While the 2026 World Cup faces skepticism over its massive economic projections, early near-capacity stadium attendance highlights how this shared mega-event is successfully building the social capital and sports diplomacy needed for cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.
The 2026 FIFA World Cup (WC) is putting the concept of sports diplomacy on full display in both theory and in practice.
Diplomacy, in its most basic sense, is the peaceful means of negotiation and conduct between sovereign states, carried out by official agents whose duty is to represent their nation's interests and pursue foreign policy. In the post-Cold War world, diplomacy that relies on threats of "hard power" – understood as military might – increasingly gives way to a greater appreciation for "soft power."
Soft power in diplomatic relations is understood as the use of culture, ideology, and institutions to persuade and shape the behavior of other sovereign states. Coupled with the value of soft power, a demand for transparency, and the development of communications technology, diplomacy has taken on a more public nature by including non-traditional actors such as civil society, corporations, and other non-state actors. Today, public diplomacy also involves a nation's attempts to engage directly with foreign publics to build trust, foster cooperation for long-term relationships, and promote the attractiveness of a given nation's values. States find the appropriate nexus to address such needs in sports diplomacy.
The World Cup is an opportunity for host nations to promote a good image of their capacity, grandeur, and identity. Through such mega sports events, nations have a chance to present themselves as leaders in their region and to create and maintain opportunities to foster cross-regional and cultural relationships.
Sports diplomacy can also facilitate reconciliation and cooperation for economic relationships. The 2002 FIFA WC supported cooperation between Japan and South Korea, with cold relations dating back to Japan’s colonization of the Korean Peninsula. Through the preparation and execution of the WC, each state also mobilized its youth and broader society to cultivate mutual warmth and appreciation through cultural exchange. Similar opportunities for cross-cultural exchange and mutually beneficial economic and social ties exist for the 2026 FIFA WC in the Western Hemisphere.
As the 2026 tournament continues, it remains to be seen how sports diplomacy will shape international relations in the Western Hemisphere and what opportunities will emerge for strengthening cooperation, particularly in the context of the upcoming USMCA renewal talks. As Joshua Peng has explained, the trilateral hosting of the WC by the United States, Mexico, and Canada, is a unique scenario that is testing the functionality of current USMCA conditions and carries implications for upcoming negotiations.
Behind the Economic Projections
The FIFA WC is one of the sporting events with the largest economic impact. FIFA estimates that the 2026 WC will generate $80.1 billion in global gross output, of which $40.9 billion is value-added Gross Domestic Product (GDP), along with $9.4 billion in government revenue, 824,000 full-time jobs, and a social return on investment of 3.64.
For the US alone, which is hosting the tournament in 11 cities, the White House projects $17.2 billion in value-added GDP and 185,000 jobs created. Los Angeles is hosting 8 games of the tournament, and the overall economic impact was estimated in 2024 at $594 million in direct spending from an influx of 180,000 out-of-town visitors, plus follow-on spending related to tax revenues and wage gains. This estimate was revised upward in January 2026 by close to a 50-percent to $892 million. Mexico and Canada are expected to have much lower economic impact than the US, with estimates of close to $2.7 and $1.4 billion (both USD) in value-added GDP, respectively.
There is mixed evidence on the short- and long-term economic impact of the FIFA WC. An analysis of the impact of the 1994 WC hosted in the United States showed that it might have been negative for the host cities and the overall economy. Victor Matheson, an economist who has studied Brazil and Russia's experiences hosting the cup, argues that WC economic projections are rarely met, both because of substitution (when consumption shifts from one sector to another) and crowding-out effects (travelers are less likely to come to the host country during the tournament). Host countries also have to make significant investments in stadiums and infrastructure, resulting in a substantial economic burden. In fact, the average economist in the United States opposes sports subsidies because they see the costs as greater than the benefits.
Beyond the cost-benefit analyses of hosting FIFA's WC, there is evidence of positive impacts on trade due to increased host-country visibility. An analysis of Qatar's WC found evidence of a gap between the event's projections and its outcome. This analysis found an impact of the WC close to 1 percent of Qatar's GDP, with much lower-than-expected hotel occupancy at 59-percent. The report points to a long-term effect of hosting the WC, which was associated with higher tourism in the years that followed.
