. Are partisan detachments operating in the enemy's rear?

Kim Il Sung. Yes, they are operating, although the conditions are very difficult for this.

Stalin. Are Japanese being captured?

Peng Dehuai. Only Japanese who are American citizens are being captured.

Malenkoy. What explains the fact that few aircraft are being shot down during the massive American air raids on North Korea?

Peng Dehuai. We think that there are many. About 5,800 American aircraft have been shot down since the start of the war.

Stalin. Do Chinese pilots mastered jet aircraft?

Peng Dehuai. Chinese pilots can participate in combat operations when Soviet pilots are conducting them.

Stalin. What are they doing, are they afraid?

Peng Dehuai. They have enough courage but they are not able to fly in formation.

Stalin. They need to be launched into the air more often. Only in the air can they learn. At one time Soviet pilots also did not want to fly, they preferred to sit in school. But then they gradually began to fly, and they learned to fly. Now we rate pilots by the number of sorties. Those who have more sorties get awards. School training provides little. Combat training provides real experience. The air need not be feared. On the contrary, one ought to feel at home in the air. It is also necessary to teach night flying. Otherwise you will have no aviation. A system of awards is also needed.

Do you have orders and medals?

Peng Dehuai. Not yet. We intend to introduce them in 1953.

Stalin. It can't be done that way. It seems to me that they have an anarchical disdain for orders and medals. They also had no generals. They think that all this is against communism. Meanwhile, the presence of ranks in an army, insignia, and a system of awards has great importance. It is impossible to create a real army otherwise. Otherwise only partisan units might exist. They waged a civil war for 15 years, expelled the American imperialists, achieved victory, but no military ranks, insignia, or orders exist in the army. This is wrong. People grow and their growth should find its own expression. One ought to think about this seriously. The officer corps ought to be well supplied, there should be salaries, etc. The main thing is to retain and support officers and create all the necessary conditions for them, because they are military specialists.

Zhou Enlai. Cde. Stalin, your comments are absolutely correct. But such a situation has developed in the Chinese army because of the fact that we have been waging a civil war for the past 20 years and have practically been in war communism conditions. At the present time we have been taking steps to reorganize our army and convert army service from voluntary to compulsory, that is, to conduct military conscription.

At the present time there are 4,300,000 men in the ranks of our army, of which 1,440,000 are officers, beginning with sergeant and above [Translator's note: evidently non-commissioned and commissioned officers are lumped together here as "officers"]. In addition, we have 530,000 internal troops. We have already started to reorganize our army beginning this year, and in 1954 it will be completely restructured. We propose to reduce our army to 3 million and by improving the army's equipment subsequently only 2,500,00 men will remain plus a half million internal troops.

Stalin. That's correct, but two and half million is the minimum. It is necessary to have a strong air force and navy besides the infantry.

Peng Dehuai. We could not reorganize our army earlier because the war broke out in Korea and we had to allocate considerable resources to maintain our volunteer forces in Korea. The expenses total \$2,600,000 US from the time Chinese volunteers entered the war in Korea to the end of this year. In connection with the fact that a stable financial and economic situation has been established in the country at the present time we will be able to reorganize our army and introduce a system of salaries in it comparatively rapidly.

Kim Il Sung. With whom specifically we will be able to hold talks about existing requests and requisitions connected with military issues?

Stalin. With Cdes. Molotov and Bulganin.

We intend to send one division of jet bombers each to Korea and China if, of course, you want this.

Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung. Of course we want this, Cde. Stalin.

Stalin. I would like to invite the Chinese delegation which came to us openly to an official dinner. As regards those who came unofficially then I want to hold a home dinner for them.

Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung thank Cde. Stalin.

Recorded by N. Fedorenko

[handwritten: signature and 5.IX]

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* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 97

Top Secret
Copy N° 1

[Stamp: Attachment to N° 3584s-1dv
of 12 ?September? 1952]

from the journal
of Cde. V. I. IVANENKO,
Counsellor of the USSR
Embassy in the DPRK

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION WITH THE CHIEF
OF THE ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF
THE CC OF THE KOREAN WORKERS PARTY
Cde. PAK [YEN BIN]
(a Soviet Korean)

On 7 August I received Pak [Yen Bin], the Chief of the Organization Department of the CC of the Workers Party, at his request.

Cde. Pak [Yen Bin] reported that an expanded meeting of the Political Council of the CC of the Korean Workers Party had been held from 2 to 4 August. The chairmen of provincial committees of the Workers Party, ministers, senior CC officials, and others were present at the meeting, a total of 102 people.

The following issues were discussed at the meeting:

1. The fulfillment of Cde. Kim Il Sung's instructions described in his speech of 2 February 1952, "The Tasks and Role of Local Government Bodies at This Stage".
2. The results of the realization of the IV plenum of the CC of the Korean Workers Party.
3. Political and educational work in the countryside.
4. The condition of state farms.
5. The conduct of preparatory work to collect tax in kind.
6. The evacuation of the population from the cities.

Pak [Yen Bin] said that corresponding decisions were adopted concerning all the issues and that these decisions would be sent to the Embassy in the near future.

Pak [Yen Bin] said that during the report about political and educational work in the countryside the speaker, Choe [Cher Hwan] sharply criticized Pak [Yen] (a Soviet Korean), the chairman of the South Hamgyong Workers Party provincial committee, for an incorrect policy in the creation of labor mutual aid groups in the village and for a leadership cult [*vozhdizm*]. Pak [Yen] had developed a provision about group mutual aid

and had sent a circular directive to all Party organizations of the province of South Hamgyong about this issue without the knowledge of the CC. The CC condemned this provision as anti-Party. The essence of this provision is the following. The main tractive force in a Korean village is the bull. An acute shortage of tractive force is being felt at the present time. Only middle and prosperous peasants have bulls. When organizing mutual aid groups Pak [Yen] took the bull as the basis as the main tractive force. There were three to five peasant farms in a mutual aid group, including one or two peasant farms having a bull. Plowing and other laborious work was done with a bull. The owner of the bull was also a member of the labor mutual aid group and members of the labor mutual aid group gave the owner of the bull a certain payment for plowing land and other work and also cared for the bull. Poor peasants in the mutual aid group were dependent on the prosperous peasant, the owner of the bull.

Pak [Yen] thought that the main labor link in the village is the labor mutual aid group and accordingly broke up the primary Party organizations of the Workers Party. As a result of this, the influence of the Workers Party in the village was weakened. Pak [Yen] publicized himself more like a district official and ignored Kim Il Sung.

Instead of admitting his mistakes Pak [Yen] sharply accused the CC of the Labor Party, saying that the CC doesn't understand anything on this issue, etc. Kim Il Sung spoke at the meeting, saying that Pak [Yen] is not correct, that the CC has taken a correct line, and that possibly individual CC officials do not know this issue well but that on the whole the CC understands and has correctly examined this issue. Only at a closed [uzkoe] meeting of the CC Political Council where members of the Political Council and district Party officials were present did Pak [Yen] admit that he had made a mistake.

Pak [Yen Bin] said that it was suggested that Pak [Yen] be transferred to other work for the mistakes he had committed but it had not been decided to which [work].

Pak [Yen Bin] then said that the Americans had stepped up the bombing of cities and in connection with the upcoming celebration of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Korea it had been decided to evacuate part of the population of the cities to rural areas. One hundred thousand of the evacuated population will be sent to make hay for fertilizer and for silage, including 30,000 people from the city of Pyongyang.

Pak [Yen Bin] then said that some days ago the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda had organized a report about a visit of a Korean Government delegation to the Mongolian People's Republic. The report was made by Li [Syn Yep], the chairman of the Korean government delegation. He is a secretary of the CC of the Workers Party.

The organization of the meeting was done at a low level, in connection with which reproaches were directed at the CC. Accordingly Pak [Yen Bin] pursued the idea of removing the department of propaganda from the purview of the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda and transferring [it] to the CC of the Workers Party. I replied to Pak [Yen Bin] that right now, during this period, the removal of the department of propaganda from the Ministry of Culture and Propaganda and the transfer of this sector of work to the CC

of the Workers Party would be politically incorrect. A deputy minister of culture and propaganda is a member of the Workers Party and the CC has the opportunity to manage this sector of work more quickly.

V. A. Vasyukevich, a First Secretary of the Embassy, was present at the conversation.

Cde V. A. Vasyukevich recorded the conversation

COUNSELLOR OF THE USSR
EMBASSY in THE DPRK

[signature] (V. IVANENKO)

Three copies printed. gb.
N° 185 21 August 1952
1st copy - Cde. Vyshinsky
2nd copy - 1st DVO
3rd copy - to file

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 98

Copy N° 1

to GENERAL-COLONEL

Cde. M. S. MALININ

[Handwriting in the left margin mostly off the page listing people who were shown this document, possibly including one N. O. Pavlovsky]

I am submitting information material about combat operations in Korea as an attachment.

ATTACHMENT: As above, incoming N° 01471, copy N° 1, 15 pages, to the addressee only.

GENERAL-LIEUTENANT [signature]

(KOTOV)

30 October 1952

Top SECRET
Copy N° 1

COMBAT OPERATIONS IN KOREA

(The material was compiled on the basis of a report of the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the staff of the Chinese volunteer forces, conversations with the commanders of the 42nd and 64th Army Corps and other officers, and also the personal observations of the members of the group of Colonel K VITNITSKY)

Map [scale] 1:1000000 and 1:500000

1942 edition

OUTLINE

I.

Information about the enemy.

1. Numerical strength of the enemy operating in Korea.
2. Combat operations of the enemy.
3. A description of the enemy's defense.

II.

Combat operations of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteer forces.

4. A brief survey of the combat operations.
5. A description of the construction of the field works employed by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteer forces.
6. The tactics of wearing down the enemy and individual examples of combat operations recently conducted by the KNA and KND [Chinese volunteer forces].
7. Conclusion

I.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE ENEMY

-1-

According to information available in the staff of the Chinese volunteer forces the following enemy forces are active in Korea at the present time:

American divisions	- 7
British divisions	- 1
Turkish, French, Greek, Filipino, and others	- 1

Total: - 9 divisions of the interventionists

Five of the seven American divisions are at the front and two are in the rear. The British division is at the front at the present time.

The formations and units of other countries who are participants in the intervention in Korea are attached to American divisions and are at the front.

The total number of ground forces of the troops of the interventionists is:

American	-	250,000 men
British	-	30-40,000 men
Remaining	-	15,000 men
<hr/>		
Total:		300,000 men

The American troops are consolidated in the 8th Army, whose commanding general is VAN FLEET.

The South Koreans have 10 divisions, of which nine divisions are at the front and one in the rear. The total number of South Korean troops is about 200,000. They are consolidated into two armies subordinate to the American command.

Thus, the total number of ground forces of the interventionists and the South Koreans is 19 divisions, of which 16 are at the front and three are in the rear (two American and one South Korean), and the total strength is about 500,000 men.

The American Fifth Air Force operating in Korea has 2,437 combat aircraft of various types. There are five aircraft carriers, 20-30 light naval vessels, and a large number of landing ships operating chiefly along the east coast of Korea.

-2-

The aircraft operate in groups, entire formations, and individually. In connection with Clark's order to subject 78 cities of North Korea to massive bombing American aircraft have recently stepped up their operations and conducted raids of 30, 50, and even 100 aircraft simultaneously. They bomb not only cities but also individual villages. On 22 September we ourselves observed a raid of 30 American aircraft which obviously were going to the area of Pyongyang and were dropping bombs in various places en route, including on peasants working in the field (the area of Sariwon).

Without reaching Pyongyang, this group of aircraft (it obviously had encountered Korean fighters) destroyed, in the full sense of this word, one of the villages in the area of the city of [Kosyu].

On 21 September 1952 when we were traveling through this village it was intact and the residents were engaged in peaceful labor. On the 23rd at the site of this village we

observed complete ruin and fires and also a large number of large and small craters from aerial bombs. Four civilians were killed during this raid and a large number injured.

On 23 September from the village of [Chinsho] (in the area of the city of Sariwon) we observed the operations of four American ground attack aircraft which made six bombing runs at a low altitude to shell and machine-gun the villages of [Tumundarm] and [Shonchen] with barbaric methodicalness.

American aircraft systematically bomb railroads and highways, especially in areas south of Pyongyang. All road intersections, the area of bridges, [railroad] stations, and large cities are, as a rule, marked with the explosions of aerial bombs. In places the density of the explosions of aerial bombs reaches 20 per half a kilometer of road.

The largest bombs are the 450, 250, and 100 kg bombs; there are also a large number of craters from 1,000 kg and even higher high-explosive bombs. The diameter of the craters from 450 kg (1000-pound) aerial bomb reaches 10 meters and a depth of two and one-half to three meters. The diameter from 1,000 kg aerial bombs reaches 15-16 meters and the depth in soft soil, four to five meters.

An inspection of the bombing of one of the factories and a number of other targets by the command post of the Chinese volunteer forces allows the conclusion to be drawn that the accuracy of bombing even from high altitude (seven km) is quite high.

Tanks are used to break through a defense during an offensive, when conducting local operations, and also as mobile firing positions during a defense.

The report of the chief of the operations department of the Chinese volunteer forces mentioned that the American have special mountain tanks.

Ground[-based] artillery up to 302 mm inclusively and naval guns up to 420 mm are used.

One hundred and five mm (50%) and 155 mm (25%) are the largest caliber; all the remaining calibers of artillery and mortar shells and are 25%.

The enemy's tactics of directing artillery fire have recently changed somewhat. Previously the Americans mainly directed artillery fire at areas, now they make artillery strikes and direct methodical fire at individual locations and the forward edge.

In August and September the enemy stepped up his operations on the forward edge and began to employ more varied forms; sometimes only scouts operate, often individual subunits and units make several attacks a day on a narrow sector of the front, but on individual days they are undertaken on a broad front.

At the present time the forward edge of the enemy passes through the [Emper], Day-suayto, and Kiotso-to islands, the southern shore of the river Kan-ko along its turn to the south, [Tsayota] (excluding), [Korohori] (excluding), [Sankonri], [Tetsugen], [Kinka], [Kindzio] (excluding), [Gando], [Bunturi], [Sayko] (excluding), [Sansenri], further along the southern shore of the river [Kanko] leading to the seacoast 12 km south of [Kodzio].

Before the fifth battle (spring 1951) the enemy ignored the construction of obstacles since he relied on tanks and aircraft. Only individual emplacements and slit trenches were dug. After hitting it with strikes the enemy began to build fortifications and install obstacles.

The main defense zone of the enemy is the most reinforced in the sector [Bunson], [Sananri], [Tetsugen], [Kinka], [Sankenri], and Hill 1085.

At the forward edge of the defense trenches have been dug to a depth of 1.5 meters and a width of 0.8-1.0 meters and pillboxes and dugout shelters have been built. The pillboxes have two or three layers of beams, internal dimensions of 2x1, 5x1, and five meters, a firing port height of 40 cm, a width of 60 cm, and a garrison of two or three men.

As a rule, shelters are located on reverse slopes and accommodate a squad. The dimensions of the shelters are 3x2x2 meters, covered with two or three layers of beams, and with a sprinkling of earth of from half to one meter. Some shelters have firing ports to provide self-defense.

The number of pillboxes and shelters that the Americans and South Vietnamese are erecting is quite large.

Up to 33 pillboxes and 30 shelters were destroyed at one of the company areas (a reinforced company) seized by the Chinese people's volunteers.

The enemy is adapting the most important hills for perimeter defense.

The Americans have recently begun to urgently install barbed-wire obstacles and minefields in front of the forward edge and in depth to counter the nighttime operations of the Chinese people's volunteers and the Korean People's Army.

Barbed wire barriers of from three to 10 rows of wire are being installed. Minefields are placed in spaces between the barbed-wire obstacles and independent of them.

The staff of the Chinese volunteer forces has no detailed information about the types of mines employed by the enemy and their placement.

The rear boundary of the enemy passes through the line Seoul, [Fiseyfu], [Kahey], [Kasen], [Ioko], [Rintey], and [Gokori]. This line has been under construction for a year.

Trenches, pillboxes, and even permanent structures are being erected in it and obstacles are also being installed. The above points are equipped as centers of resistance with a perimeter defense.

II.

Combat Operations of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteer Forces

-4-

From 15 January to 15 March 1951 the Korean forces and the forces of the Chinese people's volunteers waged fierce battles at the [Hango] ([Kan-ko]) River. The enemy conducted a strong bombardment and shelled combat formations of the KNA and KND with ground attack aircraft and artillery.

The extended lines of communications, the lack of roads (the existing roads were badly damaged), a shortage of ammunition, and the inability to entrench and build fortifications led to the forces of the KNA and KND being forced to retreat in spite of fierce resistance.

The battle of seven companies of Chinese volunteers in one of the sectors of the front which perished but did not surrender can serve as an example of stubborn resistance.

The fierce battles of the fifth battle, which continued in individual sectors until 11 June 1951, concluded by 23 May. There were especially strong battles during this period in the region of the city of [Kinka]. The troops began to entrench themselves during these battles increasingly often, which contributed to the firmer retention of occupied defensive lines and a reduction of losses.

Beginning 12 July 1951 the Korean forces and the forces of the Chinese people's volunteers extended the construction of fortifications in the main defense zone. They began to erect earth-and-timber structures, trenches, and individual sectors of trenches.

The interventionists again used massive air and artillery action on the combat formations of the KNA and KND during the autumn offensive, counting on the troops being knocked from the lines they occupied and retreating.

The interventionists' plan was thwarted and the order of the Korean command and the Chinese people's volunteers "Do not retreat" was carried out.

The Korean command and the Chinese people's volunteers have been further reinforced at the line: [Dzyunito] Island, the city of [Keson], the north bank of the river [Kan-ko] ([Hengan]), the western bank of the river [Syasen], [Korihori], southeast of [Sakuney], north of the city of [Tetsugen], the city of [Kindzio], [Munduni], [Igu], [Soyko], the eastern bank of the river [Konko], and 10 km south of [Kodzio]. This line is the forward edge at the present time.

The autumn battles showed that a trench of ordinary depth and earth-and-timber structures does not sufficiently protect troops from massive air raids and large-caliber artillery fire.

The soldiers themselves, at their own initiative, have begun to dig small tunnels and deeper (no more than two meters) trenches. The tunnels were used very successfully to protect the soldiers during mass air raids and artillery strikes. Large tunnels are dug in Y and E shapes and small ones in the form of spurs.

A tunnel in combination with a system of trenches and connecting trenches allowed individual very important sectors and hills to be held. There were cases when individual garrisons spent up to 10 days in tunnels of a hill held by the enemy and did not surrender. These garrisons gave considerable assistance to the counterattacking units of the volunteers when taking hills which had been occupied by the enemy.

The following shortcomings occur when building tunnels:

- a) The system of tunnels is insufficiently linked with the system of trenches and connecting trenches; up to now in a number of sectors, trenches and tunnels have been built and equipped independently of one another. The entrances are not being secured and are insufficiently adapted for defense.
- b) Some tunnel exits face the enemy.
- c) A number of tunnels are dug with a small slope and therefore there is weak drainage and they become flooded.
- d) While digging tunnels piles of dirt are poorly camouflaged, which (when the enemy has air supremacy) allows him to precisely determine the location of the construction of the tunnels and the nature of their arrangement.
- e) In a number of tunnels the garrison is not supplied with water in the event of a blockade, as a result of which there have been cases of soldiers drinking their own urine.
- f) Tunneling of all branches of a tunnel on one level, leading to poor natural ventilation.

The examples cited above require additional elaboration of a number of issues, in particular: securing entrances, the construction of exits from tunnels to trenches, the discharge of water from tunnels being built in very fractured rock, the supply of garrisons with water, a calculated study of the slopes in tunnels to provide natural ventilation, and a calculation of the gradient of the entrance and exit tunnels to support the same task.

Recommendations about a system of catch basins and reservoirs in tunnels and also the minimum slope of tunnels which are being dug were left behind by a group at the staff of the volunteers.

Thus far the Chinese people's volunteers and Korean People's Army have done much work to create fortifications at the forward edge and have started to create a system of obstacles, also using for this purpose barbed wire and mines captured and taken from the enemy.

The construction in depth of permanent structures has begun in the most important sectors.

This year the troops are much better supplied with ammunition and food since the existing roads have been considerably improved and a number of roads rebuilt; a large number of new bridges were built and ruined ones repaired, and protection and air observation was organized on the main roads.

The existing shortcomings during the construction and repair of bridges and roads are:

- a) the location of alternate bridges close to the main ones;
- b) the lack of shelter (slit trenches) along the main roads.

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Individual examples of combat operations by Chinese people's volunteers and the Korean People's Army displaying the tactic of wearing down the interventionists and South Koreans[:]

1. On 18 September 1952 in the zone of the 39th AK [Army Corps] in the area south of [Sakuney] at Hill 222.9 an assault detachment of the 2nd PD [Infantry Division] consisting of the 8th company, the 1st fire platoon of 57 mm guns, and two combat engineer platoons seized this hill and defeated the enemy occupying the hill in [Translator's note: one digit obscured by a stray mark] 5 minutes after the start of the operation.

The rapid capture of the hill and the defeat of the enemy were explained by the careful preparatory work of this particular operation beforehand and in particular good intelligence and excavation by the SAP [Translator's note: expansion unknown, but doubtless combat engineer-related], which allowed the assault detachment to freely approach the enemy and make a sudden attack.

After seizing the hill and capturing prisoners the detachment withdrew to its initial positions, leaving only one platoon on the hill with additional machineguns.

The enemy counterattacked this platoon up to 20 times on 19 and 20 September and withdrew each time, suffering great losses. On 21 September the platoon withdrew to its position.

The enemy lost 287 men as a result of this operation, of which 178 were killed and 109 wounded.

2. During these same days in the area of [Gontari] the 2nd company of the 235th regiment attacked an enemy garrison and killed 200 officers and enlisted men in 25 minutes, knocked out four tanks, and took 16 men prisoner. Our losses totaled 70 men.

Before our withdrawal of 26 September the enemy still made repeated counterattacks on the sector occupied by the 2nd company and continued to suffer great losses. The enemy even gave a special name to this sector, "Krysa [rat]".

3. A third operation similar to the two previous ones is planned for 27 [September] in the zone of the 39th Corps.

4. In the zone of the 65th Corps in the area of [Sissiri] two and half platoons with the support of 40 guns destroyed two South Korean platoons in two hours and 10 minutes and took five men prisoner. Our losses were 11 men.

[one page missing]

...and enemy operations, and also prepared to conduct these operations, in particular ejection ahead of artillery fire spotters during artillery preparation, the construction of SAP to approach the enemy, the breaching of enemy minefields beforehand and partially in barbed-wire obstacles, conducting several operations at night, etc.

It is evident from the examples cited above that the selection of assault detachments also has great importance, and that these detachments include scouts, riflemen, machine gunners, combat engineers, and artillerymen with the appropriate weaponry.

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1. There is information that General Clark has given, Van Fleet, the Commanding General of the 8th Army, a special mission to prepare for the next offensive. This is confirmed by the regroupings and active air operations being conducted by the enemy.

2. The command of the Chinese people's volunteers assesses the presumed offensive of the interventionists as doomed to fail for the following reasons:

a) The Chinese people's volunteers and the Korean People's Army have much more combat equipment and ammunition than previously and troop morale is incomparably higher than the morale of the interventionists and South Koreans.

b) A large number of trenches, earth-and-timber structures, and tunnels, which provide shelter for the troops and allow [them] to direct fire from organized positions, have already been built.

Besides the main zone the boundaries of corps reserves and rear boundaries are being equipped with permanent centers of resistance.

c) To date, a large number of additional roads, main and alternate bridges have been built and existing roads have also been widened and considerably improved.



DOCUMENT NO. 99

Report

Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
for the period of 20 November to 31 December 1952

I. Poland-DPRK.

1. In this reporting period a further rapprochement between our two countries took place, especially in the area of culture. [...]
2. The increased assistance from our country to fighting Korea, naturally, has a positive influence on our mutual relations. [...]
3. The composition of the group of 133 Korean students invited by our government to study in Poland was finally completed in this reporting period. [...]
4. The Embassy of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in the DPRK has from the beginning of its creation been represented by the ambassador situated in the capital of the People's Republic of China [...]

To recap, it can be said that the year 1952 was a year of deepening our mutual friendship, a closer mutual acquaintance and efforts to improve our assistance in the direction of greater effectiveness and planning.

II. The domestic situation.

1. Broadened Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party.

From 15 to 18 December 1952, a broadened Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party convened in Pyongyang, and over 1,000 delegates from the whole country and the army took part in it. The fundamental speech on the subject of "The organizational and ideological strengthening of the Korean Workers' Party – the

foundation of our victory” was given by the Chairman of the CC KWP Kim Il Sung; then, the Secretary of the CC KWP Pak Jeongae gave a speech about organizational issues. A lively discussion developed after the speeches.

The broadened V Plenum closes the stormy period of the growth of the KWP begun after the IV Plenum: in a short, one-year period, the party grew by 40%, and now has 1,020,000 members in 48,933 basic party organizations. Despite the stormy growth in the numbers of the KWP, the party’s social composition has improved by comparison to the pre-war period. The percentage of workers in the party is now 21%, poor guys 57.9%, middle guys 3.5%, working intelligentsia 16.6%, various 1%. Compared to the pre-war period, the number of workers in the party has grown by 1%, poor guys by 2.7%, working intelligentsia by 1.1%, students by 0.4%, but the percentage of middle guys in the party has dropped by 3.6%, of wealthy peasantry by 0.2%, of merchants, entrepreneurs and others by 1.4%. The strong growth of the KWP in the period of the difficult and long-lasting national-freedom war is the best proof of the power of the party, which stems from its Marxist-Leninist ideology and its tight connections to the masses of the people. The KWP is stronger, more experienced and cohesive today than before the war, its authority has grown and its leadership role in the struggle to liberate the nation and to promote the nation’s development is unquestionable. After the IV Plenum the party dealt with the lefty mistakes by opening its ranks to true patriots of the DPRK heroically fighting at the front and in the rear. During the war, 450,000 new members joined the party; these are comrades who are for the most part not sophisticated politically. The broadened CC KWP Plenum set as one of its main goals the ideological strengthening through intensive party training and putting organizational order into the ranks of the party.

Taking advantage of the presence of party and state activists in Pyongyang, the CC KWP organized 7-day practical courses for the chairmen of district party committees and the National Committees (the equivalent of our District National Councils).

The broadened Plenum launched mass political and economic actions for the period of the winter, aiming to raise the masses to a higher level of consciousness and a greater activism in all the spheres of life, work and struggle.

2. The overall stabilization of the DPRK.

In the third year of the victorious war, despite the constantly growing air raids on the towns and villages of North Korea, the violent firing at the coastline by American warships and the cold winter, the life and work of the DPRK’s population is stabilizing more and more, and the authority of the Korean Workers’ Party and the people’s government is growing.

The setting of the frontline at the 38th parallel and the inability of the American armies to rupture it, despite many attempts, are an important source of strength and faith in the victory of the DPRK. The population knows that the front is holding strong and that it can live and work for the victorious end to this war behind this wall.

The increasingly effective and planned assistance from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Countries of People's Democracy to a large degree makes it easier for the DPRK government to stabilize the life of the people. The government and the Committee of assistance to the victims of the war distribute food and clothing to the most aggrieved in their persistent concern for keeping, if possible, the whole population alive. The preparations for winter (the building of dugouts and the transport of heating supplies) were basically completed. On 1.XII the early winter did not bring the great losses that had been feared, and the construction of air shelters, initiated by the KWP and the government, also contributed to saving the lives of the population.

The good harvest of rice, its low prices and the government's additional ration of 1 mal (7.5 kg.) of rice per family of those who work guaranteed every inhabitant of North Korea the ability to eat rice every day.

The fight with bureaucratism and with the leftover ideology of Japanese imperialism that is being conducted under the leadership of the KWP has to a certain degree purged the state and social apparatuses, and mostly brought them closer to the masses, which are feeling with increasing force that this is their own government apparatus, their own people's government.

The most distinguished soldiers were given leave for the period of the holidays, and usually the whole village greets them with enthusiasm and makes them welcome; apart from this, the Union of Korean Women has organized an action of sending New Year's gifts to the front, strengthening the ties between the rear and the front. The People's Army enjoys universal love and support. 23 [sic?] broadened session of the Central Committee of the Unified Democratic Motherland Front was devoted to preparing a ceremonious commemoration on 8.II.1953 because of the 5th anniversary of the creation of the Korean Workers' Army, a central preparatory committee was chosen and is headed by the CC KWP Secretary Pak Chang-ok. This action encompasses the whole country.

Thus, the regime of the people's democracy, under heavy fire, passed the historical exam in Korea and every day strengthens the power of the people's government in contrast to the rotting capitalism, which in the south of the same Korea is destroying the nation and increasingly sets the broad popular masses against itself.

a) The strengthening of the people's government.

The people's government, backed by the broad masses of the patriotic population, has gelled, and the activities of the state apparatus are increasingly efficient and effective. This can be seen in many areas. In education, for example, the Ministry was able to include up to 85% of school-age children in education. Aiming to keep alive and continue to bring up orphans, a Central Committee for saving the child has been organized, and social women's organizations have been pulled in, and it places orphans in state orphanages or with the families of a given locality.

The overall industrial production has risen by comparison to 1951 by 119%, cooperatives by 118% and internal trade, thanks to assistance from the Countries of People's Democracy, with the Soviet Union in the lead, to 232%; the railways carried 113% more cargo than in 1951 and so forth: each of these departments is working better and more productively than in 1951.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was recently merged with the Ministry of Security, leaving as minister the former Minister of Public Security, has also improved its work, which is of great importance for the defensiveness of the country; it has organized, together with social organizations (KWP, Union of Women, the Union of Democratic Youth), self-defense units, which are playing a growing role in catching spies, bandits and saboteurs, in almost all the towns and villages. Recently, a series of public trials of spies and saboteurs took place in Pyongyang and provincial towns, and then those who are condemned to death are publicly hanged, and their bodies are left for a few days on the scaffold. Material evidence, such as parachutes, radio transmitters, weapons, poisons, bacteria and so on, is displayed next to the scaffold. The population accepts the destruction of the enemies with satisfaction and learns how to uncover them.

In the winter, the spies are forced to crawl out of their mountain hiding places and look for shelter and food from the population, and this is why it was recently forbidden to take in anyone for the night without permission from the local national committee.

The Ministry of Health has a lot of experience in fighting the airdrops of disease-bearing bacteria, and it, together with society's input, organized 9,000 observation points in the whole country, which look out for enemy planes all day and all night to make sure they are not dropping bacteria. According to data from the Ministry of Health, Comr. Li Byeongnam, the observation is generally good, but there are sometimes belated information and discoveries of concentrations of infected flies, mosquitoes etc.

Concerned with the health of the population, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a resolution about providing health care for free to the whole population. Currently, the Ministry of Health has begun to organize this health service, especially for those who work, transforming medical rooms serving factories into polyclinics. The hard conditions of life during the long-lasting war have had a very strong impact on the health of the population; recently, tuberculosis has been spreading especially powerfully; and so, for example, tests given to stationary patients in one hospital revealed that 20% have tuberculosis, and the testing of the "healthy" in a factory revealed that 15% had TB. In view of the above, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to guarantee 700 gr. of rice and 50 gr. of meat as the daily food ration for those who are suffering from tuberculosis.

In order to make the work of the administration more efficient, adhering to a resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly decided on 22.XII.1952 to eliminate the existing communities, which remain from the old Japanese administrative system, as an unnecessary intermediate step between a village and a district, which only makes the administrative apparatus more bureaucratic.

By decision No. 330, the Cabinet of Ministers on 29.XII. established a commission with the task of preparing a plan for new administrative units.

The struggle against bureaucratism and leftovers of the ideology of Japanese imperialism, as well as criticism, self-criticism and mass actions to make growing strata of the population more active, and, most of all, the correct policies of the KWP and the government – these are the levers which constantly fortify the people's government of the DPRK and make it possible during the long war to strengthen the front and the rear.

b) The countryside.

Because of the rich harvest and the raising of the consciousness of the peasant masses, the payment of in-kind tax is going well, and many districts have delivered 100% of what they need to. The payment of the tax without any particular pressure from the administrative apparatus, but only by the influence of mass actions and a growing sense of patriotism, is the best evidence that the authority of the people's government has grown and the consciousness of the peasant masses has increased.

The Korean Workers' Party has increased its activities in the countryside during the winter period. The transmission of the party to the countryside translates into over ½ million peasants, party members, into the Union of peasants, the Union of Women and the Union of Democratic Youth, and so the population of the countryside is becoming increasingly active.

First of all, in every village during general meetings there are discussions of [illegible word, added by hand] this good harvest and what needs to be done to attain the same or better outcomes next year. People decide not to waste food, to save it and to buy working cattle and agricultural tools. During meetings, peasants have addressed the demand to cooperatives producing agricultural tools that the tools be adapted to the work of women, who currently dominate the countryside. The peasants' meetings are characterized by seriousness and a feeling of responsibility for delivering food to the whole nation, and especially to the People's Army.

The KWP and the government have been paying a lot of attention to the preparations for spring sowing and a good crop. According to the directives of the Plenum of the CC KWP, the overall production of seeds should reach 105% in 1953, by comparison to 1952, which will surpass even the best year 1948 by 150 thousand t. The Cabinet of Ministers devoted a special session to this question, and is adopting several resolutions proposed by the CC KWP, which are to make it easier for the peasantry to execute the undertaken task.

The existing Ministry of Forests and Agriculture was renamed the Ministry of Agriculture, and I don't know yet who will take care of the forests. The peasantry is learning to choose the best seeds for sowing, and the government has given the peasants 20 thou[sand] t. of artificial fertilizers delivered by the Soviet Union to prepare sowing, and this is of enormous importance for future crops; also, the action organized by the

party of collecting and preparing natural fertilizers continues, and it is yielding good results; some peasants have already prepared up to 200 t. of this fertilizer.

The party and the government are conducting a sharp critique of the activities of the peasant bank, which in 1952 gave out 60% of credit to various organizations, instead of to the poor, and this led to the development of usury in the countryside, which forced the government to take care of the indebted poor and to issue a ruling that regulates the paying off of these debts fairly.

In late December in Pyongyang, the party and the government organized a congress of peasant activists, the so-called peasants of rich harvest, with the aim of exchanging experiences and further broadening this patriotic movement. A good agricultural exhibition was organized at the congress, and many activists were rewarded for their model work. After the congress of activists ended, a conference of the Union of peasants will take place, and then agricultural exhibitions will be organized in every village to teach how to attain high yields.

Apart from the above-mentioned actions, a broad action to raise the political consciousness of the peasant masses is being conducted. Schools for adults are working very intensively, a large number of white-collar workers have been directed to the countryside to serve in the above-mentioned schools. Lessons are being conducted on the national-liberation war, about the roots of past victories over the enemy, the government's fair people's policy, the systematic and selfless help from the Countries of people's democracy, educating the masses in the spirit of internationalism and so on.

In 1952 the standard of living in the countryside rose, the peasants approach the people's government with full trust and are becoming increasingly active and conscious citizens of the DPRK.

c) Learning and culture.

On 1.XII.1953 the Korean Academy of Science began to work normally. For the first time in the history of the Korean nation, an academic center has been created, which will develop academic research according to a plan and serve the nation. The working masses received the news about the creation of the Academy of Science and the awarding of academic degrees to excellent Korean scholars with pride and joy.

The party and government are attaching a lot of importance to the development of learning, science and the arts, hence Kim Il Sung University and all universities not only are open, but are currently accepting more and more students for courses of study, even pulling them in from the front.

The Korean nation is very musical, it likes signing and music, and so, even despite the war, two good-quality symphony orchestras have been organized. The 1953 plan anticipates the construction of another underground theater hall in Pyongyang, also

to serve as an air-raid shelter for the population, as well as 4 underground theaters in the provinces.

Film makers can also mark new achievements in their creations. They have released a new film entitled "Defenders of their Fatherland" and, together with Chinese cinematography, a documentary about bacteriological warfare.

1952 was a year of difficult struggles between the DPRK and the imperialist invaders and the domestic enemy. The people's government, directed by the Korean Workers' Party, with help from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Countries of People's Democracy, has been able to stabilize life in North Korea, significantly strengthen the rear and to gather a huge majority of the population around the KWP and the government in the struggle for national liberation and the people's-democratic revolution. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is entering the third year of a bloody war more cohesive and stronger than it was at the beginning of the war.

III. South Korea

Syngman Rhee's situation has become even more difficult because of the American rabble rousers' persistent push to reduce their losses on the front and to achieve the quickest possible substitution of the American units by others. It is clear to realistically thinking politicians that only Japanese units could potentially replace the americans [sic] at the front, and for this a Japanese-Korean "alliance" is needed. I have already written in an annex to my previous report that this would mean a repeat occupation of South Korea by the Japanese and the possibility of uniting the whole Korean nation in an anti-Japanese war. In this situation Syngman Rhee is dying to prove that his "government" is capable of manning the front with South Korean units, and the Americans could just protect the rear. On 25.XI.1952, as he accepted the new letters of credence from the newly appointed ambassador of the USA Elik Briks [sic], who was previously the USA ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Syngman Rhee declared that the South Korean army is now stronger than before the war, that it is fighting on the fronts alongside the American units, that two million young Koreans are burning with eagerness to enter its ranks and that only equipment and the USA's assistance are needed.

The Americans have nothing against increasing the numbers of South Korean units, especially since the Korean soldier is 28 times less expensive than the American one, and the arming of one South Korean division costs only ca. 8 million American dollars, while the 1-month pay of an American division alone costs over 5 million dollars. An increase in the South Korean army creates the opportunity of an instant deployment on the front in the period of preparing Japanese units, and possibly also Chiang Kai-shek-ist ones to be used in Korea, and later also on a wider front. This is why Eisenhower demanded during his inspection of Korea, on the one hand, an enlargement of the Syngman Rhee army and, on the other hand, reaching a quick agreement between Syngman Rhee and Japan.

Since December 1952, army recruitment in South Korea has been very intensive and daily yields 1,100 people, according to the New York Times, and Syngman Rhee's units with very young recruits have indeed appeared on the front. At the same time, Syngman Rhee, executing Eisenhower's order, declared that on 5.I.1953 he is going to Japan to meet with Clark and activists of the Yoshida government, so it is clear that the Americans, breaking the resistance of the Korean bourgeoisie, are pushing it to reach an "alliance" with Japan quickly. Attempts at resistance coming from the Syngman Rhee group have been sharply attacked by the American press, and for now everything has "quieted down" and the USA's order is being executed. This matter must be followed closely since it carries the germ of future increased fighting of the whole Korean nation against their eternal enemy, Japanese militarism, linked with the USA's imperialism. The KWP realizes the significance of working in South Korea and, despite the bloody terror, is increasing its broad activity, mobilizing the masses to resist and to fight the invaders and the Syngman Rhee-ites.

IV. The military situation.

For the whole period of 1952, the war in Korea was a positional war, and the several attempts by the American command to disrupt the front failed with large losses for the so-called UN troops. The strengthening of positions did not cease for the entire year, but in this reporting period it became especially intensive, and both sides' increases in forces are equally intensive.

After the break-off of talks in Panmunjom and the UN's passing of the so-called Indian resolution, rejected by the DPRK and the PRC, and also Eisenhower's and his allies' statements about the need to increase supplies of airplanes, ammunition and so forth to the front in Korea, it is becoming clear that rough fighting at the front may begin, and here I would like to stress that the front is not only the 300-kilometer line of trenches, but a very long coastline, which requires constant alertness and can almost only count on defense from the land, since the DPRK does not possess a fleet, and the mining of the coastal waters takes place from wooden fishermen's boats.

The American command has increased air raids on the cities, roads and railroads, and especially all types of warehouses and the mining industry, even more. The air raids are massive, every day 800-1,000 American planes roam the skies over North Korea, and they are currently bombing in the day and at night. The appearance of reactive airplanes at night, which approach before one can hear them, is a new thing, and it is impossible to see them in the night, hence the difficulty of defense. The Americans are heralding further intensification of the terrorist air raids and, as the UP announced on 13.XII, the deputy minister of defense of the USA Patrick announced that until now it was possible to send only 666 planes per month, but in the new year it will be possible to add 750 airplanes per month to the aviation.

The front line has for a month now been intensively covered by aviation with heavy bombs and artillery, hence the need to dig into the earth and the rocks more deeply; apart from this the americans [sic] are executing massive airdrops of disease-bearing

bacteria, especially on the eastern front; and so on 24.XI.1952 in Koson district of Kangwon province, flies, mosquitoes, spiders and fleas infected with paratyphoid fever "A". On 25.XI. flies and spiders with *streptococcus* were discovered in Hu Chang district, on 1.XII. infected fleas were airdropped in Ongjin district, Songnam village, on 10.XII infected flies and mosquitoes were dropped in the city of Wonsan, and so on. The airdrops of bacteria are spreading now also in the area around Pyongyang.

There is great fear of a mass use of what so far has been sporadic and experimental, chemical weapons and gases, with the goal of potentially breaking up the front or destroying human resources. An American prisoner-of-war Lieutenant Henri [sic] Peters testified that there are little flags with "gas" written on them to mark places infected with fighting gases or chemical warfare in every american [sic] fighting unit, as well as similar little flags with "bacteriological bomb" written on them.

Since Eisenhower's inspection, the American command has been trying even more insistently to push the Syngman Rhee-ites into the first line. For 1.XII.1952 the americans [sic] kept at the front 2, 3, 7, 25, 45 divisions and the 1st sea division, and the Syngman Rhee-ites 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11 divisions. Seoul radio broadcast that South Korea currently has 12 divisions and is aiming to double them.

According to data of 15.XII.1952 from the Supreme command of the Korean People's Army, losses suffered by the so-called UN armies in November amounted to:

American	9,728
English	880
Syngman Rhee-ite	20,203

Depression is so widespread among the American troops that every USA personality who inspects the Korean front tries to give them encouragement. V[ice]-minister [sic] of defense of the USA Rosenberg promised to send them blondes to play with for the new year; Eisenhower stated that the Americans are thinking about them and that they are not fighting a "forgotten" war; finally, Cardinal Spellman came to Korea in order to bless them in the noble deed of defending the American way of life; it is a fact that the American soldier is tired by the war and does not want to die in Korea. To show the particular situation in the Syngman Rhee-ite army I am enclosing an order from the Commander-in-Chief of the KPA Gen. Kim Il Sung to decorate a former Syngman Rhee-ite lieutenant, Kuk Jon Am, who crossed over to the Korean People's Army with an airplane.

Under fire, the Korean People's Army has grown into a powerful force; it has grown not only quantifiably but also qualitatively; its supplies are becoming better and richer, it is characterized by mass heroism, which shows constantly in the fight against the enemy. By 1.X.1952 the title of "hero of the DPRK" was awarded to 398 soldiers and officers, of whom 228 are alive; tens of thousands of soldiers and officers have been decorated with top medals and about 300,000 medals for valor. The Korean People's Army has grown into a dangerous force, whose strikes the enemy has felt on his own skin.

V. The diplomatic corps.

[...]

VI. The situation of the Embassy.

[...]

[signature]
Góra Józef
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
of the Embassy of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in the DPRK

Translated by Maya Latynski

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea [letterhead]

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 100

SECOND MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY

CABLE N° 26499

Copies N° 1 to Cde. Stalin
N° 2 to Cde. Stalin
N° 3 to [illegible handwritten name]

from [BEIJING] received at 1630 17 December 1952

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to the IV Unit OS VKP(b) CC
472/45731shs 17 December 1952

Series G T

to Cde. SEMENOV

In connection with the adjournment of the negotiations in Korea and also in view of the fact that the losses of American troops on the Korean front have not reached such a degree that the Americans would agree to cease hostilities we assume that military

operations in Korea will be stepped up for a certain subsequent period of time (say, a year).

At the present time Eisenhower is making preparations for military operations which will be launched once Eisenhower takes office. Based only on military operations in Korea it is assumed that the possibility that the enemy will launch [amphibious] assault landing operations in our rear on the west and east coasts is greater than he will conduct an offensive against our positions at the front, which are well fortified and constructed along the front and in depth. All signs show that at the present time the enemy is strenuously making preparations and increasing the puppet troops of Syngman Rhee, units of the enemy navy are continuously performing maneuvers in North Korean waters, and enemy agents are also actively operating in the areas of the west and east coasts.

As regards enemy military operations, the enemy has a total of 19 divisions, four brigades, and seven independent regiments, including seven American divisions, four British, Turkish, and other brigades, and 12 divisions and seven independent regiments of the South Korean army.

Fourteen divisions, four brigades, and five independent regiments are active at the front at the present time.

If the enemy launches assault landing operations in the areas of the west and east coasts he will choose a maximum of four to five divisions from rear areas of South Korea and also four American divisions from Japan and America. Only thus will the enemy be able to organize large assault landing operations. Otherwise, because of a shortage of men he would only be able to launch assault landing operations of a tactical and holding nature in areas of our immediate rear.

The assault landing sites of a tactical nature might be in the area of [Thon-Chen] on the east coast and the [Osin] and [Munkompo] Peninsulas on the west coast.

The assault landing sites of a strategic nature might be in the areas of Wonsan and [Hamhyn] on the east coast and in the areas of [Dzinnampo], [Sinantszyu], and the [Tel'san] Peninsula on the west coast.

The assault landing sites of a strategic nature on the west coast present a more serious threat to us since our main line of transportation passes through these areas.

Assault landing operations might possibly be launched by the enemy next spring, but it is possible that the enemy will begin these operations earlier, in February of next year. The enemy might launch military holding operations with reference to the Chinese mainland to help carry out an assault landing operation, for example bombing military airfields located on Chinese territory in the area of Dandong, waging military operations with bands of Nationalist Chinese troops on Taiwan in coastal regions of China, [or] help the Chinese bandit troops of [Li Ni]'s group in Burma, in order to intensify military operations on the Chinese border.

However, as before the war in Korea [is] the key issue. If we successfully defend the east and west coastal areas in our rear in Korea, foil the enemy's plan with respect to an assault landing operation, and also inflict large losses on the enemy in manpower in combination with attacks of a tactical nature at the front, then the military situation in Korea will be more stabilized and will develop further in a direction more to our advantage.

Before replying to the question of how the above tasks might be done allow me to report about the current military situation and its features.

The situation in the Korean theater of military operations began to be comparatively stable after the defeat of the enemy's autumn offensive last year. Our troops used this period to reinforce defensive fortifications at the front and coastal areas and, successfully combating enemy aircraft, we repaired rail lines of communications and highways in September of this year and thereby ensured the constant supply of the troops in order to frustrate a possible autumn offensive.

Our troops began attacks of a tactical nature first, as a result of which 58 strongpoints were cleared of enemy units.

In three months, September through November, we inflicted losses on the enemy of more than 110,000 men killed and wounded, including more than 40,000 Americans.

In the middle of October the enemy began a gradual attack with more than two divisions against two strongpoints located in an area of about three square kilometers in a pass which is four km north of [Kumhwa]. The operations continued until the beginning of November; the enemy lost more than 20,000 men dead and wounded and expended about 20,000 shells a day, and sometimes almost 300,000 shells. Tanks and aircraft took part in battles every day. However, finally the positions remained in our hands and the enemy was not able to occupy an inch of ground.

The artillery fire of our units and enemy units was especially concentrated since such fierce positional battles were being fought. A concentration of fire of about 30 guns with the expenditure of an average of up to about 10,000 artillery shells was required in order to destroy one enemy company.

In the next three months we expended more than 2,400,000 shells (1,100,000 of them Soviet models) of which mortar shells occupied the greatest percentage. However Soviet model artillery shells like the 152 mm gun howitzer, 122 mm howitzer, 76.2 mm gun, 85 mm anti-aircraft, 37 mm anti-aircraft, Katyusha and 122 mm, 85 mm, and 76.2 tanks shells have played a very great role.

Our troops won a victory in battles in the autumn not only thanks to the heroism of the soldiers and commanders, well-built fortifications, correct command of the battle and

constant supply; the most important factor of victory turned out in reality to be the strong artillery fire and accuracy of the artillery.

As regards the relative strength of our artillery and the enemy's artillery the enemy has about 14,000 guns of various calibers, and units of the people's volunteers and the Korean People's Army have 13,000 guns of various calibers. However, among our weapons a great percentage are light mortars and rocket launchers. They are almost half of all our artillery. The enemy has many more howitzers and tank guns than we have. Our great difficulty is the shortage of artillery ammunition, in particular Soviet models. Units of the people's volunteers have almost 2,000 Soviet-model guns.

Although we received 1,120,000 Soviet artillery shells of various calibers this year the expenditure at the Korean front was very high and many kinds of Soviet-model artillery shells are no longer at the depots.

Recently the headquarters of the people's volunteer forces issued an order about the removal of some howitzer battalions equipped with Soviet guns from the front line. This decision was made on the basis of an assumption that the enemy would to organize a large winter offensive. But if the enemy found out the entire truth of our situation and begins his offensive earlier this will put us in an extremely difficult position.

Therefore the request to deliver Soviet-model artillery shells will be one of the most urgent requests with which I address to you in this telegram.

We are taking various preparatory measures at the present time in order to repel assault landing operations and an enemy offensive which he might begin earlier than the time we assume.

Right now 16 corps of people's volunteers, four howitzer divisions, four tank regiments, and five Katyusha rocket launcher regiments are at the Korean front. Seven corps of troops of the people's volunteers and three corps of the Korean People's Army are on the front line. The remaining corps of the people's volunteers are in the second line and are defending the eastern and western coasts of Korea together with troops of the Korean People's Army.

We have decided to send four infantry corps, one howitzer artillery regiment, five tank regiments, and two Katyusha rocket launcher regiments from China proper to Korea in January 1953 to increase military strength and to hold five corps on the west coast in the area north of Pyongyang, and have also decided to strengthen and create new, deeply echeloned fortifications along the sea coast and railroads in order to provide security of the narrow sector through which the transportation supply lines for the Chinese and Korean troops pass.

At the same time it is also necessary to create new deeply echeloned fortifications at other important points of the east and west coasts.

So that a resumption of military operations in rear coastal areas does not influence the normal supply of troops at the front we have decided to build a new rail line and improve the condition of existing rail lines, and also to build new highways and widen existing highways in order to improve the transportation and delivery of food and ammunition to the front in possibly larger quantities to create reserves.

We have started a new mobilization in the country in order to reinforce the troops of the people's volunteers and are thinking of sending 250,000 next year to reinforce the people's volunteer forces.

We think that military expenses in the next year might grow and the production of the defense industry needs to be increased, and therefore construction resources in 1953 will be invested only in the most important projects and some construction work which might be postponed will be reduced.

In view of the difficulties of the Korean comrades in supporting this war, besides the construction of rail lines, highways, and fortifications completely at Chinese expense we have decided to supply Korea with commodities and food worth \$60 million US annually for three years free of cost and to also accept a large number of Korean orphans, injured refugees, manual laborers and office workers in order to ease Korea's burden.

It is necessary to successfully carry out military operations in Korea in order to favorably resolve these issues. We are ready to exert every effort to win the war, however we will not achieve this without difficulty.

The greatest difficulty that we have at the present time is that in 1953 we will not be able to produce all kinds of Soviet-model guns, which are extremely necessary for the Korean front, and especially Soviet artillery shells of various calibers. Only after spring we will be able to begin making several types of Soviet guns and ammunition for them, but in insufficient quantity.

In connection with this extremely critical situation I earnestly request that you and the Soviet Government grant our request for military equipment for the Korean front in 1953 and the request through commodity circulation channels for materiel for military production in 1953.

The first request was sent to Cde. Molotov on 6 September 1952 via Cde. Zhou Enlai and the second was submitted to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade via Ye Jizhuang, Minister of Foreign Trade, who is in Moscow at the present time.

We are attaching to this telegram a request for urgently needed military equipment.

Please consider it in accordance with the attached list and I have hopes that you will supply us with the military equipment.

1. Various models of guns - 624, and also truck tractors and artillery instruments for them which we will ask you to deliver in the first quarter of 1953:

152 mm gun howitzers with limbers and spare parts - 108;
122 mm howitzers with limbers and spare parts - 218;
76mm divisional guns with limbers and spare parts - 150;
37 mm anti-aircraft guns with spare parts - 100;
85 mm anti-aircraft guns with spare parts; 48
Spare diffusers [*otvody*] for 37 mm anti-aircraft guns - 200;
Stereoscopic telescopes - 300;
Periscopic artillery aiming circles - 400;
Eight-power binoculars - 2,000;
Commander's BM zenith tubes - 20;
Mikhaylovsky-Turov aiming circles - 50;
Truck tractors - 783, including tracked tractors for 152 mm gun howitzers - 135;
ZIS-151 trucks - 336;
GA-63- trucks - 312;
GAZ-67 command vehicles - 151.

2. Artillery shells of various calibers - 805,000, which we request be delivered to us in January 1953:

1. 152 mm PG [gun howitzer] rounds with a normal variable high-explosive charge - 3,800.
2. 152 mm PG rounds with a reduced variable high-explosive charge - 1,000.
3. 152 mm PG smoke rounds - 200.
Total - 5,000.
4. 122 mm howitzer fragmentation rounds - 96,000.
5. 122 mm howitzer high explosive rounds - 45,000.
6. 122 mm howitzer hollow-charge rounds - 4,500.
7. 122 mm howitzer smoke rounds - 4,500.
Total - 150,000.
8. 122 mm tank and self-propelled artillery fragmentation rounds - 14,000.
9. 122 mm tank and self-propelled artillery armor-piercing rounds - 6,000.
Total - 20,000
10. 120 mm high-explosive mortar shells - 50,000.
11. 107 mm high-explosive mortal shells - 50,000.
12. 85 mm anti-aircraft fragmentation rounds - 30,000.
13. 37 mm anti-aircraft fragmentation rounds - 500,000.
Total - 630,00
Grand total - 805,000.

3. Artillery shells of various calibers - 1,550,000, which we request be delivered to us in February and March 1953:

1. 152 mm rounds with a normal variable high-explosive charge - 38,500.

2. 152 mm PG rounds with a reduced variable high-explosive charge - 10,000.
3. 152 mm PG smoke rounds - 1,500.
Total - 50,000
4. 122 mm howitzer fragmentation rounds - 128,000.
5. 122 mm howitzer high explosive rounds - 60,000.
6. 122 mm howitzer hollow-charge rounds - 6,000.
7. 122 mm howitzer smoke rounds - 6,000.
Total - 200,000.
8. 76 mm gun fragmentation rounds - 50,000.
9. 76 mm gun high-explosive rounds - 27,000.
10. 76 mm gun armor-piercing rounds - 15,000.
11. 76 mm subcaliber rounds - 5,000.
12. 76 mm gun smoke rounds - 3,000.
Total - 100,000.
13. 85 mm tank fragmentation rounds - 32,500.
14. 85 mm tank armor-piercing rounds - 12,500.
15. 85 mm tank hollow-charge rounds - 5,000.
Total -50,000.
16. 85 mm anti-aircraft fragmentation rounds - 150,000.
17. 37 mm anti-aircraft fragmentation rounds - 1,000,000.
Total - 1,150,000.
Grand total - 1,550,000

We ask that the above artillery equipment be included against military orders.

In the event that you agree to delivery in accordance with our request please exclude the above artillery equipment from the 6 September 1952 request for artillery armament.

Regarding the artillery armament and artillery ammunition for the 20 infantry divisions, the armament, and military equipment which will be delivered in 1953, please deliver them in accordance with the previously agreed plan and do not make any changes.

4. Here are six kinds of materials for arsenal production which we request be delivered to us in the first quarter of 1953:

Detonators for 122 mm howitzer shells	- 500,000.
Charges for 122 mm howitzer shells	- 700 tons.
Detonators for 76 mm gun shells	- 500,000.
Charges for 76 mm gun shells	- 500 tons.
Detonators for 37 mm anti-aircraft shells	- 500,000.
Charges for 37 mm anti-aircraft shells	- 100 tons.

Please include the above material for arsenal production against commodity circulation. In the event that you agree to delivery in accordance with our request please exclude these materials from the commodity request for 1953 which was submitted through commodity circulation channels.

For the period of 1 January 1953 to 28 February 1953

I. Polish-Korean relations.

[New Year's telegrams exchanged, they show growing friendship; show of Polish films; radio programs from Poland; Korean art exhibition to be shown in Poland; too little information about lives of Korean children and students in Poland.]

II. Domestic situation in the DPRK.

1. Activities of the Korean Workers' Party

As a result of the implementation of the directives of the V Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' party contained in the speech made by Chairman of the party, Comr. Kim Il Sung, meetings of basic party organizations are taking place throughout the country, at which these directives are being relayed to the broad masses of party members.

The basic guidelines of the V Plenum of the CC KWP can be summarized in the following points:

- a) The struggle for the further strengthening of the party through the qualitative growth of the party, using the method of ideological-political education of party members, and especially newly admitted ones.
- b) Strengthening organizational-party work of the basic party organizations.
- c) Struggle for the leading role of party members.
- d) Struggle for raising party-ness among party members.
- e) Struggle against liberalism, outdated sectarianism and all kinds of deviations from the party line.
- f) Struggle against the bureaucratic work style of the party organizations and state organs.
- g) The struggle for the broad application of critique and auto-critique, which are key factors in strengthening the party and giving it the fighting spirit.
- h) Struggle for a tight link between the party and the masses.

At the meetings of the basic party organizations, under fire from critique and auto-critique, the party unearths exponents of these mistakes and deviations, unmasking them before the broad masses of party members.

As a result of the party meetings, the following people have been dismissed from positions they had occupied, for their anti-national and anti-party activities: V[ice]-minister of Culture and Propaganda Choe Il Men and V[ice]-minister of Foreign Affairs Chu Nion Ha.

V[ice]-minister of Education Pak Hen Sik was dismissed from his post for the mistakes he had committed in professional and party work.

The party has declared a decisive war on mistakes at work of some party organizations. The basic mistakes of some provincial, city and regional party organizations are non-planning of working competence in steering the work of activists, as a result of which the body of party activists does not grow; incomprehension of principles, especially in the area of political guidance of work of the local state administrative cells. The party is fighting with the phenomenon of bureaucratism, carelessness and dishonesty in the work of party organizations, which could be seen, for example, in the work of the City Committee of the KWP in Hamhyn. The City Committee in Hamhyn led to the outcome of committing several mistakes, to the downfall of political-party activity of the party organizations under it and to facts of abuse on the part of functionaries of economic organs. The general meeting of activists of this committee, as a result of critique and auto-critique, uncovered these facts and the proper consequences were imposed on the guilty. All the members of the committee were dismissed from their positions. In general, it is the party's principal task, in the current phase, to fight to consolidate its ranks, and to strengthen the party's unity, as the basic precondition of the DPRK's victory in the struggle against the American-English interventionists and the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique.

2. The overall stabilization of the DPRK.

In this reporting period, a further process of stabilization of economic and political life in the DPRK could be observed. The resolutions of the V CC KWP Plenum and their implementation are contributing to the strengthening of the apparatus of people's power. The authority of the party and government of the DPRK is being created by the uncovering of all mistakes in the work of the economic and administrative organs and by the example-setting punishment of those who committed them.

Despite the difficult and lengthy war, with the criminal methods being used by the enemy side, the Korean nation calmly and trustingly believes in its victory and is working to strengthen its people's-democratic state and its successes. With the steady help from the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy, in this reporting period the government of the DPRK had major achievements in developing the individual branches of political and economic life.

A. Education

The question of developing elementary, secondary and higher education is a source of constant concern for the government and the party. Despite the heavy destruction, which the barbarian bombing by the American air pilots is inflicting on education, the network of schools is increasingly broadening. It can easily be said that education in the DPRK, despite the conditions of war, is universal. In accordance with the party's guidelines, a strong campaign in the direction of totally eliminating illiteracy is currently being waged. To achieve this goal, a large network of schools for adults is being organized. These schools are springing up mostly in the larger factories. For example, in the city of Chenjan alone, there are over 40 schools for adults. The local democratic agitation centers are in charge of organizing the teaching of adults and taking care of schools. One of the recommendations of the V Plenum of the CC KWP is the struggle to improve teaching programs in the DPRK's educational system, which do not meet the needs that the government and the party place before education.

With the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of 5 January 1953 in mind, the following academic institutions were reorganized: Institute of the Russian language in Pyongyang into the Institute of foreign languages; the State School of Music into the State Institute of Music; the State School of the Arts into the State Institute of the Arts. The period of study in all the schools mentioned above has been lengthened from 2 to 3 years.

More details about the DPRK educational system are provided in the annex to this report.

B) The development of culture.

A stormy growth of the national culture in the DPRK was observed in the period of seven years from the moment of liberation of Korea by the Red Army from the shackles of Japanese imprisonment. Folk music is developing quickly, many compositions based on folk motifs are being created (last year there were 388 [transl. note: very difficult to read: the number may actually be 588] such compositions), central theater, ballet ensembles and song and dance ensembles are being created, three symphony orchestras exist already, whose programs include new compositions. Song and dance ensembles are developing in provincial cities, and even in Korean villages. The above-mentioned data about the growth of DPRK's culture apply to the period of the war. The party and the government are making efforts to draw out the beauty of Korean culture and its progressive traditions. Writers and poets also have major successes, as in their creations they express the heroism of the struggle and work of the Korean nation in its just war of liberation against the efforts of the imperialist interventionists and the Syngman Rhee regime to subjugate the Korean nation and to deprive it of its gains. Poetry is developing broadly among soldiers on the front. Recently, many promising poets have appeared in their ranks. Soldier-poets in their poems extol the Korean People's Army soldiers' heroism and service to the people's cause.

Across Korea, the 29th anniversary of Lenin's death was celebrated very solemnly. In Pyongyang, in all the provincial and regional towns, in the villages and in schools,

lectures on the revolutionary activity of the Great teacher of progressive humanity, Comrade Lenin, are taking place. In connection to the Lenin days, the workers of many factories and institutions celebrated the memory of Great Lenin by setting production goals.

On 6 February of this year, the cinematography of the DPRK celebrated the 6th anniversary of its existence. The young Korean cinematography has had major achievements. In the past years, despite the difficult conditions of war, it produced 6 feature films, some of which were shown in Poland, 33 documentary films and 107 newsreels. The film production plan for 1953 envisages the Korean film production producing 5 feature films. These films are to connect to the best revolutionary traditions of the Korean nations. (For details, see note No. 2421/11/53/TJN of 24.II.1953.)

To commemorate the 5th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army, the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK established a state bonus for the best literary or artistic creation. The decision plans to award three-degree bonuses. A I degree bonus will entail an amount of 40,000-60,000 won, II degree of 20,000-40,000 won, III degree of 10,000-20,000 won. Poems, prose, musical compositions, literature reviews, film scripts, paintings, sculptures, dance and others qualify to be rewarded with bonuses.

The Korean government has demonstrated much concern and recognition for the creators of progressive Korean culture, hence the decisions of the Supreme People's Assembly in July of this year to establish the title of the DPRK People's Artist. According to the *Minju Choson* newspaper, on 31.XII.1952, the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK awarded the title of People's Artist of the DPRK to 10 outstanding artists.

But there are also shortcomings in the area of the correct development of culture in the DPRK. At the V Plenum of the CC KWP, Comr. Kim Il Sung spoke about a group of writers and artists who are still burdened with certain influences of bourgeois ideology, which are reflected in their creative work. Comr. Kim Il Sung called on the party to fight these deviations decisively, to fight for the right, revolutionary road of the development of culture in the DPRK, supported by the experiences of the leading culture of the Soviet Union.

c) Transportation.

The DPRK's transportation system is currently facing great challenges. The first one concerns the efficient and systematic supplying of the front. The second is the indispensable supplying of food and raw materials for production in the rear. The long-lasting war has inflicted great harm on the DPRK's transportation system, especially its railways. Station buildings have been completely destroyed, tracks and rail bridges have been seriously damaged. Road transportation has also suffered quite a lot. The damage to road surfaces is great, cars and repair stations have been damaged by the air force. Despite these difficult conditions of work, the DPRK transportation system has made great strides, but not as great as it should have been able to if it used all the forces and

reserves present in it. Comr. Kim Il Sung showed at the V Plenum of the CC KWP that the main shortcoming of rail transport is the incompetent use of the already very small rolling stock. About 80% of cars run in one direction without freight, when large quantities of freight are waiting to be transported to various parts of the country. Comr. Kim Il Sung stressed that in this situation some regions of the country suffer shortages of articles, of which there is enough in other regions. In February of this year, a council of the workers of road transportation of the Korean People's Army took place, at which drivers and mechanics, guided by the recommendations of the V Plenum, discussed the issues relating to making transportation more efficient. The basic issues of the transportation workers' council were: the question of the technical performance of the vehicles, trips without breakdowns, economizing gasoline and fulfilling the transportation plan with a surplus. The party's instructions for transportation have been the subject of discussions among the workers of the DPRK transportation system, and already now one can see a marked improvement in its work.

D) Industry.

The V Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party is placing a very important task before DPRK's industry. In examining the mistakes of some branches of industry, the party is conducting an urgent fight aimed at eliminating them, with the participation of the broadest masses of workers and the engineering-technical apparatus. In connection with this, councils of the activists of individual branches of industry, which were announced in December of last year, are being convened. From 20 to 23 January of this year, a council of the activists in heavy industry took place, at which the forms and methods of raising production, not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of quality, were discussed. Such councils of the industrial activists are also taking place in the industrial centers of provincial towns. As a result of these discussions, a concentration of the movement to raise the quantity and quality of production could be observed recently.

The DPRK's party and government are demonstrating constant concern for the growth of industry. Evidence of this is the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers to grant short-term loans for the growth of state industry. This decision assigns the distribution of these loans to the Central Bank of North Korea, whose plan of distribution of these funds is subject to approval by the Cabinet of Ministers. This decision became effective on 1 January 1953. The results of this action have not yet been published.

E) Agriculture.

At the V Plenum of the CC KWP, the achievements of agriculture were summarized, stressing the great productivity of the production of the main agricultural crops.

The overall production of cereals surpassed the harvest of 1951 by 113%, which in numbers represents an increase in the harvest of 340,000 tons. Still, these achievements could be even greater.

Comr. Kim Il Sung, in his speech at the V Plenum, subjected the Ministry of Agriculture to a critique, pointing out its mistakes. The main mistake in the work of this ministry was leaving 70,000 tenbo (1 tenbo = 0.9 ha.) of arable land fallow in 1952, and justifying this state of affairs with the difficulties stemming from the war. Too little attention was paid to the issue of assistance to the poor peasantry. The Plenum's recommendations direct the attention of the peasant masses to the issue of the further increase of good harvests per hectare of crops such as barley, wheat, soy and vegetables.

Because of the approaching spring, preparing the farmers for spring work in the fields is a burning issue. As a result of the implementation of the recommendations of the party Plenum regarding agriculture, an All-Korean congress of leading peasants was organized in Pyongyang, whose sessions lasted from 5 to 8 January of this year. The congress set for itself the task of conveying the decisions of the Plenum to the broad masses of the peasantry and further to mobilize the peasants around executing the tasks of food and industrial raw material production, which are so important to the country. Further, it had the task of promoting the experiences of the leading peasants, with the goal of applying them in agriculture more broadly. The congress demonstrated that many peasants, thanks to their concentrated effort and concern for their production, have had significant individual achievements. For example, a peasant from the Donju region of North Pyongyang province, Kim De Sik, harvested 19.8 tons of rice per hectare; Son Hwa Sir from Hweyan, Kanwon province, harvested 9.2 tons of corn per hectare; Kim Chan Han from the Phunsan region of South Hamgen province harvested 72 tons of potatoes from 1 hectare; and female peasant He Din Sen from Kuson region of North Pyongyang province harvested 10.7 tons of cotton per 1 hectare. The congress adopted a resolution about intensifying efforts to further raise agricultural productivity and eliminate existing fallow land.

The resolutions of the congress were heard widely in the Korean countryside. Under its influence, the movement of competition between individual peasants and whole villages of the DPRK aimed at raising the productivity of agricultural production strengthened. Meetings of peasants in all the villages of the DPRK discuss the congress' recommendations and they gain ardent support from the peasants.

The government and party are paying much attention to the issue of helping the poor peasants and fishermen, who are feeling the effects of the war most acutely. The DPRK Cabinet of Ministers' decision of 18 February 1953 about improving the economic situation of the poor peasants and fishermen envisions granting them assistance in the following forms:

1. Selling fallow land in more favorable conditions;
2. Handing over for farming land that is not being cultivated by institutions and factories that own auxiliary farms;
3. Giving help in relocating to those peasants who receive land in other regions;

4. Making it possible for poor peasants to join self-help groups, which own tractive forces;
5. Giving reproductive horned livestock to them;
6. Granting loans to poor peasants to enable them to buy working cattle;
7. Making it possible for those peasants who cannot make a living from farming the land they own to get jobs in factories;
8. As for poor fishermen, the resolution recommends activating so-called fishermen's communities and accepting those fishermen into the above communities.

The peasant bank, which was reorganized as a result of the critical assessment of its activity at the V Plenum, is charged with distributing financial assistance to the peasantry, first of all the poor peasantry, on behalf of the state. The peasant bank has already begun to grant short-term loans to the poorest peasants, the families of those who fell in the struggle for the independence of the fatherland, families of war invalids and those whose family members are at the front.

F) The struggle against espionage.

On 22 January 1953 the War Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a decision to make the fight against spies and the work of the people's self-defense units more efficient. The decision stresses that in the period when the American-English imperialists are massively dropping spies and saboteurs onto the territory of the DPRK, with the goal of gaining information that is important to the enemy, this fight is of great significance. In order to conduct an increasingly successful fight against espionage, it is indispensable to make the people's self-defense units more massive. It is an important condition of the efficacy of this struggle to increase vigilance among the population, which should be expressed in terms of guarding secrets of top importance to the defense of the country. Further, the decision discusses acts of mercy toward the spies who willingly hand themselves over into the hands of security authorities or people's self-defense units and express remorse for their activities to date. The decision foresees absolute and strict punishment of those who will again engage in spying for the enemy. It also envisages rewarding those who demonstrate special achievements in the fight against spies and saboteurs, as well as strict sentences for those who assist spies or hide them.

In the recent period, spies and saboteurs have been massively caught, and, what is important, not only by the people's units of self-defense but by individual peasants, workers and even by school children. This phenomenon is the result of the broad political-propaganda action being conducted by the government and party, whose goal is to demonstrate the harm inflicted on the country by spies. In the month of February alone, 150 spies and saboteurs were caught.

Last year, 2,400 members of the people's self-defense units were decorated with state orders and medals for outstanding services in the struggle against espionage, and diplomas of recognition were granted to 6,572.

The struggle against espionage can easily be described as a broad, patriotic, nation-wide movement.

G) V anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army.

On 8 February 1953, the whole Korean nation celebrated the 5th anniversary of the creation of the Korean People's Army very solemnly, a creation that was a historical act in the life of the Korean nation. Since then, the DPRK has ceased being a defenseless country, which has been demonstrated especially in the period of the just war against the imperialist American-English interventionists and their Syngman Rhee-ite lackeys.

In the period of these 5 years, the Korean People's Army has been covered in glory, having become stronger like never before, and it is being transformed into a modern army that, as it defends its country from enemies, is inflicting losses that grow every day.

The People's Army's political consciousness has grown significantly, especially in the period of the national-liberation war. The army's high morale is based on the party-educational work inside the army, which is being conducted by the Korean Workers' Party. This has enormous significance for achieving the final victory. In this period, the People's Army's fighting power has also grown, the experience of the commanders has increased in the difficult conditions of the war, as they conduct military operations, as they become familiar with the Stalinist science of war strategy and tactics and rely on the experiences of the heroic Soviet Army, especially in the period of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War, as they have learned to win and to beat the enemy.

The numbers of the army have grown threefold during the national-liberation war, and the firepower of each infantry division has increased by 160% compared to 1951.

In his speech at the council of the top officers of the Korean People's Army, Comr. Kim Il Sung placed the following task before the army in 1953 with the goal of firming up the readiness of the Korean People's Army to conduct a long-lasting war and to fight on a broad scale:

1. To educate soldiers and officers in the spirit of the justice of our cause and to prepare them to conduct the stubborn, long-lasting war. The ideological-preparatory work should be conducted in such a way that, if the enemy wishes to perform a daring attack or he undertakes any sort of landing operation, it will not only to shatter the enemy but strike the death blow, and thereby accomplish a breakthrough in the course of the Korean war.

The educational and party-political work should be concentrated fully in the direction of strengthening discipline in the army and of the one-person command, to

educate all soldiers and officers in the spirit of hatred toward the American armed interventionists and the treasonous Syngman Rhee-ite clique. Strictly to protect military secrets, combat talkativeness and take care of military equipment with care.

2. It is necessary to make the operational and tactical use of all types of arms and their interaction in battles more efficient. To strengthen our land and sea positions and to defend them steadfastly.

Not to allow the adversary to move forward and to land his troops on the shores. Incessantly increase the activeness of our armies in the defense and to exhaust the enemy's forces, while destroying as much as possible of his live force and equipment.

To increase the accuracy of our anti-aircraft artillery fire.

3. As quickly as possible to raise the quality of our commanders' and staffs' tactical and strategic preparedness.

To improve all types of intelligence and to remember that without intelligence we cannot achieve accurate strikes at the enemy.

4. Incessantly to train all types of armies. Conduct more tactical exercises and military shooting. The exercises should be conducted on flat areas and in the forest, in conditions maximally similar to the real battle situations, and to conduct 40% of them at night.

5. To make the work of supplying the army more efficient and to appreciate the fact that the course of military operations depends on the supplying of units with ammunition and food at the right time.

The fulfillment of the recommendations from Comr. Kim Il Sung will undoubtedly contribute to the further strengthening of the Korean People's Army and its preparedness to push back any sort of attack by the enemy and to inflict the final defeat on him.

Especially important was this year's anniversary of the creation of the KPA. It is connected to the DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly's nomination, as an expression of the recognition of his great services lying in the work of strengthening and educating the Army, of the creator of this Army, Comrade Kim Il Sung as the Marshal of the DPRK. Comr. Kim Il Sung's life has been inseparably connected with the wartime successes of the Korean People's Army, hence the love of the Korean nation for the Army and her Commander, which could be seen in the thousands of letters and gifts sent to the soldiers at the front by the people on the occasion of the V anniversary of the KPA. Delegations of peasants and workers from the whole country travelled with greetings to the soldiers at the front. These included the Central People's Delegation, composed of the Chairman of the CC Trade Unions, Minister of Health and Minister of Education, visited the soldiers at the front. The delegation brought 8,500 parcels with gifts and hundreds of letters from

the people to the soldiers. Furthermore, on the occasion of the V Anniversary of the KPA, theater ensembles and song and dance ensembles visited the front.

On the basis of the facts given above, one can deduce that the DPRK's political and economic life is stabilizing more and more. This gives a stimulus and encouragement to the Korean nation in its further fight for victory in the war of national liberation. The Korean nation knows that the issue of the country's political and economic development rests in the strong hands of the party and government, that the toughened units of the Korean People's Army, together with the Chinese People's Volunteers, are standing up to defend the Fatherland, that it has growing help from the peace camp led by the Soviet Union in its struggle.

III. The military situation.

The approaching spring, according to American plans, is to be the right moment for launching a great, in their view, offensive against the Korean People's Army and the units of the Chinese people's volunteers. It aims to rupture the positional war, which has lasted nearly 2 years.

Among the aggressors, there do, however, exist serious doubts whether with the help of the offensive they will be able to gain anything other than losses. Hence a number of views on this issue, among which pessimistic opinions predominate. The statement by Gen. Robert Ickelbarker [sic], ex-commander of the USA's armies in Japan, is characteristic. He believes that even after the gathering of all the armed forces of the USA in the Far East, there will be no possibility of breaking the Korean front.