Upon commencement of the 2026 WC, there was skepticism about the optimistic statements of FIFA and government officials regarding the economic impacts. Despite the cautious outlook for what future matches may hold, the first 15 days of the 2026 tournament have already taken off strongly. Figure 1 depicts attendance data broken down by host country and stadium, with bars showing a side-by-side comparison of capacity and attendance, and it shows most matches at or near full capacity (98-percent and above). Because the stadium capacity has been shared, the host countries' investment may have been reduced. Thus, future analyses of the economic impacts of a shared WC are relevant for evaluating whether this approach can result in economic benefits that outweigh the costs.
Cooperation Beyond the Tournament
The 2026 FIFA WC created a framework of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere that is important for two main reasons. First, the timing of the 2026 WC is relevant in the context of the USMCA review taking place this summer. Given the current environment and the relevance of the partnership, the WC provided these host countries with an opportunity to interact and cooperate for a common goal. Although there is criticism of how the WC has been marketed as three separate tournaments, the social capital built in planning and executing the event is relevant to the goals of sports diplomacy and the negotiations for further economic integration through the USMCA.
Second, the Western Hemisphere is well represented in this tournament, which is also relevant to future cooperation. It is the first time that 12 of 48 country teams competing at the WC are from the Americas, representing 25-percent of the teams (US, Canada, Mexico, Curaçao, Haiti, Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Soccer is probably the most popular sport in most Latin American countries, and this region has among the highest levels of soccer fan engagement in the world. Thus, furthering sports diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere, especially through soccer, can improve relations. Fostering soccer-based interactions in the region can not only have important economic benefits but also positive social impacts for international relations.
Figure 1 Notes on games and dates: Average attendance per stadium with dates of the matches are listed as follows. Toronto (Canada v Herzegovina, 6/12; Ghana v Panama, 6/17; Germany v Cote d'Ivoire, 6/20; Panama v Croatia, 6/23); Vancouver (Australia v Turkiye, 6/13; Canada v Qatar, 6/18; New Zealand v. Egypt, 6/21; Switzerland v Canada, 6/24); Guadalajara (Korea Republic v Czechia, 6/11; Mexico v Korea Republic, 6/18; Colombia v Congo, 6/23); Mexico City (Mexico v South Africa, 6/11; Uzbekistan v Colombia, 6/17; Czechia v Mexico, 6/24); Monterrey (Sweden v Tunisia, 6/14; Tunisia v Japan, 6/20; Russia v Korea, 6/24); Atlanta (Spain v Cabo Verde, 6/15; Czechia v South Africa, 6/18; Spain v Saudi Arabia, 6/21; Morocco v Haiti, 6/24); Boston (Haiti v Scotland, 6/13; Iraq v Norway, 6/16; Scotland v Morocco, 6/19; England v Ghana, 6/23); Dallas (Netherlands v Japan, 6/14; England V Croatia, 6/17; Argentina v Austria, 6/22; Japan v Sweden, 6/25); Houston (Germany v Curacao, 6/14; Portugal v Congo, 6/17; Netherlands v Sweden, 6/20); Kansas City (Argentina v Algeria, 6/16; Ecuador v Curacao, 6/20; Tunisia v Netherlands, 6/25); Los Angeles (USA v Paraguay, 6/12; Iran v New Zealand, 6/15; Switzerland v Boznia & Herzegovina, 6/18; Belgium v Iran, 6/21); Miami (Saudi Arabia v Uruguay, 6/15; Uruguay v Cabo Verde, 6/21; Scotland v Brazil, 6/24); New York/New Jersey (Brazil v Morocco, 6/13; France v Senegal, 6/16; Norway v Senegal, 6/22; Ecuador v Germany, 6/25); Philadelphia (Cote d'Ivoire v Ecuador, 6/14; Brazil v Haiti, 6/19; France v Iraq, 6/22; Curacao v Cote d'Ivoire, 6/25); San Francisco (Qatar v Switzerland, 6/13; Austria v Jordan, 6/16; Turkiye v Paraguay, 6/19; Jordan v Algeria, 6/22; Paraguay v Australia, 6/25); Seattle (Belgium v Egypt, 6/15; USA v Australia, 6/19; Bosnia and Herzegovina v Qatar, 6/24)