According to the American radio, some of the American generals are aiming to launch their offensive and believe in its successes. It can be seen from this that there exist various tendencies in the military leadership of the USA. One can also observe a significant livening up among the aggressors. Visits to Korea took place recently by representatives of the USA general staff, Gen. Collins, the French Marshal Alfonse [sic] Juin, who was accompanied by the commander of the French expeditionary corps, Gen. Allard and the visit by Stevenson. These visits show that the aggressors are preparing for a spring offensive.

The Korean People's Army and units of the Chinese People's Volunteers may successfully push off the enemy's attacks at any moment. Nonetheless, intensive preparations are being made in case of the announced offensive. The front line, and especially the coast, is being strengthened with artillery and tank units. The Korean comrades expect that in case of landings on the territory of the DPRK from the sea, the enemy may have some successes in the first days, but once they are on land, the enemy's forces will be totally routed.

No nervousness can be observed in the DPRK, the Koreans are calmly making preparations to push off any attacks. For example, in late February, the Hungarian and Czech hospitals were evacuated to places located in the rear. Recently, the American air

force intensified its air raids even more against the main communications routes, in this way intending to paralyze supplies to the front, but they did not succeed. Supplies to the front not only were not paralyzed but, on the contrary, strengthened.

The fighting spirit in the ranks of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers is growing every day. There are frequent examples of soldiers' collective and individual heroism. According to the Main Command of the KPA, in February of this year, during one of the attacks by the Chinese people's volunteers, one of the soldiers performed a heroic act by covering the enemy's firing position with his body, thus making it possible for his unit to continue to attack.

In contrast to the spirit of heroism and sacrifice of the people's units, dissatisfaction with the lengthening war is spreading in the enemy's army. The army's morale continues to disintegrate. The phenomenon of mass desertions by soldiers of the American army is evidence of this. According to UP on 8.I of this year, since the beginning of the American aggression against the DPRK, 46,000 infantrymen have deserted. Of this number, 35,000 were captured, while 11,000 escaped in unknown directions. Furthermore, 851 soldiers have deserted from the air force, 1,240 from the navy and 637 soldiers from the landing forces. Incidents of soldiers' refusal to execute orders are also frequent. Thus, for example, 93 soldiers and 1 officer of the 65th regiment of the 3rd American division have refused to execute an order to attack one of the hills on the western front. As a result of this, the American command put the rebels before a military court.

The phenomenon of soldiers and officers of the Syngman Rhee army crossing over to the Korean People's Army was the reason for the decision issued on 9.I of this year by the DPRK War Council about rewarding soldiers who, individually or collectively, cross over from the south to the north. This decision includes the following rights:

1. Granting of civil rights.
2. It envisages awarding state decorations to those who have performed such a heroic deed. It envisages paying out a money bonus to those who cross over to the side of the KPA with their weapons.
3. Those who want to fight against the American-English interventionists and the Syngman Rhee clique will be able to join the ranks of the KPA, have their military ranks recognized and, in cases of particular services, be promoted to a higher military rank.
4. Those who want to work are assured the appropriate work. It guarantees the giving of land to farmers and envisages assistance in farming it. Those who want to study have the right to choose a school, and the state will cover the cost of their studies.

In cases of soldiers and officers crossing over with their families, this decision guarantees the same rights to these families.

The above-mentioned rights also apply to former citizens of the DPRK.

The decision also guarantees even better treatment of soldiers and officers of the foreign aggressive armies who go over to the side of the KPA. This document is an expression of the strength of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea.

According to data from the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army, the aggressors' losses in the month of January of this year are as follows:

Killed or wounded	Americans	4,000
	Englishmen	500
	Turks	50
	Others, including Syngman Rhee-ites	8,350
Total killed or wounded		12,900 enemy soldiers and officers.

The aggressors' losses for the month of February of this year amount to 9,500 killed, wounded and captured, including 4,400 American soldiers and officers.

On 22 February of this year, the commander-in-chief of the so-called UN armies in Korea, Gen. Clark wrote a letter to Comr. Kim Il Sung and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese People's Army Units Pan De Huai proposing an exchange of prisoners-of-war being held by the two warring sides.

It is difficult to know what is the real meaning of this announcement. It is possible that it is one of the propaganda moves from the side of the Americans, who want to throw off responsibility for the talks they broke off in Panmunjom. So far, the Korean Side has not spoken up on this issue. It is to be expected that an answer will be given shortly.

IV. The situation in South Korea.

a) The economic situation of the Syngman Rhee's regime is becoming increasingly desperate. According to one of the South Korean newspapers, the Syngman Rhee budget for 1953 is 7,327,400,000 won. Of this, 5,008,700,000 won is being appropriated for war purposes. The support of the so-called UN army costs the Syngman Rhee-ites 900,000,000 won. Thus, 92.7% of the budget is intended for the goal of conducting the war. Because of this enormous amount in the budget, the Syngman Rhee-ites intend to increase taxes by 218% compared to 1952. Burdening the people of South Korea with new taxes will further worsen the already catastrophic situation of the popular masses.

The inflation in South Korea, which has been advancing for seven years, forced the puppet government of Syngman Rhee on 15.II.1953 to implement a so-called

monetary reform, which is allegedly supposed to put an end to the phenomenon of inflation. According to data from the Syngman Rhee-ite side, the total number of monetary units in circulation has grown from 2,600 million won (as of 15.VIII.1945) to 10 billion won (as of 14.II.1953). The new unit of money is called the “hwan” and is exchanged at 1 hwan to 100 won. As a result of this reform, instead of the stabilization of the currency, which was expected by the Syngman Rhee-ites, one can observe its ongoing drop.

The prices of basic food items grew over the 2 days since the reform more than threefold. Profiteering is growing. An inhabitant of South Korea is allowed to exchange only the small amount of 50,000 won, for which he can buy only 2.5 kgs. of rice. The remainder of the money has been deposited in banks. Following the monetary reform, shops were closed for several days. The people did not trust the new monetary unit, and products were rarely exchanged for the new money. The Syngman Rhee police forced merchants to open their shops and arrested every one who did not want to take the new currency.

The monetary reform was also calculated so that, as a result of it, the Syngman Rhee-ites would manage to force the group of young people who have been avoiding service in the South Korean army to serve. The Syngman Rhee-ite press, bragging, has been writing that this is an effective way to force this youth to come out of hiding because they would otherwise have no money to live on. When money is exchanged, a certificate from the police is demanded when money is exchanged. [sic]

The deepening economic chaos, approaching catastrophe, in the Syngman Rhee-ite regime, the even more tragic situation of the people of South Korea are the effect of the so-called monetary reform.

b) In connection with the steady attempts of the American imperialists to replace the American units at the front with Korean Syngman Rhee units, the Syngman Rhee regime has decided to broaden the age limits for recruitment. Before this decision, the duty to serve in the military encompassed men of 19 to 28 years, now it is from 17 to 32. The Syngman Rhee-ites, in accordance with their masters' orders, thus want to strengthen the ranks of their army with thousands of young Korean men. According to the Seoul press, the commander-in-chief of the so-called UN troops, Gen. Clark, will be able to organize two more new Syngman Rhee-ite divisions. This way, the number of Syngman Rhee-ite armies will grow from 12 to 14 divisions.

The Syngman Rhee-ite soldiers have not received sufficient amounts of food for a long period of time. The food crisis in the army intensifies every day. As the Syngman Rhee-ite minister of defense admits, the soldiers receive food of a value that is barely one third of the necessary caloric amount. A result of this is the phenomenon of the total exhaustion of soldiers, of whom thousands are in bed in hospitals. *New York Times* writing about hunger in the Syngman Rhee-ite army, demands that Van Fleet pay greater

attention to the issue of improving the food situation because this may lead to massive phenomena of tuberculosis and other diseases in the South Korean army. Hunger and the inhumane treatment of the soldiers of the Syngman Rhee army by the American mercenaries and Syngman Rhee's officers is causing a constantly growing resistance on their part. In order to prevent this, the American commanders of the so-called UN army assign American instructors to the Syngman Rhee-ite units, whose task is to eliminate all signs of dissatisfaction and disobedience among the troops. The hatred toward American imperialism and the American mercenaries among the Syngman Rhee-ite soldiers is very strong. One of the soldiers who went over to the people's side stated that many soldiers in the Syngman Rhee army, if they could, would turn their arms against the Americans [sic]. Currently, the phenomenon is observed of individual groups and individual soldiers of the Syngman Rhee-ite army crossing over to the KPA and Chinese people's volunteers' side. According to *Nodong Sinmun* of 26.II of this year, in the period of 1 to 13 February of this year, 51 Syngman Rhee-ite soldiers and officers went over to the people's side. In a single day, 13.II of this year, 27 soldiers of the 6th, 12th and 15th Syngman Rhee-ite divisions went over to the people's side with their full equipment.

These facts are evidence of the fact that only terror is maintaining the obedience of the soldiers and forcing them to fight against the DPRK.

c) The Syngman Rhee clique's war policy, taking over the basic branches of economic life, robbing natural resources by the American imperialists in the disguise of so-called assistance to the South Korea has created incredibly difficult conditions of life for the people. The Syngman Rhee-ites, obeying the orders of the American imperialists, are closing down factories. Thus, for example, compared to 25 June 1952, the output of the textile industry, which is the most developed branch of production, dropped by 63%, the food industry by 70%. The situation of the metallurgical industry, whose production has dropped by 85%, is no better.

The treatment of South Korea as a colony by American imperialism, paralyzing the economic life increases to a great degree unemployment, hunger and destitution of the south's working masses. In South Korea there is over 1 million unemployed, and the number of half-unemployed and war victims who receive no help is going up to 14 million, of whom 5 million are in camps, where unbearable living conditions dominate. The workers who work are receiving starvation wages. A worker's earnings compared to June 1950 are 33.3%, while the prices of basic consumer goods have risen by 1.503% [sic]. Unemployment, hunger and destitution of the working masses of South Korea are the cause of the incessant worsening of the condition of the health of inhabitants, and especially of children, among whom large mortality rules. For example, of 1,000 children, 220 die. On the basis of a statement from the health ministry of South Korea, over 100,000 who are suffering from tuberculosis are deprived of health care and have no means of being treated.

The Koreans from the north, who have been kidnapped by the American and Syngman Rhee-ite armies to the south during the temporary occupation of a part of the DPRK, cross the front line risking their lives in order to return to the DPRK. They talk

about American crimes that are being committed on the Korean nation. Among others, the Americans are forcing the North Koreans to work in American military intelligence, especially taking advantage of young people. They use these young people to create so-called defense units and drop members of these units onto the territory of the DPRK as spies. This activity has escalated the hatred of the Korean nation toward the imperialist interventionists and their Syngman Rhee-ite lackeys even more.

d) The struggle of the Korean nation against the Syngman Rhee-ite regime and its imperialistic patrons grows in strength daily. On 22 December 1952, a [missing word] of harbor workers in Pusan took place in protest against the murder of a harbor worker working on an American ship by an American mercenary. Over 1,000 workers took part in the strike.

People's partisans are developing active activities in South Korea, inflicting serious losses on the enemy. Despite the police expeditions aimed against the partisans, which the Syngman Rhee-ites organize incessantly, their activity has not weakened. On 13 December 1952, partisans from Li Hen San's unit active in the region of the cities of Tegu – Kochan, with the active assistance of the people, shattered a column of vehicles of one of the American units. Partisan units on the island of Chechjudo are very active, inflicting large losses on the Syngman Rhee-ites there. On 22 December of last year, the partisans attacked a formation of Syngman Rhee-ite troops in the area of the city of Chemphen, which was there with the goal of protecting transportation. The Syngman Rhee-ites are not managing to stamp out the partisan activities. Recently, the Syngman Rhee-ites positioned military units of 50 men each in every village in order to protect the areas threatened by partisan activity. They apply very tough repressions against peasants living in those areas. For example, they take all the food [sic] away from the peasants, leaving them nourishment for only 2 days. In this way, they want to paralyze the peasants' aid to the partisans. These moves, like the terror being used against the civilian population, that actively support the partisans will not weaken the strength of the partisans in the south, nor their struggle against the hated Syngman Rhee regime and the American interventionists.

e) The Japanese reaction is to play a major role in American imperialism's aggressive goals to subordinate the nations of Asia and to prolong the aggressive war against the DPRK. After gaining sad experiences in Korea, propagate the motto: "Asians against Asians," they want to exploit Japanese, Kuomintang and South Korean armies as cannon fodder in their aggressive plans. In order to realize these goals, they need military alliances between these regimes. The main difficulty for American imperialism is putting together a military alliance between Syngman Rhee's regime and the Japanese reaction. As we know, the overwhelming majority of Koreans, both in the south and in the DPRK, know perfectly well that Japanese imperialism is Korea's deadly enemy. Creating such an alliance would be equivalent to a repeat occupation of South Korea by the Japanese. In fighting such an alliance, the working class of South Korea has a temporary ally in the national bourgeoisie, which grew up as a result of the lifting of the Japanese occupation and which will not agree to lose the positions it has gained for itself. In this situation, the Syngman Rhee-ites are caught between a rock and a hard place, on the one hand the

pressure of the American imperialists to throw together this alliance, on the other hand the wild resistance of the popular masses. Syngman Rhee and his clique, which stems from the Korean bourgeoisie, would not really have anything against tying themselves to the Yoshida government by a military alliance, seeing in it a hope for remaining in power and the possibility of support in the fight against the DPRK. But opposition among the bourgeoisie and the strong resistance of the masses led by the working class are forcing Syngman Rhee to maneuver and to keep his real intentions to himself. The course of events shows that the American imperialists are intently trying to prevent the signing of a military alliance between Syngman Rhee and Yoshida. This is shown by the frequent visits by a variety of politicians from the USA, who come to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. After their visits, one can see a livening up in the Syngman Rhee clique and the desire for the two regimes to come closer. For instance, on 1 February of this year, a Japanese government delegation came to Seoul and met with Syngman Rhee. According to Seoul radio, the meeting was useful and allegedly contributed to the removal of the contradictions that serve as obstacles to the reaching of an agreement between Japan and South Korea. Syngman Rhee also went to Tokyo. Before leaving for Japan, he declared at a press conference that his trip is only a personal visit and has nothing to do with the issue of rapprochement between South Korea and Japan. In this way he wanted to calm down the agitated public opinion.

The differences between Japan and South Korea are expressed in:

1. Disagreements related to the Japanese demands for the return of Japanese property in Korea, which was confiscated after Korea was liberated from the Japanese occupation. The Syngman Rhee regime does not want to agree to it because the Korean national bourgeoisie does not want to return it.
2. There are serious differences and arguments between the two regimes over the so-called fishing line in the Sea of Japan. The Syngman Rhee-ites have determined an area of fishing at 60 miles from their shores, not allowing the Japanese to fish there. The Japanese, on the other hand, do not want to recognize this since it works against their interests.

In the current situation, it seems unlikely that the Americans [sic] will be able to join South Korea and Japan with an alliance. If this were to happen, however, the Syngman Rhee regime will meet an even more ardent struggle of the Korean nation, which will lead to its inevitable downfall.

V. Internal Embassy matters.

[Personnel changes, Korean comrades think the staff is still too small; meetings with various ministry officials to bring the two countries closer; embassy is suffering shortages of Polish products]

E. Cerekwicki

[signature]

Charge d'Affaires a.i.

DPRK of the Embassy of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in the

Translated by Maya Latynski

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DOCUMENT NO. 102

DECIPHERED TELEGRAM

Incoming N° 500015/sh

from correspondent 20 sent on 3 January 1953 at 0931
to the 8th Directorate of the Soviet Army General Staff
received at 1745 3 January 1943

by landline
extremely urgent

[Stamp: SUBJECT TO RETURN
to the IV Unit of the OS
CPSU CC Incoming N° 1/27/shs 3 January 1953]

to Cde. SOKOLOVSKY

I report a personal letter from KIM IL SUNG to Cde. FILIPPOV.

RAZUVAYEV

N° 9
3 January 1953

Attachment: a four-page letter

Deciphered at 1725 3 January [by] Belykh

Eight copies printed

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin

Copy N° 2 to Cde Stalin

Copy N° 3 to Cde. Malenkov

Copy N° 4 to Cde. Beria

Copy N° 5 to Cde. Bulganin

Copy N° 6 to Cde. Vasilevsky

Copy N° 7 to Cde. Sokolovsky

Copy N° 8 to the 8th Directorate to file

Deputy Chief of the 4th Department of the 8th Directorate
of the Soviet Army General Staff [illegible signature]

"Dear Iosif Vissarionovich!

We are endlessly grateful to you for the aid and attention which is constantly given to our People's Army, by you personally and the Soviet Government.

In connection with the great wear and tear and failure of communications equipment, we are experiencing great difficulties in organizing the command and control of troops, as a consequence of which we are forced to turn to you and earnestly request that you supply spare parts and maintenance supplies in accordance with the attached list for the Korean People's Army insofar as it is within the power of the Soviet Union.

The difficulties with communications equipment can be explained by the following reasons:

1. The Korean People's Army's supply of communications equipment was in the range of 40-[illegible]% by the start of combat operations.
2. We did not have an opportunity to import working and spare communications parts from anywhere during 1952. Also, none of these materials were delivered to us from the Soviet Union.
3. The communications equipment we have indicated were not listed in 1953 deliveries, which further complicates the situation.
4. There is considerable wear and tear on operating and spare communications parts as a result of the complexity of the theater of war and also the combat operations.
5. Our attempts to buy these materials in China have remained fruitless since the materials we need turned out not to be there.
6. We have received weapons for 10 air defense artillery regiments but have not received the communications equipment, which further aggravates the situation with communications equipment .

The DPRK government would be extremely grateful to you, Iosif Vissarionovich, and the government of the Soviet Union if it is within your power to grant this request.

Dear Iosif Vissarionovich, I again ask you to accept from the bottom of the hearts of all the Korean people our most sincere wishes for good health and long years of life for the good of all mankind.

Deeply respectful and affectionately,

KIM IL SUNG

Pyongyang, 29 December 1952"

Continuation of CABLE N° 500015/sh

The communications equipment for which the KNA is experiencing a critical need for urgent replacement:

1. RBM [combat vehicle-mounted] radios - 100.
2. KVM receivers - 50.
3. EhZS-1.5 - 75.
4. TAI-43 telephones - 5,000.
5. PTF-7 cable - 10,000 km.
6. GU-4 radio tubes - 200; GKZ-500 - [illegible]; GKEh-100 - 240; SO-257 - 7,500; SO-241 - 1,400; 2K2M - 2,300; 6K7 - 240; 6Kh6 - [illegible]0; 6F5 - 120; 6Zh7 - 120; 6P-3 - 50.
7. Spare parts for RAF radio motors - 10 sets.
8. Spare parts for RSB radio motors - 20 sets.
9. Spare parts for a PZS-1,5 - 50 sets.
10. TAI-43 handset tubes - 400.
11. Cords for TAI-43 telephones - 4,000.
12. Cords for PK-30 switchboards - 200.
13. Plugs for a PK-30 - 200.
14. Jack for a PK-30 - 200.
15. MK-10 insets - 4,000
16. P-3A radars - 12.
17. Tubes for TGI-200 radars - 30.
18. Tubes for TGI-300/8 radars - 30.
19. Tubes for GI-1 radars - 50.

In addition, 18 tubes each for a P-3A radar.

KIM IL SUNG

Printed by Poklonova 1855 3 January 1953

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 103

Embassy of the
Polish Republic
in Korea
No. 2421/8/53/TJN

Pyongyang, 24 January 1953

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!

Note

According to information gathered in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here and from the 2nd secretary of the Hungarian Mission, preparations are underway for serious battles.

1. All hospitals have received orders to prepare a maximum number of beds to receive the ill, and half of the beds are to be kept in reserve.
2. The intensive construction of new rooms for the sick has begun, the buildings are scattered in groups of two-three, making it difficult to destroy them.
3. For a week now, alarm exercises have been conducted in the hospitals, giving 30 minutes for the evacuation of the staff and apparatus.
4. Almost all the compressors have been taken down from the existing works and deployed to strengthen and deepen the front and coastal fortifications.
5. Rail, car and horse transportation has been working intensively regardless of the enhanced bombardments by the enemy air force.
6. Universal military training has begun, encompassing all workers and white-collar workers, first of all teaching them to shoot from guns and light machine guns.

Almost the whole body of party and government activists realizes the seriousness of the situation, since they know that the enemy is pulling in serious forces and that he is capable of committing every crime to reach his goal, but the faith in the force of the Korean People's Army, Chinese volunteers and assistance from the Soviet Union and the Countries of People's Democracy is strong, and this allows everyone to prepare for the heavy fighting with gravity and concentration, in the belief in the full victory of the just cause.

Góra Józef
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
of the Embassy of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in the DPRK

3 copies made
[...]

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 104

Embassy of the
Polish Republic
in Korea

Pyongyang, 27 January 1953

SECRET [crooked stamp]

SECRET

No. 2421/6/53/TJN [tajne—secret]

Note

On 26.I. of this year, V[ice]-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Comr. Pak Heonyeon invited all the heads of the diplomatic missions for a conference, “another conference,” as he said, whose goal was briefly to acquaint us with the results of the activities of the people’s government in 1952, plans for 1953 and the current situation.

The bombarding of the electric power plant in Supun in July 1952, and the subsequent destruction of other electric power plants, has largely made the execution of plans for industry and agriculture difficult, since the basic sources of energy were destroyed or damaged. Not only industry but also rice paddies, which are artificially watered by electric pumps, have been endangered. The heroic work of the working class and peasantry under the leadership of the Korean Workers’ Party and government has saved the situation and allowed the overcoming of all difficulties. The overall fulfillment of the industrial production plan for 1952 was 119%.

Light industry, which is of grave importance in supplying the population, fulfilled its plan in the area of cotton textiles (88%), producing 18,407,500 m. of textiles of the 20,960,000 m. that had been planned. Of rubber shoes, 2,667,470 pairs were produced, yielding 231.8% compared to 1951. 40,560,000 packets of matches were produced, i.e., 191.1% compared to 1951. Of soy oil, which is used widely because of a lack of meat and it is an important food product, 2,036 t. were produced, i.e., 169% compared to 1951. Of vodka, whose production is monopolized, 11,151,000 liters were produced. Only 2,495 t. of tobacco were produced, i.e., 51% of the plan. The quality of Korean tobacco is good, but the peasants have no interest in producing it, hence the plan was not fulfilled. 119,996 t. of salt, i.e., 51% compared to 1951 were produced. The extraction of salt dropped because the DPRK has old supplies of salt, and annual use is no higher than this year’s production.

Transportation [...]

Demonstrating the heroism of the working class, Comr. Pak Heonyeon gave a few examples of heroic work. The miner Li Chon Son fulfilled the annual plan by 14.V.1952 and began to mine for the 1953 plan; the miner Cho Do Sil mined 217 t. of lead ore in a record day, i.e., 27 workloads, producing 190% of the annual plan.

The industrial plan for 1953, as for last year, sets as its main tasks securing the front, strengthening the country's defensive power and raising the standard of the population's life. Here are some figures:

The extraction of lead is to reach 117% compared to 1952, tin 84.5%. The production of cotton textiles is to reach 28,601 km., of silk textiles 1,281 km., of rubber shoes 9,623,000 pairs, of fish 115,188 t., of tobacco 5,050 t., of soy oil 7,422 t. and the weight of transported freight 5,500,000 t.

Agriculture.

I mentioned the difficulties brought on by the shattering of the power plant above, to it must be added the shortage of work force in the countryside, the shortage of tractive power, artificial fertilizers, the destruction of houses and so forth.

[Trans. note: omitted are the effects of flooding, government supplies of food, agricultural education of the peasantry, production records of individual farmers, activists' congress, animal husbandry, administrative changes in the provinces.]

Regarding the talks in Kaesong, everyone knows that the Americans have interrupted these talks for an indeterminate period of time, and everything points to the fact that they do not want to resume them. After rejecting the Soviet Union's plan at the UN, adopting the Indian resolution, which is only a veiled American resolution, and the current speeches by the new president of the USA, it can be seen clearly that the imperialists, in preparing a new offensive, are counting on resolving the Korean question by force. The commander in chief Clark asked for the sending of 3-4 additional divisions to Korea; at the same time a new commander of the American army in Korea, Gen. Taylor, was named and intensive exercises of sea landing forces are being conducted in the south of Korea. Apart from this Syngman Rhee has gone to Japan, where he held talks not only with the Japanese government but also with Chiang Kai-shek's representatives. At the same time, air raids are intensifying at the front and in the rear areas. All the above facts point to an escalation of the situation, preparations for an offensive on a large scale. The Americans want to cut North Korea with landings from the sea at Wonsan and Sinandzhu, to attack from all sides, but the Korean nation is prepared to break this newly prepared offensive. The defense of the front and coast is strong as never before, and new attacks will bring nothing other than American losses. The unity of the front and the rear is unbreakable and the high fighting spirit is rising even higher. Opinions are divided in the ruling circles of the USA, not everyone is certain of victory. Thus, for example, Lt.-General (ret.) Robert Ikelborker [trans. note: should be Eichelberger] declared on 23.I. of this year, according to the UP, that even if it gathers all its forces, the USA will not be able to shatter the Korean front; he recalls the losses in 1950 and predicts that the current offensive may bring even greater losses. In reality, the Korean nation is well-prepared and, in case of an American offensive, it will try to fulfill the predictions of the retired lieutenant-general.

The totality of the activities of the people's government in 1952 has excellently increased the unity and strength of the front and rear stabilizing the life of the population despite the bestial bombing raids.

The Korean Workers' Party

In November 1951 the IV Plenum of the CC CWP took place, which adopted the resolution about the growth of the party; at the V Plenum, which convened in December of last year, the party's growth by 40% was acknowledged, but in many cases the quality of this growth was forgotten, and hence the V Plenum set as its goals the elimination of these mistakes and an improvement in the work of the party. The basic line of work of the KWP and government continues to be based on the resolutions of the IV Plenum of the CC KWP and on the February speech by Kim Il Sung. The peoples' government had great achievements last year in fighting aggression, strengthening the rear, massive heroism of the Korean People's Army thanks to Kim Il Sung's correct leadership, thanks to the assistance from the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the Countries of Peoples' Democracy.

A nation that is conducting war usually goes hungry, but in the DPRK it is the opposite: this is so thanks to the assistance of those many assault brigades about which Comr. Stalin spoke.

The conference lasted 2 and one half hours.

Góra Józef
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
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[...]

Translated by Maya Latynski

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DOCUMENT NO 105

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea

Pyongyang, 6.II.1953

TOP SECRET

No. 2421/9/53/TJN [tajne—secret]

(February 6, 1953)

NOTE

According to information obtained from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here, as well as from heads of diplomatic missions here (Mongolian Ambassador, Hungarian envoy), every day the tempo of preparations for the spring battles increases. The American diplomats are screaming about the need to substitute Asian military units for the American ones, and as a result of this noise the command of the USA really has

begun to withdraw its units from the front, but only in order to shift them to the south with the goal of intensive training in landing. At the same time, the Syngman Rhee-ites, who have served in the navy, are being pulled away from the front thus creating future landing armies.

They are also counting here on the inclusion in the landing groups of some of the VII USA fleet brought here from Taiwan and the English Far Eastern war fleet, whose commanders have recently been to Tokyo and Korea. The imperialists are bringing all the Far Eastern forces for the Eisenhowerian solution to the question of Korea, and this is why there exists the likelihood that they will deploy the Chiang Kai-Shek-ists against China in the area of Antung, i.e., on the Chinese-Korean border, with the goal of cutting off one of the main supply routes to the DPRK.

The population of North Korea realizes that hard battles are approaching, but even the most reactionary elements know that at the end of the day the DPRK will win. The example of liberated China and the third year of the war in Korea itself have broken the reactionists' faith in the power of the USA. The most shaky elements, traders, speculators and so forth, are taking into account the possibility that the front will move temporarily, and this is why they are trying to speculate as much as possible, to earn money by inflating the price of gold and silver, upsetting the stability of the DPRK's currency.

The Americans are now dropping spies en masse, mostly former residents of North Korea. The drops are taking place at night, mostly from helicopters. The security service and the population are intercepting whole groups of these spies, five, ten and more of them. The mass consciousness-raising political work is yielding increasingly better and longer-lasting results in the period of preparation for the hard battles.

3 copies made
[...]

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Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 106

[Source: TsAMO RF. F. 64 IAK. Op. 174045. D. 147. pp. 15-32. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg]

From a report of Col. Berezhnoy, the chief of staff of the 64th IAK:
"Brief Results of the Combat Operations of Corps Units, an Analysis of the Air Situation, and the Tactics of Our Fighters' Operations" at a tactical flight conference to summarize the experience of the combat operations of the 64th IAK held on 7 and 8 February 1953.

Brief Results of the Combat Operations of the Corps

...It is most advisable to dwell on the stage of combat operations after the last corps tactical flight conference, which was held at the end of August 1951. The entire stage can be broken down into three periods, depending on the period a particular formation or unit was in the corps.

- the first period, from September 1951 through January 1952 (five months). Combat operations in this period were conducted by the air divisions of Col. Kozhedub and Col. Kumanichkin.

- the second period, from February 1952 through July 1952 (six months). Combat operations in this period were conducted by the air divisions of Col. Shevtsov and Col. Kornilov.

- the third period, from July 1952 through December 1952 (five months). Combat operations in this period were conducted by the formations and units of Col. Komarov, Col. Yeremin, Col. Grokhovetsky, and Lt. Col. Dobrov...

The greatest stress was in the first period. Up to 2,400 sorties were conducted a month on average, or 25 flights per combat-ready crew. We had the highest stress in November 1951 when the corps conducted about 3,500 sorties or 35 flights per pilot.

The high stress in the first period is explained, particularly in November 1951, by the high activity of enemy air operations in the area protected by the corps and by the insufficient training of Chinese Air Force units who conducted almost no combat operations during the same period. Our radar equipment noted up to 9,000 enemy overflights monthly north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The greatest number of enemy overflights was also noted in November - 9,700. At the same time, part of the enemy overflights were not counted in view of a lack of visual [observation] posts during this period.

Enemy air activity subsequently declined as a consequence of the heavy losses suffered from our fighters. Combat stress declined at the same time - in the second period down to 13 and in the third period to 10 sorties [monthly] per combat-ready pilot. The total number of combat sorties conducted by the corps in the third period grew due to a considerable increase (double) in the number of combat-ready crews. Thus, the conclusion can be drawn that we have recently operated with little tension and when necessary we can increase it to two or two and a half times, that is, we can perform up to 5,000-5,500 combat sorties a month.

The activity of our fighters' combat operations can be determined based on the number of crews who participated in battles, the number of engagements without waging a battle, and on the number of combat firings relative to combat sorties.

Up to 50% of all crews which scrambled during the first period participated in battles, and the number of engagements without waging battle was only 12%. This speaks of the

high activity of the operations of our units during this period when performing a combat mission. We are subsequently observing a decline of this activity, especially in the last period since August. In the third period an average of only 30% crews participated in battles, and the number of engagements without waging a battle reached 50% of the total number of encounters with the enemy. The large number of engagements in the last period without waging a battle is explained on the one hand by enemy aircraft declining battle and on the other by a decline in the activity of our fighters' operations against ground attack aircraft and the insufficient activity of flight personnel in battles with enemy fighters. As a rule, enemy groups which are retiring have not been pursued.

The number of crews which used weapons in air battles in the first two periods was somewhat less, mainly as a consequence of operations in larger groups than in the third period. The activity of the groups of our fighters depended to a considerable degree on the aggressive and bold actions of the group leaders and their tactical training. The majority of encounters with the enemy which ended without waging a battle were the result of an insufficiently thought-out maneuver to descend and in some cases also a reluctance of individual leaders to commit their group to battle with the enemy. Some unit and subunit commanders and their deputies fly few combat missions, which cannot fail to have an effect on the activity and the results of the combat operations of these units and subunits.

The overall results of the combat operations are being assessed primarily based on the results of air battles, the number of enemy aircraft shot down, especially bombers and ground attack aircraft, and our own losses, which mainly depend on the activity of the flight personnel, their combat experience, and the preparedness of group leaders.

[The following] are the average number of enemy aircraft shot down per month: in the first period - 74 aircraft, including 37 bombers and ground attack aircraft; in the second period - 28 aircraft, of which seven were ground attack aircraft; in the third period - 32 aircraft, of which five were ground attack aircraft. Thus, the best results achieved in air battles were in the first period, when the activity of combat operations of the corps' fighters was the highest. Especially noteworthy is that 50% of all enemy aircraft shot down in this period were bombers and ground attack aircraft. Suffering heavy losses, the enemy was forced to subsequently change the tactics of his operations and reduce his activity in the area protected by our fighters.

Our lowest losses were also in the first period. The ratio of enemy aircraft shot down to our losses was 9.2:1 in our favor, a very high effectiveness.

In subsequent periods the ratio of losses was only 2.2-2:1 [SIC] in our favor, that is, the effectiveness of combat operations declined. Our losses doubled. Especially few enemy ground attack aircraft were shot down in this period (in 1952 bombers no longer operated during the day). The main reasons for the decline of the effectiveness of combat operations in 1952 were:

- the air situation and the principle of the enemy's combat use of air arms changed radically;

- whereas in the first period the situation was less complex, that is, when B-29 bombers were operating during the day protected by F-84's, in the second and third periods, by virtue of the losses that had been suffered, the enemy completely abandoned the combat use of B-29's during the day and considerably strengthened his air forces both quantitatively and qualitatively with F-86 fighters, which were close to the MiG-15's in their performance data, which was reflected in the effectiveness of the combat operations of our fighters on the whole;

- whereas in the first period the enemy used the F-84 as a fighter, in the remaining periods the F-84 operated only as a ground attack fighter protected by F-86's;

- the complication of waging air battles against F-86 fighters in comparison to bombers and F-84 fighters;

- divisions arriving as replacements had a number of serious shortcomings in training, especially in operational use. The organization of searches, group formation flying, and flights at high speeds and altitudes were the weak link in their training. Flight personnel did not have practical skills in battle management and the leadership of units in the complex conditions of the air situation.

The effectiveness of combat firing in air battles was also higher in the first stage where 205 shells were expended, or four bursts [*chloveko-strel'ba*, SIC], for every enemy aircraft shot down. Subsequently six firings were made for each aircraft shot down and 340 shells expended. At the same time the number of aircraft knocked out of action [*podbitye*] grew from 20% to 40%. This says that the effectiveness of fire in battle declined. The reasons for the decline in the effectiveness of combat firing in the second and third stages were chiefly the same ones which reduced the effectiveness of operations.

1. Waging air battles predominately with enemy fighters, approaching them, and hitting them is harder than, we assume, bombers and ground attack fighters.

2. The insufficient activity of groups, poor discretion, and poor coordination in groups as a result of which groups fell into such a situation that they were often forced to wage a defensive battle and open fire for interdiction. With a careful analysis of the air battles one can see that in a majority of cases the enemy attacks first and not our groups. A desire to bring the battle to a decisive defeat of the enemy by more persistently pursuing him was also lacking, which led to a growth in the percentage of aircraft hit against the number of those shot down.

One of the factors which determines the insufficient activity of our fighters is also the number of encounters with the enemy which failed to materialize. Though here the quality of guidance plays a great role, the opportunity for an engagement depends to no less degree on the operations of the groups, on the correct decisions of the group

commander, on the rapid and precise execution of commands sent from the ground, and on a correctly organized active search for the enemy. If the enemy attacks us first this means that the search has not been sufficiently well worked out in our groups and our pilots do not see the enemy, and guidance cannot help in such conditions. In the first period failed engagements were 20% of the total number of interception sorties and sweep missions; in stages two and three it was 33-34%.

Based on the results of the combat operations of the units in the third period, that is, the units in the corps at the present time... a gradual growth is being noted in the effectiveness of combat firings and air battles. This growth is still insufficient in comparison with the first period but in December a trend toward a reduction of effectiveness of operations even appeared - the number of enemy aircraft shot down and the number of firings per enemy aircraft shot down declined. An especially negative factor was the fact that, having increased combat stress in December, making 450 sorties more than in November, we reduced the activity of our operations. Though, in January units of the corps generally increased the activity of their operations, they achieved especially great success in combat operations at night. The overall results and the effectiveness of the combat operations of each unit in the corps... The divisions of Lt. Col. Yeremin and Col. Komarov, which had a considerable number of battles with the enemy, operated most actively. The division of Col. Grokhovetsky and the regiment of Lt. Col. Dobrov waged fewer battles. Based on the number of combat firings, that is, based on the activity of the groups in air battles [it was] better in the units of Cdes. Grokhovetsky and Komarov, where 40% of the crews who participated in battle fired at enemy aircraft. The pilots of the division of Cde. Yeremin used weapons less often in air battles - a total of 18% of the total number who engaged in battle. Many such battles were waged in the unit of Cde. Yeremin where not a single pilot fired. For example, on 7 and 8 December 1952 the units waged six battles in squadron strength in which 42 crews participated but not one shot was fired at the enemy. What can explain such a situation? It is obvious that either the crews cannot close with the enemy to a distance of effective fire or they count every time they meet the enemy without engaging with him a battle. [The percentages which] were engagements without waging battle, except those included as battles: Col. Yeremin's [unit] - 48%, Col. Grokhovetsky's - 44%, Col. Komarov's - 45%, and Lt. Col. Dobrov's - 68%. A large percentage of engagements without waging battle were the result of the insufficient combat experience of the flight personnel and the insufficiently decisive actions of which I spoke earlier. How does [such a] picture result? Let's take the units of Cde. Yeremin. Of each 100 crews scrambled 88 had an engagement with the enemy, but if one takes only those crews which were directed to intercept then the percentage of engagements will be still greater (about 95%). Of these 88 crews only 46 engaged in battle with the enemy; 42 crews did not wage an air battle for one reason or another. Only eight crews of every 100 crews which took off fired on the enemy in air battles. It needs to be frankly said that the percentage of our crews which have fired is too small. What does this mean for the fighters when in a regiment of 24 crews two pilots have fired on the enemy? This means that the regiment is not able to perform its combat mission, that is, the effectiveness of the operations of the corps' fighters is clearly insufficient. According to current tactical operational standards, it is necessary for no less

than 50% of all crews, not less than 12 pilots in a regiment, to fire for effect to successfully repel enemy air raids...

The 133rd IAD, which had 61 enemy aircraft shot down with a loss ratio of 3.2:1, achieved the best results of the divisions. The percentage of aircraft put out of action was insignificant - 16%, and our unrecovered losses were 35%, that is, two-thirds of the aircraft damaged in battle returned safely to their airfields and were repaired by the units' repair organizations.

The effectiveness of fire in an air battle depends to a great degree on the distance and firing aspect. When firing from a great distance (more than 600 meters) and especially at large aspects (more than 2/4), the accuracy of fire on such targets as fighters and ground attack aircraft falls sharply...

[The following] can be concluded from the data cited above:

1. The most advantageous ranges at which to fire in air battles with fighters and ground attack aircraft are from 200 to 600 meters, from which 80% of the enemy aircraft were shot down and only three bursts were made per aircraft shot down. Fire is exceptionally effective from a range of less than 200 meters - fire is a sure thing (a total of 1.6 firings for each aircraft shot down), but they are less advantageous in an air battle in view of the great difficulty in closing to such a short distance and therefore only 6% of aircraft were shot down from these ranges. In some cases, firing from a range of 600-800 meters also produces an effect but firing from a range greater than 800 meters is useless.
2. The most advantageous firing aspect in an air battle is 0/4-1/4, at which 70% of enemy aircraft were shot down. An average of three combat firings were made for every aircraft shot down. Effective fire was also achieved at an aspect of 2/4; 25% of the aircraft were shot down, but six combat firings were needed for one aircraft shot down, that is, twice as many. An aspect of more than 2/4 is completely disadvantageous, just like shooting from more than 800 meters...

About 30-40% of all firing is done from a range of more than 800 meters and at an aspect of more than 2/4, that is, in such conditions when the possibility of shooting down an enemy aircraft is unlikely. Undoubtedly, a large number of these firings were done not with the goal of hitting the aircraft, but of interdicting it. But this confirms once again that our groups were often waging defensive battles and not offensive [ones]. If the results of the combat operations of our best subunits are analyzed then one can once again be convinced of the importance of taking a favorable position for an attack. The best squadrons in the corps are:

the 2nd aeh of the 518th IAP, the commander is Capt. Molchanov; the 3rd aeh of the 147th IAP, the commander is Major Afanas'yev; the 1st aeh of the 676th IAP; the commander is Lt. Col. Gnezdilov; the 3rd aeh of the 415th IAP, the commander is Major Petrov; the 1st aeh of the 913th IAP, the commander is Capt. Babich; and the 1st aeh of the 726th IAP; the commander is Lt. Col. Degtyarev. On average, about 80% of firing was done in these

squadrons at an aspect of up to 2/4 and a range of up to 800 meters, that is, considerably more than in other subunits of the unit. Therefore the effectiveness of their operations was also considerably higher - three or four firings per every enemy aircraft shot down and the ratio of losses was an average of 7.5:1 in our favor...

At the same time I want to briefly dwell on the combat operations of the units of the OVA [Combined Air Army] of the Chinese Air Force. Exceptionally great attention was devoted by the corps command to helping fighter units of the OVA engage in battle in the interests of more successfully accomplishing the combat mission assigned us by the Minister of War. The combat mission of the OVA was performed in close coordination with the fighters of the corps on the basis of a plan for joint use of the forces. Great work was done to pass on the experience of combat operations and maximum assistance was given in the organization of tactical control. The activity and effectiveness of our operations grew in the last period as a result of the steps that were taken to organize coordination and to engage units of the OVA in battle. For example, in November and December OVA units made 2,078 combat sorties and waged 51 air battles with enemy fighters and ground attack aircraft. One hundred and twenty pilots fired in battle and 32 enemy aircraft were shot down. Our losses were 13 MiG-15's. Thus, with the active support of the corps' fighters, units of the Combined VA received sufficient experience in fighting air battles.

The results of combat operations at night. The corps began to conduct combat operations to protect installations during hours of darkness in September 1951.

Initially the 351st IAP operated on LA-11 aircraft. The experience of battles showed that LA-11 fighters can operate successfully at low and medium altitude against B-26 bombers but were ineffective at high altitude (more than 5000-6000 meters). In view of this, one squadron of the 351st IAP and one squadron of Cde. Komarov's formation were trained on MiG-15 aircraft to operate at night and began to perform the combat mission in May 1952. One squadron of Cde. Grokhovetsky's formation even began to operate starting in December...

A total of 1,487 combat sorties were made, of which 800 were on LA-11 aircraft and 687 flights on MiG-15bis aircraft. The enemy conducted 7,592 overflights in the area protected by the corps at night but no more than 20% of the were in the searchlights' areas. Repelling bomber raids beyond the SPP [area illuminated by searchlights] presents great difficulty as a consequence of the complexity of guidance, which does not allow the all the forces of our night fighters to be used.

Fifty-five solo air battles were waged in which 24 enemy aircraft were shot down, including 18 B-29's, five B-26's, and one F-94. In addition, 11 enemy B-29's and B-26's were put out of action. Our losses were one pilot and two MiG-15bis aircraft.

Based on activity and effectiveness the combat operations of the fighters at night can also be divided into two pronounced periods of combat operations.

The first period - from September 1951 to December 1952.

The second period - from December 1952 to present.

Briefly, these periods are described by the following data. During the first period 1,256 sorties were made, 38 solo air battles were fought, and 13 enemy aircraft shot down. An average of 97 sorties were made for each enemy aircraft shot down.

During the second period 231 sorties were made, 17 solo air battles were fought, and 11 enemy aircraft shot down. An average of 21 sorties were made for each enemy aircraft shot down.

As a result of the losses suffered by the enemy the latter sharply reduced his activity in areas north of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. The effectiveness of the combat operations of the night fighters is sufficiently high at the present time.

The increase of the effectiveness of the operations of the fighters at night was facilitated by the steps taken by the commander and staff of the corps, as a result of which we achieved:

1. A combination of the coordinated and precise work of the flight personnel, weapons crew, and RTS operators.
2. The use of a relatively high number of night fighters (10-12 aircraft at the same time) to destroy bombers at distant approaches both beyond and within the SPP.
3. Alternatives have been worked out for illuminating and tracking the target for the main directions of approach which enemy bombers [take] to installations using the Shoran system. Searchlight stations have been specially assigned for [giving] targeting designations of the direction of the bombers' exit route to the fighters.
4. The illuminated searchlight area has been expanded using searchlight units of the NOA of China.
5. A tactical flight conference of night crews has been held with ZA and ZPr [anti-aircraft searchlight] officers at which the experience of combat operations at night was summarized and measures were developed to increase the effectiveness of operations.
6. A conference has been held to summarize the experience and improve the work of searchlight subunits in conditions of interference.
7. The resistance to jamming of RTS has been increased by putting the Periskop RTS into operation.
8. Performing special training of officers who lead night operations to control and guide from the remote indicator of the RTS Periskop screen and two guidance desks.

9. A careful study has been conducted with flight personnel of searching for enemy aircraft beyond the SPP on a moonlit night against the background of the moon and in other conditions.
10. A repeated study of the performance characteristics of the B-29 and B-26 aircraft and their vulnerable places.
11. Commanders systematically holding critiques of combat operations at night with a detailed analysis of the successful and unsuccessful air battles fought by pilots.
12. A study of 10-day surveys and a summary of the experience of combat operations of corps units and conveying them to flight personnel.
13. An improvement of the educational work with flight personnel and motivating them to increase combat activity...

[The following] pilots have achieved the best results in battles at night: Major Karelin, deputy commander of a regiment, who shot down five B-29's and one RB-29; Major Dushin, two B-26's; Captain Dobrovichan - two -29's, and others.

The ration of losses is 10:1 in our favor. Two hundred and twenty shells have been expended for each enemy aircraft shot down. But this is only the beginning of the successful combat work at night. We should expand and improve it["].

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 107

Pyongyang, 11.II.1953

TOP SECRET SECRET [STAMP]

Top Secret!

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea

No. 2421/15/Kor/53Tjn [tajne—secret]

(February 11, 1953)

Note

The intensification of the bombing of North Korea has recently been growing v. significantly, and the air raids are usually taking place at night. The number of USA airplanes that appear over North Korea reaches 2,500 per 24-hour period.

The powerful hits are still directed against cities, rail hubs and warehouses, but the imperialists' main air forces are trying to disturb the system of fortifications at the front, near the front and on the coast, and to destroy the military units of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Chinese volunteers. Furthermore, air raids against the North Korean villages are becoming more frequent. Thus, for example, on 8 February at 1 a.m., the USA air force completely destroyed a village 4 km. away from the Hungarian hospital. Using fragmentation bombs, firebombs and napalm, they leveled the village in 1 hour, and of the 340 inhabitants none came out alive, 300 were killed and 40 were grievously wounded. This is thus not only an effort to terrorize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea but a planned and executed physical destruction of the population of North Korea.

Korea's Workers' Party and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are appealing to and organizing the population to increase their vigilance in the fight against epidemic diseases and to speed up the work on air-raid shelters.

3 copies made [...]

[signature]

Góra Józef

Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Embassy of the
PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in Korea

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 108

Embassy of the
Polish Republic
in Korea

Pyongyang, 22 February 1953

Secret

No. 2421/13/53/TJN [tajne—secret]

Note

On 21 February at 3:30 at night, a powerful enemy air raid occurred. A large number of B-22 heavy bombers took part in the air raid. The Chinese People's Volunteers' military hospital, located 15 km. from Pyongyang in Wai Yong in [illegible] region, was the target of the bombing [illegible]. During the air raid the planes dropped a large number of napalm bombs, small bombs [illegible] which are usually used for bombings in the mountains.

As a result of this bombing, Jongu village was wiped off the surface of the earth and so was a part of the hospital of the Chinese People's Volunteers. As a result of the bombing, a large number of sick and wounded volunteers perished, as did about 20 people of the civilian population.

On 22 February at 4:00 a.m., the northeastern part of Pyongyang was bombed, which had been completely destroyed as a result of previous air raids. Right now, the American pirates again destroyed the rebuilt mud huts inhabited by the civilian population. Very many children, old people and women perished in this air raid.

It is characteristic that the enemy's air force strikes its targets very accurately, which proves that they are informed precisely about their targets by spies.

Recently, during one of the air raids, several heavy bombs were dropped on the road leading to our valley. Chinese military transports travel on this road at night. Because of this, posts have been placed along this road to warn those using this road about the enemy's planes.

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[...]

CEREKWISKI [CEREKWICKI?] EUGENIUSZ
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland]
Embassy in the DPRK

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 109

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea

REPORT No. 2

of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland

in the Democratic Republic of Korea

for the period of 1 March 1953 to 30 April 1953

Report No. 2
of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic Republic of Korea
for the period of 1 March 1953 to 30 April 1953

1. Mourning in the DPRK after the death of Comrade J.V. STALIN.

The news about the death of Comrade Joseph Stalin put the entire nation of the DPRK, which lost its great defender and friend, in deep mourning.

On the day of Comrade Stalin's death, the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK issued an extraordinary resolution in which it announced a period of mourning in the whole Country until the day of the funeral. As a result of this resolution, state flags of the DPRK, with a black ribbon attached to them, were displayed on all state buildings. Mourning rallies were conducted in all institutions, production plants, villages, schools and military units of the Korean People's Army. In the cities of Pyongyang, Wonsan, Chongjin, Sinuiju, Nampho, Hamhyn, Nange and Heju, cannon salvos were fired on the day of Comrade Stalin's funeral.

On 8 March of this year, Comr. Kim Il Sung, members of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and members of the DPRK government expressed their condolences to the Ambassador of the USSR to the DPRK.

Throughout the whole period of mourning, numerous delegations of party, state-organization, army, worker and peasant activists visited the Embassy of the Soviet Union in order to express their deep pain caused by the death of the Genius Teacher and Great Leader of the progressive humanity of the world, Comrade Joseph Stalin. Representatives of diplomatic missions of the countries of people's democracy accredited to the DPRK also delivered their condolences, including the employees of the Embassy of the PRL [Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa—People's Republic of Poland] in the DPRK.

On 9 March, a central mourning rally took place in the hall of the underground Moranbon theater in Pyongyang, at which members of the CC KWP led by Comr. Kim Il Sung, members of the Presidium of the Supreme National Assembly [sic], members of the government, representatives of the army, diplomatic corps and large numbers of the capital's population said good-bye to Great Stalin.

In this period, in all the towns and villages of the DPRK, mourning rallies attended by countless numbers of people took place. Workers and peasants took oaths that they would increase their efforts to work even more productively and in this way to contribute to the victory of the DPRK in Her righteous struggle against the imperialistic interveners and the despised regime of Syngman Rhee.

At the news of Comrade Stalin's death, great mourning touched the soldiers of the Korean Peoples' Army and the units of the Chinese People's Volunteers. On 9 March of this year, in all the units of the Korean People's Army and units of the Chinese People's Volunteers, mourning rallies took place, at which the soldiers, bidding farewell to Comrade Stalin, took simple soldier's oaths of loyalty to the Fatherland and pledged to fight the enemy until the last drops of their blood.

Confronting this great loss that progressive humanity has suffered, the Korean nation pledged to work even better, to gather more closely around its people's-democratic government and its Chairman, Comr. Kim Il Sung.

From the day of the death of Comrade Stalin until the present moment, in all towns, villages, production plants, schools and military units of the Korean People's

Army, party members and non-party people are studying materials and documents devoted to the death of Comrade Stalin.

The memory of Stalin will never be extinguished in the hearts of the Korean nation, just as it will not be extinguished in the hearts of all the progressive people in the entire world. The Korean nation, led by its Party [two illegible words] and its Chairman Kim Il Sung, will faithfully guard the recommendations of the Great Leader.

II. Polish-Korean Relations.

- 1.[Polish Red Cross hospital being set up, Poland equipped a factory, gifts from the Polish nation]
2. [Invitation of KPA's dance troupe to Poland, books about Poland being translated, Polish embassy is well equipped with propaganda materials, news about Poland on Korean radio]

III. Internal situation in the DPRK

1. About the activities of the Korean Workers' Party.

In the reporting period, the Korean Workers' Party continues to conduct the struggle to realize the resolutions of the V Plenum of the CC KWP in all areas of political and economic life of the DPRK.

Party meetings, at which the resolutions are being conveyed to the mass of party members, continue taking place throughout the country. The party's main task in the current phase is the struggle to strengthen work discipline and thrift in the production of raw materials and financial resources, as well as the mobilization of all the forces and material resources to speed up the spring work in the fields.

The party meetings at which the resolutions of the V Plenum are being conveyed have demonstrated that party members have high political consciousness and that the overwhelming majority of party members have decisive will to fight against all the deviations and the mistakes stemming from these deviations.

The meetings at which the recommendations of the V plenum were discussed enjoyed a high participation, which went as high as 90% of the party members and candidates, and over 40% of the assembled, mainly workers and peasants, spoke up in the discussions. The party meetings devoted to the V Plenum contributed to raising the political consciousness and militarization of the party members and to strengthening Her inner unity.

As a result of the realization of the resolutions of the V Plenum of the CC KWP, for unknown reasons, Pak Heonyeong was dismissed from the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs which he had occupied and Minister of Foreign Trade Cha Su-I was

dismissed from his position. In accordance with a resolution of the Supreme People's Assembly, on 23 April of this year, former head of the Cadre Department of the CC KWP Comr. Din Ban-Su was named the Minister of Foreign Trade of the DPRK.

Head of the III Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ku Dzhe-Su was dismissed from the position he occupied for deviations from the party line and mistakes made in professional work, and for hostile anti-national activities, Li Se-Yeb was dismissed from the post of secretary of the CC KWP, as he is suspected of sabotage-espionage activity on behalf of American imperialism.

One of the recommendations of the V Plenum is the fight to raise the level of party training. Because of this, on 17 February of this year, a plenary session of the City Committee of the Korean Workers' Party in Pyongyang took place, at which the achievements and mistakes in party training were subjected to a critical analysis.

The program of party training developed by the CC KWP includes the following issues:

- a) Stalin: the economic problems of socialism in the USSR.
- b) Documents from the XIX Congress of the CPSU.
- c) Documents from the V Plenum of the CC KWP.

The Plenum of the City Committee of the KWP in Pyongyang showed that in many party organizations, the issue of party training was approached formally, while in others party training was not implemented according to the program, but most frequent were the cases of lack of proper [supervision?] over party training by higher party authorities. Because of this situation, the KWP Committee of Pyongyang delegated 291 activists to party work in the area of party training.

The struggle to raise the level of party training and make it more efficient is taking place in all the party committees throughout the country. In this reporting period, meetings of party committees on all levels took place and were devoted to the issue of party training, at which through critique and auto-critique the shortcomings and mistakes that had been noticed were eliminated.

The implementation of the recommendations of the V Plenum continues and encompasses increasingly new segments of political and economic life of the DPRK.

2. The struggle for the further strengthening of the people's-democratic government in the DPRK.

The DPRK Party and Government are conducting a fight to make the work of the rural People's Committees (the equivalent of our national councils) more efficient, since their work leaves much to be desired.

Because of this, on 18 February of this year, the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK issued a resolution about making the work of the rural people's committees more

efficient. The resolution points to the necessity of increasing the role of the rural people's committees on a base of successfully restructuring the local government organs with the participation of the broad masses of the society. Further, the resolution demonstrated that the people's committees as basic organs of the people's government should know the conditions of the population's economic situation and its distribution. The employees of the people's committees should become acquainted with the economic situation of the countryside, learn to find the appropriate roads and methods of developing the economy of those villages, so as to contribute to raising the material and cultural levels of the life of the inhabitants of the countryside. The people's committee should be a factor in mobilizing and gathering the peasants around their production tasks. It should aim in its work to eliminate fallow land, to raise the productivity per ha. by popularizing modern methods of soil cultivation.

The rural people's committee should pay much attention to improving the economic situation of the fishing villages, by organizing fishermen's work communities, which would make it possible to use fishing equipment better.

The resolution points to the need to raise cultural work in the countryside, it recommends the proper use and direction of institutions that exist in the countryside, which should occupy themselves with these issues.

The rural people's committee must realize the legally guaranteed assistance to the families of the fallen, invalids and those whose family members are at the front. Apart from this, it should care to implement demonstrating assistance to the front.

The people's committee can fulfill its tasks only then when it strengthens its ties with the masses and rids itself of the bureaucratic style of work. If it delves into the troubles of its terrain and tries to eliminate them. A deep study of Marxism, Leninism and Stalin's teachings and the broad implementation of the weapons of criticism and auto-criticism are a basic condition of fulfilling these tasks.

In connection to implementing the recommendations of the V Plenum regarding making the work of the organs of state government and economic organs more efficient, concerned with forming stronger ties between the power apparatus and the masses, the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK issued a resolution about examining requests and complaints from the population on time and precisely. The resolution, in essence, says that in order to strengthen the existing ties to the masses, to closely and on time examine the population's requests and complaints and in order to further strengthen the activity of the broad masses, the Cabinet of Ministers is assigning the top employees of the government and of finances the task of thoroughly studying Comr. Kim Il Sung's speech at the V Plenum of the CC KWP about the fight against bureaucratism and listening carefully to the voice of the broad masses. Because of this resolution, it recommends that directors of departments and chairmen of provincial, regional and city peoples' committees pay attention that the organs they supervise not burden the population with illegal taxes and not conduct mobilization of the work force beyond real state needs. This is a question of mobilizing the work force for public work.

The resolution grants the citizens the right to submit demands to individual organs of power, work teams and employees of institutions that will restore the rights they are owed and to compensate for losses in cases of illegal violations of their interests or rights. Citizens have the right to criticize the work of individual organs of the government and to submit proposals to make the work of these organs more efficient. Citizens have the right to submit complaints and grievances in cases of the violation of rights and interests of third parties, although their personal interests have not been violated by this conduct.

In order to make it possible to submit complaints and grievances, the resolution recommends setting proper days and hours during which they can be submitted. In the central organs of power, this should take place 1 day per week, in provincial, regional and city people's committee organs a few days per week should be set. In institutions, complaints and grievances should be accepted daily.

Complaints and grievances should be examined carefully by the responsible worker of the institution to which they came in, immediately after being delivered. In case it is necessary to acquire additional data, the persons submitting the complaint or request should be summoned.

The resolution also regulates the deadlines for examining complaints and grievances submitted by citizens. Central institutions (Departments) should give a response within 40 days, provincial people's committees within 30 days, Regional and city people's committees within 20 days and village people's committees and work places within 10 days. As for requests and complaints coming from military person, they should be examined within 1/3 less time.

The responsible employees of the institutions to which requests and complaints have come in, are obliged to notify the interested parties about the way in which the issue will be addressed. Some requests and complaints and responses to them may not be published in the press.

In case of the issue is unsatisfactorily addressed by lower-level authorities, the interested parties have the right to appeal to a higher authority.

The decision of the Cabinet of Ministers on the issue of examining complaints and grievances coming from the population was received with deep satisfaction by the working masses of the DPRK. The DPRK's working masses can see the deep concern of the party and the government about improving their material situation and concern over making the work of the organs of the people's government more efficient.

3. The agricultural situation.

a) Agriculture

The party and government are devoting much attention to the preparations for spring work in agriculture. The issues of fully conducting the spring sowing and

eliminating fallow land is the main task facing the DPRK's farming at this moment. A meeting between comr. Kim Il Sung and leading peasants of North Pyongyang prov[ince] was an expression of the party's concern about the efficient handling of spring sowing. In his conversation with the peasants, Comr. Kim Il Sung pointed out the main task facing farming in the spring period. It is the struggle to broaden agricultural production in the area of introducing new agricultural cultures and the struggle to increase the productivity of agricultural production per hectare. In order to fulfill this task, one must first of all carefully work the soil, apply fertilizers, which were prepared during the winter, and use selective seeds for sowing; second, one must popularize the methods of cultivation used by leading peasants, who have already obtained large crops, so that all the villages in the country can obtain bigger crops this year already. The issue of shortages of tractive force should be resolved by making the work of self-help groups more efficient, tilling the soil on time and the preparatory work for spring sowing should be started earlier than usual this year. Comr. Kim Il Sung called on the People's Committees to conduct mobilization of the work force with the goal of assisting the peasantry, he pointed to the need to develop patriotic competition to raise the amount of crops on a broad scale. In this phase of competition, the goal is to complete spring sowing as quickly as possible. Comr. Kim Il Sung's meeting with the leading peasants of North Pyongyang province was discussed widely among the DPRK's peasants, who decided to fulfill their leader's recommendations.

The press reported on 6.IV of this year that Kim Il Sung has written a letter to the peasant leaders, who last year had given grains to the military at the front. This letter states that last year over 334 peasants gave the army 36,460 kgs. of grains.

In response to the recommendations of the V Plenum of the CC KWP and Kim Il Sung's recommendations made at the March meeting with the peasant leaders of North Pyongyang prov[ince] and to celebrate the 1 May holiday, the Korean peasants have been engaged in competition to finish the spring sowing quickly. Because of favorable atmospheric conditions, already on 10 March of this year the peasants of the southern regions of the DPRK have begun to sow spring barley. According to the press, by 10 April, all the provinces of the DPRK had sown 103.2% more arable land than last year. In Hannan province, the area of sown land is 307% greater than last year, North Pyongyang prov[ince] 127%, the Pyongyang area 117.3% and Chagan province 111.6%. The provinces that lie directly at the front line also have had major achievements with the spring sowing. For example, in North Hamgen prov[ince] spring sowing was completed 10 days earlier than last year. In the most endangered front-line province of Kanwon, by 14.IV 150% more land had been sown than in the previous year, and 49.9% of the planned sowing was done. The peasants of the Kesong region had finished their spring sowing and potato planting by 12.IV. The big achievements in the spring work in the fields are the result of the DPRK peasants' deep patriotism and the efficient activities of the self-help groups. As a result of the implementation of the resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers about assistance to the poor peasants and fishermen, one may notice the active help given by the wealthier peasants to the Government and party. In Chagan province, for example, the poor peasants are receiving help from the middle ones not only in the form of tractive force but also in seeds.

The government and the party are devoting much attention to the issues of draft cattle and swine husbandry. One of the recommendations of the V party Plenum is the fight to raise cattle husbandry to a higher level by applying modern methods. The DPRK's husbandry has suffered especially much as a result of the war and the temporary occupation of some of the DPRK by the American and Syngman Rhee intervention force. Because of this situation, the party and government have set the task for the peasantry to heal these losses as quickly as possible by conducting rational husbandry. The Mongolian People's Republic has given the DPRK much assistance in this area, donating a large number of cattle to Korea. In order to fulfill these tasks, a council of activists of the state grain farms and state livestock farms took place from 23 to 28 February of this year. Taking part in the meeting was V[ice]-Premier Ho Gae, the Minister of Agriculture, the head of the propaganda department and head of the agricultural department of the CC KWP. Those gathered analyzed the achievements of state grain farms and state livestock farms. In 1952 the area of arable land in state farms grew by 195% compared to 1951. Harvests grew by 674%, milk cows by 109.7%, rams by 128%, hogs by 2,156%. Some of the larger state farms were mechanized. These achievements were made possible by the assistance from the countries of people's democracy, and especially the USSR and the PRC. Next to the achievements in the work of the state farms, there are also shortcomings. The leadership apparatus of these farms has been taking insufficient advantage of the modern machinery. The meeting stressed the fact of the unprofitability of some state farms and the insufficient supplies of grains, meat and dairy products to the army and the population in proportion to their capacity. The discussion indicated that these shortcomings could be removed by applying to a higher degree than has been done so far of modern methods of cultivating the land and animal husbandry, greater use of machinery, placing the competitiveness of work on a higher level and a more daring cultivation of agricultural cultures that are little known in the DPRK. The learning of the Soviet revolutionary science of cultivation of soil and cattle husbandry, the fight for the proper positioning of people, the elimination of fallow land and material and financial economies are the preconditions for fulfilling these tasks.

In summarizing the discussions, V[ice]-Premier Ho Gae stressed the huge political and economic importance of this council and its outcomes for further increasing the role of state farms in the conditions of war, and he added that this year's achievements of these farms are opening up perspectives for their further development.

In connection to the strong movement of competition to raise the quantities in agricultural production, which has encompassed the majority of peasants in the DPRK, in recognizing the importance of this movement, the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK issued a resolution on 14 April of this year to reward the regions and villages that attain leading places in this competition. This resolution anticipates prizes on national, province-level and district-level scales. Each award has three degrees. For more information on this subject, see the appendix to this report.

b) Industry.

The DPRK's working class is getting ready to celebrate the international holiday of the working masses, 1st of May. In all factories, a competition began on April 1 under the motto of the struggle to raise the quantity and quality of production and to save raw materials, with which the DPRK working class desires to celebrate its holiday. In connection to the mass movement of competition in the factories and state institutions, the party and the government are conducting a decisive struggle to increase the discipline of work, which is the basic condition for the successful execution of the production commitments. In many factories, the workers are entering a competition to eliminate absenteeism and shirking. In this reporting period, general meetings of employees took place, in which all those who disobey the work discipline are being subjected to criticism. Apart from this, party bodies and administrative organs are conducting a broad political-consciousness-raising action, whose goal is to create the awareness among the workers that work discipline is an indispensable precondition for achievements in production. With this in mind, once a week, every factory hosts political chats on this topic. According to the press, the struggle to fortify discipline has already had some achievements. In many work places, the percentage of absenteeism has dropped from 7% to 1.6% in a monthly relationship. This is an expression of the deepening political consciousness of the working class of the DPRK, which knows that the victory of the Korean nation in the war against the American interveners and the Syngman Rhee clique depends to a large degree on its achievements in production.

The cooperative production enterprises, which until recently were exploited by profiteering elements, are playing an important role in the DPRK's economic life. The DPRK's party and government are striving to raise the economic importance of the cooperative production enterprises by tearing them out from under the influence of the profiteers and usurers. This will be possible if the state gives the cooperatives plentiful assistance to strengthen their material base, introduces rational production, gathers a larger number of small producers in them and surrounds them with greater protection. In the conditions of war, during which the great majority of the large factories of the consumer industry was destroyed, elevating the economic role of these cooperatives will contribute to strengthening the economic power of the DPRK, which will facilitate supplying the front and the population with necessary products. Because of this, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a decision to strengthen the economic role of the cooperative production enterprises. This decision states that the state will not limit the free management of their production in order to assist these cooperatives. It will not limit the free setting of prices for the products these cooperatives manufacture, with the exception of orders from the state and cooperative organizations and of those products that are of great importance to the state. The state planning commission will assure the distribution of products being produced by the cooperatives. The state will grant financial and material help to the cooperative production enterprises organized by the families of those who are on the front, the families of war invalids, working women or auxiliary cooperative production enterprises in the countryside. A share of these funds will be designated for production activities and the rest for the partial elimination of the destruction caused by war. The state will lower the sales tax from 50% to 30% of its full level for newly created cooperatives for a period of 6 months or a year from the moment

they begin their production activity. After this period, the state will release these cooperatives from yet another part of this tax.

Cooperative production enterprises led by war invalids are allowed to hire skilled technical workers to comprise up to 20% of their staff. Aiming to raise the standard of living of workers in the cooperative production enterprises, the government decision anticipates creating a premium fund made up of a part of the production from the state's raw materials, to be distributed to enterprises that have met their obligations vis-à-vis the state. The state planning commission will set the size and prices of production of the products ordered by the state and by cooperative organizations. In cases where the producer asks for a change in the prices of the goods because of a change in the conditions of production, the state planning commission should consider the request within 5 days. The decision directs the Central Committee of Cooperative Production Enterprises to organize the exploitation of local sources of the raw material on which the production by the cooperative enterprises is based.

In this reporting period, a review of the qualifications of the cadres of the middle and upper technical supervisory levels in industry, agriculture and forestry is being conducted in the DPRK. The intention of the review is to distribute and properly use the technical cadres and to train those who do not possess full professional qualifications. With this in mind, examination boards have been created in ministries and provincial people's committees, before which those who do not possess documents to confirm their qualifications are examined. The procedures for ascertaining technical qualifications of the middle and upper levels of the technical apparatus and for conducting the examinations have been set according to a resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers.

c) Trade.

One of the recommendations issued by the C Plenum of the CC KWP was to make the work of the state and cooperative trade, which is playing a growing role in the DPRK, more efficient. State and cooperative trade has major achievements. The working capital of the units of state and cooperative trade is growing every year. In 1947, this capital increased 9 times compared to 1946, in 1949 it increased 22 times and, in 1950, 17 times compared to 1946, even though in the second half of 1950 state and cooperative trade was already working in the period of war. The percentage data of this trade's share in the overall working capital of trade in the DPRK also illustrate the growth of state and cooperative trade. While, in 1947, 84.5% was private trade and only 15.5% was state and cooperative trade, in 1949 the sector of socialized trade rose to 53%. On the basis of these data, one can observe a gradual displacement of private trade by socialized trade. Thanks to the party's correct policies in the sphere of sales, DPRK's socialized trade contributed significantly in the area of basic necessity supplies to the working masses and, during the war, to the work of efficiently supplying the front.

Despite the difficult working conditions caused by the lengthy and difficult war, thanks to the selflessness of the employees of socialized trade, this trade has had major achievements. The overall amount of working capital of socialized trade was 213.3%

higher in 1952 than in 1951. These achievements were possible only because of the steady aid from the countries of people's democracy led by the Soviet Union.

Next to its achievements, the socialized trade also has shortcomings and inefficiencies. One of the shortcomings in the work of socialized trade is some workers' inability to understand a basic task that trade faces, which consists of efficiently distributing merchandise and meeting the wishes of the consumer. There have also been cases of retail outlets of socialized trade, which in their push to increase their turnover sold some deficient goods to profiteers, as a result of which there was a lack of these goods in the state and cooperative outlets, while they could be found on the black market.

Socialized trade was unable fully to play the role of middleman in sales between the city and the countryside, as a result of which peasants became the victims of profiteers. The leadership organs of socialized trade developed their outlets in the countryside insufficiently. Evidence of this is provided by the fact that socialized trade serviced 80% of the population of the DPRK in 1952, only 52% of that population were peasants, even though the DPRK is a country with an overwhelming majority of rural dwellers.

In order to implement the recommendations of the V Plenum of the CC KWP regarding improving the efficiency of the work of socialized trade, from 7 to 10 April of this year an all-Korean council of activists of state and cooperative trade outlets was held, at which the work of socialized trade was subjected to analysis and critique. According to the press, employees of socialized trade are successfully implementing the recommendations of the V Plenum and of the All-Korean council of activists.

Recently, the employees of socialized trade outlets joined in the May 1 competition under the motto of starting mobile sales outlets. The particular development of this type of outlet can be observed in villages. This is related to the greater possibility of reaching the furthest corners of the country. For example, in North Hamgen province, this year over 150 such outlets have been launched, in North Pyongyang province 460 of them have been organized and in the vicinity of Pyongyang, within 30 to 40 km., outlets of socialized trade are organizing the sale of wares as ordered by consumers.

These facts indicate that state and cooperative trade, thanks to the constant concern of the party and government, has entered the proper road of development and is increasingly becoming a factor that deepens the economic ties between the city and the countryside, displacing more and more private trade and profiteering from trade turnover.

d) Health care.

The bacteriological war being fought on the territory of the DPRK by the criminal American imperialism is creating a particular danger of spreading epidemic diseases in the period of spring and summer. The government and the party are mobilizing all forces to permit detected air drops of bacteria to be liquidated immediately, and they also protect the population from epidemic diseases by broadly implementing preventive

vaccinations and frequent disinfections of the sources from which these diseases spread. In order to make the fight against epidemic diseases more efficient, the Cabinet of Ministers issued a special decision on 27.I of this year, which contains the guidelines for this struggle. In view of the fact that in the period of winter, the phenomenon of many people disregarding regulations about the fight against epidemic diseases, the decision instructs the chairman of the special state commission for fighting epidemic diseases and the chairman of the provincial sections of this committee to conduct a broad propaganda action with the goal of explaining to the population the threat of the spread of epidemic diseases and of demonstrating to the population what steps need to be undertaken in order to stamp out infectious diseases before they spread. The decision recommends that the Minister of Health conduct preventive vaccinations of the population by the end of March of this year and also organize the efficient diagnosis and isolation of the contagiously ill. The staff of the health service has launched a competition to celebrate May 1 under the motto of quickly implementing this decision. Throughout the country, employees of the health service are organizing chats and lectures about the significance and the methods of fighting epidemic diseases. They are organizing preventive vaccinations of the population and of domestic animals, organizing days of cleanliness and stamping out rats, mice, mosquitoes, lice etc. The employees of the branch of the health service of the People's Committee of Kanwon Province have had major achievements in this struggle, since in March of this year they conducted a sanitary-hygienic inspection of 1,670 locations and organized 547 disinfection chambers and 226 bath houses.

The resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers about free-of-charge medicine are being realized in all corners of the DPRK. As of 1 January, free-of-charge health care is being made available in state hospitals and health care centers.

The working masses of the DPRK accepted this decision and its implementation with deep satisfaction and gratitude, viewing them as an expression of the state's constant concern for raising the state of the population's health. (For data regarding the health care system, and especially the anti-epidemiological system in the DPRK, see the annex to this report.)

e) Social insurance

Social insurance in the DPRK is guaranteed by the Constitution adopted in 1949 by the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK. Chapter II art. 17 of the Constitution states: "Citizens have a right to material security in old age, in case of illness or loss of the ability to work, as long as they have the right to social insurance. The law guarantees them health and material care through the development of social insurance realized by the state."

The war and the harsh losses are making it impossible for the DPRK government to put these principles into practice in full. Nonetheless, to a small degree of course, DPRK citizens take advantage of these rights even in the conditions of war. The decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK regarding social insurance for distinguished activists and their families is proof of this. The decision in principle states: "To offer help

to activists distinguished in the fight to liberate the Fatherland and in democratic construction, who lost the ability to earn a living through illness, injury or old age, or in the case of the death of the above, to their families, the Cabinet of Ministers instructs the Ministry of Labor to pay out regular subsidies.” The level of the subsidy may not go over 6,000 won and may not be smaller than 1,000 won monthly. The decision establishes the payment of a subsidy for life to the wife of a distinguished activist, and to children until they reach the independent ability to make money. In case of the death of a distinguished activist, it is recommended that his family be paid a one-time subsidy of 50,000 won to organize his burial. Those who lost the ability to make a living should receive subsidies, food allotments and necessities in the same amount as what they were entitled to when they were active in their career, for a period of three years, in the event that his ability to work is not restored at an earlier date. These decisions guarantee the same entitlements to the families that lose their breadwinner. This period may be extended if in those three years the family of the distinguished activist, in accordance with the decision of the appropriate authorities, is unable to support itself independently.

The Cabinet of Ministers instructs the five-person Commission headed by the V[ice]-Minister of labor to execute this decision. The outcomes of the implementation of this decision have not yet been published.

IV. The DPRK’s foreign policy.

In the past reporting period, the foreign policy of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea continued to walk the line of strengthening the friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China and the countries of people’s democracy and was directed against imperialistic aggressors and the treacherous Syngman Rhee clique, striving to attain a resolution of the Korean war peacefully, using the truce negotiations in Panmunjom. The recent announcement by the governments of the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, on the basis of which talks began again after a long interruption, about signing a truce in Korea, is an expression of the DPRK’s peaceful policies.

1. Exchange of ill and wounded prisoners-of-war.

On March 28, Marshal Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huei sent a letter to the commander of the so-called UN armies, in which they declared that in response to his proposal of 22 February of this year, the Korean-Chinese side agrees to the repatriation of the wounded and sick prisoners-of-war of both sides, stressing that this issue would have been resolved sooner, in accordance with the previously reached agreement, were it not for the interruption of truce talks. At the same time, the Korean-Chinese side expressed the hope in this letter that the positive consideration of the issue of repatriating the wounded and ill prisoners-of-war should lead to the complete sorting out/regulating of the problem of prisoners-of-war, therefore to the signing of a truce.

In accordance with the above-mentioned suggestions, contained in the letter from Marshal Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh Huai, liaison officers of both sides met in

Panmunjom, and on 11.IV of this year an agreement was signed on the issue of repatriating the wounded and ill prisoners-of-war. On the basis of this agreement, the initial numbers of wounded and ill prisoners-of-war to be included in this exchange were as follows: the American side was to hand over ca. 5,800 prisoners, including ca. 5,100 soldiers of the Korean People's Army and ca. 700 Chinese people's volunteers, while the Korean side ca. 600 prisoners-of-war, including ca. 450 Syngman Rhee-ites and ca. 150 of other nationalities. An agreement was also reached regarding the organizational details of the exchange, including the decision that the Korean-Chinese side will daily repatriate ca. 100 wounded and ill prisoners, while the American side ca. 500 daily.

On 20 April, the repatriation of the ill and wounded prisoners-of-war began, and the flow of the repatriations so far indicates that it may end well. The Americans are, however, attempting to malign our side, faulting it for allegedly treating the prisoners-of-war cruelly, but as we know from press and radio reports, their action has completely failed. On the contrary, during the exchange the prisoners, as they were saying good-bye to the medical personnel from our side escorting them, thanked them for the good treatment and they repeat this after returning to their side. The result of this was the isolation of former prisoners-of-war, not allowing talks with correspondents and even, according to western agencies, it was necessary to send the prisoners for "ideological retraining" because they "were infected with communist propaganda" in prison.

On 23.IV our side let the other side know that a certain number of wounded and ill prisoners-of-war, who are located in field hospitals near the border and also those who are captured during the period of the exchange, were being additionally repatriated. In response, the American side also committed to repatriate an additional number of ill and wounded prisoners-of-war.

On 26.IV our side completed the repatriation of the ill and wounded prisoners-of-war. Overall, 684 prisoners were exchanged, including: 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 Englishmen, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1 South African, 1 Dutchman, 1 Filipino and 1 Greek.

The repatriation of our side's ill and wounded prisoners is continuing, without any particular obstacles.

2. The freeing and sending back to the Fatherland of persons interned in North Korea.

Further evidence of the DPRK government's desire to regulate the Korean problem peacefully was the freeing and sending back to the Fatherland, at the request of the English, French and American governments, of 7 English citizens, 14 French citizens and 7 American citizens interned in North Korea, who were handed over to the DPRK government with the Soviet Union as the intermediary. All the internees, in the course of being handed over in Antung to representatives of the Soviet Union, expressed their gratitude to the Korean side for treating them well during the time that they were in the territory of the DPRK.

3. Truce talks in Panmunjom.

The statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai and Marshal Kim Il Sung, which was fully supported by the Soviet government in an announcement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR comr. Molotov, which aimed to regulate the Korean problem peacefully, forced the American interveners to continue the truce talks they had interrupted. After the successful resolution of the question of repatriating the ill and wounded prisoners-of-war, the liaison officers of both sides agreed on a date for the meeting of delegations for talks about signing a truce in Korea. The first plenary session of the two delegations took place on 26 April. At this session, the Chairman of the Korean-Chinese delegation, Gen. Nam Il presented a plan for solving the problem of repatriating prisoners-of-war made up of 6 points in which, giving precise dates, he proposes repatriating all prisoners-of-war who are demanding it and passing prisoners who do not want to go back to a neutral country. Further, Gen. Nam Il suggested that within 6 months the sides to whom the prisoners-of-war belong go to the given neutral country with the goal of conducting consciousness-raising work among the prisoners, and then the neutral state will conduct the repatriation to the Fatherland without any obstacles of those prisoners who demonstrate the desire to return, and if after the given 6 months pass and after the consciousness-raising work on the territory of the neutral state, any prisoners are still left who do not want to return to their country, their fate should be discussed by consultation at a political conference, whose organization is anticipated in Article 60 pt. 4 of the truce agreement.

In the further course of the truce talks, the Korean-Chinese side rejected the proposal of the American side about designating Switzerland as a neutral country "because of its big traditions that Switzerland has in these issues." Discussions about appointing a neutral country are continuing.

The resumption of negotiations about a truce was greeted with great hope by the people of the DPRK, but their dragging out is not giving hope for the quick signing of a truce. The American side has so far shown no positive initiative, constantly threatening to break off the talks again and screaming about "resolving the Korean problem by force."

Still, the position of our side and the pressure from the public opinion of the whole world, demanding a cessation of the Korean war, should force the aggressors to sign a truce in Korea.

V. Situation of the Embassy.

[Military attache's jeep broken down, when staff need to travel increasingly, so a replacement is urgent.]

E. Cerekwicki

[signature]

Charge d'Affaires a.i.

Embassy of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in the DPRK

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 110

TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

to Cde. G. M. MALENKOV

I submit the text of my statement on the Korean question.

[signed] V. Molotov

31 March 1953

Distributed to

Cdes. Beria,

Bulganin,

Kaganovich,

Mikoyan,

Khrushchev

N° 332

The text of a statement by the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs submitted to the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers on the Korean question.

STATEMENT OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. MOLOTOV ON THE
KOREAN QUESTION

On 28 March a letter of reply from Kim Il Sung, the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Dehuai, the Commanding General of the Chinese volunteer forces, addressed to General Clark, the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Forces in Korea, was published regarding an exchange of sick and injured POWs.

This letter expressed agreement to the exchange of sick and injured POWs by both sides and pointed out that agreement had actually already been reached on this question in the course of the armistice negotiations in Korea and that only the breakdown of the negotiations at Panmunjom had prevented this exchange from taking place earlier. At the same time agreement was expressed to conduct an exchange of sick and injured POWs in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of the Geneva Convention regarding the period of hostilities. At the same time the letter stresses that such an exchange of sick and injured POWs should lead to an unimpeded settlement of the entire problem of POWs

and thereby to the achievement of an armistice in Korea. The immediate resumption of negotiations in Panmunjom was proposed with this goal.

Immediately after this Zhou Enlai, Premier of the State Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs, spoke in [Beijing] and Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, spoke in Pyongyang. Both the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Democratic People's Republic of Korea declared that they agreed with the proposal to exchange sick and injured POWs and as before express readiness to come to agreement about a settlement of the entire problem of POWs without delay and thus an end to the war in Korea.

The governments of the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea thereby displayed initiative in the matter of seeking agreement about an armistice and an end to the war in Korea.

I am authorized to state that the Soviet Government expresses its complete solidarity with this noble act of the governments of the PRC and the government of the DPRK and has no doubt that this act will receive warm support from the people of the entire world. The Soviet Government also expresses confidence that this proposal will ~~meet with proper support of the American people and that it will~~ be correctly understood by the government of the United States of America.

[Translator's note: there are several versions of the text of this document: one has the above phrase crossed out, while another says that this phrase "was crossed out by hand by an unknown author"].

The Soviet Government has invariably supported all steps directed at the establishment of a just armistice and an end to the war in Korea.

This was initiated in the reply of I. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, to an appeal of Mr. Nehru in July 1950.

As is well known, the radio statement in New York in June 1951 by the Soviet representative to the Security Council served as the basis for the start of armistice negotiations in Korea. These armistice negotiations, which were first held in Kaesong and then in Panmunjom, led to an agreement about all conditions of an armistice except the question of the repatriation of POWs. But the armistice negotiations were broken off by General Clark in October of last year, which held up the conclusion of an armistice.

In the above letter of Kim Il Sung, the Supreme Command of the Korean People's Army, and Peng Dehuai, the Commanding General of the Chinese volunteer forces, agreement is not only expressed with General Clark's 22 February proposal about the issue of an exchange of sick and injured POWs, but also proposed a resumption of the armistice negotiations in order to put an end to the war in Korea.

The Chinese-Korean side accepted General Clark's proposal that an exchange of sick and injured POWs be conducted in accordance with Article 109 of the 1949 Geneva Convention about dealing with POWs. This article says:

"Subject to the provisions of the third paragraph of this Article, Parties to the conflict are bound to send back to their own country, regardless of number or rank, seriously wounded and seriously sick prisoners of war, after having cared for them until they are fit to travel, in accordance with the first paragraph of the following Article. Throughout the duration of hostilities, Parties to the conflict shall endeavor, with the cooperation of the neutral Powers concerned, to make arrangements for the accommodation in neutral countries of the sick and wounded prisoners of war referred to in the second paragraph of the following Article. They may, in addition, conclude agreements with a view to the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity. No sick or injured prisoner of war who is eligible for repatriation under the first paragraph of this Article, may be repatriated against his will during hostilities".

This article of the Geneva Convention relates to the period before the conclusion of an armistice when hostilities have not yet ceased. Inasmuch as an agreement about employing this article has now been reached and might be signed by both sides in the immediate future no obstacles will remain to an exchange of sick and injured POWs beginning without further delay.

Special attention ought to be paid to the fact that in the statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhou Enlai of 30 March which was drawn up jointly by the governments of the PRC and DPRK, it proposed not only conducting an exchange of sick and injured POWs but also resolving the issue of the repatriation of POWs on the whole, which will lead to the conclusion of an armistice agreement and an end to the war in Korea. For our part, the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea propose that, following a reasonable settlement of the issue of sick and injured POWs the entire issue of POWs be resolved so that both sides are guided by a sincere desire to achieve an armistice in Korea in the spirit of mutual compromise.

Of course, the issue of the repatriation of POWs on the whole should also be resolved in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, on which both the Soviet Government and the governments of the PRC and DPRK have both insisted. However, as everyone knows, neither the lengthy negotiations at Panmunjom nor repeated discussions of this issue at the UN General Assembly have produced positive results.

Inasmuch as this issue has remained the only difference between the warring sides in Korea which stands in the way of an armistice agreement, the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, guided by a desire to achieve peace and end the war in Korea, have made a new step toward a final resolution of this issue. They have proposed that both sides renew armistice negotiations and commit themselves to immediately repatriate all those in their

hands who insist on repatriation after the end of hostilities and to transfer the remaining POWs to a neutral country in order to ensure a just resolution of the issue of their repatriation. Such a proposal provides an opportunity to fairly resolve the issue of the repatriation of POWs and remove the remaining obstacles to the achievement of an armistice in Korea.

There can be no doubt that the peoples of the entire world and all the people filled with an honest desire to put an end to the war in Korea and to further the consolidation of the peace and security of the peoples of the Far East and the entire world will greet this proposal with heartfelt sympathy and give it full support.

The Soviet Government acknowledges the entire fairness of this proposal of the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and expresses readiness to fully assist its implementation.

~~Today many people recall how powerless the United Nations showed itself in the issue of establishing an armistice and an end to the war in Korea. This lesson cannot be forgotten. This should especially be remembered by those who attach importance of the United Nations as an international center created to improve mutual understanding between peoples and to strengthen peace throughout the entire world*.~~

* This paragraph was crossed out by the same person.

The fact that the Chinese people and the Korean people have been deprived of their legal representation in the United Nations, first undermines the authority of this organization and second, deprives it of the opportunity to properly promote the strengthening of international security and world peace.

The Soviet government considers it its duty to again issue a reminder [*napominat'*] that the issue of the restoration of the rights of the Chinese people and the Korean people in the United Nations is one of the pressing issues and that the restoration of the rights of China and Korea at the UN, especially in current conditions, will promote the strengthening of peace throughout the entire world.

AP RF. F. 3, Op. 65, D. 830, pp. 107-112. Original

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 111

Embassy of the
Polish Republic
in Korea

Pyongyang, 5 June 1953

Secret!

No. 2421/40/53/TJN [tajne—secret]

Report

from a conference organized by the Government of the DPRK on the issue of implementing the plan of reconstruction for Pyongyang.

On the second of June 1953, a conference devoted to presenting and discussing the plan for reconstructing Pyongyang. The V[ice]-Premier of the government, Choe Changik, chaired the conference, Minister of Construction Kim Sun Hwa gave an overview of the basics of the plan, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs V[ice]-Minister Li Don Gen was also present at the conference because participating in the conference was the diplomatic corps accredited to Pyongyang, led by heads of missions.

After reviewing the history of the city's development, which took into account the situation in the period of the Japanese occupation, the Minister of Construction summarized the basic elements of the plan. In 1952 work began in the sphere of preparing plans for the reconstruction of the city on the basis of the experiences of the Soviet Union and countries of people's democracy, with a particular focus on the construction of Stalingrad and Warsaw. Thanks to the strenuous assistance of Soviet specialists, the plan has been developed definitively and now, after its approval by the government, will be realized in the nearest future.

The area of the newly built Pyongyang will encompass 1,500 ha., the surface of the city will amount to 25 km. sq. According to the basics of the plan, the full reconstruction of the city will be implemented over the course of 8 years.

In the final phase of construction, Pyongyang will accommodate 600,000 inhabitants (prior to the outbreak of the war Pyongyang had 450,000 inhabitants, currently 150,000). The plan's architectural premises take into account the needs of the population in the broadest sense and are an expression of modern design based on the premises of socialist realism.

The plan foresees a major afforestation of the city, the creation of parks and places of rest on Moranbon Mountain and the nearby islands on Taedong River.

The creation of an industrial area is being planned in the southern part of the city; it will concentrate, as an initial premise, factories of the metallurgical and textile industries.

In the center of the city, which includes the buildings of state institutions, will be built Kim Il Sung square and his monument to honor the memorable services of the leader of the Korean nation in the struggle against American imperialism. At the same time as Kim Il Sung square, a beautiful Stalin Avenue will be built, stretching for 2,300 m. and 40-45 m. wide. On both sides of Stalin Avenue, 4- and 5-storey buildings will be erected. The avenue will end in Opera Square with the building of the Opera, which will be beautiful in its architectural design, and at the intersection of the Avenue and the Square a monumental statue of Stalin will be placed. From the center in the south direction, Mao Zedong Avenue will be built. It will be 2,000 m. long and 35 m. wide, and

3- and 4-storey buildings will be placed on both of its sides. At the outlet of the Avenue, on the northern side, a sports stadium will be built. On its southern side, the Avenue will end in Mao Zedong Square and a monument to him. 35% of the public and residential houses will be 3- and 5-storey high.

The built-up area will encompass 20-30% of the overall surface, as opposed to 80% in the pre-war period.

After the discussion and remarks by those present, the leaders of the conference, thanking for the assistance given to Korea by the countries of the peace camp, appealed for further support for the Korean nation, which has suffered such heavy losses in the period of the bestial imperialist attack. The appeal from the leaders of the government to the countries of the peace camp was not concrete, since the needs of the DPRK in the area of means of production, industrial and housing construction are so great that every form of assistance will be received with understandable satisfaction.

The heads of the diplomatic missions, including the head of the Polish mission Stanisław Kiryluk, stressed that the Korean nation's struggle for freedom concerns all nations that love freedom and peace, and the reconstruction of the heroic city of Pyongyang is a political concern, the duty of all fraternal countries. Those assembled declared that they will ask their governments to make the help for the reconstruction of Pyongyang concrete. At the same time, the leaders of the conference appealed to the representatives of the friendly countries to realize quickly the construction of the seats of Embassies in Pyongyang, for which land has already been prepared. At the end of the conference, the main designer, a Soviet architect, asked for any potential further critical remarks to accompany the plan after it is studied thoroughly.

As I relay this news to the state authorities, I am asking them to take a stand on making the assistance of the People's Republic of Poland to the reconstruction of Pyongyang concrete and to send me instructions and guidelines in this matter.

Kiryluk St.
[signature]
Embassy of the PRL [People's
Republic of Poland] in Korea

3 copies made
[...]

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 112

Embassy of the

[illegible number added by hand]

Polish Republic
in Korea
[letterhead with eagle]

REPORT No. 4

of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
for the period of 26 June 1953 top 31 July 1953

Report No. 4.

of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
for the period of 26 June 1953 top 31 July 1953

I. Armistice in Korea.

On 27 July 1953, an armistice was signed in Panmunjom. On that day, the military actions, which had been conducted for over 3 years in Korea, were interrupted. The aggression of the American-English imperialism and their Syngman Rhee-ite lackeys against the DPRK was over. The news about the signing of the agreement to cease fire was received with great joy by the DPRK's population. On 28 July of this year a powerful demonstration of the population of the capital and its surrounds, which was devoted to celebrating the great victory of the Korean nation over its enemy, took place.

At the rally in Pyongyang, Premier Kim Il Sung gave a speech to the whole nation about the agreement that was reached on the armistice, in which he devoted a large section to discussing the significance of the armistice as a victory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the sources of the victory.

Signing the armistice in Korea is a great historic victory for the Korean nation, which was achieved as a result of the 3-year heroic struggle for its freedom and national sovereignty against the aggression of the united, foreign interventionary armed forces and Syngman Rhee's venal clique. The American interventionists, despite the mobilization of a large part of their armed forces and of the armed forces of 18 satellite states, were incapable of realizing their insane-criminal plans to conquer the DPRK. They suffered serious losses and defeat in this war. The American aggressors learned about the strength of the Korean nation, of the people's democratic government and of its armed shoulder, the Korean People's Army. The Korean nation over the five thousand years of its history fought for its freedom and sovereignty more than once, but it has never inflicted such a defeat on an enemy stronger than itself as in the current national-liberation war. The

source of this victory is lodged in the great standing of the Korean nation, which has won the sympathy and support of the nations of the whole world. The Korean nation's victory in the war was made possible by the enormous support and aid from the camp of peace and progress led by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which was expressed by the common struggle of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers against the imperialistic aggression. The Korean nation, its army and the units of the Chinese People's Volunteers defended the People's-Democratic regime in the war and its gains on the road to the revolutionary transformation of the country's political and economic life. The outcome was that the Korean nation defended its democratic base, the foundation of the further development of revolution in the DPRK, it preserved the possibility of fully unifying the country that has been artificially torn apart. The victory in the national-liberation war elevated the domestic and international authority of the DPRK government and placed the Korean nation in the first row of fighters for freedom, national liberation and democracy. The Korean nation's struggle became a symbol and an example of a struggle for freedom and national sovereignty to all nations that find themselves under the yoke of colonial oppression, and mostly to the nations of Asia.

In the course of the war, the Korean Workers' Party and the people's-democratic government were enriched by new experiences, as thousands of specialists grew up in various areas of political, economic and military life as they were being brought up by the people's-democratic government and make up the new national cadre. In the Korean war, the myth about the invincibility of the USA was shattered. The aggressors, despite their use of barbarian fighting methods unprecedented in the history of wars, did not manage to reach their goals. These methods brought them anger and condemnation in the eyes of all the peace-loving people of the world. They suffered a military and a political-moral defeat. The Korean war confirmed once again that the unity of the peace camp, headed by the Soviet Union, is immovable and invincible. In contrast to the unity of the camp of peace and progress, the Korean war brought increasingly deepening internal contradictions in the imperialistic camp. Premier Kim Il Sung, further on in his speech, sketched out plans for healing the wounds in the national economy caused by the war and for the further peaceful construction of life in the DPRK on the road to further revolutionary transformations.

The basic precondition that makes it possible to transfer to peaceful construction in the DPRK is maintaining full vigilance to repel any attacks by the enemy. The signing of the armistice does not mean at all that the American imperialists have given up their aggressive plans vis-à-vis the DPRK. The armistice is the first serious step to resolve the Korean question in a peaceful way. The existence in South Korea of the Syngman Rhee clique, which shouts about marching North, leaving the American aggressive armed forces in Korea and the American imperialism arming Japan, brings the danger of the possibility of renewed disturbing of the peace in Korea. The DPRK government realizes that at this moment there is the possibility of restarting the war, hence it is crucial to continue to strengthen the army, raising it to higher and higher levels. The Korean nation should increase its vigilance even more in its fight with the DPRK's internal enemies, who have also not given up their plans to win back the positions they lost.

In this situation, strengthening the rear is an extremely important matter. It is imperative, with this goal in mind, to begin immediately to rebuild the national economy, to introduce stabilization into the lives of the population of the DPRK and to strengthen the country's defenses. The main direction of rebuilding the DPRK's national economy should be to create a base for the future development of industrialization of the country by building, first, those branches of industry whose absence became clear in the course of the war. Eliminating the colonial disproportions in industry, leftovers of the Japanese colonial policy conducted toward Korea in the period of occupation, is the goal of the plan for rebuilding the national economy. The plan will anticipate broadening heavy industry, with the simultaneous reconstruction and expansion of those branches of industry that will contribute directly to increasing the material prosperity of the working masses. With this goal in mind, the Korean nation should first of all direct its efforts to rebuild and develop the metal, machine, mining, electro-technical, railway transportation, war and textile industries. Next to the rebuilding of industry, the reconstruction and expansion of agriculture is an equally important issue. In the sphere of agriculture, it is imperative to direct the main efforts at improving the material situation of the poor and middle peasantry as quickly as possible, by developing irrigation work, introducing modern cultivation methods, rebuilding irrigation installations, assuring the delivery of tractive force and the further strengthening of the importance of state farms and animal farms, so that within a year or two the agricultural production is up to not only the pre-war level, but surpasses it significantly.

In the area of developing culture and education, the DPRK faces the tasks of rebuilding all scientific institutions and raising the level of their work. The plan foresees creating an institute of people's economy, which is to fulfill the role of a mass school for preparing employees of the state apparatus, conducting the serious work of preparing reserve cadres by sending larger numbers of youth than so far to universities in the Soviet Union and the Countries of people's democracy. The plan anticipates creating the appropriate working conditions for young specialists who will complete their studies abroad, so they can convey a maximum amount of their knowledge and work in rebuilding the country.

In order to fulfill the tasks in the area of developing education, the national movement in the direction of rebuilding elementary schooling and secondary schooling must be developed, so that within two to three years it will be possible to reach the pre-war level in schooling.

The implementation of all these goals will be possible only with the great assistance and support granted the DPRK by the Soviet Union and the Countries of people's democracy.

Comr. Kil Il Sung's speech was received with ardent enthusiasm and approval by the broad masses of the DPRK's population. At the rallies in provincial and regional towns and Korean villages devoted to celebrating the victory of the Korean nation over

the imperialistic aggressors, the DPRK's working masses made commitments to rebuild the country quickly.

According to the press, the working class in many of the DPRK's provinces has begun to rebuild factories destroyed by the war.

Recognizing the great services rendered to the act of victory in the national-liberation war, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, by a resolution of 28 July of this year, gave Marshal Kim Il Sung the title of "Hero of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Decorating Kim Il Sung with the title of "Hero of the DPRK" was greeted by the working masses with great pleasure, which is demonstrated by the hundreds of letters sent to Kim Il Sung by the population.

(For details regarding the ceremonies relating to the signing of the armistice in Korea, see note No. 2421/52/53/TJN/.)

II. Polish-Korean relations.

[Preparations to celebrate Polish national holiday, July 22; 1,000 Korean orphans leave for Poland and Korean students; Polish and Korean workers become pen pals; Polish propaganda materials for Korea.]

III. The Korean domestic situation.

1. The further strengthening of the people's-democratic government in the DPRK.

Throughout the national-liberation war, thanks to the party's correct policies, the DPRK people's-democratic government became stronger every day. During the Korean nation's heroic struggle for its freedom and national sovereignty, the people's-democratic government was its director and organizer. The victory of the Korean nation, attained in the war against the imperialistic intervention and the treacherous Syngman Rhee-ist clique created great respect for the people's-democratic government domestically, as well as in the international arena. Under fire in this exceptionally hard war, the people's-democratic government was able to gather around itself the overwhelming masses of the population and mobilize them around the supreme task that was the struggle against the enemy, all the way to victory. During the war, the people's-democratic government, with the support of the whole nation, was able not only to organize production for the needs of the front, but also in the last months of the war to implement a program of broadening production for the population's consumer needs. Under fire, the people's-democratic government was able to strengthen the Korean People's Army to become a force capable of inflicting a major defeat on the enemy.

In the speech by Premier Kim Il Sung at the rally in Pyongyang on the occasion of signing the armistice in Korea, the DPRK's people's-democratic government presented the outlines of the plan for reconstructing and expanding the national economy damaged by the war. The DPRK government called on the working masses to intensify their efforts

in rebuilding the country, which had been destroyed by the American aggressors in a barbarian way, with the same devotion as that which the Korean nation had shown in fighting the war to defend its freedom and its national independence. The government's appeal was greeted enthusiastically by the whole population of the DPRK, for the Korean nation believes that the people's-democratic government will lead it on a road to new victories in rebuilding their country.

The announcement of the resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK about an amnesty related to the termination of the national-liberation war is an expression of the strength of the people's-democratic government in the DPRK. The amnesty grants total pardons to prisoners sentenced to prison terms below 3 years and to those with suspended sentences. It also provides for unlimited forgiveness of sentences of any length to those who were sentenced for certain war crimes. It releases women with underage children, pregnant women and the seriously ill from sentences of any length. It cuts in half the sentences of those given prison terms of over three years. The amnesty anticipates a halt to court proceedings against those guilty of crimes committed prior to the announcement of the amnesty, those included in the amnesty. The decision on the amnesty crosses off the register of persons with criminal records and restores the right to vote to those who have served their sentences or those whose sentences were forgiven by the amnesty, for sentences shorter than 18 months.

Not covered by the amnesty are people with sentences of over three years for anti-state crimes, for premeditated murder, for forging money and for common banditry.

The amnesty announced by the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK aims to bring back to work on rebuilding the destroyed country those who once erred. The news that the amnesty was announced was greeted by the working masses with deep contentment, as an expression of the wise policies of the party and government of the DPRK.

In recent days, those who had been amnestied began to be released. The prisoners released from the Pyongyang prison by the provisions of the amnesty reported for work to rebuild Pyongyang. According to the press, the majority of the amnestied prisoners have asked the government to direct them to work, wanting to contribute to the faster rebuilding of the country in this way and to erase their guilt.

The following changes have taken place recently in the DPRK's government: The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK named 2 new V[ice]-Premiers of the DPRK government: 1. V[ice]-Marshal of the DPRK and Minister of National Defense Choe Yonggeon; 2. Former Minister of Railways Pak ui-wan. The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly named former V[ice]-Minister of Railways Kim Hi Il to the position of Minister of Railways of the DPRK.

The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK decorated 62 party and state activists with high state awards and medals in recognition of their outstanding service during the period of the Patriotic war. I am giving the names of the

most important DPRK personalities who were decorated. The Order of “National Flag I degree” was awarded to: the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Dubong, Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party Pak Jeongae and Pak chang-ok, Minister of Internal Affairs of the DPRK Pan Hak Se, Minister of Education Pak Nam Un and the Editor-in-chief of the CC KWP organ *Nodong Sinmun* Li Mun Il. V[ice]-Premier Choe Yonggeon was decorated with the “Freedom and Independence” medal. V[ice]-Premier Hon myung-hee and Dep[uty] V[ice]-Minister of Foreign Affairs Lee Don Gen, V[ice]-Minister of Culture and Propaganda Ki Sek Pok and DPRK’s Ambassador in Warsaw Koe Ir were awarded the “Order of Labor.”

2. DPRK’s industry.

In this reporting period, the DPRK working class launched a competition to shorten the time for fulfilling the annual production plan. According to the press, the movement of competition under the slogan of completing the production plans ahead of schedule encompasses an overwhelming majority of factories. In many branches of industry, and mostly in coal mining, some enterprises have completed their year’s production plans with a large surplus. These enterprises’ major production achievements stem from strengthened work discipline, for whose increase very serious political-educational work has been conducted in the DPRK for many months now.

In order to guarantee the quick fulfillment of annual production plans in all production enterprises, close oversight of the plans’ execution was introduced in all plants. One of the forms of this control is analyzing the achievement of daily production plans, which takes place at brief daily meetings of production brigades. Experience shows that this form of overseeing the execution of production plans yields good results. Apart from this form of control of the execution of plans, bi-weekly production conferences take place, at which great pressure is placed on raising the technical qualifications of the workers who have recently flowed into these factories, as well as discussions of issues related to overcoming difficulties in production. The problem of shortages of qualified workers in the DPRK’s industry, because of the signing of the armistice and the need to make the transition to broader dimensions of production, appears most clearly. It is impossible to eliminate these shortages quickly. In order to moderate somewhat the difficulties related to cadres, in nearly all production plants, a short-term form of raising the technical qualifications of the mid-level technical supervisors and workers through technical councils has been developed, at which the achievements of production innovators are shared, as well as through short training courses organized in these factories.

To reach the goal of meeting annual production plans in industry ahead of time, the party and the government have recently been conducting an action aiming to raise the role of agitators in production brigades. The agitators have the task of popularizing and introducing new methods developed by production innovators into the production processes and to propagate the competition movement as a way of raising productivity in production, and at the same time to raise the standard of living of the DPRK’s working

masses. The fact that a week-long special course to train the agitators of production brigades was organized in Pyongyang proves the importance that the DPRK's party and government are attaching to this issue. Lecturers at the course included Secretary of the CC KWP Pak Chang-ok and Vice-Premier Chong Il.

Responding to Premier Kim Il Sung's instructions regarding the reconstruction and expansion of the DPRK's industry, which were included in his speech at the rally for the armistice in Korea, the working class took them on with deep enthusiasm. According to the press, workers in many industrial centers have already launched the reconstruction of factories, plants and mines damaged by the war. Three days after the signing of the armistice, workers of Pyongyang-area brickyards began to produce bricks.

3. Transportation.

After the signing of the armistice, new tasks face the DPRK's transportation system. In contrast to the missions facing the transportation system during the war, which lay mostly in transporting supplies to the front and indispensable raw materials to industry, right now it faces new serious duties, such as transporting food and industrial products for the population more broadly than was the case during the military actions.

During the war, the transportation system barely served passengers. Therefore, its new task, and a very urgent one, is starting up the transportation of passengers. The main burdens of this task fall on the DPRK's rail transportation system. The heroic railway men have committed to implementing the slogan announced by the party and government about starting passenger transportation as quickly as possible. It will be extremely difficult to fulfill this task. As a result of the war, the DPRK's railway system suffered huge losses, as station buildings, track, bridges, signal equipment and rolling stock were thoroughly damaged. Three months before the armistice was signed, only 28 passenger cars were left in the DPRK. The railway men, just like during the war, made a great effort to rebuild the bridges and track, 90% of which had been built provisionally and was not suitable for the transport of passengers.

The DPRK's railway men had begun their work on rebuilding railway installations with great help from Chinese railway volunteers already during the war. Thanks to this effort by the railway men and the assistance from the People's Republic of China in the form of delivering several sets of passenger trains, the DPRK government was able to start passenger transport on one of the main railway lines connecting the cities of Sinuiju and Kaesong on 31 July 1953. According to a communiqué from the Ministry of Railways, on 5 August of this year normal passenger transport is to start on the following railway lines: Pyongyang-Sinuiju, Pyongyang-Kaesong, Pyongyang-Wosan. Much attention is being paid in the DPRK to starting urban transit. Urban transit, which was broadly developed in provincial towns before the war, was thoroughly destroyed, just as these towns were destroyed. Road communications in Pyongyang have been started exceptionally efficiently and quickly. On 30 July 1953 dozens of trucks adapted for passenger transportation appeared in the streets of Pyongyang. These trucks reach the most important places in the city. The DPRK Ministry of Railroads services urban transit.

According to the press, urban transit has been started up in the larger provincial cities, such as Sinuiju, Wonsan and Hamhyn. Organizing urban transit systems in such a short time is an expression of the major organizational competence of the Ministry of Railways.

Currently, the DPRK's transportation system is fighting very large difficulties in executing the enormous tasks it faces. In this area, significant help from the countries of people's democracy, in the form of steam locomotives, cars, railroad signal equipment and equipment to create a base for the repairs of railroad and vehicle stock is indispensable.

4. Agriculture.

This year, a plague of parasitic insects has struck the DPRK's agriculture and ravaged cultures such as millet, corn, barley and vegetables. The spread of this plague presented the very serious threat that crops will be reduced. To avert this threat, the DPRK party and government conducted a broad mobilization of the whole population to fight this plague. To underscore the importance of this action, on 27.VI of this year, the Chairman of the War Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Kim Il Sung issued a special order about the special methods of conducting the fight against the parasitic insects. The order calls on the Ministers of agriculture, internal affairs, national defense and education, as well as the Chairmen of the Provincial People's committees, to organize and conduct the battle against the plague of parasitic insects. The order stresses that the battle should have the characteristics of a national movement. Soldiers of the units of the Korean People's Army who are in the rear, employees of the organs of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, workers, students and pupils must be mobilized for this battle. The order instructs the Minister of Agriculture and the Chairmen of the Provincial People's Committees to make the organs on the district, township and village levels responsible for the efficient conduct of this action. To mobilize the appropriate numbers of technically skilled agricultural workers, who will have the task of conducting chats with the peasants with the goal of discussing methods of destroying the parasitic insects. The order instructs the Minister of Agriculture and the Chairmen of the Provincial People's Committees to deliver the proper amounts of chemical substances necessary to kill the insects to the areas particularly infected by the plague. In order to familiarize the broad masses of the DPRK population with the importance of this action, the order instructs the Ministers of Agriculture and Culture and Propaganda to conduct propaganda-and-consciousness-building work by using the press and the radio.

In response to the order from the Chairman of the War Commission to fight the parasitic insects, hundreds of specially trained brigades made up of KPA soldiers, workers, peasants and school youth went out into the fields to inspect the infected places, destroyed the insects and isolated the infected places from the places that have not yet been taken over by the plague.

According to the press, the danger that the parasitic plague would spread has been contained in time.

This action demonstrated once again the deep consciousness and dedication of the DPRK's population and underscored the nature of the worker-peasant alliance, the foundation of the people's-democratic regime of the DPRK. As always, this time too the working class came to the aid of the peasants in a period that was difficult for them. This compelled the peasants to intensify their efforts to increase the productivity of agricultural production even more and to deliver a greater quantity of food to the working class and the necessary agricultural raw materials indispensable for production to industry.

In the second half of June of this year, the peasants launched the harvest of early grain cultures. According to the calculations of the Ministry of Agriculture, this year large harvests of the early crops are expected. Analyses conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture in South Pyongyang, Hwanhe and Kanwon provinces and in the area of Kesong (this is an area of the most intensive agriculture) indicate that this year's wheat crops per chonbo (1 chonbo = 0.9 ha.) will be 107.7% greater, barley 124.2% and vegetables 108.6% than planned.

Materials about the sowing of rice this year indicate that in South Pyongyang, Hwanhe and Kanwon Provinces, the area of rice cultivation increased by 60,000 chonbo, while the areas sown with barley, millet, corn and gaoliang increased by 70,000 chonbo. These examples of calculations indicate that this year's crops are significantly larger than last year's. This is an outcome of the great concern of the government and party, which gave the DPRK's peasantry significant help. They are also an expression of the deep patriotism of the DPRK's working peasants.

In accordance with the resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK issued last summer regarding the preparations of fertilizer of natural plant origin, the most serious task facing DPRK agriculture in the current phase is the issue of quick haying. The DPRK's peasants have entered a competition under the slogan of quick haying. The first harvesting of hay began in June of this year in all DPRK, and the second in July. The peasants of Chango district of Kanwon prov[ince] have major accomplishments in haying, as they collect 500 kg. of hay per person. The peasants of that province have carried out 152% of the haying plan. Efficient haying assures the preparation of greater quantities of natural fertilizer, which guarantees increasing the harvest in 1954.

In this reporting period, the peasants in many provinces of the DPRK began to pay off to the state the in-kind tax out of this year's harvest, mostly with early vegetables, grains and dairy. Peasants from the area of the city of Hamhyn delivered 36.5 t. of vegetables as in-kind tax, while peasants from Pukchen region delivered 39.7 t. of vegetables to the state. Because the peasants have been paying their in-kind taxes, a lot of food products of agricultural origin have appeared in state and cooperative shops. The prices of these products are relatively low. The peasants' efficient payment of in-kind taxes has contributed to satisfying the food needs of the urban population and eliminated the food shortages present in the period preceding the harvest. This way, the working peasants of the DPRK paid off their debt to the urban working masses, coming to their assistance at a difficult period for them.

With deep satisfaction and enthusiasm, the peasants caught on to Premier Kim Il Sung's instructions regarding the development of agriculture in the period of rebuilding the DPRK, as stated in the speech he made on the occasion of the signing of the armistice in Korea. According to the press, the peasants are massively returning to their old locations and conducting short-term reconstruction of their farms damaged by war.

5. Plans for reconstructing the towns and villages in the DPRK.

Korean towns, communities and villages were damaged barbarically by the activities of the enemy's air force during the 3-year national-liberation war. During the war, the population lived in extremely difficult conditions in dens they carved out in rocks and burrows they dug out in the earth. During the war, the population did not pose the problem of rebuilding their homes. After the armistice was signed in Korea, the issue of rebuilding the towns, communities and villages appeared to the DPRK government in all its seriousness. The population of towns and villages began to come out from underground, to return to their old places, to rebuild its damaged homes and farms in an improvised way. The population is waiting for help from the state. The DPRK government is doing everything to help the population as quickly as it can. Because of this, on 30 July 1953, the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers issued a resolution about guaranteeing the realization of reconstruction plans for the DPRK's cities. To guarantee the implementation of the plans for reconstructing and constructing the damaged cities, the resolution recommends that the reconstruction and construction of towns be subordinated to the overall state plan of urban construction. All the organs of the government, production plants, political and social organizations and individuals who own land that can be built on or installations in the cities included in the construction plans, must submit to the overall plan. The construction of these plans or installations must be approved by the construction commissions of the Provincial Peoples' Committees, which determine the locations of individual buildings and develop plans in accordance with the spirit of the town's architecture. In cases where the intended construction violates the plans to rebuild the town, the construction commission has the right to move this building to another location. Cases of the vicious violation of reconstruction plans will be punished by law. The resolution provides for the granting of permits to conduct construction to private individuals, and guarantees leasing the appropriate lots from the state, who will conduct construction in accordance with the plan for the city's construction. Provincial and town people's committees have the right, in urgent cases and on a set deadline, to order those who are violating the plan to abandon construction. In such cases, the state guarantees that it will assign a lot for construction elsewhere. Persons who own houses and installations that are to be moved may sell them to the state. The resolution allows the temporary use of houses and installations which have not been damaged. In cases when land that is privately owned by peasants is taken away by the state for construction, the state will reimburse the land and its crops. The decision about guaranteeing the realization of the plan of reconstruction and expansion of the DPRK's towns covers provincial towns, towns that serve as administrative centers for districts and areas inhabited by the working class.

The above-mentioned resolution shows the state's concern for the planned realization of reconstruction and is an expression of the state's oversight of the reconstruction of towns, which will make it impossible for them to take a spontaneous course. In the plans to rebuild towns, the DPRK is paying enormous attention to the quick rebuilding of the administrative centers and centers of the DPRK's cultural life, and one can also see in them the party's and government's concern for quickly raising the standards of living of the working class.

The working masses greeted the announcement about the quick reconstruction of the ruined towns of the DPRK with deep joy. Workers in many cities have begun to remove rubble. In Pyongyang, already during the war, the population cleared plots for construction as part of the plan to reconstruct the towns. As a result of this work, several weeks before the war ended, construction began on a city theater on Moranbon mountain in Pyongyang, and a CC KWP club is very advanced. The speed of the reconstruction is quick, despite very primitive tools. Presently, piles of bricks that have been extracted from the rubble and cleaned are growing on the future Pyongyang construction sites.

The Korean nation has joined the reconstruction of its towns and settlements damaged by war with great enthusiasm. It is obvious that without help in reconstruction from the Soviet Union and the countries of People's democracy, the realization of these ambitious plans is impossible. The Korean nation believes that in the period of reconstruction, just as during the war, the countries of the peace camp will give the DPRK plentiful assistance.

6. Education.

On 2 July 1953, young people started exams in all elementary and secondary schools of the DPRK. The DPRK's government paid a lot of attention to this year's examinations. The exams were taken in front of commissions whose members included the social factor. The course of the exams showed that the level of learning is quite high. Such results are a big success of the teachers, who needed to overcome big difficulties related to the conditions of war in their responsible work.

In July of this year, the 1952/53 academic year also ended in the DPRK's higher education. This year, university graduates attended practical training contributing to their diplomas for the first time during the war. Students of Kim Il Sung University started them in May of this year. Students of medical institutes are enrolled in vacation and practical training in hospitals and clinics around the country.

It must be stressed that in the past school year, the DPRK's education could boast about significant successes.

Because of the signing of the armistice in Korea, the DPRK's government faces the task of shifting education from war to peace conditions, expanding the sphere of secondary education and creating new forms of professional training, in accordance with the plan created for the reconstruction of the DPRK's national economy. A resolution of

the Cabinet of Ministers of 30.VII.1953 about the preparatory work for the new 1953/54 school year addresses these tasks and the methods for solving them. The resolution stressed that a major responsibility facing the DPRK's government is to normalize education quickly. Because of this, it points out the need to build schools in coordination with the progressing reconstruction of towns and villages. In order to accomplish this task, the resolution recommends moving elementary and secondary schools from buildings that are ruined and threaten with collapse into safe places immediately. At the beginning of the new school year, to open schools that had been closed for the duration of the war and to increase the numbers of classes in schools so as to be able to accept those young people who could not go to school during the war. Intending to strengthen educational administration, the resolution recommends closer collaboration between the general administrative authorities and school authorities by reorganizing the school authorities to be compatible with the organization of the general administration, according to the principle of one school per administrative rural region. To increase the number of schools, which is forecast in the plan to develop education in the DPRK for the 1953/54 school year, it recommends returning those school buildings that in the period of war were occupied by other institutions to the Ministry of Education and allows schools to take over some buildings now holding state institutions. The school buildings that now belong to other institutions must be returned to schools at the beginning of the school year. Institutions that damaged these buildings or their equipment must return them to the schools in renovated or new condition. In order to guarantee bearable conditions for the work of schools in the winter period, the administrative authorities have the duty to deliver to the schools the appropriate quantities of fuel or to allow the felling of trees in the forest for heating. The resolution also pays much attention to raising the material standards of teachers and students of pedagogical institutes. Beginning in the new school year, all students of pedagogical institutes will receive a stipend and teachers of elementary and secondary schools an amount of rice with ration cards.

The resolution provides for an increase, as of 1 August of this year, of rice rations at state prices for students of institutes that train lecturers for universities. In order to accomplish the preparatory work to start the new school year, the resolution recommends creating special commissions in provincial, regional and urban centers, which will include representatives of state and social organizations and employees of the educational system. These commissions should also be assisted by work places and state institutions, and their collaboration should encompass the broadest social masses, who have a direct interest in it.

Because of the need to eliminate shortages of cadres who are necessary for the reconstruction of the national economy destroyed by the war as quickly as possible, the DPRK government has begun to reorganize the educational system. The issue of reorganizing education is discussed in decision No. 111 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK. According to this decision, the period of attendance in elementary schools is being shortened from 5 to 4 years. Because of the need to increase the professional qualifications of graduates of technical colleges, the period of study in technical colleges of machine construction, veterinary medicine and domestic animal husbandry was extended from 3 to 4 years. The period of study in technical colleges of the light, metals,

electric, mining, chemical, ceramic, silk, agricultural machine construction, industrial construction and fishing industries and in technical colleges of the railroad, agriculture and forestry industries was extended by 6 months, which means that right now the course of study in the above-mentioned technical colleges will last 3 years and 6 months. The period of study at Kim Il Sung University in the faculty of medicine and in the medical institute in Hamhyn was extended from 4 to 5 years. The period of study in the Pyongyang pedagogical and foreign-language institutes was extended from 3 to 4 years. The course of study in the faculties of pharmacy and hygiene of the medical institute of the city of Pyongyang was extended from 3 to 4 years. The courses of study in all the faculties of the institute of the rural economy in Wonsan also have been extended from 3 to 4 years.

The decision to reorganize education points to the fact that great pressure is being placed on training the highly skilled cadres needed in the basic areas of the national economy. The tasks facing the party and government of the DPRK in the area of education are huge in this phase and difficult to fulfill because of the significant damages suffered by the DPRK's educational system in the period of war. The DPRK government, aware of these difficulties, mobilized the broad masses of the population around the implementation of these tasks.

7. A lowering of the prices of industrial products.

In this reporting period, one can observe further tendencies of lowering the prices of industrial products of mass consumption in the DPRK. According to the official bulletins of 22 and 30.VII of this year, the prices of the following products have gone down: cotton fabric by 19%, men's rubber shoes by 32%, women's rubber shoes by 36%, sports shoes by 54%, work shoes by 40%, vodkas by 19%, wine by 18% and sugar by 22%. The prices of drugs have also come down, on average by 49%, with penicillin by 75%, malaria drugs by 36%, dressings, such as cotton wool, gauze and bandages, by 75%.

The current price drop can be explained by the increase in supplies of these articles resulting from the broadening of production, the large assistance from the countries of people's democracy led by the Soviet Union and the end to profiteering on these products by private merchants, who, because of the signing of the armistice, are trying to sell off the products they have hoarded. The final effect of the observed lowering of prices of the above-mentioned industrial products has contributed to the increase in the standard of living of the DPRK's working masses.

IV. The military situation.

On 25 June 1953, 3 years have passed since the reprehensible attack on the DPRK by Syngman Rhee's criminal clique and the armed intervention by American-English imperialism. In the period of the 3 years of the national-freedom war, the strength of the Korean People's Army, which, together with the Chinese People's Volunteers, dealt the enemy increasingly deep losses in people and in equipment, grew. The Korean war showed once again that armies of the new type are superior to the armies of the capitalist

countries. This superiority comes from the fact that the army of the new type is an army in whose ranks fight workers and peasants who have been liberated from class oppression, it comes from the high morale of the soldiers and officers, which comes from the deep awareness that their fight is right, that they are defending the interests of the workers and peasants, as well as the people's state, which guarantees material and cultural prosperity to the working masses. The example of the Korean war has proven that the nation that is fighting for its sovereignty and freedom, and that has the people's armed forces, is invincible. The course of the Korean war overthrew the idolatrous faith in technology existing in capitalist circles, and this war demonstrated that technology needs to be guided by humans who are aware of the purpose of their struggle.

On the third anniversary of the aggressors' attack on the DPRK, the supreme command of the Korean People's Army issued a communiqué (CTAK [Central Telegraph Agency of Korea] bulletin of 25.VI of this year), in which it lists the enemy's losses for the three years of the war. In this period, the Korean People's Army and the Units of the Chinese People's Volunteers killed, wounded or took prisoner 889,381 of the enemy's soldiers and officers, including 380,773 American soldiers and officers, 580,644 South Koreans and 27,974 from the USA's satellites. The following quantities of military equipment were captured from the enemy: 327 tanks; 8,987 vehicles; 145 armored vehicles; 10 war planes; 5,879 cannons of various calibers; 110,238 guns; 4,000 telephones and radio equipment; 30,000,000 shells and bullets of various calibers and 15,000 hand grenades. The enemy's equipment that was damaged: 2,565 tanks; 3,825 vehicles; 1,188 cannons of various calibers; 163 destroyed or damaged warships and 5,418 war planes.

On 13 July 1953 the positional war that had gone on for over two years was disrupted by a powerful strike of the Korean People's Army and the Units of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The final offensive was directed at the eastern and central stretches of the front, which were being defended mostly by divisions of the Syngman Rhee-ite army. The strike was so powerful and the firepower so concentrated that the enemy was unable to offer any resistance whatsoever. It needs to be stressed that the enemy's defense positions were exceptionally powerfully fortified. They had had time in the 2-year period to build these fortifications. In the final offensive, the people's forces used artillery fire of an intensity unprecedented in the Korean war. According to the men taken prisoner as a result of this offensive, the enemy soldiers were pinned down so much that they were incapable of any action whatsoever. Many of the Syngman Rhee's soldiers went mad, a large number were burned alive in the fortifications. As a result of this attack, the enemy, abandoning literally everything, fled in an indescribable panic. In the period of the 5-day offensive, 30 km. of fortifications were ruptured, an area of 160 sq. km. was liberated, the most elite, so-called "capital" Syngman Rhee-ite division, which had been inspected by Dulles during his last trip to Korea, was completely smashed.

According to a special communiqué from the Chief Command of the KPA, the offensive inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 26,000 enemy soldiers and officers were wounded or killed; captured from the enemy were 44 tanks; 1 armored vehicle; 274

cars; 1 airplane; 247 cannon of various calibers; 423 machine guns; 3,199 light automatic rifles; 15 flamethrowers and 30 munitions and military equipment depots.

This last offensive demonstrated the great force of the Korean People's Army and of the units of the Chinese People's Volunteers, a force capable of repelling all attacks, and, most importantly, capable of offensive action. It was an object lesson for the enemy, who must now reckon with this force.

In response to the offensive of the people's forces, in this period the American air force multiplied its barbarian air raids over quiet Korean towns and villages. It must be admitted that there had not been such a great intensification of bombardments for quite a long time. The planes flew during the day and at night, attempting to destroy and slow down the transportation system, but in vain.

A few days before the armistice was signed in Korea, on 24 July of this year a large number of heavy bombers bombarded Pyongyang several times, mostly the area of the former airport, wanting to prevent its quick reconstruction.

On the day the armistice was signed, the enemy's air force bombarded the DPRK until literally the last moment before the deadline for the ceasefire.

The signing of the armistice in Korea ended over 3 years of the Korean nation's hard battle for its freedom and independence. The Korean nation, and the whole camp of peace and progress, achieved an enormous victory in this war. The aggressors were thoroughly defeated, and they were taught the lesson that aggression pays less and less.

V. The hospital of the PCK [Polski Czerwony Krzyż—Polish Red Cross] in Korea.

In this reporting period, the PCK hospital in Korea began basically normal work, and it must be said that it has already had certain successes in this work. But right now the hospital is overcoming a number of challenges, about which more below:

1. The shortage of drugs, which were not provided in sufficient quantities when [the staff and equipment were] leaving Poland is a fundamental problem in the work of the hospital. The likely reason for this was Poland's idea that the hospital would be started in stages. But it turned out that from the very beginning our medical group needed to service a hospital full of patients, over a thousand people, with the numbers of drugs brought along. Apart from this, according to a statement by the hospital director that some of the drugs were damaged by humidity and the most recent flood which came down on the low-lying area where our hospital is located. During the flood, a technical tent was swept away by the water and some of the hospital equipment, including 1 x-ray lamp, oxygen machine etc. were damaged.

Right now, the shortage of drugs is becoming more and more acute because of the constant inflow of sick people. The hospital should be supplied with drugs as quickly as possible.

2. The shortage of vehicular transportation, and especially the shortage of Gaz 67B-type all-terrain vehicles, continues to create serious difficulties in the hospital's work. There is also a shortage of gasoline for the cars because of the small allotment, which also affects the work of the generators that are to service the hospital's installations and makes it impossible to start the large generator for which airplane gasoline is needed. This state of affairs also makes it impossible to start the large x-ray machine in the department of internal medicine. Because there still exists the possibility of switching the electric transformer to 220 V power, which is necessary to start the x-ray machine and physical and electrotherapy (right now, the current in the hospital is 110 V), the Embassy has asked the Head of the Health Service of the Korean People's Army about this issue and is currently waiting for a response. At the same time, because of the more frequent interruptions in the supply of electrical energy, the Embassy has asked for deliveries of a certain additional amount of gasoline, which now, after the signing of the armistice in Korea, should be possible.

3. The III ward, which lies at a large distance from the center, has so far not been moved, which also makes work difficult for the personnel of this ward, who nonetheless work with significant dedication and commitment. The fact that during the flood, the personnel of the III ward was cut off from the center and worked the whole time in very difficult conditions, without sufficient quantities of food, is an example of this.

The Embassy and the hospital director have already taken several steps to overcome these difficulties, but quick help from Poland is indispensable in the matters of vehicular transportation and drug supplies.

After detailed analysis of the hospital reports and after discussing these issues with the leadership of our group, the Embassy believes that the decisions presented in the hospital's reports for the period of 3.V to 16.VI.1953 are correct.

Apart from the difficulties of a technical nature, there are also certain difficulties in the hospital related to conducting normal political work, and the reason for this is the lack of Polish newspapers and publications, which should be sent to the hospital as quickly as possible. So far, the Embassy has been helping the hospital in this area, sharing the press received from Poland, but this is insufficient. The political and party work is made difficult by the shortage of ideological-propaganda materials published by the CC PUWP [Polish United Workers' Party, such as *Nowe Drogi*, *Notatnik agitatora* etc. The hospital has no radio whatsoever, which would be necessary because this is the only possibility in Korea of getting quick information in this way. The Aga radio, which it does have, is broken. The hospital should be supplied with an appropriately powerful radio, preferably of Soviet production, adjusted for long-distance reception.

Apart from the shortages that were mentioned, the hospital receives no medical publications at all, which makes its work in the area of relaying the achievements of Polish medicine to the Korean comrades difficult.

The Ambassador here, inasmuch as he can, supplies propaganda materials and photographs to make small display cases on the hospital grounds in order to conduct political-propaganda work among the patients and the Korean hospital personnel, intended to familiarize the Korean comrades with our country and its successes in socialist construction. All this has contributed to a very large degree to propagating our country, which is so far insufficiently known to the broad masses of the Korean population.

Our comrades from the hospital, apart from conducting propaganda-political work inside the hospital, have also made connections to the local population and have taken one of the elementary schools in their region under their wing. The comrades are asking that a certain number of products and clothing that could be given to the children from the school in their charge be included in the next transport for the hospital.

VI. Internal Embassy issues.

[The embassy is often not informed by Poland about issues that concern it directly, and finds out about them from Koreans; the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not always answer the embassy's questions; the embassy is suffering tremendously from staff shortages.]

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Translated by Maya Latynski

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Report

Of the Commander of the 64th iak [Fighter Aviation Corps] of the Soviet Air Forces with a Brief Analysis of the Combat Operations of Units of the Corps in the Korean Theater of Combat Operations during the Period from June 1951 through 27 July 1953*

In connection with the approach of the Chinese-Korea border by forces of the American occupiers in November 1950 our fighter formations (the 28th and 151st iad [Fighter Aviation Divisions]) were assigned the task of protecting the most important industrial and administrative centers of Northeast China and the rear installations of the forces of the DPRK People's Army and Chinese volunteers from strikes of the USAF. These included the bridges across the Yalu River, airfields in the area of Dandong, and the hydroelectric station in the area of Siodzio.

The depth of the area of combat operations of our fighters was bounded by the Yalu River and the coastline of the Korea Strait.

With the advance of the Korean and Chinese forces to the south an additional task was assigned of protecting the installations and communications of North Korea to a depth of up to 75 km.

The 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, composed of the 28th, 151st, and 50th iad, was formed at the end of November 1950.

As a rule, the Corps was composed of two or three fighter aviation divisions, one independent night iap [fighter aviation regiment], two zenad [anti-aircraft artillery battalions], and one anti-aircraft searchlight regiment; however the composition of the corps was not constant and periodically changed.

After the conclusion of the Korean armistice on 27 July 1953 by the end of August two fighter aviation divisions, one night iap, two zenad, and one anti-aircraft searchlight regiment remained in the Corps.

Until June 1951 part of the forces of the Corps, consisting of approximately two regiments with a total number of up to 60 combat-ready crews, were used to retrain Chinese and Korean pilots to conduct combat operations because of limitations of the airfield network near the Chinese-Korean border and in connection with the performance of missions by the Corps' formations.

And only since July 1951, after the Miaogou airfield was put into operation, was an opportunity presented to increase the number of forces involved to five regiments (120-150 combat-ready crews).

From the inception of combat operations in Korea until the end of 1951 the main strike force of the USAF during the day was bombers (B-29 and B-26 aircraft) and accordingly the Corp's main efforts were directed at combating them. Subsequently, ground attack aircraft became the main strike force of the enemy in the daytime and accordingly the main efforts of the Corp's fighters were directed against them.

It was necessary to fight not only bombers and ground attack aircraft in order to protect the installations and communications of North Korea from bombing but also the enemy fighters which supported their operations.

From November 1950 through January 1952 the Corp's units and formations made 19,203 sorties when performing combat missions [...]**

The Corp's fighters fought [3]07 formation air battles in daytime during this period, of which 19 were pairs, 112 were squadron, 64 were regimental, 50 were divisional, and 42 were corps.

Seven thousand nine hundred and eight-six crews participated in air battles, which were 43% of the total number of crew sorties.

Five hundred and sixty-two enemy aircraft were shot down as a result of the air battles: 58 B-29's, one B-26, two RB-45's, two F-47's, 20 F-51's,, 103 F-80's, 132 F-84's, 218 F-86's, eight F-94's, 25 Meteors, and three F-6's and F-5's.

Sixteen individual air battles were conducted at night. Two enemy B-26 aircraft were shot down.

A total of 564 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles during the period from November 1950 through January 1952.

Our own losses for the same period were 34 pilots and 71 aircraft.

The overall loss ration was 7.9 to 1 in our favor.

Thirty-three sorties were made for each enemy aircraft shot down and 285 sorties for each aircraft lost.

The average expenditure of shells [*snaryady*] for each enemy aircraft shot down was 212.

On average, each formation air battle lasted 15 minutes with bombers and fighters, during which an average of two or three attacks were made by our fighters; and 10 minutes with fighters, with an average of two attacks.

Our fighters went into battle in small and large formations.

The primary altitudes for air battles were: against fighters - 8000-12000 meters, against bombers and ground attack aircraft - 7000 meters and below.

Typically, enemy fighters tried to wage air battles at altitudes of 8000 meters and below since the performance of F-86 aircraft fell sharply when climbing to an altitude above 8000 meters and they were considerably inferior to the specifications [*dannye*] of MiG-15 aircraft.

Suffering heavy losses in bombers, ground attack aircraft, and fighters, the enemy was forced to rapidly reexamine the problems of the combat use of their air forces, switch to new tactics, and reinforce the fighter group by rearming from the F-80 to the F-86 aircraft.

In the first air battles the enemy became convinced from their [performance] characteristics that the F-80 and F-84 fighters could not be used any further as fighters.

At the beginning of 1952 after a number of measures carried out by the American command by augmenting the air group, a qualitative improvement of the aircraft, and a change in tactics, the air situation in the Korean theater of military operations became more complex in both daytime and at night.

In the first half of 1952 the performance of combat missions became additionally complicated by the reduction of the strength of the Corps to two fighter aviation divisions (the 324th and 303rd iad operated until March, and the 97th and 190th iad from March through July).

In 1952, after the main strike force of the enemy air forces became ground attack aircraft, the performance of combat missions became even more difficult since it had about four times as many aircraft compared to bombers.

In order to use the maximum possible forces against enemy ground attack aircraft, combat against a "screen" of fighters was done predominantly in small groups (flights, squadrons) separated by altitude from 8000 to 14000 meters. This allowed comparatively small forces to tie down the large forces of the "screen" of fighters on a broad front and to create more favorable conditions for strike formations to operate against the ground attack aircraft.

Whereas in 1951 14,112, or 75%, of the 18,759 combat sorties were made in large formations (regiment, division, corps), in 1952 12,529 were made in the daytime in large formations, or 53% of the total number of 23,539 sorties.

Flights in large formation were made predominantly in units and formations operating against ground attack aircraft [...]

One thousand and sixty-two combat sorties were made at night.

During 1952 the fighters of the Corps fought 868 battles in formation in which 9,014 crews participated.

Three hundred and seventy-nine enemy aircraft were shot down as a result of the air battles, which were: eight F-51's, 13 F-80's, 41 F-84's, 315 F-86's, one Meteor, and one F4u4.

Thirty-two individual air battles were fought at night in 1952 and 15 enemy aircraft (11 B-29's, three B-26's, and one F-94) were shot down.

A total of 394 enemy aircraft were shot down in 1952 in day and night air battles.

Our losses were 51 pilots and 172 aircraft.

The overall loss ratio was 2.2 to 1 in our favor. The intensity of combat operations increased considerably compared to 1951 and the number of combat sorties in 1952 increased monthly by an average of up to 600 sorties.

Enemy aircraft changed tactics as a result of the growing activity of our fighters and by the end of 1952, suffering considerable losses in fighters and ground attack aircraft, switched from large formation operations to operations in small formations on a broad front, trying to use the adverse weather conditions north of the [Ansyu-Kaysen] line as much as possible.

The effectiveness of air battles declined in 1952 in comparison to 1951.

The decline in the effectiveness of the operations of our fighters occurred for the following reasons:

1. Air battles were fought predominantly with enemy fighters which were not much inferior to the MiG-15 aircraft.

This is confirmed by the following data. In 1951 496 enemy aircraft were shot down in air battles, including 206 fighters of the F-86 type; in 1952 a total of 379 aircraft were shot down, including 315 fighters.

2. The probability of a kill in air battles with enemy fighters and fighter-bombers was considerably less than against bombers.

3. In 1952 the Corps performed the mission of introducing fighter units of the Chinese OVA [Combined Air Army] into battle at the same time as [performing] combat operations.

Beginning in November 1952 the command of the Corps devoted great attention to involving the OVA in active combat operations.

PRC Air Force units and staffs were given great assistance in the organization of combat operations, which consisted of the following:

- a) passing on the experience of waging combat operations by holding meetings, critiques, and the study of the alternatives of joint flights to wage air battles with enemy fighters and ground attack aircraft;

- b) the organization of command and guidance.

The commitment of OVA units to battle was done sequentially: initially against small formations of enemy aircraft, then when repelling mass enemy air attacks and consisted basically of three stages:

The first stage - joint flights by fighters of the Corps and the OVA. When doing this the Corps units took the main blow on themselves, tied down the enemy fighter "screen" in battle at distant routes of approach, from the [Ansyu-Kaysen] line; units of the OVA were committed to battle from the line Teysyu-Bugdin to build up strength; IAK formations supported the disengagement of OVA units from battle;

The second stage - OVA units operated in the first echelon, but Corps fighters built up strength and covered their disengagement from battle;

The third stage - independent operations, mainly against enemy fighters. Units of the Chinese Air Force operated on the west coast, the Korean Air Force on the east coast. Corps units were in readiness to help OVA formations, depending on the developing air situation.

By the end of 1952 the OVA already had a sufficient number of combat units and took part in repelling not only echeloned operations but also mass enemy air attacks in cooperation with the Corps' fighters.

This allowed counteraction to enemy air formations to be increased, the operations of our fighters at distant routes of approach to be stepped up, and more appreciable losses to be inflicted on the enemy.

The constantly growing activity of the combat operations of our fighters forced the enemy by the end of 1952 to rearm part of their air groups from F-84 to F-86F-30 aircraft.

At the same time, with the beginning of 1953 the American command decided to step up the night operations of their bombers against targets and communications north of the Ansyu-Kanko line and thus sort of compensate for the daylight operations of ground attack aircraft in these regions.

In the first half of January 1953 the Corps' fighters inflicted serious losses on enemy bombers with night operations. Seven B-29's were shot down in air battles, as a consequence of which beginning with the second half of January until the conclusion of the armistice the enemy used night bomber operations in North Korea only in adverse weather conditions.

Unlike 1951-52, the combat operations of the Corps in 1953 were conducted in more difficult air and weather conditions.

The American command began to use F-86's and F-30's [SIC, probably F-86-F30 was intended] as ground attack aircraft. Beginning in March 1953 in adverse weather conditions they operated in small formations in the area protected by the Corps.

The main burden of performing combat missions laid mainly on the Corps since it did not seem possible to use OVA units to wage combat operations because of the[ir] unpreparedness for operations in adverse weather.

Consequently, the intensity of the Corps' combat operations was very high beginning in January and until the conclusion of the armistice. The following data is evidence of this: whereas in 1952 23,539 sorties were made over 12 months, 1961 a month on average, in 1953 18,152 sorties were made, an average of 2,600 a month, during the seven months of combat operations. The average monthly number of combat sorties in 1953 rose by 650, or 33%.

The Corps' fighters designated to combat the fighter "screen" began to be committed to battle in small formations in order to create more favorable tactical conditions for strike formations to operate against the enemy's ground attack aircraft. Thirteen thousand and nine of the 18,152 combat sorties over seven months of 1953, or 72%, were made in pairs, flights, and air squadrons.

Enemy fighters encountering the active operations of our fighters committed to battle only when there were favorable tactical conditions or a clear superiority in numbers.

In spite of numerical superiority, the American command did not succeed in solving the problem of supporting the operations of their ground attack aircraft in open air battles and stepped up the operations of "hunters" in the area of airfields of the Dandong airfield complex for this purpose, tying down our fighters in air battles in clearly unfavorable tactical conditions.

Five hundred and eight formation air battles were fought in daylight in 1953 in which 3,713 crews participated. The air battles were fought at all altitudes, beginning with low altitude and ending with the practical ceiling of the MiG-15 aircraft.

One hundred and twenty-six enemy aircraft were shot down in the air battles, of which 12 were of the F-80 and F-84 ground attack type and 114 were fighters.

The results of air battles show that the Corps' fighters mainly fought battles with enemy fighters and in very rare instances with ground attack aircraft, whose operations in the area protected by the Corps were of an incidental nature.

One thousand three hundred and seventy-three combat sorties were made, 59 individual air battles were fought, and 13 enemy aircraft were shot down at night: one RB-29, six B-29's, one B-26, two F-84's, two F-94's, and one F-ZD [SIC].

A total of 139 enemy aircraft were destroyed in day and night air battles during the seven months of 1953. Our losses were 25 pilots and 76 MiG-15 bis aircraft. The overall loss ratio for 1953 was 1.9 to 1 in our favor.

Unlike 1951-52, except for takeoffs from a [ground] alert posture at airfields in readiness one and three, in 1953 combat missions were performed by patrolling at distant routes of approach toward the main installations being protected and above the installations, since takeoffs from a [ground] alert posture in adverse weather conditions did not guarantee the timely intercept of the enemy.

Corps fighters shot down 1,097 enemy aircraft during the war in Korea. Our losses were 110 pilots and 319 aircraft. The overall ration of losses during the war in Korea were 3.4 to 1 in our favor.

Conclusion:

In spite of the obvious superiority in the strength of the US Air Force, the active and intense combat operations of Corps fighters from the start of combat operations in Korea to the conclusion of the armistice did not give them the opportunity to destroy the main installations being protected and inflicted considerable losses on the enemy in all types of aircraft.

Commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps
Guards General-Lieutenant of Aviation Slyusarev

Chief of staff of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps
Colonel Berezhnoy

Printed from:

* The document does not have an exact date

** In view of the large size of the document some places which do not have fundamental importance have been omitted.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 114

[Source: AP RF. F. 3. Op. 65. D. 830. pp. 136-147. Original]

Telegram

Of the Soviet Chargé to the PRC to the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with a Draft Reply of the Commander-in-Chief of the Korean People's Army and the Commanding General of the Chinese People's Volunteers to the Letter of the Commanding General of the UN Multinational Forces and with a Note from the Chinese-Korean Delegation about the State of the Armistice Negotiations, 3 July 1953

At 0330 3 July at the instruction of Zhou Enlai Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xiuquan came to the Embassy and delivered a draft reply of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai to Clark's letter of 29 June (it is proposed to send the reply to Clark on 5 July), and also a note which describes the PRC government's assessment of the current state of armistice negotiations and measures planned in connection with Clark's letter.

We cite the complete text of these documents below:

"The current state of armistice talks and measures in connection with Clarks' letter.

The state of the talks. For the past 12 days, when Syngman Rhee released POWs and unleashed a campaign against an armistice, the US , reaching an impasse in the Korean War, primarily engaged in urging Syngman Rhee to cut back his campaign against an armistice and reaching a compromise with him.

In order to pacify Syngman Rhee, the Americans are trying to conclude a temporary agreement with him. This would provide an opportunity to sign an armistice agreement and allow the US to get out of the current difficult position. However, Syngman Rhee is seriously trying to draw the Americans into his plans. He cannot be satisfied by the conclusion of a temporary agreement and continues to advance the demand that the political conference be limited to three [Translator's note: the typed word is very faded here, but is probably "*mes.*" (months)], at the end of which military operations would be resumed and he would be granted the right of veto at the conference. This demand is at odds with the US resolve to end the war. Accordingly, the two-day talks on this issue between the US and Syngman Rhee reached an impasse. Right now, the Americans are inclined to put pressure on Syngman Rhee.

On 29 June Clark unexpectedly replied to Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai's letter in the above circumstances. The purpose of this reply is, first, to show Syngman Rhee that the limit to concessions has been reached and that the US cannot make further concessions, and to try to sign an armistice agreement, ignoring Syngman Rhee's opposition; second, to show us to what limits he (Clark) can go in his guarantees; by signing an armistice agreement he hopes to strengthen his position in talks with Syngman Rhee (after an armistice it will be easier to limit weapons supplies to Syngman Rhee) and to remove the issue of the 27,000 POWs; third, to show the entire world that the US wants to end the war.

It can be assumed that Syngman Rhee, who deeply understands the United States' weak points, will not make concessions. However, the US plays the main role in the war in Korea and it is possible for the sake of its own interests that it will increase pressure on Syngman Rhee at the necessary time. Therefore, although there are certain very great differences between Syngman Rhee and the US on the issue of an armistice, one can

nevertheless speak of the possibility of achieving an armistice in Korea and at the same time say that Syngman Rhee will continue minor provocations after the armistice.

Countermeasures

Based on the above situation and also bearing in mind the vacillation in US policy caused by the complex domestic and foreign differences with respect to South Korea, we suggest holding to the following policy:

Retain the initiative in achieving an armistice, try to achieve a common point of view with the US on the issue of an armistice in order to isolate Syngman Rhee and strike him a blow, and also to force the US to put pressure on Syngman Rhee, and deepen the domestic and foreign differences of the American side. It is proposed to take the following steps in accordance with this policy:

1. Prepare and send the reply of Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai to Clark on 5 July. In the reply agree to a resumption of negotiations, criticize the American side, and also indicate the possible consequences for the policy of collusion being pursued by the US.

The text of the letter of reply is attached.

2. Prepare and launch a strike on the puppet troops of Syngman Rhee before the signing of an armistice in order to move the front line to the south. After the resumption of the meetings point out to the opposite side that, inasmuch as the signing of an armistice has been hampered through the fault of Syngman Rhee, the situation has changed and, based on the agreement that a settlement ought to be achieved on the basis of the actual situation, propose revising the line of demarcation again.

It can be assumed that the other side will agree with this proposal as a consequence of the complexity of its relations with Syngman Rhee at the present time. However, it is also quite possible that the other side will not make concessions and will resort to propaganda gimmicks. In this event, we are prepared, [after] having selected a suitable moment, to make the concessions in the end and set the line of demarcation as was agreed to on 17 June 1953.

3. Prepare for a resumption of the meetings of delegations after 6 July at which the following questions are to be put to the other side regarding the realization of an armistice agreement:

- 1). The revision of the line of demarcation;

- 2). Will Syngman Rhee be a party to the armistice and the associated issue of the timely evacuation of troops from the demilitarized zone in accordance with the armistice agreement?

3). Will Syngman Rhee's clique participate in the joint inspection groups of the military armistice committee?

4). The charging of the American side with the responsibility for returning the 27,000 POWs; if the American side declines this responsibility then we will retain the right to raise this question for discussion [at] the political conference;

5). Guarantees for the security of the Red Cross joint groups when they conduct surveys of POWs and of the representatives for conducting explanatory work;

6). Ensuring that POWs who insist upon repatriation are not subjected to forcible retention;

7). The question of how to ensure the realization of "the rights of a repatriation committee of neutral countries" when it resolves the problem of POWs not being directly repatriated and how to guarantee the security of the personnel and troops of this committee;

8). The time that the work of the neutral observation committee is to begin work;

9) [When] the armistice enters into force.

4. Staff officers and interpreters should prepare for the signing of the armistice agreement simultaneously with the start of the meetings of the delegations. The construction of the premises in which the signing of the armistice is to be signed is being resumed.

5. We think that the signing of the agreement might be scheduled for about 15 July. It is necessary to announce that the Polish and Czechoslovakian representatives and their deputies in the observation committee of neutral countries, members of 20 inspection groups, and also at least their operations staffs needed for the initial period will arrive in [Beijing] on approximately 10 July. Be ready to report about this to the other side at the meeting of delegations".

"To the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Armed Forces, General Clark".

In your letter of reply of 29 June 1953 you admitted that the forced release of POWs of the Korean People's Army from POW camps by the Syngman Rhee clique and the forcible retention of these POWs is a serious and regrettable incident. This is correct. However, your explanations and the measures you have adopted with respect to this incident cannot be considered satisfactory.

All the simple facts confirm that the UN forces cannot completely shed their responsibility for this incident. It has long been evident that the South Korean government and army prepared this incident in advance and your side knew about this but however took no steps to prevent it. After this incident emerged your side took no effective measures against the actions of the South Korean security detachments under

the control of UN forces. These actions were directed at wrecking the agreement on POWs and forcing the POWs to leave the POW camp. After our letter of 12 June in which we pointed out that your side should pay serious attention to this, you as before allowed the South Korean security detachments to continue the forcible release of POWs from the camps. As a result of this the total number of POWs forcibly retained by the Syngman Rhee clique is more than 27,000, including more than 50 Chinese people's volunteers. In the 18 June letter of the chief of your delegation, General Harrison, and in your letter of reply of 29 June it says that measures are being taken at the present time to return the POWs "who fled". However, at the same time these letters contain a statement about the impossibility of completely returning these POWs. In fact the gendarmerie of your side received an order not to take any steps with respect to the POWs "who fled". In addition, it was complicit in the forcible sending of these POWs to military training centers of the Syngman Rhee army. In military terms the position taken during this period by UN forces boils down at the very least to complicity in the actions of the Syngman Rhee clique and the creation of obstacles in realizing an armistice.

You try to compare the humane actions of our side which released POWs on the field of battle before the start of the armistice talks with the disruptive actions of the South Korean security detachments which forced POWs to leave camps after the conclusion of the POW agreement. This is completely untrue. With respect to the POWs "who fled" your side will bear full responsibility for their return in any event. We are forced to warn you that the Syngman Rhee clique is still continuing to shout that it intends to release and forcefully detain more than 3,500 POWs of the Korean People's Army who are not being directly repatriated. The Syngman Rhee clique in collusion with agents of Chiang Kai-shek is trying to force the Chinese people's volunteers POWs to leave the POW camps and thereby once and for all wreck the POW agreement which has already been reached by both sides. With respect to this incident, we think that your side should accept full responsibility and give guarantees that such incidents will not be repeated.

Your letter contains a guarantee that UN forces will take possible military measures of a preventive nature at the necessary points in order to ensure the implementation of the armistice agreement. We think that this is necessary. However, your side declares that it cannot reliably guarantee the observance by the South Korean government and forces of an armistice agreement reached by the delegations of both sides. At the same time, the Syngman Rhee clique continues to shout that it "will unify Korea by military means". Just this statement alone is evidence of who began the aggression three years ago. If at the present time UN forces continue to indulge the Syngman Rhee clique and allow it to commit all sorts of criminal actions in order to undermine the possibility of solving the Korean issue, this will lead to, as before, [a situation where] armed aggression might flare up at any time against the Korean People's Democratic Government after the signing of an agreement for an armistice in Korea. Therefore, we think that your side ought to take effective steps so that the South Korean government and forces observe an armistice agreement and all other agreements relating to it. Only then might there be a guarantee that an armistice in Korea might not be violated.

Based on the above, although your reply cannot also be considered entirely satisfactory, considering that your side has expressed a desire to exert efforts for a rapid achievement of an armistice and also taking into account the assurances you have given, we agree however to the delegations of both sides setting a meeting time and agreeing on the practical implementation of the issues relating to an armistice agreement which precede the signing of this agreement. The date of the meeting should be set by the heads of both delegations via the liaison officers.

Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
Marshal Kim Il Sung

Commanding General of the Chinese People's Volunteers
Peng Dehau

5 July 1953

After delivering this document Wu Xiuquan then orally reported the following at the instruction of Zhou Enlai.

In the opinion of the PRC government, the latest provocative actions of Syngman Rhee are explained on the one hand by his desire to bargain with the US for a little more aid and on the other by a fear of the Chinese volunteers in Korea and China in general. This is why Syngman Rhee insists so stubbornly on concluding a "mutual defense" pact with the US.

Syngman Rhee's statements that if the US does not meet his demands he will give an order for South Korean troops to fight to the end is an empty phrase.

The PRC government thinks that the US will give Syngman Rhee only limited defensive aid. The US is afraid that if Syngman Rhee is given large-scale aid he might begin serious adventures and draw the US into them. However, the prospect of being drawn into any large adventures in the Far East does not suit the Americans right now. The Americans have certain differences with Syngman Rhee in this regard.

There are also differences between Syngman Rhee and the US about behavior at a future political conference. Syngman Rhee thinks that if the conference does not accept his (Syngman Rhee's) demand then he ought to leave the conference and resume wide-scale offensive operations against North Korea even to the Yalu River, that is to the Korean-Chinese border. The Americans, for their part, think that the talks at a political conference ought to stop only in that the event it becomes obvious that the Korean-Chinese representatives at this conference seek what North Korea and China could not achieve through [force of] arms. Taking all the above into consideration, the PRC government considers it necessary to sign an armistice agreement in the interests of peace. "In this case", Wu Xiuquan joked, "a paradoxical situation will be created inasmuch as we and the US are sort of acting together against Syngman Rhee".

Wu Xiuquan then said that, in the opinion of the PRC government, Syngman Rhee might be able to organize only minor provocations and dirty tricks but will not be able to mount anything more serious.

In conclusion, Wu Xiuquan said that the PRC government awaits the opinion and comments of the Soviet government about the draft reply to Clark, the note, and those ideas which he was charged with describing orally.

3 July 1953 Vas'kov

* There is a stamp on the document: "Protokol Prezid. (Presidium Record)" PK N° 14. p. 1"

** Time of receipt

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DOCUMENT NO. 115

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea
[letterhead with eagle]
No 242/6/53Tjn [tajne—secret,
added by hand]

Beijing, 16 July 1953

BY MESSENGER [stamp]

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Independent Eastern Department
Head E. Słuczański

I am enclosing a Report for the period of my work in Korea from 31 May to 21 June 1953, together with notes No. 2421/49/53/Tjn., No. 2421/44/53 Tjn., No. 2421/46/53 Tjn. and No. 2421/45/53 Tjn. (1 copy of each note).

Encl[osed] Report (6 copies)
+ 4 notes

St. KIRYLUK
AMBASSADOR OF THE PRL [People's
Republic of Poland] in the DPRK

SECRET!

Copy no. ...

REPORT

of the Embassy of the People's Republic of

Poland in Korea

(for the period of my work 31.V – 21.VI.1953)

7 copies made

[...]

I. An analysis of the political, economic and cultural relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of Poland.

[Attitude of Party and Government leaders very friendly to Polish representative, shown by all the leaders who received him; they appreciate Polish assistance; friendship "vibrant, deep and full of significance"; Polish surgical-internal medicine hospital especially important because of growing diseases, especially tuberculosis; hospital employees working well; but some equipment is still needed, as are Polish political materials and newspapers.]

II. The political-economic situation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

During my stay in the DPRK, the key political issue focusing the attention of the Party, Government and Nation were the truce talks in Panmunjom which were close to being completed.

Despite the many attempts at sabotage and blackmail by the American side, the will of the Korean-Chinese side to reach a truce forced the so-called Command of the UN Armed Forces to agree on a key issue, the repatriation of prisoners-of-war.

After discussing this point, an atmosphere of intensive preparations for the new situation in the newly changed conditions of action was dominant.

As nervousness grew in the Syngman Rhee clique, which sensed its inevitable defeat, in the DPRK one could observe a total equilibrium and intensified educational work to stress the fact again that now, just like three years ago, the Syngman Rhee clique, enveloped in aid from the American imperialists, was the source that unleashed the bloody war, and it holds total responsibility for its results and the misfortunes of the Korean Nation.

Three years of murderous war did not break the Korean nation physically or morally. The front was fixed and became a fortress that could not be taken, something the enemies stress with regret. Work in the rear, in the towns and villages, is planned and organized, despite continuous bombardments.

One can sense the strong, elastic leading hand of the Party and Government; one can feel, despite the very difficult conditions of war, that the nation has learned a lot under the leadership of the party, become accustomed to performing its functions, and at every work post, with devotion and model discipline, knowing that every person's effort brings victory and peace closer.

The cadres of the party and state apparatus are a mature core today, which is ideologically strong, hardened in the battle against the invader and the internal enemy,

capable of new, creative efforts in the conditions of building a thoroughly destroyed country.

It is a major victory for the Party in its liberation and social struggle that the anti-national, anti-people conspiracy of the imperialists' lackeys, who have put down roots in the leading positions in the party and state apparatus and set for themselves the goal of overthrowing the People's Government and transforming the DPRK into a meek servant of the dollar masters, has been uncovered and liquidated.

The former secretary of the Party's Central Committee, Li Se Yep, who headed the conspiracy against the People's Government was being paid by the imperialist American intelligence, and he pulled several conscious and unconscious Party and Government activists into his dirty work.

The names being mentioned include the former vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs Pak Heonyeong, former ambassador to the People's Republic of China, Kwan Ojik, former ambassador in Moscow Chu Jen Ha and others.

At the same time as the uncovering of the espionage conspiracy, the party punished and dismissed from their posts several comrades who had given in to opportunistic, leftist deviations, underestimating the role and significance of the National Front either in the nation's liberation or its social struggle. The vice-minister of Culture and Propaganda comrade Chei Il [illegible word] was dismissed from his position for these ideological deviations.

The liquidation of the conspiracy, the purging of the party and state apparatus of hostile elements, which were foreign and shaky and the elevation of new cadres from the party ranks and political apparatus of the People's Army have seriously strengthened the People's Government and become a mobile challenge for the whole party, whose principal task is the daily arming of its members with the weapons of vigilance at all fighting and working posts.

The enhanced vigilance and keeping of state and working secrets have become visible at every step. The party and state apparatus has taken on responsibility for every word that is spoken, for every number that is given out.

The fact that all the central offices and institutions are summarizing the results of the fulfillment of plans in their spheres of activity; that they know the needs and the problems of the departments assigned to them and respond to the questions being asked of them knowledgeably; and that they feel that they are in charge of their areas is an expression of the setting of power and an expression of the planning of work.

I was able to come to this conclusion by conferring with the heads of many departments on the issues of interest to our country.

The harvesting of a rich crop last year, the intensified and great assistance from the Countries of the camp of peace have improved [Korea's] economic situation significantly.

The population of the DPRK no longer goes hungry, even though the food norms that have been introduced are still far from sufficient (800 gm. of rice for someone who works hard, 600 for someone who works more lightly and 400 for those who do not work), with certain supplements of fat and meat, represent a basis for existence.

The fact that the rural people fully fill their needs by basing their work on neighborly help is giving the state increasingly large and qualitatively better harvests.

For hundreds of kilometers, one cannot see even a scrap of uncultivated land. Even high mountain slopes and deep bomb craters are even being used.

The total burden of the cultivation of land rests on women, children and old people who stay in their fields from dawn till late dusk, and often replace tractive force, demonstrating the limitlessness of heroic effort.

The patriotic work of the Korean workers is expressed not only in their physical work, which often surpasses their strength, but also in their understanding of the country's situation and the response to the appeals of their People's Government.

The Korean press every day gives news about the increased delivery commitments taken on by the peasants to feed the Army, the urban population and, especially, the children who are drained by the war.

In order to make the existence of the urban population easier, the People's Government has allowed private trade, of both the bazaar and basket types, to develop widely.

An example of organized private trade is the construction of an underground bazaar in Pyongyang, which supplies the population with all indispensable food and clothing items at prices that are, however, very elevated.

Parallel to the private trade, the development of state trade is visible; for example in Pyongyang, a number of state shops have been opened, which for the most part sell articles from the Soviet industry.

Factory cafeterias, of which all employed take advantage, represent a major relief for the working population.

The three years of war have created an unheard-of, it would seem, situation: the country is alive, pulsating and vibrant.

The terrorist air raids, despite the total terror of their effects, do not make as big an impression as they did a year ago. The people, in a focused and prudent way, have learned to fight the enemy psychologically and physically, defeating the lowly American pirates. Life has moved underground, and it is there that the remains of surviving industries are working, there that warehouses, government offices and institutions are located.

From Anjun to Pyongyang, in an area of three hundred kilometers, one can see burned earth, injured with bomb craters, Korean towns and villages have been transformed into charred remains and ruins.

The oppressive view is [illegible word] little house carved in the rocks, a mud hut on a mountain slope and the expression of the calm and intense will of the inhabitants of Korea.

The ruined and destroyed country is preparing for reconstruction. The Party and Government are preparing plans for reconstructing the totally ruined industry, the shattered towns and villages.

The approval by the Government of the plan to reconstruct Pyongyang, whose outlines were summarized at a conference with the participation of the diplomatic corps by the minister of construction Kim Sun Hwa, serves as the expression of preparations for the planned reconstruction. The plan was prepared with the help of Soviet specialists. The area of the newly built Pyongyang will encompass 1,500 ha., the area of the city will amount to 25 square kilometers and the full reconstruction of the city will be completed in eight years.

This conference, as well as several conversations with party and government leaders, and especially with Comrade Pak Jeongae and Vice-premier Comr. Hegai, were an introduction to the total picture of the situation of the destruction and needs of the DPRK.

Comrades Hegai and Pak Jeongae provided concrete data regarding the perspectives for assistance from the countries of the Peace Camp, Korea being rebuild, including what was mentioned above that the People's Republic of China has accepted the commitment to deliver to the DPRK indispensable clothing and food in the period of the next few years, that the Soviet Union will give help in the reconstruction of industry, that Czechoslovakia has taken on the commitment to build a truck factory in Korea.

Referring to Poland's potential help, Comr. Hegai stressed that, thanks to the decision of the premier of the Polish Government, Comrade Bolesław Bierut, a delegation of Korean specialists, which will get to know the industry in our country and will discuss the extent of help that Poland will be capable of giving to the DPRK, is leaving for Poland at the end of June.

I am giving the precise contents of the [illegible word] conducted in Korea in the enclosed notes.

The scale of destruction and the extremely difficult economic situation of this country demand aid in all spheres of life, and especially in the area of means of production. Assistance from People's Poland in every shape and form, for the damaged industry, ruined towns and villages, will be accepted with pleasure and, at the same time, with an understanding of our difficulties.

III. The friendship between the Chinese and Korean nations.

The war in Korea and the three years of the nation's struggle for liberation are the [illegible word] of the unprecedented heroism of the nation and of the savage imperialistic barbarianism.

In these difficult years, the Korean nation connected itself with deep ties to the nations bringing it assistance.

The Soviet Union, the liberator of the Korean nation: the epoch of its social victories is a model and an inspiration in its struggle and work. The love of the Korean nation toward the Soviet nations and the faith in the strength and might of the country that is building communism represent a serious incentive in the steadfast struggle for liberation.

The Nations of the Countries of People's Democracy, which are building a new and better life, until recently so little known to the average Korean citizen, have become close despite the geographic distance between them.

Yet the friendship of the Korean and Chinese nations, forged in the fire of the difficult struggle, a friendship confirmed by the fact of direct participation of the representatives of the Chinese nation in Korea's liberation struggle is in its expression the strongest tie between nations fighting for a common cause.

People's China and Their Leader Comrade Mao Zedong are the symbol of the power of friendship and sacrifice for every Korean.

The Korean nation knows and talks about the fact that People's China is sending food, that People's China has saved over twenty thousand Korean children by giving them shelter and care. The Korean nation knows that the Chinese volunteer is not only a soldier, sapper or airman, but also a friend who will fix a house, help to cultivate soil, repair tools and defend a Korean child, often saving it from bombs, and will give a part of his food rations to the Korean child and woman.

The sight of the Chinese volunteers, their fighting, moral and social attitudes, confirms the deep belief that the Great Chinese nation, out of which such people have

sprung, is undefeated, and it will achieve total victory in its struggle and work and for a new socialist tomorrow.

The assistance given by the Great Chinese Nation to the nation of Korea, its contribution to the Korean nation's liberation struggle, is one of the most beautiful stories of brotherhood and friendship of nations fighting for their independent existence and social liberation.

IV. An assessment of the work of the PRL [Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa—People's Republic of Poland] embassy in the DPRK.

[Relationship improving; improvements still need to be made in organization and office work, but we worked on this; need to give vacations to overworked staff, some of whom are not getting along; more staff is needed; thinking about building embassy headquarters; good impression created by arrival of Kiryluk's wife]

St. KIRYLUK
[signature]
Ambassador of the PRL in the DPRK

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 116

[CPSU CC letterhead]

N° 119/9

24 July 1953

to Cdes. Molotov and Korobov

Excerpt from Minutes N° 19 of the CC Presidium meeting of 24 July 1953

Draft Telegram to North Korea Concerning the Issue of the Participation of Cde Kim Il Sung in the Signing of the Armistice Agreement

Approve the attached draft of the telegram on this issue submitted by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cde. Molotov)

CC SECRETARY

N° 342

Telegram from the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet ambassador to the DPRK with recommendations of the CPSU CC to the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK not to take part in the signing of the Armistice Agreement in Korea

24 July 1953

ref. point 9 of Minutes N° 19

NORTH KOREA
TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pass the following to Kim Il Sung and the Korean friends: the CPSU CC is in favor of the armistice in Panmunjom being signed by one of the deputies to the prime minister of the DPRK and Peng Dehuai for the Chinese-Korean side. Kim Il Sung himself is not obligated as Prime Minister to personally sign the armistice. The solution of the issue of who will sign the armistice for the Chinese-Korean side belongs entirely and completely to the governments of the DPRK and PRC and should not by any means be dependent on pressure from the Americans, etc.

In present conditions a trip by Kim Il Sung to Panmunjom is fraught with a certain risk in view of the behavior of the South Koreans, who might resort to some sort of provocation against Cde. Kim Il Sung. The interests of the matter require precluding the slightest possibility of such a provocation from the South Koreans and this might be ensured by Kim Il Sung not personally taking part in the signing of the armistice at Panmunjom. On this issue the CPSU CC does not advise yielding to any other considerations since these considerations are of secondary importance in this situation. But, of course, Kim Il Sung's refusal to go to Panmunjom need not be ostentatious. And what is more, just because Kim Il Sung will not go to Panmunjom it is extremely important that Cde. Peng Dehuai be in Panmunjom to personally sign the armistice together with a deputy prime minister of the DPRK.

The CPSU CC does not think that the Americans will manage to use the failure of Kim Il Sung to go to Panmunjom in any way to postpone the signing of the agreement. The postponement of the signing of the agreement for such a reason would not receive the support of international public opinion.

We think that there is no need to fear an unfavorable impression on the Korean and Chinese peoples if Kim Il Sung does not personally sign the armistice agreement. We have no doubt that the Korean and Chinese friends will be able to properly explain the situation if there is a need for this.

These are the considerations to which the CPSU CC would like to direct the attention of the Korean and Chinese friends. We hope that these considerations will be taken into consideration.

Inform Kim Il Sung and the Korean friends that we are sending the considerations mentioned above to [Beijing] at the same time to be passed to Cde. Mao Zedong and the Chinese friends.

Telegraph when this is done.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 65. D. 830. pp. 170-71. Copy

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 117

Ref. point 2 of Minutes N° 20

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA

to Cde. KIM IL SUNG

The report of the signing of the armistice prompted deep satisfaction among all the Soviet people, who view the successful end of the armistice negotiations as a great victory of the heroic Korean people and the valiant Chinese people's volunteers.

The Korean armistice agreement is at the same time a great victory of the entire camp of peace and democracy.

With the end of the war the Korean people are faced with the tasks of the restoration of national unity of the Korean state and at the same time the task of restoring the economy, which was wrecked by a war unleashed on the Korean people.

The Soviet government wishes the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea success in solving these great and pressing tasks and expresses readiness to give all possible aid to the Korean people who are worn out with suffering in establishing a peaceful life and healing the serious wounds caused by the bloody war for the freedom and independence of their motherland.

Chairman of the
USSR Council of Ministers

G. MALENKOV

Moscow, 27 July 1953

269-II

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 118

N° 343

Telegram from the Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers to the Chairman of the
Soviet Council of Ministers on the occasion of the signing of the Korean Armistice
Agreement

29 July 1953

Dear Cde. Chairman!

Allow me in the name of the government and all the people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to express sincere gratitude to you and through you the Soviet government and all the Soviet people for the hearty congratulations on the occasion of the historic victory of the Korean people and the Chinese people's volunteers in the bloody war provoked by the American imperialists against the Korean people.

I am deeply convinced that the enormous unselfish aid and support of the Soviet people to the Korean people serves as one of the main factors of our victory in the difficult three-year war in defense of the freedom and independence of our motherland against the American aggressors and a reliable guarantee that the Korean people will successfully carry out the very important tasks with which they are faced in connection with the armistice of the achievement of the peaceful unification of their motherland and the speedy recovery of an economy ravaged by war.

The expression of the Soviet government's readiness to give all possible aid to the Korean people, who have now begun to solve the problems associated with the peaceful unification of their motherland and peaceful construction, strengthens our confidence and inspires us to further victories in our work.

Chairman of the
DPRK Cabinet of Ministers
Kim Il Sung

Otnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza s narodnoy Koreey 1945-1980. Dokumenty i materialy [The Soviet Union's Relations with People's Korea, 1945-1980. Documents and materials]. Moscow, Nauka, 1981, p. 94

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DOCUMENT NO. 119

N° 344

Telegram from the Soviet ambassador to the PRC to the Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers about a meeting with the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the PRC on the occasion of the successful conclusion of the negotiations and the end of the war in Korea

[The instructions in] your [telegram] N° 1188 were carried out on 28 July.

Having heard the greetings of the CPSU CC Mao Zedong asked me to pass on the deep gratitude to the CPSU CC on behalf of the CPC CC.

Mao Zedong noted that the enemy had been forced to accept an armistice not only due to military but also due to political and economic reasons.

In military terms the last year of the war showed that the enemy was not only not able to attack on the ground but also was not able to firmly hold and defend the front line. The Chinese troops learned not only to fight a positional war but to also make breakthroughs at the front.

Of the political reasons which forced the enemy to agree to an armistice Mao noted the military differences in the camp of the imperialists and the considerable energizing of world public opinion which opposed the war in Korea.

As regards the economic reasons, Mao Zedong stated that the American monopolists amassed colossal profits in military orders and supplies during the first two years of the war but then, in connection with the armistice negotiations nearing the end and also as a result of a strengthening of the movement for ending the war in Korea, their profits began to rapidly fall.

Returning to the military side of the matter Mao Zedong noted that from the purely military point of view it would not have been bad to continue to beat the Americans for about another year in order to occupy more favorable lines along the [Hangan] River. A further advance to the south would have been fraught with the risk of extending the flanks in the west and east coasts of Korea. In this event the danger of the landing of an assault force in the rear of the Chinese-Korean forces would have grown considerably.

Touching on further steps after the signing of the armistice agreement, Mao Zedong said that the PRC government has a number of issues about which it would like to consult with the Soviet government.

We will prepare a preliminary outline of the measures concerning which it will be necessary to consult with the Soviet government by about 10 August, declared Mao Zedong.

Zhou Enlai was present at the conversation.

29 July 1953

Kuznetsov

Memorandum: N° 1188-1189 (outgoing N° 15227) of 28 July 1953. Cde. Molotov gave instructions to pass to Mao Zedong a salutation [*obrashchenie*] from the CPSU CC in connection with the successful conclusion of the armistice negotiations and the end to the war in Korea.

AP RF F. 3. Op. 65. D. 830, p. 187-189. Original.

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 120

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea

SECRET [stamp]

Pyongyang, 1 August 1953

Secret!

No. 2421/52/53/TJN [tajne—secret]

Note

On 27.VII.1953 at 10:00 local time, in Panmunjom, a truce agreement for Korea was signed. This act was signed by the head of the Korean-Chinese delegation to the negotiations on a truce in Korea, Gen. Nam Il, and by the head of the delegation of the so-called UN armed forces, Gen. Harrison, and then it was sent to be signed by Marshal Kim Il Sung, who signed it in Pyongyang on 27 July 1953 at 22:00. On 28.VII.1953, the truce agreement was signed by the Commander of the units of the Chinese People's Volunteers Pen The Hue. The commander in chief of the so-called UN armed forces, Gen. Clark, also signed this agreement on 27.VII. of this year in Tokyo.

On 27.VII.1953 an order from Marshal Kim Il Sung and Gen. Peng The Hue addressed to the units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers was announced, and it reads as follows:

1. The ground forces, the air force and the navy, as well as units of the defense of the coast, of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should carefully honor the agreement on a truce in Korea and cease fire on all sections of the front at 22:00 hours on 27 July 1953, i.e., within twelve hours after the signing of the truce agreement.

On all sections of the front, you must within 72 hours of the implementation of the truce agreement distance yourselves by 2 km. from the demarcation line which has already been announced by both sides, i.e., within 72 hours of 22:00 on 27 July 1953.

2. Ground forces, the air force, the navy and units of coastal defense of the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers must guard their positions very vigilantly and eliminate any attempts at provocation from the other side.

3. The Korean Peoples' Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should be favorably disposed toward the Military Commission which is acting to cease fire and the personnel of this Commission, the Commissions of neutral countries and personnel of these commissions, the personnel of the united units of the Red Cross, which will be present in the areas controlled by our armies in order to execute the truce agreement, and guarantee their security and demonstrate active assistance in their work.

According to the truce Agreement in Korea of 27 July 1953 at 22:00, military actions have stopped on the whole front line, which stretches 155 miles from east to west.

On 27 July 1953 at 22:00, for the first time in three years, street lamps, which had already been prepared during the war, were switched on. Light illumination was put on also in other towns and villages of the DPRK.

On 28 July 1953 at 12:00, a powerful demonstration of the population of the city of Pyongyang took place to honor the great victory of the Korean nation. Parade stands were placed in a huge square in the center of Pyongyang, which had been specially prepared for this. The Government and the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and generals of the Korean People's Army, headed by Marshal Kim Il Sung, were on the central stand. An enormous rally, in which ca. 110 thousand people participated, was opened by the Chairman of the People's Committee of Pyongyang Chon Yon Phio. Marshal Kim Il Sung appeared with a speech to the whole Korean nation relating to the signing of the truce in Korea (I am enclosing the text of Kim Il Sung's speech).

After Kim Il Sung's speech, which was received enthusiastically by the assembled population, the DPRK's hymn was played, artillery salvos were heard and the ceremonious sound of the historical bell at the ancient Tidonmun Gate. A great demonstration of the population began, in which workers, peasants, working intelligentsia, student youth and schoolchildren from Pyongyang and the area took part. The demonstration lasted ca. 3 hours.

In the evening, after the demonstration, Pyongyang was brilliantly illuminated. At 21:00, 24 salvos were fired from 124 cannons, lighting the city with rockets and streams of fireworks. Artistic performances by professional and amateur artistic ensembles, including very many school ensembles, took place in all the streets of the city for 3 days. The mood among the population was very celebratory.

The demonstrations and rallies relating to the signing of the truce took place also in provincial centers and cities of the DPRK.

On 31 July 1953 at 22:00 in the evening a ceremonious reception took place at Marshal Kim Il Sung's on the occasion of the signing of the truce. Members of the DPRK government, Central Committee of the KWP, the Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the DPRK Kim Dubong, the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers Gen. Peng The Huei together with his staff and the heads of diplomatic posts accredited to the DPRK.

The reception ended at 2:00 in the morning.

3 copies made.

[...]

E. Cerekwicki
Charge d'Affaires a.i.
of the Embassy of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland]
in the DPRK

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 121

Embassy of the
Polish Republic
in Korea

Pyongyang, 14 August 1953

No. 2421/59/53TJN[secret]

Note

From 5th to 9th August of this year, the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party took place. The agenda of the 6th Plenum was as follows:

1. The struggle for post-war reconstruction and development of the national economy in connection to the signing of the ceasefire and further tasks for the party;
2. About anti-party and anti-state sabotage-spying activities of the Li Seungyeop clique and the question of Hegai's suicide;
3. Organizational questions.

Comrade Kim Il Sung gave the first speech about the first point of the 6th Plenum's discussions. The main motif of the speech was a detailed discussion of the plan for the reconstruction and development of the DPRK's national economy. I will send an analysis of this plan according to Comrade Kim Il Sung's speech in my next political report.

On the second point of the discussions, CC Secretary of the KWP Pak Jeongae gave a speech. The contents of the speech by Comrade Pak Jeongae have not been published anywhere yet.

On the third point of the discussions, the CC Plenum adopted several organizational resolutions, which are the result of discussions about the first and second points, namely:

- a. The CC KWP Plenum adopted the resolution about excluding 7 members of the CC (including former V[ice]-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the KPR Pak Heonyeong, former DPRK ambassador to the Soviet Union and later V[ice]-Minister of Foreign Affairs Chu Nion Hwa and former minister of Foreign Trade Chan Si U) from the CC and from the party for their anti-party and anti-state activity;
- b. The Plenum removed from among party ranks the deputy member of the CC, former KPR ambassador to China, Kwon O Dik for his anti-party and anti-national activities;
- c. For failing to demonstrate the proper attitude and loyalty to the party and the state, the Plenum adopted the resolution to remove from among the members of the CC four members, including the former head of the 3rd department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK Ku Dze Su and the vice-chairman of the Union of Democratic Women Cho Bok Na;
- d. the Plenum co-opted 5 new members to replace those who had been removed from the positions of deputy members of the CC.

On the remaining organizational questions, the Plenum adopted the following resolutions:

- a. A Presidium of the CC composed of 15 members, namely Kim Il Sung, Kim Dubong, Pak Jeongae, Pak Changok, Kim Il, Pak Yeongbin, Coy Won Thak, Choe Changik, Chen Il Lion, Kim Hwan Il, Kan Mun Sok, Kim Syn Hwe, Kim Kwan Nep, Pak Cyn Chol and Nam Il, was created to replace the existing organizational office.
- b. The Plenum elected a new CC political bureau made up of Kim Il Sung, Kim Dubong, Pak Jeongae, Pak Changok and Kim Il.
- c. The Plenum abolished the functions of the CC Secretaries and created the functions of the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the CC. The Chairman of the CC KWP is Comrade Kim Il Sung, and the vice-Chairmen are Pak Jeongae, Pak Changok and Kim Il.
- d. The Plenum adopted a resolution to create a Commission for developing a new statute of the Party. The commission is made up of 16 members with the Chairman of the CC KWP Kim Il Sung at its head.

As an outcome of the 6th Plenum, the Chairman of the Commission of Party Control attached to the CC KWP Chan Sun Men and his deputy Li Gi Sok were relieved of their current functions. Former DPRK emissary to Czechoslovakia, Kim Yn Gi, who had recently held the function of the Chairman of the People's Committee of Kangwon Province, was named chairman of the Commission of Party Control.

Furthermore, the Plenum approved Kim Chu Men to the position of the Head of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the CC, Kim Hwan Il as head of the Work Department, Kim Min San as Social Head and Li Cher Won as head of Education.

The resolutions of the 6th Plenum of the CC KWP have great significance for the further strengthening of the party's internal unity. The Plenum showed to the wide

masses of party members that the party is capable of isolating and cutting out anti-state and anti-party elements, whose activities have come into the open in the period of the national-liberation war, from the party.

Approved: K. Cerekwicki
Chargé d'Affaires of the PRL [Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa—
People's Republic of Poland] Embassy in the DPRK

4 copies made:

Copy no. 1-Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
Comrade Bolesław Bierut

“ “ 2-Comrade J. Berman

“ “ 3-Comrade E. Ochab

“ “ 4-Comrade O. Dłuski

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 122

Embassy
of the Polish Republic BY COURIER [stamp]
in Korea
No. 2421/61/53/TJN [tajne—secret]

Pyongyang, 2 September 1953
SECRET! SECRET [stamp]

Note

On 1 September 1953 a Korean government delegation, headed by the Premier of the DPRK government Kim Il Sung, left for Moscow, having been invited by the Soviet government.

The delegation is made up of: V[ice]-Premier of the DPRK government, Chon Il Lion, V[ice]-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party Pak Jeongae, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission Jung Jeuntaek, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nam Il and Minister of Railways Kim Hwe Il.

Saying farewell to them at the station were the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK Kim Dubong, members of the government, numerous assembled population and representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited to the government of the DPRK. The Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the DPRK Suzdalev also left with the delegation.

During a conversation with the diplomatic corps at the train station, Comr. Kim Il Sung said that on his way back from Moscow he would wish to visit Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, in order to thank the governments of

these countries and the leaders of the parties for the enormous assistance being given by these countries to the Korean nation.

After the delegation departed, V[ice]-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK, Yi Donggon, approached me, and in our conversation he implied that the delegation would go to Poland as long as it is invited by our government.

3 copies

K. Cerekwicki [signature]
Chargé d'Affaires of the PRL [Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa—
People's Republic of Poland] Embassy in the DPRK

[...]

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 123

Pyongyang, 12 November 1953

Embassy of the Polish Republic
in Korea

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Independent Eastern Department

No. 56/211/53 [trans. note: added by hand]

Note

On 10 November of this year, a Korean Government Delegation headed by Premier of the Government of the DPRK, Marshal Kim Il Sung, invited by the Government of the People's Republic of China, left for Beijing.

The delegation includes Vice Chairman of the CC KWP Pak Jeongae , Vice-Premier of the Government of the DPRK Hong Myeonghui, Minister of Foreign Affairs Nam Il, Chairman of State Planning Commission Chen Chun Tek, Minister of Finance Yun Gongheum, Minister of Railways Kim He Il, Minister of Communal Economy Chu Hwan Sob.

Vice-chairman of the Government Choe Yonggeon and Choe Changik, chairman of the CC KWP, representatives of political and social organizations and the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Government of the DPRK saw the delegation off at the main train station in Pyongyang.

The charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the DPRK and the Chairman of the Chinese People's Delegation, which at the moment is present in Korea, also travelled to China with the Korean Government Delegation.

Cerekwicki Eugeniusz
[signature]
Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the PRP
in the DPRK

Copy received by:
Embassy of the PRP in China

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 124

Embassy
of the Polish Republic
in Korea

No. 242/2/11/54
[transl. note: best try; number
is difficult to read, since it
was added by hand]

REPORT No. 8

of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea
for the period of 1 December to 31 December 1953

Political report No. 8

of the Embassy of the People's Republic of Poland
in the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea
for the period of 1 December to 31 December 1953.

I. Polish-Korean relations.

1. In connection with the upcoming arrival of our specialists with the goal of giving technical assistance to the reconstruction of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Embassy here, in accordance with an order from the Center, has asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK to inform our Country whether our specialists will be able to take topographic photographs and make plans of the buildings in whose reconstruction Poland is to assist. Despite repeatedly asking to hurry up the answer to the above question,

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has so far not given any explanations. The reason for this is probably a lack of answer from the ministries and organizations in the DPRK involved in this.

2. [Polish embassy asked for materials for student ensembles and from the DPRK Academy of Science.]

3. [Polish embassy asked for film cooperation.]

4. [Polish films have been shown.]

5. [Polish embassy is asking for propaganda materials.]

II. Internal situation in the DPRK.

1. VII Plenum of the central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party

From 18 to 19 December 1953, the VII Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, the second one since the truce, convened. Two fundamental issues were discussed at the plenum:

- a) The issue of increasing the work of the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland;
- b) Conducting a reporting-electoral campaign in the leading organs of the party on all levels.

The speeches given at the Plenum were by: regarding the first point, V[ice]-chairman of the Central Committee of the KWP, Kim Il; regarding the second point, V[ice]-Chairman of the Central Committee of the KWP, Pak Jeongae. The texts of the two speeches were not published anywhere.

The Plenum developed a plan of conducting a reporting-electoral action. According to the calendar of this action, it is to be conducted in the period of 20 January 1954 to 5 April 1954.

The VII Plenum of the CC KWP adopted resolutions which are important to the life of the party and which will lead to the further elevation of the ideological and political consciousness of party members, to the further strengthening of its ranks through critique and auto-critique in the course of the reporting-electoral meeting being conducted.

For the details regarding the organizational resolutions of the VII Plenum of the CC KWP, see note No. 2421/79/53/TJN of 28 December 1953.

2. VI Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK.

After a nearly four-year interruption caused by the war, from 20 to 22 December 1953 the VI Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea convened in Pyongyang. The whole government of the DPRK, headed by Kim Il Sung, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party arrived for the deliberations of the VI Session of the Supreme People's Assembly.

Heads of diplomatic Missions accredited to the DPRK were also invited to the opening of the Session.

The Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, Kim Dubong, performed the celebratory opening of the Session.

Participants in the Sessions honored the memory of the Great Leader of the Proletariat, Joseph Stalin, and of Those who perished in the Fatherland war with silence.

The following issues were placed on the agenda of the VI Session of the Supreme People's Assembly:

1. About the work of the Government Delegations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which spent time in the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, as well as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary;
2. Adoption of the decisions of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly issued in the period between the V and VI Sessions of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea;
3. Confirmation of the partial changes in the composition of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK.

Kim Il Sung discussed the work of the DPRK government delegations. In his speech, Kim Il Sung analyzed in detail the agreements signed between the Government of the DPRK and the Governments of the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, stressing what great assistance these countries promised to give to Korea in rebuilding its national economy destroyed by American invaders.

Discussing the assistance of the Soviet Union, which has assigned an amount of 1 billion rubles out of its budget for the rebuilding of the DPRK's national economy, Kim Il Sung presented the plan for using the above amount, as agreed by the DPRK Government and the USSR Government. The following factories are to be rebuilt using these funds:

1. Kim Chak Metallurgical Works;
2. Steelworks in Song-jin;
3. Chemical conglomerate in Hynman;
4. Cement works in Synhori;

5. Colored metals works in Nampho;
6. Hydro-electric power plant in Sunphun;
7. Textile factory in Pyongyang.

Apart from these, the following new enterprises will be constructed:

1. Meat-processing conglomerate;
2. Textile factory;
3. Fish cannery;
4. Hydrochloric acid factory;
5. Paint and varnish factory;
6. Tractor-repair works;
7. Central radio station.

In building and rebuilding the above-mentioned factories, the Soviet Union has committed to supply equipment, building materials and to guarantee technical assistance by specialists who will direct the construction. At the same time, the Soviet Union is to pass on to the Koreans technical documents for the production processes in these factories, patents, licenses, as well as training the technical cadres for these factories.

The Soviet Union will also deliver to the Koreans a variety of equipment and construction materials for these factories, which will be rebuilt with the DPRK's own forces, as well as the articles and materials indispensable to the development and reconstruction of agriculture and industry and the raising of the standard of living of the population. As part of this assistance, the Soviet Union will deliver agricultural machines and tools, synthetic fertilizers, breeding cattle, horses, fishing boats, buses, textiles and other necessities, as well as equipment for hospitals and schools. It will also equip the central scientific-technical library, which is to have between ten and twenty thousand volumes.

All this enormous assistance from the Soviet Union will be provided to Korea during the next 2 years, with two thirds of it in the course of 1954, and the rest in 1955.

The Soviet Union has also cut in half the debt which the DPRK incurred in the pre-war period and stemming from the agreement on economic-cultural assistance, which Korea signed with the Soviet Union in 1949.

Next, Premier Kim Il Sung discussed the assistance from the People's Republic of China. By an agreement signed by the Korean Government Delegation with the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, China has agreed to annul all debts stemming from the assistance given to the DPRK in the period of 25 June 1950 to 31 December 1953. At the same time, the People's Republic of China has assigned the sum of 8 trillion yuan for help to the DPRK, with 3 trillion yuan to be given to the DPRK during 1954 and the remaining 5 trillion yuan in the course of the next three years.

As part of this aid, Korea will receive hard bituminous coal, cotton textiles, wool, food, construction materials, means of transportation, metal products, machinery, agricultural tools, fishing boats, paper and office supplies and necessities.

In 1954 China will deliver 100 thou[sand] t. of food, 30 thou[sand] t. of soy, dozens of shipping boats, textiles, coal and several other products. China will continue to deliver technical assistance and will send worker brigades to rebuild the railroads; they will deliver steam locomotives (48 such steam locomotives were sent in the mo[nth] of December of this year) and passenger and freight rail cars. Apart from this, cadres of Korean specialists will train in the People's Republic of China.

After discussing the help from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, Premier Kim Il Sung summarized the agreements reached with the countries of people's democracy.

He first mentioned Czechoslovakia, then Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia and Albania.

In discussing Czechoslovakia's aid to the DPRK, Kim Il Sung mentioned the factories that Czechoslovakia will build and rebuild. They are: car and car-part factories, a tool factory, the rebuilding of a cement plant and the rebuilding of three hydro-electric power plants. To implement their aid, the government of the Republic of Czechoslovakia has sent its specialists, who have conducted preparatory work, to Korea.

Apart from the above, Czechoslovakia will deliver construction materials and necessities to Korea.

Poland: On the basis of a signed agreement, the People's Republic of Poland will build shops that will repair steam locomotives, shops that will renovate railway cars, rebuild and restructure three coal mines, deliver technical aid for the reconstruction of the country and send a variety of diverse materials and articles.

Hungary: Will give aid in building a chemical (benzene) factory, will build a weights and measures factory and a machine-tool factory, and, in the course of 1954, they will deliver various electrical machines and communications equipment and factory equipment. To implement this assistance, on 26.XII. of this year, a 6-person delegation of Hungarian specialists arrived in Korea.

GDR: In 1954-1956, it will build a factory of diesel engines, a factory of electrical equipment and a printing press. Apart from this, in 1954 the GDR will send factory equipment, necessities and a range of other materials for a total of tens of millions of rubles.

Romania: From 1953 to 1956, the government of the Romanian People's Republic will give Korea assistance amounting to 65 million rubles. For this amount, a cement works, a pharmaceutical factory will be built, and equipment for brick factories will be delivered.

Romania will also send 10 passenger railcars, 10 fishing boats of 150 HP each, 30 tank trucks and a variety of materials and necessities.

Bulgaria: Will give Korea assistance for a total of 20 million rubles. This sum will include silk textiles, window glass, equipment for brick factories and wood product factories.

The Mongolian People's Republic and Albania will also continue to help.

All these data, which were included in Kim Il Sung's speech at the VI Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, point to the great aid and solidarity of the countries of the peace camp in rebuilding Korea, which has been destroyed by imperialistic aggressors. Thus, the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has fully backed the government's peaceful policies, expressing the whole Korean nation's appreciation for the brotherly assistance being given to it.

After Kim Il Sung's speech and a discussion which developed on the above issue, the VI Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK fully approved and endorsed the agreements signed by the government delegations.

It also unanimously endorsed all the resolutions issued by the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK in the period between the V and VI Sessions of the Supreme People's Assembly.

Also approved were the proposed changes in the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, and Kim Dubong remains the Chairman of the Presidium and only V[ice]-Chairmen were changed.

As can be seen from the personnel changes in the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, in the Supreme People's Assembly and in some government ministries implemented as a result of the VI Session, these changes are not fundamental. It is only a matter of implementing the correct distribution of cadres in accordance with the country's new needs in the period of post-war stability and reconstruction.

For detailed data regarding the resolutions of the VI Session of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK, see note No. 2421/80/53TJN of 28.XII.1953.

3. DPRK industry.

In the month of December, in all the branches of industry of the DPRK the working class fought with exceptionally strengthened effort to fulfill the determined production plans ahead of schedule. According to the press, many production enterprises adopted new production norms in accordance with the technological conditions of work in those enterprises.

The workers of a metallurgical plant in Chondzhin, who are working in accordance with the new production norms, executed 160% of their annual plan of producing steel pipes. The metallurgical plant in Razin executed 163% of their annual production plan, and in Hynnam the chemical conglomerate, a section of which has working again, 130% of the production of carbide was fulfilled.

The industrial enterprises of a consumer nature have also had great production achievements, and in accordance with the guidelines of the VI Plenum of the CC KWP they are increasing their production of necessities every day. According to the newspaper *Mingzhou Choson* of 29 December 1953, the Pyongyang factory of soy products executed 135% of their production plan compared to September 1953, and the factory of applied chemistry (production of soap and cosmetics) in Sinizhu executed 125% of their production plan compared to the period that preceded the signing of the truce in Korea.

In the previous reporting period, despite the inconvenient atmospheric conditions, work was being performed non-stop in connection with the rebuilding of industry. The main stress, as can be seen, was directed at the quickest possible reconstruction and build-up of the industry of construction materials, whose shortages can be felt in the DPRK very acutely. Thanks to the effort of the working class of the DPRK and the large help from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, nearly every day new, rebuilt industrial buildings are being handed over for operation.

In December, three great brickyards in Hamhyn, Hwansu and Chondzhin were rebuilt and began to work; altogether, their annual production of these brickyards will add up to 23 mil[lion] bricks. In 1954, it is expected that 2 large brickyards will be constructed in the region of Pyongyang, of which each one is to produce 100 mil[lion] bricks annually.

Right now, the overall production of bricks in the DPRK amounts to 100 mil[lion] pieces a year. To meet the needs related to the reconstruction of the national economy of the DPRK, brickyards are to be expanded, and their total productive power should be 500 mil[lion] pieces annually.

In the Pyongyang industrial district, which was a large center of the textile industry before the war, a rebuilt textile factory in Pyongyang began production on 27 December.

According to the guidelines of the VI Plenum of the CC KWP, major geological work is being conducted in the territory of the DPRK with the goal of locating new deposits of raw materials. The geological exploration is paying particular attention to finding new deposits of bituminous coal, of which there is very little in Korea.

In South Hamgen Province, as a result of geological exploration, new deposits of iron ore were found. The Soviet Union is giving a lot of assistance to the DPRK in these explorations.

For a long time now, an action has been conducted in the whole territory of the DPRK of collecting scrap metal, which at this moment when many ore mines and factories have not yet been rebuilt, is a major source of raw material for production. The DPRK's government is attaching a lot of importance to this action. This is expressed in the launching, to direct this action, of a special council of raw materials stemming from waste and scrap metal, which is attached to the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK. It must be admitted that the action of collecting scrap metal, like other previous ones, has taken on a truly mass character. The example can be given that last month the inhabitants of Pyongyang collected over 8,408 t. of scrap metal and 627 t. of other raw materials.

4. Agriculture.

In connection with the implementation of the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers about taking steps with the goal of stabilizing the life of the inhabitants of Kanwon Province, in this reporting period, the Peasant Bank of this province began to divide among the peasants the credits designated for the reconstruction of the agricultural economy. The current credits are devoted mostly to the purchase of tractive force, hogs and poultry. At the same time, the Ministry has delivered 1,768 breeding hogs, 300 draught oxen and 1,900 calves, with the goal of distributing them to the peasants at state prices.

The above leads to the conclusion that, following the distribution of credits, the government is creating possibilities of purchasing the stock animals and agricultural tools which are indispensable to operating a farm.

In accordance with the implementation of the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the DPRK concerning creating centers of tractive force, the Ministry of Agriculture began to found them. According to the designed plan, centers of tractive force will be founded in the following provinces: in Hwanhe Province – 15 centers, South Pyongyang – 10, Kanwon – 6, North Pyongyang – 8 and South Hamgen – 6 centers. In every center of tractive force, there will be 150 to 2,500 horses. The task of these centers will be to give assistance in the form of tractive force to associations for soil cultivation and to poor peasants, who own no tractive force.

According to press reports, the work of founding the centers of tractive force is very advanced and it is to be completed before the beginning of the period of the spring farm work.

The speedy repairing of the damage in the rural economy of the DPRK caused by the war and its further development on a basis of the democratic transformation of the Korean countryside is a subject of deep concern to the party and government of the DPRK. A further piece of evidence of this concern and help being demonstrated by the state to the peasants is the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of 18 December 1953 about the annulment of peasants' debts vis-à-vis the state in the form of unpaid in-kind taxes and unpaid-off loans of grain and seed, which have been received from the state, and the lifting of compulsory meat deliveries.

With the goal of the quick development of agriculture and animal husbandry, raising its production capacity and raising the standard of living of the basic peasant masses, the Cabinet of Ministers decided:

- A) Beginning on 20 December 1953, debts stemming from unpaid in-kind taxes for the period of 1950-1952 for using irrigation devices, machine-tractor centers and unpaid loans in seeds, synthetic fertilizers and food obtained from the state, are being cancelled;
- b) As of 1 January 1954, compulsory meat deliveries to the state are being lifted.

The resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of 18 December 1953 includes major relief for the peasants, which will no doubt contribute to a quicker rebuilding of agriculture in the DPRK.

5. Transportation

One continues to observe the quick tempo of rebuilding and developing the DPRK's transportation system. Rail transportation, which has so far played the most serious role in this country, has had the greatest achievements in reconstruction.

In this reporting period, railway lines have been rebuilt in Hwan Province, which lies in the border area, where freight and passenger transportation has been restored on the following lines: Hwandzhu-Sonrim, Hedzhu-Jenna and Hedzhu-Ongin.

The DPRK's government has made major efforts toward rebuilding the restoration bases for locomotives and cars, which were damaged during the war. Information obtained from the Minister of Communications indicates that at the moment, rail yards for locomotives in Wonsan, which before the war were among the largest enterprises of this type in the DPRK and the rail yards for engines and cars in Pyongyang, have been partly rebuilt. Both rail yards fill minimum needs in the area of the restoration of the rolling stock.

Numerical data speak of the unquestionable restoration of the DPRK's railways, as they illustrate the growth of freight and passenger transportation. Following the signing of the truce in November 1953, trains have transported, by comparison to July 1953: in August 115% more, in September 132.7% more, in October 175.5% more and in November 192.3%. In November 1953, the transportation of passengers grew to 142.8% by comparison to August of that year.

These serious achievements in the reconstruction of rail transportation are the result of, among other factors, the large assistance given to Korea by the People's Republic of China, which, as can be deduced from the words of the Minister of Communications, has taken on assistance in the reconstruction of rail bridges.

According to the agreements reached between the Government of the DPRK and the Governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, in December 1953 passenger air transportation was opened on the Pyongyang-Chita-Pyongyang line. The Korean society of air communications is servicing this line, while the Soviet Union has provided planes together with support for them.

According to the information we have, in January 1954, air service is to be started on the Pyongyang-Hamhyn-Chondzhin-Soviet Border route.

In the area of restoring air communications, the DPRK government has encountered large obstacles stemming from major damage to airports and navigation equipment and shortage of passenger planes. The Soviet Union has given huge help to the DPRK to rebuild this sphere by delivering planes, helping to rebuild airports and training airport staff.

6. Education

In this reporting period, the Ministry of Education, with the assistance of People's Committees, conducted a broad action of organizing schools for adults. The focus of this action was directed at the countryside in view of the winter season of work in agriculture, during which the rural population is able to devote more time to learning. As a result of this action, on 1.XII. of this year four-month night schools for adults were organized in which learning is to take place in the period of the winter months. The program of the schools foresees covering elementary-school material in a period of three years. According to incomplete data, right now over 300 night schools, where ca. 25,000 people are learning, have been opened in the territory of the DPRK. Secondary-school teachers and university students are taking an active part in the action of teaching adults, taking advantage of the winter break in the work of schools and institutions of higher learning.

The teaching of adults will contribute to raising the professional qualifications of full-time workers and peasants, who in this way will be able to take advantage of the gains of modern learning and technology to a greater degree. Next to the above-mentioned action of the education of adults, the Ministry of Industry is conducting a broad network of short-term trade courses, which are mostly organized at larger production enterprises. Lower-level supervisory staff, such as foremen and highly skilled workers, are being trained in these trade courses.

Much attention is also being devoted to the issue of training experts in higher-level supervisory positions in all branches of industry and in construction because, as the post-war national economy develops, the shortage of skilled specialists in higher-level supervisory positions is being felt more and more. In order to eliminate this state of affairs at least partly, in October of this year an institute of industrial construction, which was separated from the Kim Chek institute, was created, and apart from this in December of this year an institute of construction was created at the State Construction Commission in Pyongyang.

Even with all these forms of professional training and the creation of new institutions of higher learning, the shortage of specialists will be felt in Korea for a very long time still. Because of this, the government of the DPRK has taken advantage of sending a certain number of technicians and workers for training in Czechoslovakia, where they will acquaint themselves with technological processes by working in industrial enterprises in the same kind of production as the factories which the Czech specialists are to design and reconstruct in the DPRK. According to the information we have, the People's Republic of Hungary is also supposed to take a certain number of Korean workers for training.

7. The health service.

Since the signing of the truce in Korea, the DPRK government has devoted much attention to the issue of raising the standard of health of the population. The reconstruction of hospitals and clinics is being conducted very quickly. According to information from the Ministry of Health, in the period of 27 July to the end of December of this year, the number of hospitals has reached 160% and beds 110% compared to the pre-war period. These achievements were possible for reasons including the major medical assistance given to the DPRK during the war and now by the Soviet Union and the countries of people's democracy. Currently, the hospitals of the countries of people's democracy are placed in the main industrial centers and have shifted to take care of the civilian population. Thanks to the work of these hospitals, the DPRK has eight high-class hospitals serving the civilian population with a total of 1,600 beds, and, according to the plan for developing the health service, in 1954 the number of beds in the hospitals of the countries of people's democracy is to rise to 3,200. Apart from this, the hospitals of the countries of people's democracy receive the ill in clinics. The number of patients being cared for in the clinics is over 700 persons per day in each one of these hospitals.

One can feel a serious shortage of specialists such as [indecipherable word], neurosurgeons, dentists, laryngologists, gynecologists and obstetricians in the DPRK. With this in mind, while training cadres in the Korean institutions of higher learning, the Ministry of Health has established the profiles of the hospitals of the countries of people's democracy in such a way that the above-mentioned specialists are to be present in them. The hospitals of the countries of people's democracy, according to the plans of the Ministry of Health of the DPRK, are not only to fulfill the task of bringing medical help, but mostly to conduct the training of Korean medical cadres, which has been stressed very much lately. Some of these hospitals, including the hospital of the PCK [Polski Czerwony Krzyż—Polish Red Cross] in Korea, are to comprise a clinical base for the Korean medical institutes.

Apart from the reconstruction of hospitals, very energetic work is being conducted to rebuild sanatoria and semi-sanatoria, as very essential elements of the final phase of clinical medicine. According to incomplete data, from the signing of the truce to the end of the current year, 3 sanatoria were rebuilt in Kanwon Province, 2 sanatoria in North Hamgen Province and 1 semi-sanatorium in Chagan Province.

In view of the very bad condition of the health of the population, and especially the working class, the DPRK government, despite great difficulties, has guaranteed by law universal free-of-charge medicine. In this way, for the first time in the history of the Korean nation, universal free health care has been implemented.

On the occasion of the V anniversary of the founding of the Pyongyang Institute of Medical Sciences, on 26-27 December 1953 a scientific conference for employees of the health service took place in Pyongyang. Taking part in the conference were: Minister of Health Li Bion Nam, professors of institutes of medical sciences, representatives of the health service of the Korean People's Army and numerous doctors. The goal of the conference was to relay the experiences of practical medical work during the war and the scientific achievements of Korean medicine to the scientists. One of the main themes of the conference was the issue of fighting tuberculosis and distomosis.

8. Culture.

On 16.XII. of this year a 3-person delegation of the Korean Academy of Science departed for Moscow, having been invited by the USSR Academy of Sciences. The composition of the delegation is: Secretary of the Korean Academy of Science Chan Chu Ik, member of the Academy of Science Li Syn Gi, head of the Institute of Technology of the Korean Academy of Science Kim Hi Syk.

The task of the delegation is to become acquainted with the work of the scientific institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The length of the stay of the delegation of the Korean Academy of Science in the territory of the Soviet Union is expected to last 2 months.

According to the plan of development for DPRK Radio, on 10.XII. of this year a radio station was built in Kaesong with assistance from the Soviet Union. This station's activity is expected to broadcast programs for Southern Korea.

In the past reporting period, a number of new cultural installations were opened. On 29 December 1953 the newly constructed building of the State Theater was opened in Pyongyang. The theater is calculated for 800 spectators.

Also in the provinces, intensive work is being conducted to reconstruct buildings of public use. According to the press, in December of this year, a movie theater for 1,000 spectators was put into use in the city of Peksan and a movie theater for 600 spectators in the city of Pakchon.

The tempo of rebuilding cultural installations is very quick. To support this claim, data from the Provinces of North and South Pyongyang can be used, showing that in the period between the signing of the truce to the end of the year, 25 halls for movie theaters were rebuilt and 5 new cinemas were built. Furthermore, in these provinces, 1,000 common rooms in factories and village houses of culture were put to use.

III. The hospital of the PCK [Polski Czerwony Krzyż—Polish Red Cross in Korea.

1. In December of this year, in accordance with directives from Poland, the first medical group ended its 7-month period of work in the PCK hospital in Korea.

Prior to the departure of our group to Poland, the DPRK government decided to decorate them for their services in the work of bringing medical help to the Korean nation during the war and after the signing of the truce with high state decorations, about which this Embassy has informed the Central office.

In accordance with the original plan, the Order of the National Flag II Class was to be awarded to 6 comrades, including the whole leadership of the group; the Order of the National Flag III Class to 20 comrades and the others were to receive the medal for services at work.

A resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council of the DPRK, the following Korean decorations were given to members of our medical group:

- a) Order of the National Flag II Class to the Director of the Hospital Dr. Wiechno Wojciech;
- b) Order of the National Flag II Class to 17 doctors;
- c) medal for services at work to 33 paramedics, nurses and technical employees of the hospital.

The ceremonious farewell to the medical group, combined with the awarding of the state decorations, took place in both places of work of our hospital. Present at the ceremonies was the current Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] in the DPRK Cerekwicki. (For details, see notes No. 2421/74, 75, 78/53/Tjn./)

2. The new medical group arrived in Pyongyang on 12 and 20 December 1953. The comrades were welcomed at the Korean-Chinese border by the head of the DPRK consulate in Antung and the Attache of the Embassy of the PRL in the DPRK Jop Stanisław. At Pyongyang train station, the arrivals were welcomed by the V[ice]-Minister of Health of the DPRK, the deputy to the Head of Diplomatic Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs here and employees of the Embassy.

From Pyongyang, the groups took the train to the location of the hospital.

On 21.XII. of this year, the Director of the Hospital of the PCK in Korea, Dr. Fajkiel, paid a visit to the Minister of Health of the DPRK Li Bion Nam. On the Embassy side, present during the visit was Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Embassy Cerekwicki. During the conversation with the Minister of Health, questions were discussed of assistance from our doctors in the professional training of the Korean personnel of the hospital, scientific cooperation with the Hamhyn Medical Institute, the composition of our medical group and general organizational issues concerning the working conditions in the PCK hospital in Korea. (For details, see note No. 2421/76/53/Tjn.).

3. [Hospital staffer lost passport]

4. The new medical group, much like the previous one, does not receive sufficient political press, and they also receive no medical periodicals at all, which significantly makes the group's work difficult both in the sphere of raising their professional qualifications and in relaying the achievements of Polish medicine to the Korean comrades. It needs to be stressed here that from 1 January 1954 the group's doctors have begun systematic training of the hospital's Korean personnel.

The leadership of the previous group and the Embassy, in its reports on the situation of the PCK hospital, have brought up this issue several times.

The medical group does not possess a sufficient number of cultural installations or a radio. Also insufficient are the supplies of the library in the areas of science, politics and fiction.

There is also a shortage of materials for party training.

Because of the above, the Embassy sees the need to turn to the proper powers in Poland with the goal of eliminating the existing shortages in the equipment of the PCK hospital in Korea, especially in the sphere of regularly bringing daily, political and professional publications.

IV. Internal Embassy matters.

[...]

[signature]
E. Cerekwicki
Charge d' Affaires a.i.
of the Embassy of the PRL in the DPRK

8 copies made.

[...]

Translated by Maya Latynski

* * *

DOCUMENT NO. 125

[Source: APRF, F. 0100, Op. 47, D. 107, Papka 389, pp. 1-4]

Draft

Of the Plans for Directives on the Korean and Indochina Issues for the Soviet Delegation at the Geneva Conference, 17 March 1954

to Cde. V. M. Molotov

I submit to you drafts of the plans for directives on the Korean and Indochina issues for the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Conference. The materials were prepared on committee.

Kuznetsov

17 March 1954

Distributed to:

Cdes. Gromyko, Zorin, Fedorenko, Sobolev, Novikov, Soldatov, Lavrishchev, and to file

AVPRF F. 0100 Op. 47. D. 107. Papka 389 p. 1

TARGET PLANS [PLAN-DIREKTIVY]
OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON THE ISSUE
OF KOREA

The directive of the Soviet delegation on the Korean issue should include an ultimate goal [*programma-maksimum*] which calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and the unification of Korea, and a minimum goal which provides for measures to move from the armistice to actual peace in the event that agreement is not achieved on the main issues relating to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the unification of Korea.

The Soviet delegation ought to bear in mind that the initiative has come from the DPRK and PRC delegations when submitting issues for discussion.

Ultimate goal

A proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops and the unification of Korea

1. Withdraw all foreign troops from Korea in six months and thereby provide the Korean people with the fulfillment of their inalienable right to freely decide domestic state affairs.
2. Recommend [the following] to the representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Republic of Korea in order to create a government of a united independent democratic country:
 - a) hold nationwide elections to a National Assembly based on the free expression of will of the population of all Korea;

b) create an all-Korean Committee of representatives of North and South Korea elected respectively by the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea to prepare and hold free nationwide elections to a National Assembly.

Provide that one of the first tasks of this committee is the preparation of a draft nationwide election law which ensures the genuinely democratic nature of the elections, the participation of democratic organizations in them, and holding elections in conditions of real choice, precluding foreign interference and pressure on the voters from local authorities and terrorist groups.

The election law will be subject to the approval of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

3. In the event that a proposal is submitted at the Conference about the creation of an international committee to observe the elections in Korea the Soviet delegation should proceed on the basis that it is the business of the Koreans themselves to hold the elections.

4. Promote the admission of Korea to the United Nations after the formation of a national Korean government.

Minimum goal

Proposals about measures ensuring a move from armistice to actual peace

1. In the event that agreement is not achieved on the main issues relating to the withdrawal of foreign troops and the unification of Korea proceed from the position that measures should be taken to maintain peace in Korea before achieving an agreement on this issue acceptable to all the interested parties. Submit a suitable proposal for discussion at the conference for this purpose which incorporates an obligation by the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Republic of Korea not to renew military operations and the issue of achievement a peaceful settlement of the Korean [issue]. [Translator's note: the word "issue" was probably supposed to follow "Korean"].

2. Recommend a reduction in the number of foreign troops in Korea as a first step toward the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

3. Recommend that the governments of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Republic of Korea reduce the strength of their armed forces.

4. Recommend the adoption of measures directed at closer relations between North and South Korea (the establishment of economic, cultural, and other ties) and submit corresponding proposals with this purpose.

5. In the event that agreements are not achieved on these proposals (the minimum goal) the Soviet delegation should submit a proposal to continue talks between the interested parties on the issue of a peace settlement in Korea after the Conference (in a committee specially created for this purpose or through ordinary diplomatic channels[]).

Note

A. A. Gromyko - Deputy Minister

V. A. Zorin - Deputy Minister

N. T. Fedorenko - Chief of the MFA Far East Department

A. A. Sobolev - Chief of the MFA Department of [Latin] American Countries

K. V. Novikov - Chief of the MFA South and Southeast Asian Countries Department

A. A. Soldatov - Chief of the MFA UN Affairs Department

A. A. Lavrishchev - Chief of the MFA First European Department

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DOCUMENT NO. 126

[Source: AVPRF F. 0100 Op. 47 Papka 389 D. 107 pp.8-20]

Memorandum

On the Question of a Conference of the Five Great Powers with the Participation of the PRC, 15 April 1954

Secret
15 April 1954

(memorandum)

[Translator's note: there are some seemingly random quotation marks in the text which do not in fact seem to contain complete quotations. They have been entered where they appear in the text]

At the conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, US, Britain, and France which opened in Berlin on 25 January the Soviet delegation proposed to discuss the following issues:

1) Measures to reduce tension in international relations and the convening of a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of France, Britain, the US, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

2) The German question and the task of ensuring European security.

3) An Austrian State Treaty.

Dulles, Eden, and Bidault tried in every way to avoid consideration of the first issue proposed by the Soviet delegation at the conference, insisting that the work of the Berlin Conference be limited to an examination of only the German and Austrian issues. As a result of a two-day discussion of the issue of the conference's agenda the agenda proposed by the Soviet delegation was nevertheless adopted by the Berlin conference although Dulles, Eden, and Bidault made reservations at the time in the sense that their acceptance of the agenda did not signify their agreement with the wording of the points contained in this agenda, especially the subject which was being inserted in this wording by the Soviet delegation.

Insisting on a discussion of this issue the Soviet delegation explained its proposal by the fact that the convening of a conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of the five powers with the participation of the PRC is a long-standing issue inasmuch as in present conditions only a combination of the efforts of all the great powers together with the efforts of other countries can ensure a reduction in tension in the international situation and the achievement of corresponding agreements on urgent international problems.

It was pointed out at the time that the UN Security Council is charged with "the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security" and that according to the UN Charter all important decisions of the Security Council to maintain international peace should be adopted with the unanimous consent of the five powers - France, Britain, the US, the USSR, and China.

The Soviet delegation noted that at the present time these very important provisions of the UN Charter cannot be fulfilled for one reason, that the People's Republic of China, the only legal representative of the Chinese people, is not represented in the UN and that such a situation was created primarily as a result of the fact that the restoration of the legal rights of the PRC is being resisted by one of the countries, namely the United States of America. However the abnormality and inadmissibility of this is so obvious that it would be wrong to tolerate the present situation.

The Soviet delegation also pointed to the need to recognize the urgency of taking such measures as a considerable reduction of all weapons, especially the weapons of the great powers, and the need to make decisions directed at prohibiting atomic, hydrogen, and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the establishment of effective international monitoring of this prohibition, and as the first step toward this, to recognize the need for governments to renounce the use of atomic weapons.

The Soviet delegation also noted that the settlement of issues regarding the People's Republic of China, including the restoration of its legal rights in the SON [Translator's note: SIC, probably a typo for "OON", the UN], has special importance. A forward movement in this regard would have great importance for the settlement of important international political and economic problems, including a resolution of the Korean issue".

The Soviet delegation directed attention to the fact that 25 large and small countries with a [total] population of about one billion people have established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Not one independent country remains in Asia which has not established political relations with the PRC or at least was not intending to establish political or economic relations with the PRC". Many European countries including countries which belong to the Atlantic Pact have recognized it necessary to establish diplomatic relations with the new China.

Only in North and South America can there not be found a single country which has yet decided to establish normal relations with people's democratic China. But what this indicates is understood without further explanation.

The Soviet delegation declared at this point that the Soviet government proceeds from the point of view that such a situation cannot continue for long. The convening of a conference of the five powers with the participation of the PRC would in many respects promote an easing and an improvement of the entire international situation.

Dulles, who spoke first, objected to the proposal of the Soviet delegation, repeated the usual insinuations against the PRC in connection with the war in Korea, calling China "an aggressor". He cited figures of American losses in Korea, 150,000 killed and wounded, when he was doing this.

Dulles declared that the US would not agree to participate in a conference of the five with the participation of the PRC to discuss issues of international peace. He added that the US is not refusing to deal with the new "regime" when "the circumstances require this", referring at this point to the armistice in Korea and to the talks in Panmunjom to convene a political conference on Korea. Continuing objections to the convening of a conference of the five powers Dulles tried to depict the matter as if such a conference would mean that the five great powers intend to command other countries".

Replying to the attacks of Dulles and his references to the UN resolution in which the PRC was declared an "aggressor", the Soviet delegation stated that the government of the USSR holds to its point of view which was stated by its delegation to the UN. This resolution does the UN no honor, and to the contrary this mistaken resolution depreciated the authority of the UN.

The Soviet delegation also directed attention to the fact that the war in Korea ended thanks to the PRC and the ShchTsR [SIC, possible a typo for the USSR], that an end was put to the war in Korea after action [*vystuplenie*] by Zhou Enlai and Kim Il Sung at the end of March 1953 and the American, British, Chinese and Korean soldiers were able to return home. The Soviet delegation pointed to the need to take this fact into consideration when talking about the PRC and its role in the issue of strengthening peace.

Speaking on 27 January Dulles again declared that the US rejects the idea of convening a conference of the five powers. At this point he referred to the fact that back in 1945 in San Francisco the UN "rejected the principle of the world dominance of the five powers"

and he insisted that the Berlin conference of the four powers consider only the German and Austrian questions. He also declared that the convening of a political conference on Korea with the participation of all five powers was called for by the armistice agreement in order to settle the political issues in Korea. Not denying the need to examine several other issues" Dulles however tried to depict the matter such that they could be discussed either at the UN or via ordinary diplomatic channels.

Dulles proposed that the conference "not make any decision about the first point of the agenda and move to the second and third points", that is, to the German and Austrian questions".

Unlike Dulles, Bidault declared that he recognizes "the special responsibility" of the five powers according to the UN Charter; however, here he repeated Dulles' point that these powers "do not have special privileges to rule the world". Regarding the issue of the participation of China in a conference of the five, Bidault declared that it is possible to have relations or hold talks between countries with different political systems. However, immediately afterwards he opposed a conference of the five with the participation of the PRC at the present time; Bidault tried to explain his objections by the fact that the PRC government was allegedly "helping continue the war in Indochina and that therefore "the French government will not consider a proposal to convene a conference of the five as long as the facts remain as they are". If the facts change, he added, then the French government would welcome the situation "in the new light of the facts".

Repeating that France has never rejected "contact in relations" and stressing that there are two problems in Asia - first, Korea, and second, Southeast Asia - he declared that there is the possibility of solving the first problem through a political conference, renewing the talks in Panmunjom which were broken off. As regards Indochina then in his opinion the simplest method would be a political conference which would not only deal with the Korean issue but also the issue of Indochina. Bidault added here that he was not at all refusing to consider other possible means and referred to the fact that diplomatic means had not yet been used for this to settle such issues.

Eden's position came down to repeating the point about the need "to begin with the problem of Germany and Austria". Following Dulles, Eden referred to the fact that according to the UN Charter the right to solve problems of peace is not just given to the five powers. He stressed that the existing problems in Asia, and Korea and Indochina in particular, are "the main sources of tension" and causing everyone much concern. He repeated the unbeaten [SIC, *nebityy*; possibly the author meant *izbityy*, trite] American point about "the lack of evidence" that the PRC government desires cooperation in an attempt to settle the Korean and Indochina questions and other Asian problems.

In connection with the statement of the Soviet delegation that one of the issues which ought to be examined at a conference of the five is the issue of arms reduction and a halt to the arms race Eden stated that in his opinion it would be best for this issue to be examined within the framework of the UN.

Having shown the groundlessness of the objections and reservations of the representatives of the three powers to the proposal to convene a conference of the five, the Soviet delegation noted that both Dulles and Eden and especially Bidault had entertained in their statements the possibility of convening a conference of the five powers with one or another restrictions and conditions, although in different form. The Soviet delegation again stressed the need in this matter to convene a conference of the five powers taking the statements of Dulles, Bidault, and Eden into consideration, and also taking into consideration that such a conference cannot just be limited to Asian issues but there are grounds to also deal with other international problems which have especially great importance for international peace.

In the course of further discussion in their statements on 28 January Dulles, Bidault, and Eden tried to challenge the argument cited by the Soviet delegation in favor of convening a conference of the five powers. In doing so Dulles did not stop at a direct distortion of the facts, declaring that the Soviet delegation was allegedly proposing transferring all of the most important functions of the United Nations to the conference of the five and "replacing this organization with a Council of the Five Great Powers". He again made malicious attacks with regard to the PRC and Cde. Zhou Enlai personally. Without offering any proposal about the issue under discussion Dulles proposed moving to consideration of the German and Austrian issues.

Bidault, continuing to express his "doubts" about the advisability of convening a conference of the five, accused the PRC of "aggression in Indochina". Objecting to the discussion of arms reduction issues at a conference of the five Bidault again tried to explain this by the fact that the UN deals with these issues. He declared that the examination of the issue of disarmament is impossible "without halting military operations everywhere" and that therefore, he said, in the opinion of the French government the participation of China in an examination of the issue at a conference of the five about the development of international trade is undesirable in current conditions and circumstances. Bidault tried to explain the cessation of trade with China by the fact that the French cannot deliver goods to China which the Chinese might use against the French in Indochina and that "if China changes its position then France will reexamine its attitude toward the issue of trade with China". Bidault stated that the French government is ready to use any opportunity to restore peace in Indochina by halting military operations under conditions acceptable to all the interested parties. Trying to sum up the discussions on the first issue, Bidault stated that in spite of the distance [between] the positions of the participants of the conference a rapprochement of the points of view on several issues cannot be considered impossible.

Eden again continued to speak against convening a conference of the five powers, referring to the "impracticability" of convening a conference with a broad agenda. Advocating the consideration of "specific and practical problems" in both in Asia and Europe which affect the great powers he tried to explain his objections to the convening of a conference of the five powers by the fact that issues of international importance are of interest to many countries in view of which they cannot be examined at a conference with a limited number of participants. Eden spoke in favor of the need to settle such

political problems in Asia as Korea and Indochina and also for a search for methods for the practical solution of these problems. He proposed deferring the first question of the agenda for the time being and moving to the German and Austrian issues, explaining this by the need to have time for further "deliberation and an exchange of opinions" in order to renew the discussion of the issue of convening a conference of the five powers later.

Responding to Dulles, Bidault, and Eden the Soviet delegation showed the groundlessness of Dulles' assertion that we were supposedly proposing to undermine the UN by a council of five and declared that the Soviet Union is not in favor of changing the UN Charter but putting it into practice. As justification of its proposal to convene a conference of the five powers the Soviet delegation also referred to the fact that at the 3rd Session in 1948 and at the 5th Session in 1950 the General Assembly made a special appeal to the great powers to meet and discuss either collectively or through some other procedure all issues which might threaten international peace and interfere with the work of the UN in order to resolve differences and achieve agreement, and also directed attention to the fact that the Western powers often hold conferences of the three ministers of foreign affairs without limiting the agenda of such conferences.

The Soviet delegation contrasted the proposal offered by the US, Britain, and France in May 1952 in the Disarmament Committee about establishing agreed limits for the level of the armed forces for the five great powers, including the PRC, with the point of Dulles, Bidault, and Eden about the issue of arms reduction being a UN matter, thereby stressing the recognition by the three powers of the special role of the great powers in this issue. The Soviet delegation also directed attention to the fact that in this proposal of the US, Britain, and France the establishment of limits on the strength of the armed forces for all other countries was conditioned on the establishment of agreed limits for the five powers.

Replying to Dulles' attacks on the PRC the Soviet delegation declared that if the Chinese representative had been present at this conference he would have given a fitting response to Dulles' statement and that, in view of this, such a statement made in the absence of those against whom it was directed is neither more justifiable nor more convincing. The Soviet delegation also stated that the accusations advanced against the PRC by Dulles have no basis inasmuch as he is obviously receiving information about the PRCV from Nationalist Chinese sources.

The Soviet delegation also stated that the PRC is not an aggressor, as Dulles and Bidault are trying to establish, but a victim of aggression and that there is no need to shift the blame for their own blunders, shortcomings, mistakes, and incorrect acts onto others. It was stressed at this point that it is the PRC that is in such a position where it has someone to accuse and has someone against whom to take offense inasmuch as an entire series of injustices have been committed with respect to China by other countries. This was contrasted with the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC on the basis of equality and the recognition of mutual rights.

The Soviet delegation said that the initial conclusions about the issue being discussed might be worded in terms that a conference of the five is not being rejected although the purposes of such a conference have still not been agreed upon.

Objecting to this conclusion, Dulles stated that "the US does not agree with the proposal to convene a conference of the five powers with the participation of Communist China, although it does not object to talks with China about Korea inasmuch as this is not a conference of the five powers.

Bidault, speaking in favor of "the principle of talks" to settle unresolved issues in Asia, declared that the issue of the nature of such talks, the participants of the talks, and the issues under consideration require further discussion. At this point he again referred to the need "to receive guarantees and evidence of a halt in military operations before beginning talks".

The Soviet delegation, referring to the fact that the participants of the conference evidently have a desire to continue the search for agreement, proposed creating a Committee which would continue the study of the issue of convening a conference of the five with the expectation that the four ministers would again turn to the discussion of this issue on receipt of a report from the committee. However, Dulles and then Bidault and Eden spoke in favor of them not wanting to make a decision about a committee but were ready for the ministers to meet alone [*v uzkom sostave uchastnikov*] in the next few days and discuss issues relating to the first point of the agenda. The Soviet delegation reserved the right during such a meeting to again raise the issue of the creation of the aforementioned committee.

At the same time the Soviet delegation submitted a proposal about convening a World Conference on General Arms Reductions (the text of this proposal was communicated to the PRC government beforehand).

At the 29 January meeting Dulles tried to avoid discussion of the Soviet proposal about convening a conference on general arms reductions and proposed moving to discussion of the German question.

In reply to this the Soviet delegation directed the attention of the participants of the conference to the seriousness of the issue of arms reductions and that it would not be understood if the delegations of the three countries did not define their position toward the Soviet proposal.

Dulles tried to refer to the fact that the issue of convening such a conference has already been examined at the UN and insisted that the conference move to consideration of "serious questions, the German and Austrian".

However, Bidault submitted his own "draft resolution about convening a general conference on disarmament" for the consideration of the conference. The proposals which the US, Britain, and France had previously submitted at the General Assembly

session and in the UN Disarmament Committee formed the basis of this draft. These proposals include the conclusion of "an agreement about a program of coordinated disarmament", "guarantees and international monitoring, allowing only weapons necessary for the individual and collective security of countries", etc. The draft also contains a demand to halt all military operations wherever they are and also a condemnation of aid to and support of aggression "wherever such aid has occurred". The draft proposes that the USSR, US, Britain, and France come to agreement in the Disarmament Committee about the basic principles of disarmament which "would provide an opportunity to convene a general conference on disarmament in accordance with the General Assembly resolution of 11 January 1952 in conditions favorable to success".

Contrasting his draft to the proposal of the Soviet delegation about convening a world conference on arms reduction Bidault proposed that the draft he had submitted be considered together with the issue of convening a conference of the five and other related issues which would be considered in the next few days by the four ministers at a special, more private [*s bolee uzkim sostavom uchastnikov*] meeting.

Eden tried to explain his objections to the adoption of the proposal of the Soviet delegation by the fact that "progress in disarmament" needs to be conditioned first on a relaxation of international tension and the restoration of international trust". Supporting Bidault's proposal about moving the French draft to the consideration of a private meeting, Eden insisted on moving to the consideration of the German and Austrian issues.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, submitted a proposal to move both proposals, the Soviet and the French, to the consideration of a private meeting.

This proposal was adopted.

The discussion of the Soviet proposal which occurred about a reduction of tension in international relations and about convening a conference of the five powers showed that the Western powers refuse to agree with the Soviet proposal about a conference of the five but at the same time they consider it politically and tactically disadvantageous for them to expressly reject this proposal".